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INTRODUCTION
The present study examines the impact of French colonial 
rule on the development of black politics in Senegal from 
Galandou Diouf to the rise to power of Leopold S£dar Senghor. 
The period 1936-1952 is significant on two counts: From a
Senegalese angle, it is the final chapter in the history of the 
monopoly of political life by the Quatre Communes, for 1951 
marks not only the ascendancy of L.S. Senghor but also the 
victory of the bush over the communes de plein exercice and of 
prewar 'subjects' over 'citizens.' From a French angle, it is 
an early chapter in the history of the decolonization of Black 
Africa, a process that was greatly accelerated by the Second 
World War.
The paucity of scholarly work on the late prewar period and 
on the Second World. War in French West Africa partly explains 
the vacuum one encounters in divers political histories of the 
postwar era which invariably begin with 1945. Notwithstanding 
the fact that historians unanimously agree that the war was a 
turning point in the history of colonialism in Africa, little 
attempt has been made to address the war as the complex process 
of upheaval and change that it was. Even less is known about 
how its impact was felt by various strata of African society, 
for the response to the war was not monolithic.
It is inevitable that these gaps have restricted our 
understanding of the postwar period in French West Africa and
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of the dynamics that created the conditions leading up to 
political independence. In Senegal, in particular, the 
atypical path of African nationalism from assimilation to 
independence makes fascinating history as it unfolds from the 
late 1930s onward.
It will be the task of this study to explore some of the 
dimensions of the impact of the Second World War and assess its 
long-term ramifications, using this framework as a base upon 
which to analyse the political history of postwar Senegal. The 
Popular Front era, which is the point of departure of this 
study, brings the war into even sharper focus.
Within the existing body of historiography, an attempt will 
be made to fill in the lacunae of Edward Mortimer's book,
France and the Africans: A Political History, 1944-1960, (1969)
which does not contextualise the complexity of the 
repercussions of the Second World War. In addition, this study 
aspires to follow up Wesley G. Johnson's pioneer work, The 
Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle for Power 
in the Four Communes, 1900-1920, (1971) .
Regrettably, one of the shortcomings herein is that socio­
economic variables and the role of Islam are to a large extent 
dealt with peripherally and only insofar as they affected 
specific political events. In other words, this is not a 
comprehensive history of the period or of Senegal as a whole, 
but rather a political history of the Three Communes. Certain 
aspects of colonial rule and political life have been analysed
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at great length at the expense of others. The criterion used 
was the desire to elucidate events which have either been 
misinterpreted or else neglected. I have tried, however, to 
give as detailed and complete a picture as possible of the 
Senegalese political arena, incorporating dominant as well as 
marginal forces.
I should also add that a great omission in this study is the 
central role of the rural elite in postwar politics in Senegal. 
This elite first began to emerge as a political force under the 
Popular Front and has only been alluded to herein, when it 
deserves a study in its own right. Little is known about those 
French-educated bureaucrats, technocrats and teachers who 
became the backbone of Senghor's party. Even less is known 
about their formative years and about the nature of their 
relations with the originaires in the Three Communes in the 
late interwar period and during the Second World War.
I will highlight the following themes: The first is the
evolution of the policy of assimilation which characterised 
black politics in the Three Communes,1 and the African response 
to it. Assimilation as a colonial doctrine had emerged with 
the French Revolution, when the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man established the equality of all citizens and, by extension, 
the indivisible unity between France and her overseas
1. In 1929, the commune of Gor6e became part of what was 
called Dakar et D&pendances. For this reason, I will be
alluding to the communes de plein exercice as the Three 
Communes from here onwards. '
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territories. This did not preclude, however, the assumption 
that French civilisation was superior to other cultures; 
indeed, the goal of the "politique d'assimilation” was, in 
theory at least, the gradual political, socio-economic and 
cultural integration of the colonies into a greater France. In 
Africa, assimilation was implemented with the view to create 
black Frenchmen.2
Senegal was the only colony in Africa where France had
attempted to fully implement assimilation on an administrative,
political, and to a lesser extent, social plane. Thus, the
communes de plein exercice had a representative in the French
Parliament since 1848, when approximately 12.000 Africans were
granted French citizenship. The Conseil General (similar to
its metropolitan counterpart but with more extensive financial
autonomy) was established in 1879. In 1880, Dakar, Goree,
a
Rufisque and St. Louis were accorded the status of^metropolitan 
departement , that is, full-fledged communes under French law 
(as was the case with the old French colonies of Martinique and 
Guadeloupe). Thereafter, Senegal's Quatre Communes became a 
showpiece of French assimilation in Africa and were often held 
up as models for other African colonies.
. For a discussion of assimilation see Michael Crowder, 
Senegal: A Study of French Assimilation Policy, (London:
Methuen, l9b2), p p .1-3; also Raymond F. Betts, Assimilation and 
Association in French Colonial Policy, 1890-1914; J.D. 
Hargreaves, "Assimilation Tn 18th Century Senegal," "Journal of 
African History, vol. iv, no. 2, (1965), pp. 177 -184; M . M .
Knight, "French Colonial Policy— the Decline of Association," 
Journal of Modern History, vol. 5, no. 2, (June 1933), p. 208; 
H . M . Dubois, "Assimilation ou adaptation?" Africa, vol. II, 
fasc. 1, (January 1929), p. 4.
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Even after the policy of assimilation was abandoned for the 
"politique d' association” the political
process continued to be dominated by the division between 
'citizens' and 'subjects.' (Association was premised on the 
principles of reform, decentralisation and collaboration rather
than integration.) Only the oriqinaires (those born in the
and descendants
Quatre Communes)Agualified as 'citizens' with voting rights. 
'Subjects' were not accorded political rights until after the 
Second World War and until then, the only representative 
institutions in the protectorate were the mixed communes.3
Until the late 1940s, the Three Communes constituted the 
epicentre of political activity in the colony. As long as the 
schism between 'citizens' and 'subjects' defined political 
participation, the goal of Senegalese nationalism was assimila­
tion. After the war, the division between 'citizens' and 
'subjects' was at its lowest and the Senegalese evolues 
anticipated the implementation of full-scale assimilation 
(embodied in the postwar slogan "equal rights for equal 
sacrifices") .
3. There were 14 mixed communes in Senegal on the eve of 
the Second World War, nearly all of which represented key 
peanut trading centers. Mixed communes had elected councils 
comprising Europeans, African 'citizens' and a handful of 
'subjects,' elected on a restricted basis. The councils were 
presided by administrators acting as mayors and appointed by 
the local governors and had little decision-making power. 
Since few Africans in the protectorate enjoyed citizenship 
status (notables, some traders, and after 1939, war veterans), 
the councils represented almost exclusively the interests of 
French traders. See Sheldon Gellar, "The Politics of
Development in Senegal," unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, (Columbia 
University, 1967), p. 58.
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The constitution of the Fourth Republic, however, failed to 
meet African demands for equality with Europeans and 
assimilation was abandoned as a political goal on the part of 
Senegal's 6volu6s. The ensuing African reaction against 
assimilation (best exemplified in the Bloc Democratique 
Senegalais) did not assume its full significance until a decade 
later, and this partly explains why independence was not 
publicly advocated by Senegal's leaders until the late 1950s.
The second theme traced in this study is the shifting ground 
of metropolitan politics and the way it affected French 
colonial policy-making as well as the Senegalese political 
arena: The politics of the Popular Front, Vichy, Free France
and the French postwar coalition governments were closely 
paralleled by political developments in Senegal. Subsequently, 
the role Lamine Gueye and L.S. Senghor played in the postwar 
deliberations on the future relationship between France and the 
colonies illustrates the qualitative changes in the 
interrelationship between metro^politan and colonial politics, 
and in the process by which French politics affected the 
fortunes of the Senegalese deputies at home.
Thirdly, the role of high-level colonial administrators 
(Colonial Ministers, Governor Generals and local Governors) who 
dominated policy-making will be examined, with particular 
emphasis on their relationship with African deputies. 
Individuals such as de Coppet, Governor General of French West 
Africa under the Popular Front and Wiltord, Governor of Senegal
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in the postwar era, not only played a pivotal role in colonial 
policy-making but also in the careers of African deputies and 
vice versa. In fact, Galandou Diouf and L.S. Senghor were 
instrumental in engineering the downfall of the aforementioned 
French colonial administrators, following the power struggles 
that developed between the two parties.
The study is structured chronologically. Chapter I examines 
the factors which shaped the policy-making of the Popular Front 
and briefly overviews the reforms undertaken by the socialist 
government in various spheres of national life from politics to 
education and labour. The objective is to evaluate the Popular 
Front's agenda of reform against what it actually accomplished.
Chapter II assesses the impact of the Popular Front on the 
development of black politics in Senegal. The socialist 
politics of the Popular Front might have stimulated political 
activity across the colony, but they also constituted a severe 
setback for Galandou Diouf while directly benefitting his 
opponent, Lamine Gueye. The Dakar-Niger strike of 1938 
demonstrated the authority the Senegalese deputy still 
exercised in France (despite his decline in influence at home) 
and signalled the sudden collapse of the socialist colonial 
administration in French West Africa.
Chapter III focuses primarily on the military dimension of 
the Second World War and on the way it affected colonial 
policy-making, including Senegal's military involvement and 
contribution in the war; the impact of the armistice; the
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events leading up to the proconsulate of the High Commissioner 
Pierre Boisson, and the pursuit of the policy of neutrality. 
Finally, the Anglo-Free French aggression on Dakar (the only 
theater of war in French West Africa), and the theme of the 
'loyal African' will be dealt with at some length.
Chapter IV examines Vichy policy-making (with particular 
emphasis on the role of Boisson and the Governor of Senegal, 
Georges Rey) in terms of its political, economic and 
ideological repercussions on the African milieu. Even though 
Vichy was undoubtedly a period of increased authoritarianism in 
French West Africa, its economic policy-making yielded some 
positive results, while its grassroots propaganda in the 
protectorate in particular, contributed to the considerable 
popularity the regime enjoyed amongst a sizeable segment of the 
African population.
Chapter V evaluates the impact of the Free French 
administration in Senegal, arguing that the advent of the new 
government did not merely signal the 'return to republicanism.' 
Rather, it denoted the commencement of the most trying and 
exacting phase of the war for Africans (economically as well as 
militarily). Political activity resumed but along racial 
lines, thus upsetting the delicate balance of assimilation 
politics. Even more importantly, the colonial administration's 
brutal suppression of the soldiers' mutiny in Thiaroye in 1944 
exacerbated an already divisive climate and inflicted a severe 
blow on the future of Franco-Senegalese relations.
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Chapter VI focuses on Senegalese aspirations after the war 
and French colonial policy-making,- putting into sharp focus the 
shifting ground of metropolitan politics from the Brazzaville 
Conference of 1944 to the legislative elections of 1951, and 
the way it affected colonial legislation. The pivotal role 
that Gueye and Senghor played in the first and second Assembl6e 
Nationale Constituante and in the legislation of colonial 
reform (such as the Lamine Gueye laws) is highlighted along 
with the alliances the deputies formed with metropolitan 
parties to maximise their authority in France and at home.
Chapter VII traces Gueye's leadership and politics from the 
Bloc Africain to the Section Frangaise de 1'Internationale 
Ouvri£re and briefly overviews the various opposition parties 
which mushroomed in Senegal after the dissolution of the Bloc 
(with particular emphasis on the Senegalese branch of the 
Rassemblement Democratique Africain and the Groupement d'Etudes 
Communistes. The Dakar-Niger railway crisis of 1947-48 is 
examined in some detail, particularly with respect to the role 
political parties played in the strike and the fateful 
involvement therein of Lamine Gueye and the Socialist Party.
Chapter VIII analyses the diverse factors that contributed 
to the decline of the SFIO in Senegal, the rupture between 
Gueye and Senghor and the foundation of the BPS. The rise of 
Senghor's party to power and the nature of the BPS 
constituency, organisation and ideology are examined at length. 
They are also reflected in the young leader's political tactics
9
(particularly his strategy vis-a-vis the Union Democratique 
Sdn6galaise and with Islamic leaders) which contributed to his 
spectacular victory in the 1951 legislative elections.
Finally, the ramifications of his rise to power are assessed.
Most of the material collected for the research of this 
study originate from the Archives de la R&publigue du S6n£gal 
in Dakar and the Archives Nationales, Section Outre-Mer in 
Paris, France (now in Aix-en-Provence). The former is rich in 
reports of colonial governors (s6rie 2G); documents of the 
secret police (s6rie 21G); election material (s6rie 20G); 
political and administrative reports (s6rie 13G); political 
memoranda from the French West African federation (s6rie 17G); 
labour reports (s6rie K); and military documents pertaining to 
the Second World War (s6rie 2D). In the French archives, I 
consulted mostly the section Affaires Politigues and the 
invaluable collection of private papers (Diouf, Moutet,
Boisson, Mandel and Deschamps).
I also had the privilege of interviewing Abdoulaye Ly,
Amadou Ali Dieng and Jean Suret-Canale (whose private papers on 
the GEC and the Union Democratique Senegalaise at the Institut 
d'Etudes du Temps Present in Paris are indispensable), as well 
as a host of Senegalese World War II veterans who talked 
extensively about the war, their role in combat and the 
conditions of their return to Senegal.
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Chapter I .
POPULAR FRONT IDEOLOGY, POLICY-MAKING AND REFORM: 
THE DE COPPET ERA (1936-1938)
Until recently, French colonial rule in West Africa under 
the Popular Front had been the subject of only a few fleeting 
references within the vast volume of monographs and articles 
devoted to the tripartite coalition proper.4 Political histories 
of postwar West Africa and Senegal have made passing remarks on 
the socio-political conditions on the eve of the war, often 
incorporating the Popular Front as part of a continuum of French 
colonial rule in the interwar period.5 This has conveyed the 
impression that the immediate prewar years were relatively 
uneventful and has reinforced the widely-held assumption that
4 . Within the last 15 years, a series of studies have 
emerged on the Popular Front including Nicole Bernard-Duquenet, 
Le Front Populaire et le Senegal (Paris: L'Harmattan, 198 5); 
William B. Cohen, "The Colonial Policy of the Popular Front," 
French Historical Studies, vol. VII, no. 3, (1972), pp. 368-393;
Yves Person, "Le Front Populaire au Senegal (Mai 193 6-Octobre 
1938)," Mouvement Social. (1979), pp. 77-101; Jean-Pierre Phan,
"Le Front Populaire au Senegal," Memoire de Maitrise, University 
of Paris I, 1974.
5 . This is prevalent in most political histories of French 
West Africa which begin with 1945. Even Edward Mortimer's 
otherwise excellent study on France and the Africans 1944-1960 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1969), devotes one paragraph to the 
Popular Front and five on the Second World War. Africans have 
also been victims of this approach. For instance, as Nicole 
Bernard-Duquenet argues in her dissertation "Le Front Populaire 
et le Senegal" (University of Paris VII, 1976), p. 240, Sembene 
Ousmane's classic "Bouts de bois de Dieu," on the Dakar-Niger 
strike of 1947-48 refers to the 1938 strike only passingly, 
greatly underplaying its significance.
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colonial reform and trade union activity did not commence until 
after 1945. As a result, key political developments which were 
set in motion by the Popular Front only to assume their full 
significance after the war have been largely underestimated: for 
instance, between 1936 and 1938, the Senegalese section of the 
SFIO Federation (which became the dominant party in the political 
arena after 1945) emerged as the leading opposition party under 
the leadership of Lamine Gueye; the first African branch of the 
PCF was founded; and political activity spread beyond the Three 
Communes to the urban centers of the protectorate (Thies,
Kaolack, Ziguinchor).
The Popular Front lasted longer in Senegal than it did in 
France and became closely identified with the proconsulate of the 
socialist Governor-General de Coppet (October 193 6-October 1938), 
who dominated policy-making and was the instigator of most 
reforms. De Coppet was too radical an administrator for the 
majority of colonialists in France and in West Africa. Thus, 
even though he was committed to reform (within the colonial 
system), the political parties comprising the government 
coalition were not. In fact, the conditions of the Popular 
Front's rise to power and the colonial doctrines of the 
tripartite government largely explain why the government's 
reforms never materialized. Throughout his term of office, the 
Governor-General operated in a vacuum, with little or no 
metropolitan support other than from the Minister of Overseas 
France, Marius Moutet.
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De Coppet's programme, as outlined in the Conference of 
Governor-Generals in 1936, was a plan of socio-economic rather 
than political reform which if implemented, would have improved 
the lives of a great number of Africans. However, it met with 
strong resistance from the Senate, the Government-General of AQF 
and the local administration in Senegal. Once the Blum 
government fell and the Radical Socialists assumed control of the 
ruling coalition, de Coppet's agenda of reform dissipated in thin 
air.
The historian William Cohen has argued that
The accomplishments of the Popular Front in the 
colonial sphere were limited. The colonial peoples had 
neither been liberated nor had their lot improved 
markedly. The failure of reform by the political 
parties most dedicated to change overseas augured ill 
for the French empire... Much of the Algerian elite 
lost its hopes for reform within the colonial system 
and became sympathetic to nationalist ideology.
Although the intensity of the development in Algeria 
was then exceptional, it portended the development of 
nationalism in all the overseas territories and the 
subsequent dissolution of the French empire.6
Even though it can be argued that the accomplishments of the 
Popular Front government were limited, its impact in Senegal was 
nonetheless crucial. Moreover, what transpired in Algeria (where 
the elite lost hope for reform) did not take place in Senegal.
In fact, it might even be argued that the opposite happened in 
France's oldest black African colony: The political freedom and
labour legislation introduced by the Popular Front directly
6. William B.Cohen, "The Colonial Policy of the Popular 
Front," French Historical Studies, vol. VIII, no. 3, 1978, p. 393 .
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benefit ed the urban elites ('subjects' as well as 'citizens') 
and thus had a profound impact on the perception of their 
relationship with France, reinforcing their hope for reform 
within the existing system by way of further assimilation.
The ideological impact of the Popular Front explains in part 
the regime's popularity amongst Africans but also sheds some 
light on the aspirations of the African elite and the dynamics of 
Senegalese political activity after the Second World War. 
Contemporary witnesses vividly remember the great influx of 
French socialist and communist administrators and teachers eager 
to share their radical ideas with Africans as well as apply them 
in colonial policy-making and in local politics.7 They also 
remember a Governor-General who for the first time in French 
colonial history opened the palace gates to Africans and heard 
their grievances with concern. The Popular Front is still alive 
in the minds of many Senegalese, not as much on account of its 
liberal policy-making as for the political openness and hope that 
it created as well as for the climate of change it foreshadowed.
THE POPULAR FRONT IN POWER.
The domestic and international conditions which surrounded 
the accession to power of France's first socialist government 
determined the coalitions colonial programme to an 
unprecedented extent: without defeating the right wing by a
substantial majority, the Rassemblement Populaire constituted a
7 . Interviews with Abdoulaye Ly, Dakar, July 17, 1984 and 
with Amadou Ali Dieng, Dakar, July 3, 1984.
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"reflexe de defense instinctive11 against the economic depression, 
the paramilitary forces of the fascist leagues and the rising 
threat of German National Socialism.8 In addition,
La France souffrait aussi d'un vieillisement et 
d'une inadaptation de ses structures. Dans tous les 
domaines, des reformes s'imposaient pour mettre l'Etat 
et la societe a l'heure de la Revolution industrielle.9
The differing motivations that led the SFIO (Section Francaise de 
1'Internationale Ouvriere), the PCF (Parti Communiste Francais), 
and the Radical Socialists to form the Popular Front were 
immediately reflected in the confused, ambiguous and often 
contradictory policies of the fragile and precarious coalition.10
A week after the electoral victory, a wave of strikes spread 
throughout France, enabling the Prime Minister Leon Blum to press 
for the Matignon agreements which increased wages by 12%, 
introduced the 40-hour week, paid holidays, collective agree-
8 . It was the Radical rural votes of the impoverished 
south-west of France that supported the SFIO. The urban working 
class had opted for the PCF. Georges Dupeux argues in Le Front 
Populaire et les Elections de 1936. (Paris: Colin, 1959), p. 175, 
that "Cette modification de l'equilibre des tendances au sein du 
Front Populaire posait alors le probleme de la solidite de celui- 
ci et de sa resistance a l'exercice du pouvoir." Blum's govern­
ment was from the beginning a socialist exercise of power within 
the existing constitutional framework? see Edouard Bonnefous, 
Histoire Politique de la Troisieme Republiaue. vol. 6, (Paris: 
PUF, 1965) and Joel Colton, "Politics and Economics in the
193 0s: The Balance Sheets of the Blum 'New Deal'," in Charles K. 
Warner (ed.) , From the Ancien Recrime to the Popular Front. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 187.
9 . Bonnefous, op. cit.. 1965, vol. 6, p. 370.
10. Dupeux, op . cit.. 1959, p. 175, and Joll, "The Front 
Populaire..." op . cit.. (September 1965), p. 32.
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merits, the nationalisation of arms factories, state control of 
the Bank of France and the right to form trade unions. However, 
in the summer of 1937, this dynamic phase of radical reform was 
followed by a conservative 'pause.'
While within France economic conditions deteriorated 
(production plummeted, unemployment rose sharply, and the franc 
was devalued), the disastrous policy of non-intervenion in the 
Spanish civil war deepened the divisions within the coalition and 
revealed the Parliament's lack of confidence in the government.11
Overwhelmed with domestic and international problems, Leon 
Blum appeared less concerned with what were traditionally matters 
of secondary importance, such as colonial affairs. In vain, 
liberal colonial administrators like Robert Delavignette 
entreated the new government not to consider the colonies "comme 
une difficulty secondaire" as previous administrations had done, 
nor to see in them "la facile occasion de reformes symboliaues."
En realite... les affaires coloniales se sont de 
plus en plus enchevetrees dans les affaires metropoli- 
taines. Telle loi 'sociale' faite pour la France 
d'Europe depend aussi d'un tariff douanier qui affecte 
directement le travail des paysans noirs. La semaine 
des 40 heures et 1'organisation des loisirs dans nos 
cites repose sur des 'pilotis coloniaux', sur des piliers 
asiatiques ou africains.12
While left-wing administrators were impatient for reform,
11. Particularly on the part of the Radicals whose support 
of Blum's policies was highly questionable.
12. Robert Delavignette, "Le Front Populaire devant 
l'Afrique Noire," Afrique Francaise. (May 1936), p. 254.
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colonialist circles were alarmed and viewed the socialist 
government with suspicion and hostility. The reshuffling of the 
colonial office, the amnesty of nationalist leaders overseas13 
and the suspension of repressive decrees— measures that were 
taken upon the government's accession to power— clearly 
demonstrated the new direction the Blum administration was intent 
on enforcing.
But the colonialists were not about to be intimidated by a 
handful of decrees and leftist rhetoric. Colonial rule, they 
professed, would continue to operate independently of the 
squabbling that characterized French party politics.
....le gouvernement nouveau courrait aux pires 
reniements s'il pensait que le bonheur des indigenes 
resulte d'un decret....[car]... 1'oeuvre colonial 
n'est ni de droite, ni de gauche.14
In the overseas territories (as the colonies were now 
officially called), the accession to power of the Popular Front 
aroused optimism and euphoria among leftist administrators, 
teachers and evolues. There was talk of a new era where 
colonialism would go hand in hand with socialism and with 
'freedom, equality and fraternity.'
Nevertheless, there was little justification for such 
expectations. Upon being elected, the Popular Front had hardly
13. Thirty-eight West African nationalist leaders were among 
those released. See Jean-Pierre Phan, "Le Front Populaire et le 
Senegal," Memoire de Maitrise. University of Paris I, 1974, p.33.
14. "Demain," Afrique Francaise. (May 1936), p. 251.
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deliberated on the colonial dimension of French policy. Its pre­
election platform contained only one paragraph which vaguely 
promised the designation of a parliamentary commission to inquire 
into the political, social and economic conditions of the 
overseas territories.1^
As the Governor Charles-Andre Julien noted in 193 6, "aucun 
parti n'a etabli de doctrine coloniale coherente"16 and contrary 
to popular belief at home and overseas, none of the parties were 
committed to colonial reform.17
THE COLONIAL DOCTRINES OF THE POPULAR FRONT,
a) The Radical Socialists.
The Radical Socialist party had abandoned its attacks 
against imperialism around the turn of the century when it became 
a member of the Bloc des Gauches government. After a brief 
espousal of assimilationist ideals, the party became an official 
advocate of 'liberal association', envisaging 'administrative 
autonomy' for the colonies. However, commitment to reform had 
not excluded support for repressive policies (e.g. in the 
Moroccan Rif rebellion in 1925). More often, it simply meant 
that any measure that was not 'prudent' or that might upset the 
status quo was interpreted as a threat to the unity of the French 
Republic. In the words of a Radical Socialist,
15- Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF), (March 21, 1936) .
16. Charles-Andre Julien quoted in Georges Lefranc, Histoire 
du Front Populaire (1934-1938). (Paris: Payot, 1965), p. 302.
17. Cohen, "The Colonial Policy..." op. cit.. 1978, p. 368.
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La these radicale, en matiere coloniale, se 
caracterise par la repudiation du nationalisme.
Nous ne jugeons pas legitime l'egoisme imperialiste... 
Non point 1'evacuation... Parliamentarisms indigene? 
Ce n'est pas l'essentiel. L'essentiel c'est la 
politique sociale, c'est d'arracher 1'indigene a 
1'exploitation ehontee dont il fait l'objet, de 
hausser son niveau de vie.18
Reluctant to acknowledge the need for political reform, the party 
advocated socio-economic change. In the 1920s, Albert Sarraut, a 
former Colonial Minister and leading figure of the party, 
formulated the doctrine of mise-en-valeur. which laid the 
foundations for state-controlled and self-financed economic 
development. In many respects, it foreshadowed the postwar FIDES 
(Fonds international de developpement economique et social). 
Sarraut's plan, however, was designed to intensify colonial 
production only for the satisfaction of metropolitan demand. The 
empire was essentially perceived as a reservoir of manpower, raw 
materials and potential wealth, while the commitment to France's 
"mission civilisatricel, was only incidental.19
b) The SFIO (Section Francaise de 1'Internationale Ouvriere).
Upon assuming power in 193 6, the SFIO was bitterly divided 
on colonial policy. Fearful of nationalist movements, the right- 
wing of the party defended colonialism and espoused assimilation
18. Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Le radicalisme devant 
1'imperialisme," La Lumiere. (October 4, 1930), p. 10.
19. Albert Sarraut, La mise-en-valeur des colonies 
Francaises. (Paris: Payot, 1923) and Michael Crowder, Senegal: A 
Study of French Assimilation Policy. (London: Methuen, 1967), pp. 
31-32.
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as the only socialist alternative to colonial rule. The exten­
sion of metropolitan social legislation overseas constituted the 
party"s main goal but with an important qualification:
L'assimilation, ne consists pas a transporter 
en bloc aux colonies, et dans les memes formes, toutes 
les institutions de la metropole. C'est une tendance 
plus qu'un systeme, et qui est loin d'exiger partout une 
uniformite d'application contraire a la nature des 
choses.20
The extreme left-wing of the SFIO (Zyromski, Guerin, Pivert and 
the Bataille Socialiste group) contested the legitimacy of 
France's "mission civilisatrice.11 maintaining that Europe had 
colonized for the sole purpose of economic exploitation. This 
faction supported nationalist movements indiscriminately and 
denounced imperialism in all its forms.21
Leon Blum and the center of the SFIO maintained that 
'superior races' had a right and duty to elevate backward peoples 
and exploit the world's 'neglected resources'.22 Oddly enough, 
under Communist pressure, the Prime Minister had in the late
20. Lagrosilliere, quoted in Manuela Semidei, "Les 
socialistes frangais et le probl&me colonial entre des deux 
guerres 1919-1939," Revue Francaise de Science Politique, vol. 
18, (1968), p. 1132.
2 .^ But even this group was torn with strife, leading to 
the separation of the Groupe Revolutionnaire from the SFIO and 
the formation of the Parti Socialiste Ouvrier et Pavsan in 1938 
which supported the right of all peoples to self-determination.
22. In Leon Blum's words, "Nous avons trop 1'amour de notre 
pays pour desavouer 1'expansion de la pensee, de la civilisation 
frangaise.. . " quoted in Semidei, "Les socialistes frangais...," 
op.cit.. (1968), p. 1139.
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1920's made allusions to
... 1'independance entiere [le plus tot possible]. 
Nous n'admettons pas, qu'il existe un droit de con- 
quete, un droit de premier occupant au profit des 
nations Europeennes sur les peuples qui n'ont pas la 
chance d'etre de race blanche ou de religion 
chretienne. Nous n'admettons pas la colonisation par 
la force. Nous aurons accompli... notre mission 
civilisatrice le jour ou nous aurons pu rendre les 
peuples dont nous occupons les territoires a la liberte 
et a la souverainete.2-3
However, Blum's argument for independence was blatantly 
contradicted by his outright dismissal of what he called over­
simplified and thence dangerous alternatives such as native 
insurrection and French evacuation.
The equivocal tone of Blum's doctrine persisted well into 
the first year of socialist rule. In fact, the Blum-Violette 
plan for Algeria was seen as assimilation leading to indepen­
dence. However, when the bill neared collapse because of 
conservative and colonialist opposition, assimilation was 
abandoned for moderate socio-economic reform.24
The SFIO Colonial Commission.
An ad hoc committee of socialist colonial experts was 
organized in 1935 to neutralize the ongoing factionalism within
23- ibid., p. 138.
24. In Moutet's words, "la colonisation pour nous, c'est le 
developpement meme des masses qui habitent les colonies, par 
1'elevation de leur niveau materiel, social, economique, intel- 
lectuel et culturel." Note the absence of the political from 
Moutet's statement; ibid., p. 1148. See also William B. Cohen, 
"The Colonial Policy of the Popular Front," French Historical 
Studies, vol. 7, no. 3, 1972, pp. 368-93.
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the SFIO which prevented the adoption of a cohesive party doctrine on 
colonial matters. Intent on reconciling socialism and colonialism, 
the Colonial Commission recognized political emancipation as the 
objective of socialist policy but only under metropolitan 
instigation and guidance.
En parlant d'emancipation politique totale, [on] ne 
pose pas une these de separatisme. car [on] ne pense 
que 1 'emancipation politique des peuples retardaires ne 
peut avoir de chance de succes durable que si elle est 
le prolongement dans les colonies d'un mouvement de 
liberation mene a son terme dans la metropole et 
permettant au proletariat vainqueur de se porter a 
l'aide des populations moins eduquees que lui politi- 
quement.2 6
The Commission's long term goal was the creation of local 
socialist sections throughout the colonies.26 In addition, the 
demands of colonial peoples for equality were to be encouraged in 
order to win over the support of civil servants who could then 
act as a 'force d'encadrement' for the peasants.
A series of reports on reforms for West Africa were drawn up 
by prominent colonial specialists. The implementation of 
metropolitan legislation overseas within three months, freedom of 
association, the legalization of trade unions, 'equal work-equal 
pay,' the abolition of the indicrenat and the enlargement of the 
electoral corps were singled out as key reforms.
25. Please ignore the double negative in the quote. 
Landrau report entitled "Le socialisme et le fait colonial," 
Commission Coloniale de la SFIO 1936-37, Papiers Deschamps. 
Archives Nationales, Section Outre-Mer (ANSOM).
26. Ibid.
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While the Commission continued to meet throughout the 
Popular Front era, it failed to overcome the divisions present at 
all levels of the SFIO. As a result, its 'technical7 and 
advisory role never contributed effectively to policy-making.27
c) The PCF (Parti Communiste Frangais^
Since 1924, the French Communist party had indisputably been 
the most consistently anti-colonial segment of French public 
opinion advocating universal suffrage, free and universal 
education, progressive taxation and the abolition of rule by 
decree. Unconditional support for nationalist movements and 
independence persisted until the VIII Party Congress of January 
1936, when suddenly the fierce rhetorical campaign against 
imperialism abated and the doctrine of assimilation was 
expediently adopted. This about face was a direct result of the 
rising specter of fascism in Europe which brought about a 
rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.
The 1936 congress resolution on colonialism essentially 
endorsed the Popular Front programme, highlighting republican 
liberties such as freedom of association, the press and the 
abolition of the indiaenat. The right of colonial peoples to 
independence was recognized but with an important qualification: 
"Le droit au divorce.11 argued Maurice Thorez, the leader of the 
party, "ne sicrnifie pas ^obligation de divorcer." thus rehashing
27. Daniel Guerin, Front Populaire, revolution manguee. 
(Paris: Julliard, 1963), p. 179.
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the official stalinist party line.28
d) The Comite de Vigilance des Intellectuels Antifascistes 
(CVIA).
A more ambitious programme was put forth after the elections 
by the CVIA. a Popular Front association of Radical, Socialist 
and Communist intellectuals. But the CVIA manifesto reflected no 
less the ambiguity and inherent contradictions of the 
coalitions collective efforts in colonial policy-making.
The purpose of the manifesto was to stipulate the urgency of 
rudimentary colonial reforms in order to hasten the advent of 
independence. 11II ne reste au'une attitude digne... c'est de 
preparer par des reformes profondes et des movens pacifiaues 
1' emancipation future des peuples coloniaux.,l29 The CVIA 
rejected assimilation outright on the grounds that colonial 
peoples did not aspire to integration with France. Yet, 
separation from the metropole was repudiated lest other European 
powers take over. Similarly, the manifesto paid close attention 
to the question of citizenship but argued against mass 
naturalization and for the allocation of added power to the local 
assemblies to offset the omnipotence of the commandants de
28. Jacob Moneta, La politique du Parti Communiste Francais 
dans la question coloniale 1920-1963. (Paris: Maspero, 1971).
See also Raymond Betts, Tricouleur: The French Overseas Empire. 
(London: Cremonesi, 1978), p. 119. Thorez is quoted from 
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Colonisation ou imperialisme: la 
politique africaine de la France entre les deux guerres," 
Mouvement Social. no. 17, (April-June 1979), p. 63.
2 .^ Paul Rivet et al., La France en face du probleme 
colonial. (Paris: no publisher listed, 1936), p. 18.
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cercle.
In other words, the reforms proposed by the CVIA were no 
different from those of the Socialist Commission, the center and 
right wings of the SFIO and the Radical party. The manifesto had 
intended to strike a blow against assimilation; yet it failed to 
remain consistent in its espousal of independence. Its recommen­
dations were radical but comfortably within the republican 
tradition.30
LEON BLUM'S COLONIAL CABINET
Largely ignorant of the dynamics of colonial politics, Leon 
Blum was careful to select highly competent collaborators from a 
broad political spectrum.31 However, they nurtured dissimilar 
notions with regard to colonial policy-making.
The Ministry of Overseas France was entrusted to Marius 
Moutet, a committed socialist and critic of administrative abuse 
in the colonies. Hubert Deschamps, a socialist colonial 
administrator in favour of immediate assimilation, Rene Barthes, 
a communist sympathizer, and Robert Delavignette, a liberal 
governor, were amongst the key figures of Moutet's cabinet.
Robert Delavignette was one of the few who believed that 
colonial rule did not lie exclusively within the association-
30. ibid.. pp. 33-56; see also Claude Liauzu, Aux oriqines 
du tiers-mondisme: colonies et anti-colonialistes en France 1919- 
1939. (Paris: Harmattan, 1982).
31. Charles-Andre Julien, "Leon Blum et les pays d'outre- 
mer," in Leon Blum, chef de qouvernement 1936-1937. (Paris: 
Collin, 1967), p. 395.
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assimilation framework. While fusing elements of both formulas, 
Delavignette warned that no single doctrine could serve as a 
blueprint for colonial policy. The great diversity of France's 
empire called for decentralization which could in turn allow for 
greater autonomy without necessarily weakening its ties with the 
metropole.32 Delavignette envisaged a French Eurafrican 
Federation founded on the African peasantry. Like Moutet, he 
opposed the emergence of black politics in Africa on the grounds 
that the socio-economic base of the territories was not 
sufficiently developed.33
Charles-Andre Julian, the Secretary General of the newly- 
founded Haut Comite Mediteranneen de l'Afrique du Nord, was the 
only administrator who recognized the urgency of independence as 
early as 1936:
La seule justification morale de la colonisation 
serait de preparer sincerement 1'independence des 
peuples indigenes... Comment pourra-t-on le faire si 
l'on continue a reserver a une minorite, souvent 
infime, de Frangais la majorite des sieges dans les 
assemblies elues dans les colonies... ne peut-on 
envisager une forme internationale de mandat qui 
preparait efficacement les colonies a 1'independance et 
marquerait un progres considerable sur 1'imperialisms 
national? 34
32. Robert Delavignette, Freedom and Authority in French 
West Africa. (London: Oxford University Press, 1950).
33. Delavignette, "Le Front Populaire devant l'Afrique 
noire," Afrique Francaise. (May 1936).
34. Charles-Andre Julien quoted in Georges Lefranc, Histoire 
de la Troisieme Republique, op. cit.. vol. 6, p. 302.
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This was the first time in French history that a Colonial 
Ministry comprised socialist and communist governors. It was 
even more unusual that the cabinet became a forum for radical 
ideologies ranging from Delavignette's French Eurafrican Federa­
tion to Julien's call for international mandates leading to 
independence.
MARIUS MOUTET. MINISTER OF OVERSEAS FRANCE.
Moutet had studied law in Lyon and taken courses on the 
French empire while also campaigning on behalf of the Lique des 
Droits de 1 'Homme.35 As the first socialist to hold the post of 
Colonial Minister, he received the undivided attention of the 
metropolitan left-wing press. Eulogies and noble promises were 
made in his name:
Jaunes et noirs de nos colonies, jusque-la livres 
aux grands concessionnaires, accables de travail, 
affames, tenus dans 1'ignorance, ou bien admis aux plus 
hauts grades universitaires et ecartes des fonctions 
publiques correspondantes, prives du droit de vote, 
d'association et meme de libre lecture, mitrailles, 
emprisones, tortures pour avoir reclame une vie 
meilleure, allaient redevenir, aux yeux du gouverneur,
cjes hommes.3 6
Despite the radical rhetoric, however, Moutet went out of his way
to dispell the fears of the 'colonial party' by repeatedly
those of
denoting the continuity of his policies withAhis predecessors.
35. Biography of Marius Moutet in Annales Coloniales, 
(September 23, 1936).
36. Moutet interview in La Lumiere. (August 15, 1936), 
Papiers Moutet, File 1, Dossier 1, ANSOM.
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D'aucuns se figurent qu'il y a necessairement chez 
les hommes de gauche une ideologie anticoloniale. Mais 
le plus grand nombre se sont bien rendu compte de 
1'oeuvre bien immense a accomplir en prenant au serieux 
la mission civilisatrice que peut poursuivre une nation 
n'oubliant ni ses traditions ni ses principes.37
Colonialist circles welcomed his appointment and acknowledged, 
somewhat sarcastically, his about face from "critique 
irresponsable" to "chef responsable de la conservation fde 
1 'Empire 1 .1,38 Others, like Daniel Guerin, a radical left-wing 
colonial specialist, bitterly protested that Moutet had come to 
identify with the colonial administration to such an extent, that 
he became suspicious of all criticism.
Moutet believed that a colonial system could be viable only
if animated from within. He strongly urged that French colonial
economic policy shift its focus from the prevention of famines to 
raising the native standard of living by concentrating production 
on subsistence rather than cash crops and by decreasing taxation 
to ease the cash burden on the peasantry. The colonies should
not have to rely on their meagre resources for economic develop­
ment, argued the Colonial Minister. It was the duty of France to 
partake in the mise-en-valeur of the empire without resorting to 
forced labour or increased taxation.
37. Marius Moutet quoted in Charles-Robert Ageron, France 
Coloniale ou Parti Colonial?. (Paris: PUF, 1978), p. 260.
38. Afrique Francaise. (October 1936), p. 505. The same 
paper quoted Moutet saying: "Si je pouvais faire comprendre en 
France que par ses colonies notre nation est un grand pays et 
que, pour ces raisons, elle doit donner ses preoccupations 
constantes au developpement colonial."
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Moutet proposed the creation of a Colonial Fund to promote 
basic technology for small scale projects that would benefit 
the rural masses as opposed to a handful of extravagant large- 
scale projects:
Nous ne ferons en apparence que de petites choses 
dans de petits villages ignores... au lieu de d6poser sur 
le sol de l'Afrique... des grands travaux qui ne sont que 
des 'grands outils morts', nous devons nous attacher 
davantage & la vie m§me du village.39
The acquisition of French citizenship would be facilitated, but
political reform would remain secondary to social change
...j'estime aussi que nous ne devons rien faire 
politiquement, tant que nous n'aurons pas donn6 & ces 
masses, par une instruction et par un code de travail, 
une organisation sociale.40
Moutet also envisaged a new form of collaboration between 
the colonial administration and the 6volu6s by providing 
training for the former in ethnography, native languages and 
traditions and by creating African municipalities based on the 
Conseil des Notables for the latter.
The Colonial Minister's programme of socio-economic reform 
raised delicate and complex problems. Moutet had to at once
39. Unsigned report, Fonds Moutet, File 1, Dossier 1, 
ANSOM. Agricultural machinery would be bought by the Soci6t6s 
Indigenes de Prdvoyance and be gradually reimbursed by peasant 
profits. [The SIP were created in Senegal in 1910 (Kaolack, 
Tivouane, Baol) and 1911 (Louga, Thifes). See Donal B. Cruise 
O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1971), p. TTH7-------- ----------- —
40. Unsigned report, Papiers Moutet, File 1, Dossier 1, 
ANSOM. -------------
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appease the 'colonial party'; promote radical rhetoric to 
reconcile socialism with colonialism; satisfy the aspirations of 
colonial peoples; fight against an apathetic, if not hostile, 
Parliament and public opinion; and contend with a dynamic but 
non-cohesive colonial cabinet.
MARCEL DE COPPET. GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF AOF
The authoritarian Governor-General of AOF Jules Brevie was 
transferred to Indochina in August 1936 and the socialist Marcel 
de Coppet assumed his post. This was part of an extensive purge 
of the colonial service decided upon by the Socialist Party 
congress of 193 6 when 18 out of 3 0 administrators were promptly 
replaced.41 However, the lower echelons of the colonial corps, 
both in France and overseas, remained intact and thus 
authoritarian and resistant to change.
De Coppet had studied law and oriental linguistics in Paris. 
His service in Madagascar, Senegal, Guinea, Dahomey, Oubangui- 
Chari, Djibouti, and Mauritania,42 earned him the reputation of 
being a "necrroohile.1,43 Even before assuming his post, de Coppet 
had made more enemies than friends. The colonialist press 
regretted Brevie's departure but avoided attaching importance to
41. AOF, (November 21, 1936).
42. Ibid.
43. In 1931 he had saved Chad from famine: a cricket 
invasion had ruined the harvest in Chad, Niger and Nigeria and de 
Coppet spent half of the reserve funds to procure millet. He was 
subsequently blamed for spending six and a half million francs 
"on feeding blacks..." Le Senegal. (August 27, 193 6).
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the new Governor-General's socialist leanings. Afriaue 
Francaise, a colonial daily, referred to him as "un peu plus 
vagabond11 than his predecessor but noted with relief that de 
Coppet did not intend to break with traditional colonial 
policy.44 Unable to prevent his appointment, colonialist circles 
were eager to find an opportunity to replace him.
De Coppet launched a programme of socio-economic reform for 
AOF which was similar to Moutet's. The Governor-General wanted 
to 'rationalise' agriculture and combat backward practises and 
prejudices. He also wanted to improve educational opportunities 
for Africans, including the construction of new schools and the 
africanization of the teaching staff.45 Regarding citizenship, 
de Coppet was convinced that even if native access to naturaliza­
tion was substantially facilitated, only a minority of 'subjects' 
would take advantage of it. Africans, (evolues apart), he 
believed, were indifferent to electoral politics and nurtured 
different aspirations. The task of the administration was to 
sense those needs before they were translated into grievances.
One such pressing issue was the widespread practice of the 
indiaenat which he wanted to restrict to "extraordinary cir­
cumstances ." 4 ^
44. Afriaue Francaise. (August-September 1936).
45. Henri Labouret, "Les projets du Gouverneur-General de 
Coppet," Afriaue Frangaise. (December 1936) and "Development 
throughout West Africa," West Africa, vol. 21, (January 8, 1938).
46. Henri Labouret, "Les projets du Gouverneur General de 
Coppet," op. cit.. (December 1936).
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THE CONFERENCE OF GOVERNQRS-GENERAL, 193 6.
Both Moutet and de Coppet had outlined a programme of 
reforms based on Leon Blum's motto: "extraire du fait colonial, 
le maximum de justice sociale et de possibilites humaines.n47 
The absence of political reform became apparent in the Conference 
of GovernorS-General convened in November 193 6 to discuss the 
main points of the Popular Front's colonial agenda. The plan 
that was drawn up concentrated almost exclusively on 
administrative and economic policies,48 while its recommendations 
were vague and general enough to be accepted by all parties as 
guidelines of 'altruistic colonization.'
In the opening speech of the conference, Moutet argued that 
the Popular Front's creed was founded on the necessity of 
alleviating the colonial fiscal regime and introducing progres­
sive taxation, thereby increasing the purchasing power of the 
colonial peoples.49 The French personnel imposed a heavy load on 
the colonial budget and Moutet proposed the africanization of the 
civil service. He also maintained that if Africans and Europeans 
had the same title and post, their salaries should be identical, 
except for the special indemnities the French would continue to 
receive as compensation for leaving the metropole. Europeans
47. Leon Blum in Hubert Deschamps, Roi de la brousse.
(Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1975), p. 178.
48. Affaires Politiaues. File 179, Dossier 1, ANSOM deals 
extensively with the Conference of Governors-General,
49. See Moutet's speech of November 5, 1936, Papiers Moutet, 
File 1, Dossier 1, ANSOM.
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would also provide the 'cadres' for rural and public projects.
Closer communication between the metropolitan and overseas 
colonial personnel and a more rigorous process of selection of 
administrators for the higher echelons of the colonial corps were 
urged and the need for further administrative decentralization 
and financial autonomy for the colonies was also acknowledged.50 
The creation of a Colonial Fund to complete ongoing projects and 
modernise colonial agriculture was paramount in the conference 
and an ad hoc commission was instituted to draft a parliamentary 
bill. Finally, a capital investment programme allocating 200- 
300 million francs to the colonies (French West Africa's share 
would be 29.7%) was approved.^
Detailed reports of the conference recommendations were 
drawn up in each territory. The Governor of Senegal alluded to 
the intensification of cultivation of local crops such as sisal, 
rubber and cotton that could reduce imports. Peasants, he 
argued, should be given incentives to devote more land for the 
cultivation of food crops by raising the prices of their produce 
and leading them without force to the granaries of the Societes 
Indigene de Prevovance for the provision of foodstuffs. The 
Governor also made references to the need for a more careful 
selection of imported manufactured goods to correspond with
50. "Voeux adoptes par la Conference des Gouverneurs 
Generaux," Affaires Politiaues. File 179, Dossier 1, ANSOM.
51. Priority would be given to national defense projects 
employing wage rather than forced labour. Health projects and 
the SIP would receive the remaining capital.
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Senegal's needs.
However, the focus of the Conference recommendations was on 
groundnut production. By 193 6, France absorbed most of Senegal's 
groundnuts (500.000 tons of shelled and 300.000 tons of unshelled 
nuts annually) thanks to the protectionist decrees of August 1933 
and January 1934. Further protectionist measures, the Governor 
of Senegal argued, could result in a Senegalese monopoly of 
shelled nuts and a substantial increase in the export of un­
shelled peanuts.52
The recommendations of the conference of Governors-General 
were strongly resisted in Senegal. The administrator of Dakar, 
Ponzio, argued that they were contradictory— recommending a 
decrease of direct taxes which could only materialize if indirect 
taxation rose.53 He further objected to the africanisation of 
the civil service (particularly to the proposed parity between 
European and African salaries) on the grounds that there were few 
Africans in Dakar that could replace the Europeans.54
The indiaenat was not discussed at the conference and 
nothing concrete was resolved regarding the reorganisation of the 
Ministry of Colonies. The Colonial Fund bill was adopted in July 
1937 by the Chamber of Deputies but was soon afterwards rejected
52. "Conference des Gouverneurs Generaux? rapport du 
Gouverneur du Senegal," 17G 322 126. Archives de la Republique du 
Senegal, Dakar, (ARSD).
53. Ibid.. "Rapport de la circonsciption de Dakar et 
Dependances," (September 1936).
54. Ibid.
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by the Senate. In fact, most of the recommendations of the 
Conference failed to materialize because funds were not made 
available.
THE INQUIRY COMMISSION
In an exercise of good will, the French Parliament agreed to 
set up a commission in 1937, to inquire into "les besoins et les 
aspirations legitimes des populations habitant les colonies..."55 
The Inquiry Commission was composed of 42 members encompassing 
the entire political spectrum56 and was headed by the socialist 
former deputy and minister Guernut.
A subcommittee was appointed to investigate black African 
affairs comprising three distinguished colonial administrators 
(Delavignette, Deschamps and Labouret), four public figures 
(among them the ethnologist Levy-Bruhl and the writer Andre 
Gide) and five members of Parliament. Labouret was in charge of 
demographic questions; Delavignette dealt with agriculture; Gide 
and Levy-Bruhl with the aspirations of the colonial peoples.
The Commission's task was to prepare "un programme d'action 
conforme a la fois aux voeux legitimes des masses indigenes, aux 
intentions crenereuses du qouvernement et aux possibilites de la
55. Law authorising the constitution of an Inquiry Commis­
sion, 17G 252 108. ARSD, and Journal Officiel de la Republique 
Francaise. (February 6, 1937).
56. Among them were Lozeray of the PCF, Taitinger of the 
Federation Republicaine de France. Paul Reynaud of the Alliance 
des Republicains de Gauche et des Radicaux Independants, Gide, 
Charles-Andre Julien, Paul Rivet of the CVIA. 17G 252 108. ARSD.
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Metropole.1157 Moutet. emphasized that the Commission would be an 
independent body with considerable authority rather than an 
academic establishment, and its recommendations would be promptly 
implemented. Research was conducted into a host of issues such 
as demography and statistics, the standard of living, mode and 
evolution of colonial production; labour conditions, education, 
and the problem of the formation of native elites; medicine and 
hygiene; and finally, the creation of a Comite d'Etudes des 
Coutumes Indigenes.58
"Association11 and "autonomous government" were frequently 
raised as desirable goals of colonial policy but it was under­
scored that it was up to the Commission to "ne pas faire naitre 
certaines esperances troo vastes qui risaueraient d'amener de 
troo penibles disillusions.1,59
A research team headed by the socialist Georges Nouelle 
organized a two month trip (January-February 1937) to AOF. Its 
reports on native labour, education, justice and administration 
were surprisingly moderate in tone and supportive of the status 
quo. For example, while female and child labour abuse were 
condemned, there was no call for the abolition of forced labour 
per se:
57* Ibid.. "Rapport de la commission d'enquete des 
territoires d'Outre-Mer,11 (July 8, 1937).
^8 . Report on the Inquiry Commission, Fonds Moutet. File 4, 
Dossier 128, ANSOM; see also Commission Guernut. File 48, Dossier 
B5, ANSOM, for the questionnaires of the Commission.
59. See Moutet's speech at the opening session of the 
Inquiry Commission, July 8, 1937; ibid.
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Dans l'etat actuel de la colonisation, l'emploi de 
la main d ' oeuvre indigene est necessaire. La suppres­
sion de ses usages ne sera possible qu'a la longue, 
lorsque se poursuivra 1'evolution vers la civilisation 
de tous les indigenes de l'Afrique.60
In the sphere of education, the report condoned assimilation and 
criticized the Goree school of African teachers for not having 
high enough standards because its graduates were "not French 
enough."
Subsequently, instead of sending an investigation team in 
Africa to acquire first-hand information on socio-environmental 
conditions, the Inquiry Commission distributed questionnaires to 
colonial administrators. The questionnaires focused on food, 
housing, industry and living conditions of the Europeans, the 
metis. and the assimiles. Most administrators completed them 
within 2 0 days.
The survey on industry dealt with the different types and 
sizes of enterprises, the ethnic composition of the workers and 
their salaries. The questionnaire on the Europeans, metis and 
assimiles. classified individuals according to their professions 
and country of origin.61 While the material was valuable and 
insightful, it was never never followed up by any reports.
After the fall of the Blum government in July 1937, the 
Commission lost its initial impetus and its members became
60. Lozeray Report, "Voyage d'enquete en AOF," Affaires 
Politiaues. File 513, ANSOM.
61. 17G 252 108. ARSD.
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disillusioned with the feasibility of the proposed reforms. In 
1938, the Chamber of Deputies suspended the meagre 3 million 
francs which sustained the organization, and most of the reports 
were left unfinished. Among the few that were published was Levy 
Bruhl's study of witchcraft and cannibalism.
POLITICAL REFORMS.
The most ambitious political programme undertaken by Maurice 
Violette and Leon Blum sought to extend French citizenship to a 
maximum of 25.000 Algerians without jeopardizing their 'statut 
personnel.' Even though Blum could have presented the 
endorsement of the decree as a fait accompli in order to bypass 
colonialist opposition, he hesitated. Wishing to remain within 
constitutional limits, he merely presented the bill in Parliament 
long after opposition from Algerian colonials had effectively 
organized its defeat. The collapse of the Blum-Violette motion 
was significant in that it demonstrated the Radicals' lack of 
commitment to the coalition's policy-making. It further made it 
clear that settler and colonialist high handedness could outweigh 
governmental authority.62
Citizenship was equally contentious an issue amongst the 
urban 'subjects' of French West Africa and particularly Senegal. 
The decree of July 23, 1937 postulated that citizenship would be
62. Charles-Andre Julien, "Leon Blum et les pays d'outre- 
mer," in Leon Blum. Chef de gouvernement, (Paris: Colin, 1967), 
pp. 379-82. Also William B. Cohen, "The Colonial Policy of the 
Popular Front," French Historical Studies, vol. 7, no.3, (1972),
pp.333-85 and Rudolf von Albertini, Decolonization. (New York: 
Doubleday, 1971), pp. 326-35.
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granted on the basis of merit to those who had served France in 
the spheres of commerce, agriculture and industry provided they 
were celibate or monogamous; residents of AOF for at least two 
consecutive years; integrated into French lifestyle and manners 
and free of any act of hostility toward the metropole. Finally, 
a clear criminal and military service record were also 
required.63
In France, opinions regarding the reform of the citizenship 
laws differed widely. The Socialist Colonial Commission argued 
that "...la liberte politique d'un individu ne reside nullement 
dans le fait au'il est citoven ou protege francais.1,64 Thus, it 
was argued, the extension of citizenship to the Four Communes in 
Senegal during the Great War had constituted a grave political 
error committed under the pressure of recruitement. Similarly, 
Galandou Diouf's efforts to include as 'citizens' certain 
categories of 'subjects' (for example those bearing the Croix de 
Guerre) were categorically rejected.
Several metropolitan newspapers hailed the decree as an 
antidote to the rising nationalism in Indochina. Granting 
citizenship to West African elites could avert future political 
disasters because it was argued that "sans passe historiaue. ni
63. Circulaire sur les conditions d'application du decret du 
23/7/37 relatif a l'accession des indigenes de l'AOF a la qualite 
de citoven francais. (Goree: Imprimerie du Gouvernement-General, 
1937), p. 7, ARSD.
64. Bouscayrol report, Commission Coloniale SFIO 1936-37, 
Pabiers Deschamps. ANSOM.
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culturel. le noir intelligent n'a qu'a bruler les etapes.1,65
In Senegal, the decree was received enthusiastically and 
Lamine Gueye praised it as a "significant social reform."66 In 
the past, he argued, granting French citizenship was an 
administrative act or favour. If the request was refused, no 
explanations were given and the decision was irrevocable. Under 
the new decree, applications would be addressed to the chef de 
circonscription who would then transmit them to the magistrate's 
court, the Attorney General and finally the Governor-General. If 
within two months there was no opposition to the request, 
citizenship would be granted. If the request was problematic, it 
would be referred to the tribunal. The entire procedure would be 
free of charge.67
Despite the African support for the new decree, detailed 
citizenship figures were not recorded after 193 6, making it 
difficult to evaluate the impact of the reform.68 However, 
judging by the fact that the number of voters who participated in 
the local elections during those years remained unchanged, the 
restrictive conditions of the decree (such as integration to
65. "Le Petit Parisien," (August 4, 1937), in Fonds Moutet. 
File 1, Dossier 1, ANSOM.
66. Periscope Africain. (August 7, 1937).
67* Ibid.
68. In 1935 there were 21 requests for citizenship out of 
which 6 were positive and 15 were negative. In 19 3 6 there were 
2 2 requests, 1 positive, 2 negative and 19 pending. Rapports 
politiques annuels AOF, 1935-38, in Affaires Politiques, File 
539, Dossier 5.
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French culture and manners, and service to France which were 
highly equivocal clauses), did not allow a sizable number of 
Africans to acquire French citizenship.
THE ECONOMY.
The Popular Front in Senegal coincided with the economic 
recovery from the 1930 crisis and a boom in groundnut production 
which paved the way toward the new government's popularity. The 
Governor of Senegal designated 19 3 6 as the 'year of the 
groundnut': peasants increased the land under groundnut cultiva­
tion and 5.000 more seasonal workers fnavetanes) were brought in 
to cope with increased production.69 Groundnut exports rose from 
389,000 tons in 1935, to 487.000 in 1936, to a record of 587.000 
in 1937.70 Their price in the French market rose from 100 francs 
per kilogramme in 1935, to 144 francs in 1936, thereby substan­
tially increasing the purchasing power of the Africans. In 1936, 
a euphoric Lieutenant-Governor maintained that
La securite de l'avenir economique du pays doit 
etre avant tout recherchee dans 1'augmentation de la 
production de la graine qui a constitute, jusqu'ici, la 
source premiere de sa prosperite.7^
However, as malnutrition and high mortality rates continued into 
the first half of 1937, it became apparent that figures
69. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1936, 22G 36 5 and 
Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1937, 2G 37 15. ARSD.
70. Ibid.
71. Speech by Martinet in the Colonial Council, July 193 6, 
Journal Officiel du Senegal. (July 3, 1936).
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indicating recovery were misleading and that groundnuts were not 
synonymous with prosperity.
Le mouvement des exportations et importations peut 
avoir une allure brillante, les recettes douanieres 
s'accroitrent, les impots rentrent facilement, les budgets se 
clorent en equilibre ou meme en exedient, la dure 
realite demeure pendant plusieurs mois de l'annee que 
l7indigene ne mange pas a sa faim.72
Necessity usually led Africans to borrow money from traders under 
unfavorable terms, such as exorbitant interest rates. To combat 
this practice, the administration agreed in 1934 to render 
obligatory the constitution of granary reserves to guarantee 
peasants a food supply through the Societes de Prevovance. Fears 
of famine increased along with the unchecked cultivation of 
groundnuts:
Le Senegal, que son mouvement commercial pouvait 
faire considerer comme un pays riche, et qui se donne 
en effet, pendant quelques mois de l'annee 1'illusion 
de la richesse, est en realite un pays que hante 
continuellement le spectre de la faim.7-*
In 1937, under instructions from Marcel de Coppet, inspector 
Ruffel presented a report on the dangers of Senegal's exclusive 
reliance on groundnuts. Ruffel delineated how peasants gradually 
abandoned the cultivation of subsistence crops and were forced to 
pay dearly for imported foodstuffs. During the period 1934-36,
72. Rapport Ruffel, "Le Senegal, pays de monoculture," 
(January 1, 197), Affaires Politigues, File 630, Dossier 3, 
ANSOM.
73. Ibid.
42
rice imports increased by 141%, further entrenching Senegal's 
dependence on France. And yet, Ruffel claimed, French economic 
planners continued to promote the *guerre de l'arachide./74
Ruffel proposed the intensification of the cultivation of 
subsistence crops such as millet, rice, manioc and corn. A 
system of 'rational agriculture' would prevent Africans from 
exhausting the soil through the regular rotation of crops, a 
careful selection of seeds, manuring of fields, and an equitable 
cultivation of cash and subsistence crops.75 De Coppet dealt 
lengthily with this report and agreed that
... 1'augmentation de la production vivriere au 
Senegal, conjuguee avec le maintien a un niveau 
raisonnable des cultures d'exportation, reste le 
principal objectif d'une administration soucieuse avant 
tout du bien etre de 1'indigene.76
The year 1937 was extolled as another 'year of the 
groundnut' but the administration went through great pains to 
convince the peasants to cultivate millet. In the beginning of 
June, "souna" millet was planted but, due to inadequate rainfall, 
the crop was destroyed. However, unlike other years, peasants 
did not instantly switch to groundnuts, but replanted more millet 
as well as other food crops. The yields were impressive: 434.000
74. "L'extension des plantations d'arachides peut se
faire sans mise au developpement des ensemences des cereales et 
autres plantes alimentaires," Circular of May 19,1936, quoted in 
ibid.
75.Ibid.
76. De Coppet letter to Ruffel dated April 21, 1937,
Affaires Politiques. File 630, Dossier 3, ANSOM.
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tons of millet (compared to 300.000 tons in 1936), 57.150 tons of 
rice, 139.000 tons of manioc, 38.000 tons of niebes, and 18.000 
tons of corn.7^
Despite the seeming economic recovery and phenomenal boom of 
the peanut economy during 1936-37, the devaluation of the French 
franc by 3 3% and the ensuing rise in the cost of living created 
dissatisfaction amongst the Senegalese peasantry. The price of 
rice shot up from 5.51 francs per 100 kgs. in 1935, to 70 francs 
in 1936 and 135 in 1937; loincloths cost 3.10 in 1935, 3.75 in 
1936 and 6.10 francs in 1937.78
Furthermore, the sudden fall of metropolitan prices in 
February 1937 temporarily worsened the condition of the peasants. 
Some resorted to keeping important grain stocks to themselves so 
that the SIP barely managed to distribute enough rice and millet 
in the interior to avert a famine.79
The recession of 1937-38 made it impossible for de Coppet to
reverse the trend of Senegal's monoculture economy via crop 
diversification and 'rationalisation' of agriculture. In France, 
the Bordeaux import-export companies which attributed Senegal's 
ailing economy to the Popular Front's radical reforms (par­
ticularly the legalization of trade unions) were quick to 
neutralize de Coppet's economic reform efforts.
77. Rapport sur la situation economique du Senegal en 1937, 
Commission Guernut. File 56, Dossier B26, ANSOM.
78. Phan, op. cit., 1974, p. 52.
79. Rapport sur la situation economique du Senegal en 1937,
Commission Guernut. File 56, Dossier B26, ANSOM.
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LABOUR REFORMS.
The 1884 metropolitan laws that legalised trade unions were 
not implemented overseas until 192 0, and even then, they only 
applied to Europeans and to African 'citizens'. 'Subjects' were 
entitled to participate in 'societes d'entraide' or 'societes 
amicales.'80 In Senegal, the first professional associations 
appeared in the 192 0s81 pioneered by the railway workers, the 
seamen and the civil servants. Union activity focused primarily 
on wage increases and the main weapon used was the strike. The 
longest and most serious strike was fostered by the seamen's 
union in 1928.
Moutet called for for the extension of all metropolitan 
social legislation overseas
Le Gouvernement entend et j'y tiendrai la main, que 
les territoires d'outre-mer participent dans toute la 
mesure du possible, au benefice de la meme evolution 
sociale que le territoire metropolitain.82
On March 11, 1937, a decree extended the right to organize unions 
to Africans who spoke, read and wrote French fluently and held
80. Iba der Thiam, "Recherche sur les premieres manifesta­
tions de la conscience syndicale au Senegal (1936-37)," Annales 
de la Faculte des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, University de 
Dakar, PUF, no. 5, (1975), p. 241.
81. Nicole Bernard-Duquenet has traced them back to the 
1900s, in "Le Front Populaire et le S^n^gal," These de troisieme 
cycle, University of Paris VII, (1976), pp. 35-36.
82. Letter of Moutet to de Coppet dated June 29, 1936. 
Proceedings of the Meeting of July 9, 1936 on the Application of 
Social Legislation Laws, K 171 f26^. ARSD.
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the Certificat d'Etudes Primaires or an equivalent degree. In 
Senegal— which had a high literacy rate compared to the rest of 
AOF— only 150 out of 1.700.000 inhabitants obtained the CEP each 
year. When in 1937 a trade union was being formed in St. Louis, 
only 3 out of 400 workers held the precious diploma.83 The vast 
majority of the workers did not qualify for union membership.
Those restrictions were repeatedly criticized in the 
Senegalese press which had anticipated more relaxed conditions 
for union membership and was enfuriated with the routine argument 
whereby Africans were not "suffisament prepares a en receuillir 
les benefices rde la legislation sociale] .1184
De Coppet argued that the conditions were imposed to protect 
the peasantry against political opportunism.85 In reality, there 
was pressure from France but also from within the Government- 
General of AOF: For instance, the Secretary-General of AOF,
Vadier, found African union activity superfluous on the grounds 
that Mle svndicat pour 17 indigene c 7est 1'administration.tl86 and 
encouraged instead African participation to the Conseil des 
Notables. Professional associations were founded for 'subjects7 
who had been excluded from union membership (decree of March 3,
83. Commission Guernut. File 107, Dossier 19, ANSOM.
84- Periscope Africain. (January 23, 1937).
85. "Legislation sur les syndicaux en AOF, 1937" 17G 369 
126, ARSD.
86. Prceedings of the meetings of July 9, 1936, on the 
application of social legislation laws," K 171 (26^ . ANS.
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1937) but they also had CEP restrictions.87
Despite the obstacles, 7.796 civil-servants, employees and 
wage-earners raced to the professional associations and trade 
unions. From May 1936 (prior to the official legalisation of 
unions overseas) to January 1937, 119 associations were created 
including 42 trade unions, 16 professional associations, 31 
athletic, artistic and literary organizations as well as 19 
mutual aid societies.88 The Seamen's and Railway trade unions 
together with EMCIBA (Svndicat des Employes du Commerce, des 
Industries, des Bangues et Assurances  ^ and the General Federation 
of Civil Servants received the most support.89
Following the enforcement of the June 1936 metropolitan laws 
on the 40-hour week, paid holidays, conciliation and arbitration 
procedures and collective agreements, an ad hoc committee was 
formed to study their extension overseas. The committee ruled 
that since the 40-hour week did not apply to French agriculture, 
it should only be implemented in Africa "when judged 
imperative."90 Alluding to financial problems, the colonial 
administration did not enforce the proposed legislation except in 
the case of a handful of industries in Dakar which substituted
87. De Coppet report to the Governor of Dakar dated October
14, 1937, 21G 53 17. ARSD.
88. Afriaue Frangaise. January 1939, and Duquenet, for 
membership figures, op. cit.. 1977, p. 147.
89. Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar et Dependances 19 38,
2G 38 25. ARSD.
90. ''Proceedings of the meeting of July 9, 1936 on the 
application of social legislation laws," K 171 20. ARSD.
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the traditional two shifts of 12 hours with three shifts of 8 
hours, improved food rations and increased minimum pay.91
Paid holidays only applied to European workers. Legislation 
on labour accidents was enforced in April 1937 and by the end of 
the year, 3 5 accidents were reported to the Labour Inspector and 
5 were taken to the Tribunal for investigation and allocation of 
indemnities.92 The protection of female and child labour, the 
distribution of 4.000 labour booklets, and the increase in 
minimum wage from 4 to 7 francs per day were all set in motion in 
1937.93 However, wage increases did not correspond to inflation 
rates and the xsalaires de famine7 prevailed.94
Collective agreements became accessible to Europeans and 
assimiles with the decree of March 20, 1937. The first were 
negotiated by the European employees of commerce and Industry of 
AOF, the metal workers, and the builders. Serious problems 
surfaced when management refused to negotiate and respect the 
agreements (the creation of collective agreements depended on the 
consent of both parties). It took EMCIBA employees 6 months to 
negotiate an agreement.
91. West Africa, vol. xxii, no, 1096, (February 5, 1938), p.
117.
92. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar et Dependances 1937, 2G 
37 1 . ARSD.
93. The decree of September 16, 1937 ensured the protection 
of female and child labour while the decree of June 1, 1937 
raised minimum wage.
94. Duquenet, op. cit.. 1976, p. 158.
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Some 41 strikes broke out in 1937 alone to protest against 
the spiralling cost of living and the delay in the formation of 
collective agreements as well as to demand salary increases.95 
Most strikes lasted one or two days and were peacefully resolved 
to the satisfaction of the workers, following the conciliation 
and arbitration procedures enforced by the administration.96
All attempts to unite the trade union movement under the 
banner of the CGT (Confederation General du Travail) failed in 
1937 and it was only the following year that African unions in 
Dakar merged into a federation.97 Throughout the Popular Front 
era, European unions remained distinct from their African 
counterparts except for the seamen's union and Air-France. This 
division was periodically exploited by political parties to 
intimidate the administration. The strike of Thies in 19 3 8 which 
will be discussed in chapter II, illustrates the impact of the
95. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar et Dependances 1937, 2G 
37 1 . ARSD; Gana Fall, "Le nationalisme senegalais 1919-1939," 
Maitrise. University of Dakar, (1979-1980); chapter on trade 
union activity under the Popular Front. See also Duquenet, op . 
cit.. 1976, half of which deals with the development of trade 
unions in Senegal and Iba der Thiam's "Recherche sur les 
premieres manifestations de la conscience syndicale au Senegal," 
Annales de la Faculte des Lettres et Sciences Humaines,
University of Dakar, no. 5, (1975), pp. 237-48.
96. Rapport Annuel Dakar et Dependances 1937, Inspection du 
Travail, 2G 37 142. ARSD.
97. Jean Suret-Canale, "Strike Movements as Part of the 
Anti-Colonial Struggle in French West Africa," Tarikh. vol. 5, 
no. 3: Protest Against Colonial Rule in West Africa, p. 51.
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trade union movement on the politics of the Popular Front.98
THE POPULAR FRONT AND ISLAM.
The new government claimed to attribute "une importance 
accrue”99 to Islamic affairs and aimed at winning over the 
marabouts who were key power figures in Senegalese society. De 
Coppet made several symbolic gestures intended to underscore his 
respect for the Islamic leaders, such as participating in the 
ceremony of the Tabaski in Dakar— thereby renewing a tradition 
that had begun and ended with Faidherbe 70 years before.100 He 
was also present when the first stone of the Great Mosque of 
Dakar was laid in March 1937.
Special facilities were granted to talibes who wanted to 
visit Mecca and their numbers rose from 2 7 in 19 35, to 4 6 in 
1936, to 62 in 1937.101 The Governor-General was also involved 
in the creation of a national medersa in 1937. The main reason 
behind administrative support for the medersa was that a group in 
the Chamber of Deputies led by Galandou Diouf was already 
pressing for the construction of a Great Mosque for Dakar with a
98. For a full treatment of the trade union movement 
during this period see Iba Der Thiam, Duquenet, Canale, Fall, as 
listed in reference 87.
99. Rapport Politique Annuel, AOF 193 6, Affaires Politi- 
aues. File 539, Dossier 5, ANSOM.
10°. Periscope Africain. March 6, 1937.
101. Rapport Politique, AOF, 1936, Affaires Politiaues, File 
539, Dossier 5, ANSOM.
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caravanserai and a medersa. In this context,
M. de Coppet fait ressortir qu'il serait dangereux 
que 1 'administration ne puisse exercer un controle en 
cette matiere et qu'il lui parait du devoir de 
1'administration... de prendre sous son patronage et 
son controle cette entreprise.102
The medersa would be an educational establishment for Islamic 
sciences, jointly administered by a Moslem and a European 
official and specialist of Islamic affairs.103
The most important undertaking of the Popular Front on the 
Islamic policy front was a 1936 report on Koranic schools in 
Senegalese villages that strongly denounced the maraboutic 
exploitation of children. Pupils were abused like slaves, argued 
the report, and they often did not learn anything because they 
spent most of the time cultivating their masters' fields. "Les 
ecoles rcoraniauesl ne comportent pas la moindre organisation, 
surveillance ou inspection. On peut dire que 1'administration 
les ignore.1,104
De Coppet urged the creation of more Koranic schools
under minimal administrative intervention and 'discreet surveil­
lance. ' He further recommended that Koranic school teachers be 
graduates of a Moslem college of influential marabouts. 
knowledgeable in French, regional administration, hygiene and
102. "Note sur la creation d'une medersa," ibid.
103. Letter of de Coppet to Moutet dated August 28, 1937,
ibid.
104. Kleinschmidt report on the Koranic schools in Senegal, 
dated 1937, Affaires Politiques, File 2807, Dossier 1, ANSOM.
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manual labour. According to de Coppet, this would eventually 
permit Koranic education to acquire a more professional charac­
ter. While there would be no interference with the curriculum 
and with teachers' pay, control of the schools was judged 
imperative to ensure that pupils enrolled in French schools right 
after completing their religious studies.105
Official reports convey the impression that the rapproche­
ment with Islam advocated by the new government was above all a 
defensive maneuver. Local administrators wrongly accorded too 
much significance to external 'subversive' movements (i.e.
Italian propaganda against French Islamic policy) and panislamic 
tendencies. The Mourides were closely watched as a potentially 
dangerous group with aspirations of political autonomy. All in 
all, the Popular Front's Islamic policy-making was formulated to 
discreetly but effectively appease and control, wherever pos­
sible, Senegal's religious leaders.106
THE INDIGENAT AND PRESTATIONS.
The indiqenat applies to the set of provisions which allowed 
French administrators to punish African subjects without 
reference to a court of law. Popular Front organizations had 
long criticized it but several high level administrators like 
Governor Antonetti fiercely defended the institution. It was
105. Letter of de Coppet to Moutet dated October 12, 1939,
ibid.
106b "Rapport sur 1'Islam en AOF 1937," Affaires Politiques, 
File 2807, ANSOM.
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argued that the indiqenat represented,
...surtout une forme simplifiee et adaptee au pays 
de notre juridiction de simple police... un moyen de 
repression simple, commode et rapide; il evite de 
recourir a d'autres procedes plus rigoureux. II reste 
en harmonie avec le degre de civilisation et l'etat 
d'esprit des populations indigenes.107
Curiously enough, the colonial commission of the SFIO also
rejected the abolition of the indiqenat while the Governor of
Senegal Lefevre suggested that it should be maintained except for
individual exemptions. Finally, under de Coppet7s initiative,
560 prominent families and all African women were exempted
(decree of December 8 and 9, 1936).108 Under the Colonial
Minister Mandel, Africans who served in the colonial army and
their families also became exempt from the indiqenat. forced
labour, and the prestations.109
The prestations was a form of forced labour whereby all able
bodied men aged 18-60 were recruited for a minimum of 4 days
annually for the execution of public and private projects (i.e.
construction of bridges, railways, roads, mines). As late as
193 0, France had refused to comply with the International Labour
Convention agreement which outlawed forced labour. De Coppet
wished to
107. Letter of Antonetti dated November 3, 1936, Affaires 
Politiques. File 540, Dossier 1, ANSOM and "Principales idees 
exposees dans la note de M. Antonetti de Novembre 1918," ibid.
108. Rapport Politique Annuel AOF, 1936, Affaires Politiques. 
File 539, Dossier 5, ANSOM.
109. Decree of May 14, 1938, Affaires Politiques. File 540, 
Dossier 1, ANSOM.
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Faire disparaitre les prestations en nature, outil 
de moins en moins commode... par ailleurs source 
permanente d'abus et de vexations pour la population 
indigene, en donnant au chef de la circonscription le 
moyen de recourir, pour 1'execution de tous les travaux 
jusque la accomplis gratuitement par nos administres, a 
une main d'oeuvre progressivement specialisee, normale- 
ment remuneree, et convenablement nourris.110
He abolished direct administrative involvement in the recruite-
ment of prestataires for private enterprises and substituted the
day of liability
prestations with an additional tax of 5 francs for each^in 25 out 
of 109 cercles in French West Africa, 8 of which were in Senegal. 
The additional tax was exorbitant as minimum wage was 7 francs 
per day and other taxes had to be paid. The new tax
was partly offset by another decree which henceforth taxed 
persons of 14 years of age rather than 8.
The decree of August 12, 1937 recognized the Geneva Labour 
Convention and acknowledged forced labour only as a form of 
taxation. Subsequently, de Coppet extended the additional tax 
pay-off period from 3 to 6 months, reduced the term of the 
prestations to a maximum of 4 days annually and implemented the 
8-hour working day. Finally, he stipulated that only 25% of the 
male population between the ages of 18 and 4 5 would be recruited 
for military service thereafter.
The execution of de Coppet's instructions remained up to the
110. Circular dated August 16, 1938, Affaires Politiques. 
File 2808, ANSOM; see also Duquenet, "Le Front Populaire et le 
Probleme des Prestations en AOF," Cahiers &'Etudes Africaines. 
nos. 61-62, (1976), pp. 159-172.
111. Duquenet, op. cit., 1976, pp. 90-100.
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the individual goodwill of the governors and while conditions for 
the indiqenat and the prestations improved, the institutions were 
never actually challenged.
EDUCATION.
The foci of de Coppet7s 5-year education programme were to
enlarge existing schools, build 400 new ones (including the first
school for girls in Senegal) and offer more scholarships to 
Africans for the pursuit of higher education. The Lvcee 
Faidherbe in St. Louis was enlarged and William Ponty's
enrollment swelled from 75 students in 1936 to 100 in 1937, to 
152 in 1938.112 A girls7 school was built in Rufisque in 1938 
and the Lvcee Van Vollenhoven was constructed during the same 
year. Scholarships enabling Africans to pursue further studies 
in France rose from 8 in 1937 to 14 in 1938.113
While de Coppet was in favour of introducing African 
languages and culture into the education system, the Inspector 
General and head of AOF education, Albert Charton, strongly 
opposed his views. Charton was in favour of a Franco-African 
metissage culture that would assimilate Africans while allowing 
them to re-examine and retain their traditional cultures. Even 
though he recognized the key role that the African elite would 
play in the future, he essentially considered African societies
112. Journal Officiel de 17AOF. March 18, 1937, p. 337 and 
17G 17 96.
113. Paris-Dakar. November 6, 1938, and Periscope Africain, 
August 20, 1938.
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backward and inferior.114 After Charton's departure, de Coppet 
offered the post of Inspector General to Leopold S. Senghor who 
declined in order to pursue his own studies.
Finally, the Institut Francais d'Afriaue Noire was created 
in 1936 for the promotion of scientific studies in black Africa 
and particularly in AOF with an emphasis on the environment, 
culture and resources of the overseas territories. Founded under 
the auspices of de Coppet, IFAN comprised a High Scientific 
Committee based in Paris and a Research Council based in 
Dakar.11^
CONCLUSIONS.
The Popular Front did not set out to erode the foundations 
of the colonial structure, nor to contest colonialism per se.
Like other French administrations, it devoted only marginal 
attention to the empire and more importantly, it lacked a unified 
colonial programme. Even when the colonies were on the 
government's agenda, only North Africa and Indochina figured 
prominently. Black Africa was remote, tranquil and tightly 
ruled.
Coquery-Vidrovitch has argued that the Popular Front never 
questioned the French colonial past after it assumed power and 
that it was never committed to fundamental reform. However, even
114. Peggy Sabatier, "African Culture and Colonial Educa­
tion: The William Ponty School," Journal of African Studies.
(1984), pp. 2-10.
115. Journal Officiel du Senegal. (September 3, 1936).
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if the government did have a 'volonte politique revolution- 
naire,'116 it would have been unable to enforce radical policy 
overseas without threatening its very survival. The liberalisa­
tion of colonial rule that the Popular Front strove to introduce 
did not intimidate the colonialists, nor did it shake the 
solidity of the parti colonial (as exemplified in the ill-fated 
Blum-Violette bill). In fact, considering that the Groupe 
Colonial (reconstituted in 193 6) boasted 220 members in the 
Chamber of Deputies, it is no surprise that the administration 
had few chances of initiating, let alone implementing, socialist 
legislation overseas.117
As a result, the socio-economic agenda of colonial reform 
drawn up by Moutet and de Coppet met with stiff opposition 
every step of the way and received little support outside the 
small circle of committed socialist administrators. For this 
reason, the Popular Front did not have enough confidence to stand 
by its programme of reforms and ensure it was properly enforced.
It is also important to contextualize the Popular Front 
within the larger framework of the interwar period in AOF— a 
period of insular and authoritarian rule. Governors-General 
Merlin, Carde and Brevie had wished to maintain a rigid status
116. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Colonisation ou Im­
perialisms : La politique africaine de la France entre les deux 
guerres," Mouvement Social. (1979), p. 64.
117. Le Courrier de 1'Quest Africain. (March 13, 1937) for 
the reconstitution of the colonial party.
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quo of limited assimilation and were reluctant to initiate 
political, economic or social change. The press was censored? 
political meetings were at best tolerated, under the continuous 
surveillance of the secret police; the abuses in the indiqenat 
and the prestations went by unnoticed.
Against this background/ the Popular Front era can be seen as a 
period of thaw in French colonialism, a liberal interlude during 
which the most flagrant abuses of colonial rule abated: the 
indiqenat and forced labour declined; the prestations were 
replaced by the additional tax; and the arbitrary authority 
of administrators was curtailed. On the socio-political level, 
the Popular Front was a period of openness and innovation: The 
political arena became receptive to new ideas and influences from 
France; literate 'subjects' who were not qualified to participate 
in electoral politics joined the trade union movement which 
provided a new outlet for political activity, as trade unions 
which had hitherto operated illegally now laid their foundations, 
and professional associations were formed. Metropolitan labour 
legislation (such as collective agreements, conciliation and 
arbitration procedures, labour booklets, etc.) was implemented, 
even if in rudimentary form. The right to strike was fully 
exercised, a host of strikes were resolved to the satisfaction of 
the workers, and in many cases, their demands for salary in­
creases were met.
Yet the majority of the Popular Front's reforms remained on 
the drawing board, partly because of the formidable opposition of
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the 'colonial party,' but also because the lower echelons of the 
colonial administration were often reluctant to obey metropolitan 
orders (which they altered at will). As one
administrator put it: "Est-ce le gouverneur qui gouverne le 
qouvernement ou le contraire? La reponse va de soi: c'est le 
gouverneur qui gouverne.11118 However, even if the colonial 
reforms of the Popular Front were not fully implemented before 
the war, they laid the foundations of postwar French colonial 
policy-making and led the way for black political activity in 
French West Africa.
118. C.A. Julien, "Leon Blum et les Pays d'Outre-Mer," in 
Leon Blum: Chef du Gouvernement, op. cit., p. 38 2.
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Chapter II.
CITIZEN POLITICS IN THE THREE COMMUNES:
THE DIOUF ERA, 1936-1940
The Popular Front in Senegal marked a period of intense 
political and trade union activity which profoundly affected the 
political map of the country in a variety of ways: The emergence
of Senegal's first modern political party, the PSS. followed by 
the rise of Lamine Gueye as the leader of the first African 
branch of a metropolitan party (the SFIO Federation), changed the 
course of Senegalese politics; the spilling over of political 
activity from the communes de nlein exercice to the urban 
trading centers of the interior (by way of the Popular Front 
committees and SFIO local sections) was also a major breakthrough 
in the development of black politics in the protectorate; the 
sudden influx of socialist and communist Europeans in the 
political arena was responsible for the divisive politics of the 
SFIO, but was also a political school of sorts for Africans.
In fact, in a mere two-year period, possibilities of 
organizing greatly expanded for Africans not only in electoral 
politics but, perhaps more importantly, in the trade union 
sector. Trade union activity flourished, strike waves 
proliferated and the Dakar-Niger strike of 1938 paralysed the 
federation. This is not to say, however, that political and 
union activity reached the majority of the population; the 
Popular Front was almost exclusively an urban movement and its
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legislation did not reach the protectorate.
The greatest casualty of the political changes set in motion 
by the Popular Front was Galandou Diouf. Metropolitan politics 
jeopardised Diouf's deputyship from the very beginning: the 
legislative elections of 1936 were a difficult victory for Diouf 
while Lamine Gueye emerged as a formidable opponent. Before 
Diouf was able to consolidate power, the Popular Front 
administration was organizing bases of popular support among the 
urban population, seeking an alliance with Lamine
Gueye. When the Minister of Overseas France visited Senegal, it 
was with Gueye that he met, not with Galandou Diouf, the elected 
deputy.
From the point of view of the Senegalese deputy, 
metropolitan politics were instrumental in ruining his career, as 
the Popular Front increasingly relied on Lamine Gueye for 
support. However, the underlying reasons responsible for Diouf's 
decline were structural: his party was essentially an 
organization that campaigned only during elections, counting 
almost exclusively on the charisma of its leader. Before long, 
it could not compete with the SFIO which was a modern party, 
equipped with the latest in organization (regular party 
congresses, cards, statutes, etc.). In addition, Lamine Gueye 
was always one step ahead of his opponent, incessantly 
capitalizing on the administration's left-leaning sympathies.
An antagonistic relationship developed between Diouf and de 
Coppet, as the former watched his popularity and control over the
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colony dwindle while his opponent gained electoral footholds 
across Senegal. When an opportunity to neutralize his rival and 
reassert his authority vis-a-vis the colonial administration 
presented itself at the height of the Dakar-Niger strike in 1938, 
Diouf exploited the crisis to the fullest, temporarily reversing 
the fortune of his party.
It has been argued that the Popular Front's "net result in 
Senegal was the bringing of more local Frenchmen into politics 
and the exclusion of many Africans."119 According to this 
interpretation, "Local African politics did not recede but had 
their struggle for originality arrested by the Popular Front.
The greatest casualty was the Senegalese Socialist Party."120 
A closer look at the PSS, the SFIO, Lamine Gueye's political 
ambitions, the role of Europeans in the political arena, and the 
PSS-SFIO fusion paint a very different picture. Firstly, the PSS 
had many Europeans amongst its founding members in the late 
1920s, and in 1935 (before the advent of the Popular Front), 
there were reports of a further europeanisation of the party. By 
"europeanising" his party, Gueye essentially took advantage of 
his European friends and of the Popular Front administration in 
order to further his own goals and give his party a metropolitan 
outlook and mass base. Ultimately, even the colonial authorities
119. Wesley G. Johnson, "African Political Activity in 
French West Africa, 1900-1940," in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael 
Crowder (eds.), History of West Africa, vol. 2, (London: Longman, 
1974), p. 559.
12°. Ibid., p. 560.
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acknowledged that it was Lamine Gueye who benefitted most from 
the fusion of the SFIO and the PSS. and that the new party, 
notwithstanding its metropolitan name, was a xParti Laministe.'
By 1939, the SFIO had won crucial victories in Senegal and stood 
a good chance of winning the 1940 deputyship elections. It is 
unlikely that Lamine Gueye would have scored such victories were 
it not for the political climate generated by the Popular Front.
Before examining the impact of the Popular Front on the 
Senegalese political arena, a brief outline of two crises in the 
history of Senegal that are critical to understanding political 
activity in the late 193 0s is in order. This includes a) the 
1930-1934 economic depression and b) the death of Blaise Diagne, 
Senegal's first black leader and deputy of 2 0 years, in 193 4.
THE 193 0-34 ECONOMIC DEPRESSION.
After the prosperity of the mid and late 192 0s, the Great 
Depression inflicted a severe blow on the fragile Senegalese 
peanut economy. During 1929-30, groundnut production rose from
400.000 to 508.000 tons, but prices dropped from 2.500 francs per 
ton in 1927, to 875 francs in 1931 and exports fell from 500.000 
tons in 1930, to 135.000 tons in 1932.121
The majority of peasants and traders who had relied 
exclusively on the cultivation and trade of groundnuts suffered
121. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1934, 2G 34 5 . ARSD; 
see also Yves Person, "Le Front Populaire au Senegal (Mai 1936- 
Octobre 1938)," Mouvement Social. (1979), p. 83; and Sheldon 
Gellar, "The Politics of Development in Senegal," PhD Thesis. 
(Columbia University, 1967), chapter on the "Peanut Economy in 
Crisis."
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most. Their purchasing power declined, prices of imports 
(particularly foodstuffs) spiralled, and their standard of living 
deteriorated. Many deserted their villages and rushed to the 
urban centers where they faced rampant unemployment, plummeting 
salaries and inflated housing and transportation costs. During 
the period 1931-36, a wave of rural exodus swelled Dakar's 
population by 71%.122
The crisis peaked in 1932 when the contraction of the peanut 
economy began to affect not only commerce, industry and banking 
but the colonial administration itself.123 The federal budget 
which relied heavily on import-export duties, from a surplus of 
46 million francs in 1930, neared bankruptcy in 1932 with a 
deficit of 18 million francs.124
Blaise Diagne, Governor-General Brevie and the Bordeaux 
trading houses joined efforts and launched the 'battle for 
groundnuts.' The SIP were delegated the task of regulating peanut 
prices, intensifying groundnut cultivation and modernising 
agriculture.125 Diagne and the 'colonial party' pressed for the 
adoption of protectionist measures on peanut exports to the
122. Duquenet, "Le Front Populaire..." op. cit., 1976, p.11.
123. Gellar, "The Politics of..." op. cit., 1967, chapter on 
Peanut Economy, and Duquenet, "Le Front..." op. cit., 1976, p. 7.
124. Person, "Le Front Populaire...," op. cit.. 1979, p. 7.
125. Gellar, "The Politics of...," op. cit., 1967, chapter 
entitled "Peanut Economy in Crisis," and Duquenet, "Le Front..." 
1976, op. cit.. pp. 8-10.
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metropole.126 Their efforts succeeded in August 1933 when a law 
was passed establishing a system of fixed quotas and increasing 
duties for foreign oilseeds, thus practically forcing French 
processing plants to import Senegalese rather than foreign 
(particularly Indian) peanuts.127
Senegal's peanut economy began to show signs of recovery in 
1934. Diagne survived the crisis with the help of two 
indispensable allies: the administration and the Bordeaux firms, 
and with the continued support of the Lebou chiefs and the First 
World War veterans for whom he had obtained French citizenship. 
Yet, his well organized political machinery was not as solid as 
it appeared. The economic recesssion had intensified the 
dissatisfaction of the younger Senegalese voters and a group of 
small, but influential, French businessmen who condemned the 
deputy's pact with the administration and commerce.128 Some
126. Claudine Cotte, "La politique dconomique de la France 
en Afrique Noire, 1936-1946)," These de troisieme cycle. Univer­
sity of Paris VII, (1981), chapter "La sequelle de la crise."
127. The economic malaise provided an excuse for the 
colonial interparliamentary group which comprised 2 52 deputies in 
the French Parliament to press for a system of imperial 
preference as an antidote to competition from British and 
Japanese products in the world market. See Gellar, "The Politics 
of Development in Senegal," op. cit.. 1967, pp. 82-84. In 
reality, they saw in it the long-sought opportunity to tighten 
France's economic links with the colonies. French industrialists 
endorsed the efforts of the colonial group, but processing plants 
opposed protectionism.
128. Small independent trade companies went bankrupt during 
the depression while big Bordeaux firms like Maurel et Prom., 
Peyrissac, etc. survived and profited as the peanut trade became 
their monopoly. The Bank of AOF refused to extend credit to 
independent African traders and European businessmen who turned 
to the opposition for support. See Gellar, "The Politics of..."
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joined Diouf while others formed a new opposition party, the 
Parti Socialiste Seneoalais (PSS) to fill what they perceived to 
be a vacuum in the political arena.
Blaise Diagne's sudden death in May 1934 "iette le Senegal 
dans une confusion politique sans precedent.”129 The Senegalese 
political arena which had for 20 years been dominated by Diagne's 
paternalistic and uncontested rule opened up to a frustrated 
opposition. *Diacmisme' crumbled overnight as its supporters 
rushed to form alliances with Diouf or the PSS.
THE POLITICAL ARENA AFTER BLAISE DIAGNE130
op. cit., 1967, pp. 70-77.
The young voters resented Diagne's defense of forced labour 
at the International Labour Convention in Geneva in 193 0 and the 
absence of democratic institutions in the protectorate. His 
collaboration with the Laval government in 1931-32 as Under­
secretary of State for the Colonies and his long trips to France 
(which he now regarded his home) further enhanced his reputation 
of being a pawn of the establishment and a defender of the 
colonial system.
129. AOF, (July 7, 1934).
130. Minor parties such as the Radical Socialists and 
right-wing groups are not dealt with at length in this study. A 
brief outline of the parties and their activities follows:
After being dormant for several years, the Radical Socialist 
Party renewed its activity in 1937 with 50 European members 
(mostly civil servants) to support the Popular Front government. 
The party was headed by Turbe, the President of the Dakar 
Chamber of Commerce, and dealt exclusively with French issues.
See Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar et Dependances 1937, 2G 37 
1, ARSD.
The right-wing groups in Senegal (Parti Populaire Francais. 
Croix de Feu. Procures Social Francais  ^, were mainly local cells 
of metropolitan parties and were supported mostly by Europeans. 
All were against the Popular Front. The Croix de Feu boasted 
among its members the lawyer Paul Vidal of St. Louis and Dr. 
Sibenaler both of whom were also leaders of the PSS, [See Le 
Senegal, (February 20, 1936)] and tried to gain the support of
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a) Galandou Diouf and the Parti National Republicain.
Galandou Diouf was born in St. Louis in September 1875.131 
His father was a Wolof trader while his mother came from a family 
of notables. Diouf received a Catholic primary and secondary 
education but was raised as a Muslim. After teaching primary 
school in Dagana for two years he was discharged, following which 
he was employed as postmaster, conductor on the Dakar-St. Louis 
line and stationmaster in Dakar. Disenchanted with discrimina­
tion in the civil service, he entered the private sector where he 
restlessly drifted for many years from one occupation to another 
without much interest or success: as an entrepreneur in Rufisque, 
as an accountant for a successful Moroccan trader in Dakar, as 
chief accountant for the Bordeaux firm Buhan-Teisseire and as 
agent for the Paterson House in Nianging.132
Having established valuable connections in the public and 
private sectors, Diouf became the first African to enter communal 
politics when he was elected to the Conseil General of Rufisque 
in 1909. His public denunciation of administrative abuse quickly
Africans. For more information on the right-wing groups see De 
Coppet Report, May 6, 1937, Commission Guernut. C107, D19, ANSOM.
131. A rich biographical profile of Diouf can be found in 
"Note a/s Galandou Diouf," unsigned and undated report, probably 
written circa 1940, 13G 17 17. ARSD. For a good account of 
Senegalese politics in the interwar period see Wesley Johnson, 
"African Political Activity..." op. cit. 1974, pp. 542-567.
132  ^ Wesley G. Johnson, The Emergence of Black Politics in 
Senegal. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 146- 
149? see also Mamadou Diallo, "Galandou Diouf: Homme Politique 
Senegalais, 1875-1941," Memoire de Maitrise. University of Dakar, 
(1972), pp. 19-20.
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earned him the reputation of fearless critic of colonialism and 
in 1912, he helped found Africa's first political action group, 
the Jeunes Seneaalais.133
Two years later, he emerged as a key figure in Diagne's 
campaign for the legislative elections. To set an example for 
the Diagne recruitment laws of 1916, he enlisted as a volunteer 
and was quickly promoted to sergeant. Diouf returned to Senegal 
wounded in 1918 and was awarded the Legion d'Honneur.134 Next, 
he accompanied the deputy in his recruitment mission to AOF and 
in 1919 was elected mayor of Rufisque, under the Republican 
Socialist electoral roll.135
Signs of friction between Diagne and Diouf first became 
apparent in 19 2 0 when the former succumbed to administrative 
pressure and agreed to the restoration of the Conseil 
Colonial.136 Rumours of rupture began circulating after the 
deputy concluded the controversial 'pact of Bordeaux' in 1923, 
and compromised with the Carde administration. Enticed by Lamine 
Gueye, Diouf— then vice-president of the Conseil Colonial and 
president of its permanent commission— dissociated himself from
133. Johnson, The Emergence..., op. cit.. 1971, pp. 146-153; 
see also Phan, op.cit.. 1974, p. 28.
134. Mamadou Diallo, op. cit.. (1972), p. 27.
135. Three years later, he was dismissed from office after 
being implicated in a fraud scandal. The administration 
denounced him and Diagne failed to support him.
136. The appointment of 20 chiefs to the 40 member Conseil 
General ensured the administration a majority in the assembly.
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Diagne and joined the forces of the opposition.137
The Periscope Africain group (Gueye, d'Oxoby, Guillabert, 
Paul Roche)138 and the SFIO backed him in the 1928 elections but 
Diagne won. In the 1930 Conseil Colonial elections, Diouf's 
opposition forces (under the aegis of the SFIO) lost again to the 
deputy who had Governor-General Carde's support.139 Diagne's 
appointment to the post of Under-Secretary of State to the 
Colonies and his brief rapprochement with Gueye in 1931 further 
entrenched his leadership and split the opposition.
In 1932, the Laval government fell, the Senegalese economy 
struggled through the worst year of the depression, and Diagne's 
political machinery showed signs of disintegration. When Diagne 
died in 1934, the xDiagnists' did not rally to his protege. 
Duguay-Cledor,140 who thereafter exerted minimal influence in the 
political arena.141 Diouf defiantly boasted that "Diagne est
137. Cheick Anta M'Backe whom he had defended in the 
Tallerie affair was against Diagne and provided Diouf with ample 
financial support. See Mamadou Diallo, op. cit., 1972, p. 40.
138. The Periscope Africain. created in 1924, supported 
Diouf until 19 3 5 when it became the main PSS instrument.
D'Oxoby was the editor of the influential newspaper L'Quest 
Africain Francais. Guillabert was a Creole former President of 
the Conseil General, and Roche was a French militant socialist 
from Rufisque.
139. Carde was accused of electoral fraud and was replaced 
by Brevie.
140. Duguay-Cledor, the head of the PRS, was also editor of 
the Franco-Senegalais and president of the Conseil Colonial.
141. Apparently he had initially considered running for the 
1934 elections but quickly gave in to Gueye, Le Franco- 
Senegalais . (July 19, 1934).
69
mort, gt le diaanisme aussi. II n /v a plus que le dioufisme.11142
Unlike Diagne and Gueye, Diouf was jovial and accessible. 
Proud to be African, he was only moderately assimilated in French 
ways: "Galandou represente sa race... fill est considere par
tous les autochtones comme leur emanation directe.1,143 Those 
qualities were also the reason why the colonial administration 
disliked him:
Diouf est une mediocrite dans toute la force du 
terme... peu d'instruction, il n'a pas une person- 
nalite brutalement et foncierement improbe comme 
Diagne..
[II est] un tout petit politicien vaniteux, 
soucieux de faire payer ses dettes et d'epater ses 
compatriotes. Rien de l'envergure de Diagne.144
Administrative reports disclose that the younger generation of 
Senegalese voters had similar reservations for different reasons:
Sa simplicity et son langage direct et image, qui 
lui ont attire la sympathie de la population rurale et 
artisanale, ne sont cependant pas du gre de la popula­
tion intellectuelle qui desirait un depute plus 
preoccupe de leur avenir.145
Diouf was proud of the contrast he offered to Diagne: Muslim, 
polygamous, "Republicain. ancien combattant. cultivateur, et
142. Report of July 1, 1934, 21G 137 108. ARSD.
143. Note a/s Galandou Diouf, 13G 17 17. ARSD.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid.
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l'ami du peuple” was how he presented himself.146
Pour le moment, le Senegal n'as pas besoin a la 
Chambre des Deputes d'un representant savant... C'est 
un cultivateur qu'il lui faut pour aider 
1'administration a vaincre la crise.147
Next, Diouf abandoned the rhetorical campaign against the 
administration and the commercial establishment that had earned 
him the reputation of being a communist and sought their 
support.148
After 25 years in politics, Diouf won the 1934 legislative 
elections by almost 1.500 votes over Lamine Gueye and became 
Senegal's second black African deputy. Subsequently, he 
abandoned SFIO patronage, the Periscope Africain and some of his 
own supporters and founded the Parti National Republicain (PNR) 
which was only nominally different from Diagne's Parti 
Republicain Socialiste (PRS), Alfred Goux, an influential and
146. Report on the political arena after the death of Blaise 
Diagne and Report of June 1, 1934; 21G 137 108, ARSD; For a good 
discussion of Diouf, Diagne and Gueye in the 193 0s see Wesley 
Johnson, "The Senegalese Urban Elite 1900-1945," in Phillip D. 
Curtin (ed.), Africa and the West: Intellectual Responses to 
European Culture. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), 
pp. 139-188.
147. Report Of June 29, 1934, 21G 137 108. ARSD.
148. He even began a cordial correspondence with the 
Governor-General. On Diouf's efforts to rally the support of the 
colonial authorities and commerce see letter of the Governor of 
Senegal Beurnier to the Governor-General dated August 8, 1934,
13G 17 37. ARSD.
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ambitious French businessman,149 became his principal lieutenant. 
Goux was a highly controversial figure even among Dioufists, and 
his appointment appeared regressive to many evolues— a clear 
break from Diagne's Africanisation policy.150
After the elections, the PNR split into three factions: the
*Dioufistes-Socialistes' led by Louis Martin, Turbe and the 
Periscope Africain group; the * Dioufistes-Gouxistes' led by Goux, 
and Le Senegal; and a smaller clique led by M'Baye Salzmann. The 
origin of the discord lay in personal rather than ideological 
differences,151 and Diouf supported Goux. Following the trium­
phant 19 3 5 municipal elections and the appointment of Aby Kane 
Diallo at the head of the Conseil Colonial. Diouf became the 
dominant force in the political arena.152
Despite the rhetoric, Diouf faithfully followed in Diagne's 
footsteps: rigged elections, authoritarianism and personalistic
politics. The opposition press resented his unconditional 
collaboration with the administration and the import-export 
houses to the point that in 1935, it accused the deputy of being
149. Goux had important connections with the Lebou 
community, the Lebanese and the small French businessmen, and 
owned Le Senegal which became the mouthpiece of Dioufism.
150. Johnson, "African Political..." op.cit.. 1974, p. 559.
151. Le Proqres. (January 26-31, 1935) and "Notice a/s 
Galandou Diouf," 13G 17 17. ARSD.
152. Goux was now mayor of Dakar, Diouf was mayor of 
Rufisque and Aby Kane Diallo mayor of St. Louis.
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no more than 111'ami et le defenseur du crouvernement.1,153
b) Lamine Gueve and the Parti Socialiste Seneqalais (PSS).
Lamine Gueye, the son of a Wolof Tijani trader from St.
Louis was born in Medine, Mali in September 1891. After Koranic 
school, he attended the Institut des Freres de Ploermel and the 
Ecole Faidherbe. following which he taught in Dakar, St. Louis 
and Bakel.154 In 1914, he supported Blaise Diagne's candidacy to 
the deputyship as member of the Aurore de St. Louis group. Two 
years later, at Diagne's instigation, he went to Paris where he 
obtained his baccalaureat. served in the auxiliary forces of Lyon 
and in 1921 became the first African to receive a French law 
degree.155
Upon returning to Senegal, Gueye began practising law in 
Dakar. His reputation grew as a result of his drafting the 
Diagne recruitment laws and his defense of the municipalities of 
Dakar and Rufisque against the powerful Bordeaux firms Maurel and 
Prom.156 In 1922-23 Diagne parted ways with Gueye and the latter 
joined the Union Republicaine des Jeunes Seneqalais and the SFIO,
153. Periscope Africain. (May 4, 1935); It is interesting to 
note that only a few years back Diouf had attacked Diagne for 
being "l'homme de la finance, paye pour soutenir le gros Com­
merce, c'est l'homme qui est a la disposition du Gouvernement.1 
13G 17 17, ARSD.
154. Gueye's thesis dealt with the citizenship issue in the 
Four Communes.
155. Lamine Gueye, Itineraire Africain. (Paris: Presence 
Africaine, 1966), pp. 13-15; also Periscope Africain. November 
23, 1935.
156. Gueye, op.cit., 1966, pp. 41-43.
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while the following year he acquired the newspaper AOF from the 
former deputy Frangois Carpot.157
His first major victory dates to 1925 when he won the St. 
Louis municipal elections and became mayor and colonial council­
lor. A brief truce with Diagne came to an end right before the 
1928 legislative elections when Lamine formed a front with Diouf 
against the deputy.158 Gueye pursued a rapprochement with Diagne 
but eventually retreated from the political scene. In December 
1931, he accepted the post of magistrate in Reunion and was thus 
absent from Senegal during Diagne's last years of rule. Many 
Senegalese never forgave him for abandoning Diouf during the 
opposition's most critical period.159
After Diagne's death, Gueye immediately returned to Senegal. 
On the eve of the municipal elections, Armand Angrand (a former 
Diagnist mayor of Dakar), Charles Graziani (a French businessman 
and publisher of the newspaper Clarte), Silvandre (an influential 
socialist lawyer), and a circle of young Diagnists formed the 
Parti Socialiste Senegalais (PSS) and endorsed Gueye's 
candidacy.160
The PSS was organized along metropolitan lines, projecting
157. Ibid. p. 53, and Duquenet, "Le Front Populaire...," op. 
cit.. 1977, p. 16.
158. Gueye, op. cit.. 1966, p. 54.
159. Person, "Le Front Populaire..," o p . cit.. 1979, p. 85.
160. The PSS was originally known as the Union Sociale 
Seneoalaise. see 13G 10 17. ARSD? detailed biographical profiles 
on Angrand, Graziani, and PSS leaders can be found in the Fiches 
de Renseignements, (July 17, 1940), 21G 10 1 . and 13G 7 17. ARSD.
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the image of a modern metropolitan party with an ideological 
platform. Unlike the PNR which operated on the basis of the 
personal interests of an omnipotent leader and his cohorts,-*-^^- 
the PSS had a doctrine and statutes that were conscientiously 
formulated by an ad hoc committee and ratified by regular 
congresses.162 Party cards were issued, propaganda was carried 
out methodically in large cinemas to proselytize new members, and 
by 1935 the party boasted 5.500 members163 and branches in all 
the major trading centres of the interior.
Ce fut un evenement sensationnel au Senegal puisque 
pour la premiere fois, ici, on voyait se grouper des 
electeurs pour former un parti base sur un programme 
bien defini et dont 1'action devait etre commandee par 
des reglements bien definis.164
Lamine Gueye readily acknowledged that the PSS was ideologically 
indebted to the SFIO. The party programme called for the 
introduction of labour legislation, freedom of association and 
the press, and the reduction of taxes.165 It also criticized the 
limited access to French citizenship and condemned the indigenat.
161. AOF. July 20, 1935.
162. The statutes of the party were formulated at the first 
PSS Congress held at the Rex theater in Dakar in June 1935. Some 
3 00 delegates from all over the country participated including 
Turbe, Paul Vidal, Telemaque Sow, Graziani, etc. Gueye was 
elected President of the party? see AOF. (July 6, 1935).
163. The total electorate was 21.000 members according to 
Duquenet, "Le Front Populaire..." op. cit.. 1976, p. 23.
164. Periscope Africain. (November 23, 1935).
165. AOF, (July 6, 1935).
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Despite the label and rhetoric, the PSS was not a radical 
party. The fact that it emerged right after the economic 
depression partly explains its emphasis on socio-economic change. 
Thus, slogans such as MLes leviers de commande de la politique 
senegalaise doivent etre tenus par des mains senegalais" had no 
separatist overtones. The party criticized the abuses of the 
colonial system but never challenged the principle of colonial 
rule per se:
Nous ne visons pas... 'self-government' mais nous 
avons bien le droit de demander, en contemplation de la 
devise revolutionnaire, l'egalite de traitement dans 
1 'unite nationale, comme dans 1 'unite legislative.166
In fact, Gueye was both a model and herald of assimilation in 
Senegal. He was distinguished-looking, serious and a gifted 
orator in both Wolof and French, though he was less assimilated 
to French culture than Diagne. His newspaper, AOF, unfailingly 
argued that there were no obstacles to Senegal's complete 
political and cultural assimilation with France.167 "Notre 
tendance, notre but, notre ideal... c'est 1'assimilation"168 
argued Gueye and the political objective of the PSS was to 
maximise the fruits of this policy.
The leadership and clientele of the PSS were not radical
166. AOF. (August 24, 1935).
167. The PSS rejected association as an ambiguous doctrine 
which served to perpetuate the subjugation of colonial peoples, 
see AOF. (August 24, 1935).
168. AOF, (August 24, 1935).
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either; people like Turbe, president of the Chamber of Commerce 
and member of the Radical Party, Armand Angrand secretary-general 
of the PSS. and Graziani, vice-president of the party (both 
former Diagnists) had essentially formed the PSS in opposition to 
Diouf. The party's motto was "La defense des travailleurs blancs 
et noirs du Senegal."169 when in fact, its clientele was elitist: 
the PSS primarily addressed itself and appealed to the low and 
middle colonial bourgeoisie, the urban and literate civil 
servants, commercial employees, traders, artisans and young 
ambitious evolues.170
The year 1935 also marked the europeanisation of the PSS.
As more Frenchmen infiltrated the party, the columns of AOF and 
Periscope Africain reflected the vaguely humanistic, eurocentric 
and paternalistic attitudes of the SFIO toward the colonies.171 
'Capitalist colonisation' was repudiated in favour of 'socialist 
colonisation' which was hailed as the formula of the future. But 
the contradictions were more pronounced than ever:
...la colonisation est chose naturelle, bonne dans 
la pensee si elle est creatrice de richesse de toute 
sorte... a la colonisation capitalists fondee sur 
1'exploitation des indigenes, nous devons promouvoir 
une colonisation socialiste qui les affranchira en
Periscope Africain. (June 27, 1936). That was also the 
motto of Clarte.
170. Rapport Annuel sur 1'organisation, Circonscription de 
Dakar et Dependances, 2G 34 15. ARSD.
171. By 1938, AOF was largely indifferent toward local 
politics, see "Note relative aux mouvements sociaux interessant 
la Direction de Surete Generale an AOF, 1938," April 12, 1939,
21G 53 17. ARSD.
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faisant d'eux des hommes qui seront nos egaux. Nous 
voulons... une patrie senegalaise majeure et libre, 
maitresse de ses droits et de ses destinees, partie 
integrante de la grande patrie frangaise.172
Behind the scenes, Lamine Gueye was putting together a stronger, 
more popular and national party.
THE 193 6 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS.
Relying predominately on his reputation and status, Diouf 
embarked on a last minute tour of the principal urban centers, 
having already procured the support of the most influential 
voting groups: the Lebous, the Mourides, the veterans and
appointees in municipal politics, the commercial houses as well 
as the colonial administration's 'benevolent neutrality'.173
In sharp contrast, Gueye campaigned systematically amongst 
young voters, educated civil servants, the Licrue des Droits de 
1'Homme. the Radical and the Socialist parties. In addition, he 
adroitly allayed fears of the establishment that had designated 
him as a 'socialiste bolchevisant.' According to an 
administrative report,
172. Emile Boyer, Socialist mayor of Seine, AOF. (December 
14, 1935).
173. Renseignements, March 14, 1936, 20G 92 23. ARSD. See 
also Le Senegal. (January 10, 1936), and Periscope Africain. 
(August 8, 1936). Diouf also summoned the support of Duguay- 
Cledor and his Voix du Senegal group that had in 19 3 4 supported 
Gueye. Thierno Amathe M'Bengue of the Parti Republicain 
Socialiste Independant Diaqniste (Renseignements, April 4, 193 6, 
20G 92 23, ARSD) and the local right-wing Jeunesse Patriotes 
group of Pierre Taittinger also supported Diouf. Renseignements, 
March 18, 1936 and March 19, 1936, 20G 92 23. ARSD. The colonial 
administration as usual turned a blind eye to fraud and Brevie 
pointedly left Dakar during the elections.
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II apparait que le PSS, tout en restant fonciere- 
ment acquis a une vision des forces de gauche, est 
decide a se desolidariser, du moins sur le plan 
electoral, d'avec les partis de 1'aile gauche du Front 
Populaire; et a se reclamer au contraire d'une politi­
que de large collaboration dans le cadre national.174
The electoral platforms of the two opponents were remarkably 
similar in content and both claimed it was based on a "politique 
de gauche": equal salaries, indemnities and treatment for black 
and white civil servants; easy accession to high administrative 
posts and the implementation of metropolitan labour legislation; 
the restoration of the Conseil General; the creation of 
additional communes de pleine exercice: compulsory primary 
education for the full communes; the protection of the peanut 
economy and the abolition of the indigenat.175
In fact, what differentiated the two parties was their con­
stituencies and, less importantly, their manner of electioneering 
and style (Gueye used sophisticated socialist jargon). Diouf 
relied on the traditional elites (the Lebous, the veterans, 
municipal appointees, etc.) while Gueye appealed to the newer 
elite (teachers, interpreters, traders, low and middle civil 
servants).
On the eve of the elections, the administration reported 
that "II n'est pas exagere de dire que l'avenir tout entier des
174. Renseignements, March 4, 1936, 20G 92 23. ARSD.
175. Le Senegal. "Profession de foi de Galandou Diouf," 
(April 16, 1936); See also 17G 9 2 23; 20G 92 23. ARSD and AOF, 
(April 25, 1936) .
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deux partis politiques en presence est en ieu.lt178 mostly 
because a host of Diouf's most important supporters deserted him 
at the very last minute (Amadou N'Doye, Louis Martin, etc.).
Even though at first it seemed that Diouf had won a landslide 
victory (with 8.323 votes against Gueye's 4.288), after verifica­
tion, 2.874 votes were cancelled. The electoral body had swelled 
from 17.000 to 21.000 partly due to the fact that 'subjects' 
voted illegally, 'citizens' voted up to 10 or 15 times, and votes 
were cast on behalf of the deceased.177
In reality, Diouf had won a difficult victory which Gueye 
subsequently contested in a telegram addressed to Blum. In it, 
he accused the Governor-General of being the deputy's puppet, 
assuming that the Prime Minister would gladly annul Diouf's 
victory.178 Thus, the irony of the elections: Diouf who was 
already being identified with the establishment and whom the 
opposition press accused of being National Front was elected 
against a socialist candidate only a few days before the 
socialist government took power in France.
Diouf struggled to prove that the elections did not have a 
"political" character:
176. Renseignements, March 4, 1936, 20G 92 23. ARSD and AOF. 
April 11, 1936.
177. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1936, 2G 36 5 . ARSD; 
and also Periscope Africain. (May 6, 1936).
178. Telegram of Gueye, undated, 20G 92 23. ARSD.
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II n'y a en AOF ni Front Populaire, ni Front 
National... Son [Lamine Gueye] echec ne signifie pas 
que les electeurs ont vote contre les socialistes plus 
que mon succes ne veut dire qu'ils ont elu un adver- 
saire du Rassemblement Populaire.179
Despite Diouf's victory, the opposition press was swept by a mood 
of euphoria. They condemned previous colonial adminstrations and 
particularly Brevie's proconsulate as a "regime de pourriture11 
and praised de Coppet and his team of socialist collaborators 
(Lefebvre, Governor of Senegal, Geismar, Secretary-General of 
AOF, and Ponzio, Administrator of Dakar), presaging the dawn of a 
new era:
Depuis l'avenement du Front Populaire la politique 
coloniale est devenue un des principaux soucis du 
gouvernement republicain qui lui reserve toute sa 
sollicitude.180
THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE POPULAR FRONT.
a) The Creation of Popular Front Committees.
Popular Front committees were formed throughout Senegal by 
order of the National Committee, the first having been founded in 
Dakar in May 193 6 by Alibert fLiaue des Droits de 1'Homme), 
Graziani (PSS), le Dallic (PCF-Section Senegalaise), Turbe (Parti
179• Le Senegal. (June 19, 1936).
18°. AOF, (June 4, 1936). Brevie was accused of 
systematically barring Africans from the higher echelons of the 
administration, of discriminating against the lower cadre civil 
servants and of encouraging the creation of fascist leagues; see 
Periscope Africain. (August 22, 1936).
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Radical) and others.181 All members182 pledged allegiance to the 
Popular Front and actively encouraged Africans to participate in 
political life.
The Popular Front committees organized festivities to 
commemorate July 14 in Dakar and St. Louis. Street demonstra­
tions were a novelty in Senegal. For this reason, when crowds of
6.000 Popular Front sympathizers marched with placards and 
French, Communist and PSS flags it was reported that:
Pour la premiere fois a Dakar on a vu flotter au 
vent le drapeau rouge et pour la premiere fois aussi on 
a entendu les accents et le chant de 1'Internationale. 
II y a vraiment quelque chose de change.183
Diouf7s party did not participate in the festivities and its 
absence was exploited by the PSS which now posed as a *partie 
integrante7 of the Popular Front, claiming that the new govern­
ment would annul the deputy's programme.184
181. AOF, (June 4, 1936); and letter of de Coppet dated June 
5, 1937; see also Commission Guernut, C 107, D 19, ANSOM; 21G 84 
17, ARSD; and Periscope Africain, (July 11, 1936) .
182. Lique des Droits de 1'Homme. SFIO. PCF, Parti Radical.
PSS, Svndicat Air-France, CGT, Svndicat PTT. Svndicat des 
Inscrits Maritimes, Association des Travaux Publiaues, 21G 84 17, 
ARSD.
183- AOF. (August 1, 1936).
184. AOF, (August 1, 1936) and Periscope Africain. (May 16,
1936). Galandou's caustic response that appeared in the 
metropolitan press further dissociated him from de Coppet.
Afrigue Francaise. (August-September 1936), and Jean Suret- 
Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, (New York: Pica 
Press, 1971), p. 457.
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b) The Foundation of the PCF— Section Seneaalaise.
A Communist party was formed in Dakar under the auspices of 
Governor Ponzio by le Dallic, manager of Air-France, in July 1936 
after a visit from the editor of the communist daily 
L'Humanite.185 Initially, it was composed mostly of Air-France 
and Treasury employees. Its attitudes toward the Senegalese were 
no different from any other party: only French citizens were 
allowed as full members while subjects were treated as "membres 
svmoathisants."i^6
During its first year of operation, the PCF's 96 active 
members attempted to influence local organizations affiliated to 
metropolitan groups like the Dakar-Niger trade union and the 
Section Dakaroise de Radio Liberte.187 However, after the 
party's leaders Descombes and Lajus left Dakar, the PCF began to 
disintegrate. In 1937, the central committee became totally 
disinterested in the local AOF groups and lost a good opportunity 
to create bases across the Federation.188
c) Moutet's Trip to Senegal (September 27-October 5. 1936).
Moutet's initiative to tour AOF. personally announce de
185. De Coppet, June 5, 1937, Commission Guernut. C 107, D 
19, ANSOM. Renseignements, July 1936, 21G 137 108, ARSD.
186. Rapport Annuel, Dakar et Dependances, Commission 
Guernut. File 6, B 35, ANSOM, 1936.
187. Yet they did not become involved in any strikes during 
1936, see de Coppet, June 5, 1937, Commission Guernut. C 107, D 
19, ANSOM.
188. Ponzio to de Coppet, October 9, 1939, 21G 53 17, ARSD.
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Coppet's proconsulate and deliberate upon African demands further 
raised African hopes for reform. After a grand reception in 
Dakar, organized by the Popular Front committee, Gueye presented 
Moutet and de Coppet with a list of reforms such as 'equal work, 
equal pay,' tax cuts and the abolition of the prestations. 
Claiming to be the 'lawyer of colonial peoples', the Colonial 
Minister totally evaded Gueye's demands and focused instead on 
the urgency of 'moral unity' between France and the overseas 
territories.189 Left-wing rhetoric alternated with moderate 
republicanism. Moutet called for the amelioration of the peasant 
standard of living yet, during his 8 day tour in Senegal, he only 
spent one hour in a single African village.190
After the reception, a soiree was held at de Coppet's 
residence bringing together 7 00 Frenchmen and, to everyone's 
surprise, 700 Senegalese. Horrified by this novelty, the 
colonialist press in France grossly exaggerated the somewhat 
unfortunate ending of the party:
Vers 11 heures, on n'y voyait que des indigenes en 
boubous sales, repugnants. C'etaient des graisseurs de 
voiture de chez Renault, des manoeuvres du port...
Ivres, ils cassaient les verres et tous vomissaient 
devant le buffet.191
Diouf blamed de Coppet for allowing things to get out of hand,
189. AOF, (September 26, 1936).
190. Paris-Dakar. (October 5, 1936), interview with Moutet, 
and also 17G 220. ARSD. The village was Tiavando.
191. Courrier Colonial (October 16, 1936) , Paoiers Moutet, 
File 8, ANSOM and Annales Coloniales. (October 1936).
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while the European colonialists came to the realisation that the 
deputy could henceforth be used against the Governor-General.
On the whole, Moutet's trip was interpreted very differently 
in France and in Senegal. The metropolitan left-wing press was 
surprised at its moderate and somewhat inconsequential tone while 
the colonialist press was alarmed at its radical implications and 
expressed open hostility. For the Senegalese, Moutet's trip was 
important in several ways: this was the first time that, upon 
assuming office, a Colonial Minister had visited the territories 
under his jurisdiction in order to personally present his 
Governor-General. It was also the first time that colonisers and 
colonised were brought together to discuss the political rights 
and aspirations of Africans.
d) The SFIO.
Before the advent of the Popular Front government, the SFIO 
in Senegal was represented by a rudimentary, semi-clandestine 
clique of isolated European militants who had minimal, if any, 
connections with the metropolitan party. One finds references to 
a Dakar section in 1928 with Roger Roche as secretary general, 
and the Senegalese Galandou Diouf, Magatte Ba, and Louis Martin 
(editor of the Periscope Africain  ^ as militant members.
After the victory of the left in France, Maurice Jacquin 
(founder of the weekly Courrier de 1'Quest Africain) assisted by 
European trade unionists from Air-France, organized scattered 
party members into SFIO sections in order to absorb the opposi­
tion and provide a platform for black socialist activity through­
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out AOF.192 The structure, statutes and congresses of the party 
were modelled on the metropolitan SFIO from which it received its 
policy line. The platform of the party focused on the purge of 
the colonial administration, the immediate application of social 
legislation without exception overseas and the creation of the 
Ecole Laique.193
Two main factions split the Dakar-based party during its 
first year of operation, primarily over the issue of African 
membership and progressively over ideological affiliation.194 
The Jaquin-Alberti-Roche group initially had an almost 
exclusively European membership that deliberated over French 
issues. The rationalisation for not admitting Africans except on 
an individual basis was that metropolitan politics were not 
relevant in the colonies. Gradually, 100 Senegalese swelled the 
ranks of the 3 50-member group but they were not allowed to belong 
to both the SFIO and the PSS. In fact, the PSS was regarded as 
"une organisation qui ne nous concerne pas” because the SFIO 
exerted no control over it.195
Just before the SFIO National Congress of November 1936,
Tety (member of the Colonial Commission of the Socialist Party),
192. Rapport Annuel Dakar et Dependances, 193 6, Commission 
Guernut. B 35, ANSOM.
193 ^ AOF, (May 8, 1937) "Congres Consultatif du SFIO, May 
2-3, 1937;" see also Periscope Africain. (May 15, 1937).
194. The Courrier de l7Quest Africain mentions a third 
faction briefly surfacing with Tety in 193 7 that only gathered 
55 members and exerted marginal influence in the party.
195. Courrier de 1'Quest Africain. (February 13, 1937).
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instructed Etienne Alibert (founding member of the PSS) to found 
a mixed Socialist Federation in Senegal.196 The Alibert-Martin 
faction began with only 14 Europeans and 50 Senegalese (among 
them Mamadou Assane N'Doye and Agrand) who were also members of 
the PSS. By May 1937, it boasted 787 members and admitted 
Senegalese on a collective basis.197
SFIO sections were created in all the major urban
centres.19® The Alberti-Martin faction was the mouthpiece of the
Popular Front proper while the Jaquin-Alibert-Roche group 
supported an extreme-left clique, the Gauche Revolutionnaire.199 
The latter engaged in long discourses on class politics, anti­
imperialism and the urgency of independence, thus exposing 
Africans to some overt criticism of colonialism and to the 
bickering factionalism that characterized metropolitan politics.
The creation of the SFIO in Senegal, the first African 
branch of a metropolitan party founded by Europeans, seems 
paradoxical considering that a local socialist party had only 
recently been founded. If anything, it points to the vacuum in 
which the SFIO began operating, independently of local political
196. Rapport Annuel Dakar et Dependances, 193 6, Commission 
Guernut, File 60, Dossier B 35, ANSOM; also AOF, (December 19,
1936 and April 1, 1939).
197. AOF, (May 8, 1937).
198. Ten sections were present at the party's founding 
congress in May 2-3, 1937. Ibid, and also Periscope Africain.
(May 15, 1937) .
199. Note relative aux mouvements sociales de la Direction 
de la Surete Generale en AOF, 1937; 21G 70 17, ARSD.
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dynamics and presupposing a de facto superiority of political 
know-how over the Africans. Suffice it to note that the concur­
rent existence of four socialist groups accusing one another of 
being "faux socialistes" while each claiming legitimacy and 
authenticity must have constituted an enlightening political 
lesson for Africans.200
More important, however, was the creation of Popular Front 
committees and SFIO branches in the protectorate: The spilling 
over of political activity beyond the Three Communes into the 
peanut belt of the interior (Kaolack, Diourbel, etc.) signalled a 
crucial development in the evolution of Senegalese politics: the 
emergence of the urban trading centres of the protectorate as a 
political force.201
200. Wesley Johnson argues that there were three socialist 
parties while in reality there were only the SFIO Federation and 
the PSS. The former had split in three factions which were not 
distinct political parties. Nor was there, as Johnson maintains, 
a socialist party with exclusive European membership that barred 
Africans from its ranks. Johnson, "African Political 
Activity..," o p . cit.. 1974, p. 561.
201. See Gellar, "The Politics of..," o p . cit.. 1967, pp. 
88-89, for an insightful parallel between the power structure of 
the SFIO and the structure of the Senegalese economy.
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THE PSS-SFIO FUSION.
Like the SFIO. the PSS was undergoing its own internal 
crisis during this period. The party's influential militants 
were either former Diagnists or young intellectual civil servants 
who belonged to both the PSS and the SFIO. The former wanted the 
PSS to safeguard its identity in order to win over the Dakar and 
Rufisque municipalities and the much sought-after key posts in 
the Conseil Colonial. The latter wanted to merge with the SFIO 
and lead the new party.
In turn, the SFIO was hoping to dissolve the PSS. admit as 
full members only the educated evolues. and cluster 'subjects' in 
the local support groups as 'sympathizers.'202 In 1937, the 
party called upon Lamine Gueye (who was a member of both par­
ties) , to decide whether he would resign from the SFIO and lead 
the PSS or else agree to conform to SFIO doctrine.203
1936 proved to be a crucial year in Gueye's career. Despite 
the electoral defeat in the deputyship elections, he suddenly 
found himself in a singularly favourable position: the Popular 
Front administration had identified its interests with Gueye and 
had generously recompensed him for his support.204 His relation­
202. Renseignements, January 22, 193 8, 21G 147 108. ARSD.
203. Rapport Politique Annuel, Police et Surete, Dakar et 
Dependances, 1937, 2G 37 33. ARSD.
204. First he was appointed tax consultant to the Colonial 
Ministry, then entrusted with the collection of documents 
pertaining to private law in AEF and finally he was appointed to 
the newly founded Commission des Coutumes Africaines and the 
Fixation du Droit Africain committees Paoiers Moutet. File 4, 
Dossier 107, ANSOM; see also Rapport Annuel, Police et Surete,
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ship with the government markedly enhanced Gueye's stature as a 
leader so that by 1938, he boasted that if general elections were 
held, he would get 80% of the votes. The colonial administration 
even remarked that
Le PSS presente une vitalite qui parait loin d'etre 
a dedaigner et il n'est pas prouve qu'il consentirait, 
le cas echeant, a se laisser dissoudre. C'est peut- 
etre, un des elements qui decideront de 1'election 
legislative du Senegal en 1940.205
It was on the electoral front that the PSS and the SFIO 
became aware of their potential impact, if united. The first 
breakthrough for the socialists in Senegal was the complementary 
municipal elections of St. Louis in February 28, 1937. Six 
Dioufist municipal councillors had resigned in January of that 
year to express their dissatisfaction with the mayor Aby Kane 
Diallo, also a Dioufist. The PSS and the SFIO for the first time 
presented a single Popular Front list which won a landslide 
victory.206 It is interesting to note that the Dioufist list 
comprised in its entirety Senegalese candidates while one third 
of the Popular Front candidates were Europeans.
On March 3, 1937, the nine new councillors resigned. The 
Popular Front committee of St. Louis demanded the dissolution of
Dakar et Dependances, 1937, 2G 37 33. ARSD.
205. Rapport Politique Annuel d'Ensemble, 1937, Dakar et 
Dependances, 2G 37 1 . ARSD.
206. Periscope Africain. (March 6, 1937); see also Note 
relative aux mouvements sociaux de la Direction de la Surete 
Generale en AOF, 21G 70 17. ARSD.
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the municipal council but the Governor of Senegal, observing 
political neutrality, decided against it. The nine Popular Front 
members were reelected in May (1.191 votes for the Popular Front 
versus 633 for the Dioufists).207 Violence erupted when Aby Kane 
Diallo and his supporters were accused of illegally using a 
second set of ballots. The mayor charged the police with 
violating electoral neutrality and called in a force of tirail­
leurs who aggravated the riot. De Coppet and the Periscope 
Africain deplored Diallo's abuse of power and suggested he be 
removed from office.208
The following day, the Popular Front councillors resigned 
for the third time and the municipal council was dissolved. The 
elections of June 27, 1937 were again victorious for the Popular 
Front (1.251 votes against 908 for the Dioufists) and Paul Vidal 
(vice president of the PSS) was elected mayor,209 along with 14 
PSS and five SFIO municipal councillors. One of the causes of 
the Dioufist party's defeat lay in the authoritarian Aby Kane 
Diallo who was highly unpopular even within his own party.
A month later, the Popular Front won the July 20, 1937 
Conseil Colonial elections by 23 votes against Diallo's 17 votes.
207. Telegram of de Coppet to Moutet dated March 1, 1937, 
Affaires Politiques. File 849, Dossier 1, ANSOM.
208. Letter of de Coppet to Moutet dated June 14, 1937, 
Affaires Politiques. File 828, Dossier 3, ANSOM; see also 
Periscope Africain. March 20, 1(037, and letter of de Coppet dated 
March 3, 1937 in Affaires Politiques, File 849, Dossier 1, ANSOM.
209. Periscope Africain. (July 10, 1937); see also Liste des 
Conseillers Municipaux elus aux elections municipaux, June 27, 
1937, St. Louis, Affaires Politiques. File 849, Dossier 1, ANSOM.
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Mustapha Malick Gaye was elected president and Robert Delmas vice 
president.210 The complementary elections of September 18, 1938, 
three months after the PSS-SFIO fusion, further consolidated the 
Socialist Federation's position with an unprecedented victory 
over Diouf (1.526 votes for the Popular Front versus 862 for the 
Dioufists).211
The PSS and the SFIO had sought a rapprochement for elec­
toral purposes. Moreover, in pursuing a fusion, both parties 
believed they would absorb the other in due time. The PSS 
Congress of June 5-6, 1938, voted almost unanimously in favour of 
a fusion between the two parties and appointed Lamine Gueye 
secretary-general, delegate to the National Council and member of 
the SFIO Colonial Commission. Alibert maintained his position as 
federal secretary and Ibrahima Seydou N' Daw (a powerful trader 
from Kaolack) and Telemaque Sow (a leading journalist) were 
delegated propaganda duties. The only ones that opposed the 
fusion were the Europeans Turbe and Graziani and rumours 
circulated that their motives were personal rather than 
ideological.212
The dilemma surrounding the fusion consisted in whether the
210. Letter of de Coppet to Moutet dated July 27, 19 37, 
Affaires Politiques. File 849, Dossier 2, and File 594, Dossier 
1, ANSOM; also cable of Beurnier to the Governor-General dated 
May 13, 1936, 20 G 93 23. ARSD.
211. AOF, (October 24, 1938).
212. Turbe had opted for the presidency of the Radical Party 
and Graziani feared losing his position as vice president of the 
PSS. The Congress also ratified the expulsion of Jacquin, Roche 
and two of their colleagues (Bonifay and Desaunay).
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PSS would become absorbed into the SFIO, reducing Gueye to puppet 
status, or whether it would remain a 'Laministe/ group within the 
SFIO under a different label, with Gueye as its leader.2-*-3 
During the party congress, Gueye ascertained that his goal was to 
"conserver intactes les forces que nous possedons mais en leur 
apportant l'appui des forces de France."2-*-4 However, his 
underlying message was clear: "Que SFIO ou PSS. le parti s'ap- 
pelle Lamine Gueve.”215 Administrative reports also confirm that 
the new party was *Laministe7 except in name and that Gueye was 
the winner of the deal, having used the SFIO to broaden his base 
and enhance his reputation.
Therefore, contrary to Iba der Thiam's argument which claims
that
La liaison qui existait alors entre ces deux partis 
[PSS and SFIO] fut en definitive si etroite qu'en 1938, 
le PSS se laissa purement et simplement absorber par la 
SFIO.216
and contrary to G.W. Johnson who has argued the greatest casualty 
of the Popular Front was the PSS, the fusion did not entail the
213. Rapport Annuel, Police et Surete, Dakar et Dependances, 
1938, 21G 136 108, ARSD.
214. Ibid.
215. Ibid.
216. Iba der Thiam, "Recherche sur les premieres manifesta­
tions de la conscience syndicale au Senegal, (la periode 1936- 
1937)," Annales de la Faculte des Lettres et Sciences Humaines. 
University of Dakar, PUF, no. 5, (1975), pp. 240; Johnson has a 
similar argument in "African Political Activity..," op.cit..
1974, p. 560.
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absorption of the PSS by the SFIO. It was rather an expedient 
and carefully planned stratagem which enabled Gueye to attain his 
stated goal of gaining access to a metropolitan party's machinery 
and know-how by swelling the SFIO's ranks without becoming 
absorbed into it.
It has also been argued that the fusion marked a culmination 
of assimilation and that Marxist jargon, metropolitan organiza­
tion and propaganda seduced the local elite with their sophis­
tication but arrested the development of indigenous political 
trends.217 This interpretation is largely correct: Following the 
1936 legislative elections during which the candidates' platforms 
were near identical, Lamine Gueye must have realized that the 
only way to beat his opponent would be to revamp his party and 
appeal to the ideological sensibilities of his constituency. To 
this effect, he formed the Socialist Federation. But the new 
party was composed of and ruled by Africans, not Europeans. (The 
PSS systematically barred SFIO leaders like Ostertag, Rogier and 
Silvandre from holding key posts within the party).218
DIOUF-DE COPPET RELATIONS.
Upon the ascent of the Popular Front, Diouf had proclaimed:
217. Suret-Canale, French Colonialism.., op. cit.. p. 456.
218. Rapport Annuel Politique, Police et Surete, Dakar et 
Dependances, 1938, 21G 136 108. ARSD; and "Note Relative aux 
mouvements sociaux," 21 53 17. ARSD; see also Affaires politi- 
ques, File 579, ANSOM. In August 1938, Angrand, Graziani, and 
Turbe reformed the PSS with the help of old Diagnist PSS members 
hostile to the fusion but the party remained of marginal 
importance. Renseignements, August 1, 1938, 21G 147 108. ARSD.
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11 Je suis avec le Front Populaire pour l'ordre et la legalite.
and spoke favourably of the Governor-General:
Marcel de Coppet n'est ni negrophobe, ni 
negrophile. II est negrojuste. II est un gros 
travailleur, anime de sentiments sinceres envers
1'indigene. II travaillera au mieux des interets du
? ? o pays.^
Yet, during the course of 1936, Diouf became increasingly anxious 
of the rapprochement between the opposition and the administra­
tion as well as of the overt displacement of his party. 
Exasperated by an impasse that befell him scarcely after elec­
toral victory, Diouf relinquished ideological party labels, 
defensively upheld the strictly local character of his politics 
and resorted to traditional Diagnist tactics:
Je ne suis ni radical, ni socialiste, ni 
communiste, mais je puis demain mettre 400.000 negres 
a la disposition de la France.
...dans ce pays, il ne peut y avoir ni communistes, 
ni Radicaux-Socialistes, ni SFIO. Nous sommes des 
Frangais. II n'y a ni Front Populaire, ni Front 
National, il y a le Front Frangais.221
For Diouf, the Popular Front must have been threatening from 
the start. After 25 years in politics, he had finally succeeded 
in winning the deputyship elections and the favour of the 
administration. Yet, within a month, his victory was being
219. Vendredi. (October 17, 1936).
220. Paris-Dakar. (October 12, 1936).
221. Renseignements, June 22, 1936, 20G 92 23. ARSD and Le 
Senegal. (January 17, 1937).
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contested and he found himself isolated on all fronts. His 
decline from protagonist to mere observer contrasted sharply to 
the PSS which was assuming the role of the dominant party.
An antagonistic relationship with far-reaching consequences 
developed between Diouf and de Coppet. In October 193 6, the 
deputy had presented his political programme to the Colonial 
Minister demanding the return of the Conseil General. 
administrative autonomy for the Three Communes, the abolition of 
the indioenat. and finally, the appointment of his friend Felix 
Martine, Lieutenant-Governor par interim,, to the post of Governor 
of Senegal. Diouf strongly urged Moutet not to overlook his 
requests (particularly the last one), or else "Ce serait... 
porter atteinte a mon prestige de depute dans ce pays..."222 He 
also sent a copy of his agenda to de Coppet asking for his "loyal 
and correct cooperation." In return, he claimed,
Chaque fois que vous aurez besoin de mon concours 
vous pouvez absolument compter sur moi. Vous pouvez 
etre certain que vous n'aurez jamais des ennemis avec 
moi comme certains le desirent.223
At the same time, Diouf admonished de Coppet that he would not 
stand by and watch his opponents ruin him.224
222. Letter of Galandou Diouf to Moutet dated October 20, 
1936, 17G 369 126, ARSD. Blaise Diagne before him also asked for 
the appointment of governors favourable to his policies.
223. Letter of Diouf to de Coppet dated August 28, 1937, and 
September 18, 1937, 17G 369 126. ARSD.
224. Letter of Diouf to de Coppet dated October 24, 1936,
17G 369 126. ARSD.
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During 1937, Diouf and de Coppet disagreed on most issues. 
The former campaigned for the extension of French citizenship (to 
the Anciens Combattants and the holders of the Croix de Guerre). 
The latter argued that neither 'subjects' nor 'citizens' actually 
wanted citizenship because they preferred African courts which 
allowed them to settle their disputes without external interven­
tion. De Coppet further argued that if citizenship entailed the 
automatic rejection of the statut personnel and the substitution 
of French for African courts, then the administration would be 
confronted with the problem of massive naturalisation.225 
Instead, he proposed the creation of a 'local citizenship' that 
would grant Africans political rights equal to those of Europeans 
but would not necessitate the renunciation of the statut person­
nel .226
Diouf repeatedly requested the suppression of the indigenat 
and the replacement of African by French courts but de Coppet 
objected on financial grounds. Similarly, when he demanded full 
municipal rights and metropolitan status for the Three Communes, 
the Governor-General claimed that the communes did not manage 
their finances responsibly. De Coppet supported what he called 
'pertinent assimilation' and gradual change. The upgrading of 
mixed communes to full communes was rejected on similar
225. Diouf also opposed massive naturalisation.
226. Letter of de Coppet to Moutet dated December 7, 193 6, 
21G 143 108. ARSD.
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grounds.227
While Diouf's frustration with the Popular Front on the 
aforesaid points cannot be overlooked, it was the added effect of 
the passivity of the PNR. and the influx of French socialist 
teachers and civil servants that supported the Popular Front 
which fuelled the deputy's suspicions and resentment.
Following the April 1936 elections, the defeated PSS became 
increasingly popular, while the victorious Dioufist party lost 
interest in its electorate, ceased much of its activity, and 
witnessed a dwindling of its power and infuence.
Le parti dioufiste ne reste puissant que grace a 
1'infuence personnelle et au sens politique du Maire, 
qui se depense et depense beaucoup pour conserver ses 
electeurs. Travaux d'edilite, secours aux indigenes, 
demarches et interventions aupres des particuliers, et 
des pouvoirs publiques, etc... sont les moyens avec 
lequels M. Goux essaye de pallier a la disaffection des 
electeurs envers le depute.228
During 1938, the Dioufist party remained inactive and the 
administration claimed it would loose the 1940 elections unless 
it changed its strategy.
The infiltration of socialist and communist French teachers 
and administrators in local politics and in the African press had 
a two-fold impact. On the one hand, it interfered with the local 
and somewhat insular style of politics in the Three Communes.
227. Letter of de Coppet to Moutet dated December 14, 1937, 
Affaires Politicrues. File 849, Dossier 3, ANSOM.
228. Rapport Politique Annuel, Police et Surete, Dakar et 
Dependances, 1938, 21G 136 108. ARSD; see also Renseignements, 
January 8, 193 6, 13G 17 17. ARSD.
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The French credo of "assimilatory socialism"229 was translated 
into the conviction that evolues had to be politically educated 
in order to overcome their "provincialism.1,230 'Democracy,'
'fascism,' French domestic issues, and marxist jargon became 
topical in the SFIO. particularly before the party fused with the 
PSS.
The political involvement of French socialist and communist 
teachers and civil servants further strained relations between 
Diouf and the administration. The European militants openly 
campaigned in favour of the SFIO, criticizing Diouf and his clan. 
For instance, Desaunay, a socialist teacher at the Ecole 
Blanchot, openly campaigned against Diouf at the St. Louis 
municipal elections of 1937. The deputy contested the elections 
and demanded sanctions against Desaunay, his entourage and the 
administrators Jaffre and Parenteau, but de Coppet denied that 
the aforementioned had engaged in illegal political 
activities.231 After the SFIO was absorbed by the PSS, the 
influence of the Europeans in the political arena declined not
229. Hubert Deschamps' term in "France in Black Africa and 
Madagascar Between 1920 and 1945," in L.H. Gann and Peter 
Duignan, (eds.), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960. Volume 2: The 
History and Politics of Colonialism, 1914-1960, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), p. 246.
230. Johnson, "The Senegalese Urban Elite...," ou.cit..
1972, p. 182.
231. Letters of de Coppet to Moutet dated April 19, 1937 and 
May 6, 1937, Affaires Politiaues. File 849, Dossier 1, ANSOM; see 
also telegram of Governor Lefebvre to de Coppet, February 27, 
1937; the same file contains reports on the inquiry into the 
Desaunay-Diouf affair.
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least because the opposition on the part of the evolues was 
particularly forceful:
...nous demandons, qu'on cesse de nous considerer 
comme des hommes de deuxieme categorie...
...au lieu d'avancer nous reculons, car malgre les 
protestations officielles de fraternite, la question de 
couleur n'a jamais ete portee a un si haut diapason...232
Diouf became further isolated when a Popular Front sym­
pathizer, Turbe was elected president of the Dakar Chamber of 
Commerce in 193 7 against Paul Charvin, the deputy's choice. In 
vain, Diouf attempted to arrest the decline of his party by 
putting pressure on de Coppet to abide by his rules. Dispirited 
and angry, he resorted to threats:
Je ne puis tolerer plus longtemps... que l'on 
semble ignorer la puissance de mon parti, et je 
souhaite aux responsables de cette situation de 
n'avoir pas a 1 'eprouver.233
Yet, the impasse that Diouf found himself in came to an end, 
albeit, violently, only a few months later.
THE THIES STRIKE OF SEPTEMBER 1938.
a) Background to the Strike.
The Popular Front era in France officially ended after the 
fall of the second Blum government and the accession to power of
232. Le Proores. (August 7, 14, 1937 and May 22, 1937), 
quoted in Surete Generale: Les revendications des originaires 
evolues vues a travers la presse locale 1936-1939," January 27, 
1939, Papiers Boisson. Archives Privees 30, File 6, ANSOM.
233. Letter of Diouf to Borrel, Governor of Dakar et Depen­
dences dated April 16, 1938, 17G 369 126 and also 13G 10 17. ARSD.
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Daladier on May 13, 1938. The new government excluded the SFIO 
from its cabinet and replaced the Colonial Minister Moutet with 
the former Governor-General of Algeria and resident General of 
Morocco, Theodore Steeg. Subsequently, de Coppet's enemies 
escalated their campaign against him and his colleagues.234
Meanwhile, Senegalese peanut exports rose to a record 
580.000 tons and the urban African standard of living declined 
markedly as manifested in the rice imports which plummeted from 
78.407 tons in 1937, to 35.170 in 1938.236 The ensuing 41 
strikes and 14 strike threats resulted in a wage raise of 15-30%. 
Seven 24-hour strikes broke out in 1938 when workers demanded 
additional salary increases and tax relief.236 Higher wages were 
only granted in one instance, while tax cuts were uniformly 
accepted.
It was the railway workers who found the most effective 
means of registering their discontent. The Dakar-Niger,
Senegal's (and by extension, West Africa's) most significant
234 . The French right-wing paper Grincroire (May 20, 193 8) 
accused de Coppet of encouraging revolts overseas and of a "manie 
d'abaisser les Europeens devant les indigenes..." It also 
accused him of receiving orders from Moscow for the demise of 
the empire. Other papers such as Paris-Dakar. the Annales 
Coloniales. and France-Afrique Noire also campaigned extensively 
against de Coppet. Conversely, a group of Europeans in Dakar and 
some evolues held meetings and addressed telegrams of support, 
see 21G 142 17. ARSD and 21G 146-7 108. ARSD.
235. 2G 37 15 and 2G 38 1 . ARSD.
236. CFAO workers struck twice; workers of the commercial 
houses, port employees, the personnel of the Maison Peyrissac, 
were among the strikers. See strike statistics 1936-1938, 
undated, unsigned, K4 1 . ARSD.
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nationwide corporative organization of incontestable strategic 
value, employed approximately 4 00 Europeans and 7.000-8.000 
Africans.237 It was headed by Albert Giran who was highly 
popular amongst Africans, and his not-so-popular assistant 
Lescanne.
Most European workers (along with a minority of Africans) 
belonged to the cadre superieur or the cadre commun superieur 
which meant that they enjoyed multiple benefits such as free 
accommodation, transport, hospitalisation, pensions, etc. Their 
union, the Svndicat des Travailleurs de Chemins de Fer de l'AOF 
(STCF-AOF) was a member of the Civil Servants' Union and 
comprised 2 69 Europeans and 34 6 Africans.238 Those Africans 
received a monthly salary and various benefits, including sick 
leave, holidays, pensions and basic health care.
The majority of the workers, however, were daily laborers, 
"irregulars" or "auxiliaries," working an average of 54 hours a 
week for 7-8 francs per day.239 They were often fired arbitrari­
ly and were deprived of rights and benefits. Their deplorable 
living conditions were no secret to the administration:
Les reglements en vigueur n'autorisaient ni
237. Note de la Surete Generale, December 5, 1938, K2 1.
ARSD.
238. Figures quoted from Duquenet, "Le Front Populaire.." 
op. cit., 1976, p. 199.
239. Giran report dated September 1937, 17G 374 126, ARSD; 
also Iba der Thiam, "La Greve des Cheminots du Senegal de 
Septembre 1938," Memoire de Maitrise, University of Dakar,
(1972), p. 51.
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paiement d'heures supplementaires, ni heures de nuit, 
ni retraite, ni indemnite de licensciement, ni incor- 
poration des journaliers dans les cadres.2*°
Some 3 02 agents de cadre, 680 auxiliaries, and 54 contract 
labourers composed the Syndicat des Travailleurs Indigenes du 
Dakar-Niger presided by Frangois Gning.241 As a socialist, Gning 
was committed to de Coppet from whom he anticipated to be rewarded 
with significant concessions for the African workers. Therefore, 
he was compelled to collaborate with the administration, par­
ticularly at times of heightened international tension and right- 
wing insurgence.242
As evidenced from the above figures, the majority of the 
auxiliaries remained outside Gning's union. In September 193 7, 
Giran obtained some concessions for the irregulars including paid 
holidays, sick leave, and hospitalisation. But as prices began 
spiralling and the African standard of living deteriorated, the 
auxiliaries became progressively hostile toward the moderate 
orientation of the Svndicat des Travailleurs Indigenes du Dakar- 
Nicer. Like a good French socialist, Gning was above all 
concerned with maintaining the status quo which he felt was being 
threatened by the unjustifiable demands of the auxiliaries. In
240. Rapport de l'Inspecteur du Travail, in ibid.. p. 199.
241. Its origins are to found in 1929 when it was launched 
as the Association Amicale et Professionelle des Agents Indigenes 
du Chemin de Fer de l'AOF. see ibid.. p. 55; see also Periscope 
Africain, (November 12, 193 8) and K1 1. ARSD.
242. Thiam, "La Greve des Cheminots...," op. cit., 1972, pp. 
116-117.
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his view, the irregulars were moving too fast and were willing to 
risk too much.
If the basis for misunderstanding between the auxiliaries 
and Gning was already there, Diouf's involvement in the crisis 
was the catalyst which precipitated the rift. Gning's real 
concern with maintaining the preciously acquired rights was 
distorted into an attitude of neglect verging on hostility toward 
the underprivileged workers.243
Diouf planned to seize the golden opportunity of offsetting
Gning's socialist union with a Dioufist counterpart that would
effectively pressure the Governor-General into complying with his
politics. His lieutenant was Cheick Diack whose brother was
Diouf's municipal secretary in Rufisque while his father-in-law,
Thierno N'Diaye, was the right hand of Maneck Seek, the PRS
representative in Thies and personal friend of Diouf since 1928.
Diack began organizing meetings with a circle of auxiliaries
under the pretext that Gning "ne s'occupe quere que des agents de
auxiliaries
cadre,"244 urging the a not to support him. In May 1938, they 
formed a delegation which was received by Lescanne on June 20. 
However, its demands for wage increases were rejected on the 
grounds that they lacked a union framework. On June 19, the 
STID-N general assembly witnessed absenteeism but the union 
continued to appeal for moderation and neglected to include
243. Ibid. pp. 118-119.
244. Renseignements, June 22, 1938, 21G 147 108. ARSD.
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auxiliaries in the executive.245 Gning found the auxiliaries' 
demands for wage increases unjustifiable:
En raison de la crise economique et politique que 
nous traversons, nous sommes obliges de peser nos 
doleances et d'aller doucement... En cette periode 
troublee par une crise economique excessivement grave, 
et par les nuages noirs qui s'amoncellent vers l'est de 
la France, nous devons nous serrer les coudes et rester 
plus que jamais unis.246
Meanwhile, the auxiliaries organized their own meetings and 
drafted their own resolutions. The apparent calm did not deceive 
de Coppet who was already foreseeing a strike.247
On August 8, 1938, the auxiliaries held an ad hoc meeting 
to discuss the formation of an autonomous union open only to 
irregulars. Gning immediately disassociated his organization 
from them on the grounds that they were creating
Un syndicat... plutot politique que professionnel 
dans le seul but de semer a tout moment du desordre au 
Reseau, ce que notre svndicat actuel n'admet pas.248
24 .^ Duquenet, "Le Front Populaire...," op. cit., 1976, p. 201.
246. Rapport moral de Gning, June 19, 1938, K1 1, ARSD.
247. In his words, "Priere... d'etudier 'dans le silence du 
Cabinet' s'il serait possible legalement, sans le cas ou 
eclaterait une greve dans un service public, par example au 
Dakar-Niger, de mobiliser les grevistes Europeens et 
indigenes..." Note de Coppet, June 23, 1938, 17G 374 126. ARSD.
248. Gning further urged de Coppet to act swiftly and make 
a "firm decision" to punish the 12 auxiliary leaders "qui 
esperent arriver a leurs fins grace a leurs appuis politiques," 
Gning to de Coppet, August 11, 1938, K1 1, ARSD.
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Lescannes underestimated the gravity of events. On
September 26, he conferred with the Thies commander par interim
and reported that 11 le mouvement des cheminots n'est pas in-
quietant."249 similarly, the security forces did not assess the
situation as critical.250 Yet, according to the Governor of
Senegal's report, that same evening the administrator of Thies
was informed by the police that the auxiliaries had decided to
against
strike in protest * the arbitrary dismissal of Cheick Diack.
b) The Setting of the Strike.
Diack who had by now reasserted himself as the head of the 
auxiliary movement undertook to travel down the entire Dakar- 
Niger line to rally support. The administration denied him the 
right to travel to Bamako and appointed him instead to a minor 
post in Gossas. It was evident that the authorities were alarmed 
by the schism in the union movement which had hitherto been under 
the firm control of the socialist Gning.251
An alternative rendition of events was sketched out by the 
Governor of Senegal: Diouf had first intervened in the Dakar- 
Niger crisis as early as September 24. While meeting with de 
Coppet, he extracted the promise that if Diack demonstrated good
249. Rapport Lescannes, September 26, 193 8, K1 1, ARSD.
250. Only 45 municipal of Dakar-Niger policemen, 5 gardes 
de cercle and 6 gendarmes would be mobilized.
251. Governor of Senegal Report, September 8, 1938, K1 1 . 
ARSD; Thiam has argued that Gning played a significant role in 
Diack's displacement; see Thiam, "La Greve des Cheminots...," op. 
cit., 1972, pp. 85-88.
106
will and took up the post in Gossas, he would soon be transferred 
to Dakar or Thies. Diack knew about this proposition before he 
left Dakar. Furthermore, Maneck Seek organized a strike during 
September 2 5 and 26, encouraging the strikers to arm 
themselves.252 Subsequently, Diouf ordered that the strike begin 
immediately.253
On September 24, the Director of the Dakar-Niger received a 
telegram from Coulibaly, the head of the Thies auxiliaries, 
demanding the annulment of Diack's transfer or else further 
unrest would break out.254 After conflicting responses within 
the administrative ranks, the Governor-General confirmed Diack's 
transfer. The next day, Diack headed for Gossas after a brief 
stopover at Thies. On September 26, the auxiliaries sent a 
telegram threatening to strike if Diack did not arrive on the 
27th.255
On September 27, 1.410 auxiliaries went on strike. A group 
of 300 demanded wage increases but resumed work after their 
foreman claimed he was not qualified to assess their claims.256 
Maneck Seek, (initially an outsider to the Dakar-Niger but who 
since August headed the Thies auxiliary section) exploited the
252. Governor of Senegal Report, ibid.
253. Redoute Report, October 1, 1938, K1 1 , ARSD.
254. Directeur de la Securite Generale Lefebvre to de
Coppet, September 30, 19 38, K1 1 , ARSD.
255. Rapport sur les evenements anterieures du Septembre
27, K1 1 , ARSD, and Lefebvre report, ibid.
256. Cau Report, March 30, 1938, K1 1 . ARSD.
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situation and hosted a meeting which had political, if not 
electoral, overtones. Some 60 to 80 workers simultaneously 
occupied an important level crossing to ensure no strike breakers 
interfered.257 A force of 80 soldiers attempted to disperse 
them. The strikers began throwing ballast stones at the police 
and at those who wanted to resume work. Violence spread rapidly. 
An isolated shot was fired, followed by approximately 50 more. 
Seven auxiliaries died and 125 strikers and policemen were 
wounded.258
At the end of the day, Diouf hurried to Thies, openly 
projecting himself as the spokesman of the auxiliaries.
Cette affaire sera portee a la connaissance du 
Ministre, on ne tue pas des noirs comme des mouches, 
nos revendications seront defendus; ne reprenez pas le 
travail.259
On September 28, the strike spilled over to Dakar, Guin- 
guineo, Louga and partially to Rufisque, Diourbel and Kaolack.260 
De Coppet mustered the support of the marabouts Seydou Nourou
257. It is not certain if the strikers arrived there before 
the soldiers.
258. Of which 45 policemen and two officers. Some 29 were 
only lightly hurt. For a detailed version of the development of 
the strike see Lescanne report to the Inspector General of Public 
Works, no. 31, October 12, 1938, K2_l, ARSD; also Duquenet, "Le 
Front Populaire..," op. cit.. 197 6, chapters on Thies strike. 
Diouf, de Coppet, and the Governor of Senegal each gave a 
different version of events.
259. Rapport Redoute, October 10, 193 8, K1 1, ARSD.
260. Iba der Thiam and Suret-Canale disagree on this point. 
The latter argues that the strike spread throughout the entire 
line while the former does not.
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Tall and Moustapha M'Backe to break the strike.261
Meanwhile, the European political arena was witnessing great 
turbulence as a result of the Munich Conference and rumours of 
general mobilisation. This state of affairs dictated an im­
mediate resolution to the conflict.
On September 29, a delegation was received by the Governor- 
General and an accord was reached according to which there would 
be no sanctions against the strikers and no further obstacles to 
the formation of the auxiliary association. Some compensation 
for the strike victims' families was promised. Finally, in an 
exercise of good will, the administration agreed to reconsider 
the question of wage increases.262
Seek warned that an agreement should not be signed without 
approval from Diouf. Finally, impressed with de Coppet's 
steadfastness, Coulibaly recommended that the strikers return to 
their posts. Diouf contradicted this order and insisted that the 
strikers should cease work until they were paid for all the days 
they were on strike. De Coppet refused to go along with this 
demand, and suspicions of Diouf's motives heightened:
Devant ses indications la faveur dont jouissait le 
depute semble en regression, les grevistes commencent a 
douter de son impartiality dans cette affaire, con- 
statant au surplus que depuis qu'elle a pris l'ampleur 
que l'on connait, on n'a jamais constate sa presence 
effective aux cotes de ceux dont il dirige dans 1'ombre
261. Tall reprimanded the strikers for disobeying the 
authorities, see Rapport Redoute, October 1, 1938, K1 1. ARSD.
262. Paris-Dakar. (October 1, 1938).
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I7action revendicatrice.263
Eager to have the last word and emerge as the person responsible 
for putting an end to the strike, on September 3 0 Diouf 
authorized the return to work on condition that he personally 
submit the strikers' demands to the Governor-General.
In order to appease the auxiliaries and put an end to the 
crisis, de Coppet contributed 2.000 francs to the treasury of the 
Association Amicale et Professionnelle des Agents du Dakar- 
Niger. visited the main railway stations and offered 1.500 francs 
to every family of the strike victims. In addition, he approved 
the statutes of the auxiliary association, increased the 
auxiliaries' wages and dismissed Lescannes who had mishandled the 
crisis.
c) The Aftermath and Implications of the Thies Crisis.
The strike was not only a spontaneous protest against meagre 
salaries, but a remonstrance against Gning's union that was 
indifferent to the great disparity in the standard of living 
between the auxiliaries and the agents de cadre, as well as to 
their rights and claims. It was also a call for the recognition 
of the dissident auxiliary union.264 From mid-August onward, the 
auxiliary movement
... a ete accroche par le parti... dioufiste a
l'effet d'un retablissement d'une situation locale
263. Renseignements, September 29, 1938, 21G 146 108. ARSD.
264. Lescannes report and Redoute report, op.cit.
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defaillante et de la reduction a merci du representant 
du parti adverse.26^
The Governor Lefebvre argued that it was not possible to prove 
Diouf's active participation in the auxiliary movement in the 
days preceeding the strike. Yet, Diouf intervened twice in 
favour of Diack and took great interest in Alassane Dieng, one of 
the leaders of the strike. But, it was after September 27 that 
his participation in the rail crisis was evident.
According to Inspector Redoute's report, the evolues were 
convinced that politics played a significant role in the Thies 
events and that Seek was responsible.266 Others believed that 
"... il s'agissait tout simplement d'une manoeuvre du depute 
contre le Gouverneur General."267 AOF reported that it was a 
case of
... une greve absurde, qu'aucun motif serieux ne 
justifiait. Ce fut 1'oeuvre malsaine de quelques 
politiciens deloyaux, interests a discrediter le 
Gouvernement actuel.
L'objectif des provocateurs? Faire partir pour 
toujours M. de Coppet... avec l'espoir de le faire 
remplacer avec un autre Gouverneur-General, plus 
malleable et qui accepterait meme de se compromettre 
pour 1'impossible reelection de Galandou en 1940.268
while de Coppet argued that
26 .^ Lefebvre report, op. cit.
266. "Bien qu'etant ni syndique, ni ouvrier, e'est lui... 
qui a porte le droit syndical sur le plan politique. Redoute 
report, op. cit.
26*^ . Ibid.
268. AOF, (November 5, 1938).
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...[les] indigenes ... ignoraient pourquoi ils 
faisaient greve... seul le bilan des victimes donne a 
un banal incident local un caractere de gravite qu'il 
n'aurait pas revetu sans la reaction des tirailleurs, 
qui se sont estimes en etat de legitime defense.269
In France, news of the strike infuriated the right-wing 
which resented de Coppet's 'scandalous weakness.' The Colonial 
Minister Mandel ordered that an investigation be conducted into 
the crisis (Gaston Joseph Inquiry commission).270 Essentially, 
the Thies strike signalled the end of the Popular Front era in 
Senegal, unleashing a second wave of propaganda against de 
Coppet. Mandel removed him from office under the pretext of 
vacation leave, following which he was transferred to Indochina.
Meanwhile, the Governor-General oar interim Pierre Boisson 
engineered a plan to neutralise and dismantle the trade union 
movement. Some 4 0 arrests took place in Thies, Dakar, St. Louis 
for rebellion and obstruction of the right to work.271 Addition­
al strikes followed but work was quickly resumed after the strike 
leaders were arrested. Diouf ceased to support the auxiliary 
movement and sided at once with Boisson who was not about to give 
in to the workers' demands or else, "ce groupement ferait la
269. Letters of de Coppet to Goux dated October 5, 19 3 8 and 
October 1, 1938, 17G 369 126. ARSD.
270. Significant changes followed the arrival of Joseph:
The Governor of Senegal Lefebvre was replaced by Parisot (Paris- 
Dakar October 26, 1938) and the authoritarian Cuneo was appointed 
manager of the Dakar-Niger.
271. Gana Fall, "Le Nationalisme..," op. cit.. 1979-80, p. 64.
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qreve chaaue fois.1,272 Only then did the Dakar-Niger irregulars 
realize that the alliance with the PRS was but a political tactic 
on the part of the deputy.
CONCLUSIONS.
The 28-month period of Popular Front rule in Senegal had 
profound and far-reaching consequences in the development of 
black politics and the evolution of the trade union movement. 
Contrary to previous administrations which had at best tolerated 
political activity, the Popular Front encouraged political 
participation (by way of Popular Front committees, the SFIO and 
the PCF) not only in the Three Communes but, more importantly, in 
the interior. The emergence of the urban trading centres in the 
interior as a political force marked the beginning of a new era 
in Senegalese politics.
De Coppet's objective was to harness and control the 
Senegalese socialist movement so as to monitor its development. 
The result was substantially different: Seeking an opportunity
to assume a leading role in the political arena, scores of 
Europeans became involved in the SFIO. Before the SFIO fused 
with the PSS, the SFIO was largely a European party preoccupied 
with metropolitan politics— in a sense, isolated from black 
politics proper (i.e. the Dioufist party and the PSS). Thus, 
even if many Europeans did become involved in local politics as 
Wesley Johnson has argued, it was not to the exclusion of
272. Rapport Politique Annuel, 1938, 2G 38 31. ARSD.
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Africans.
The SFIO—PSS fusion, though a triumph of assimilationist 
ideology, was scarcely a victory of the SFIO at the expense of 
the PSS. The legislative elections of 1936 had in fact 
demonstrated that Diouf and Gueye led parties with near identical 
platforms which differed only in terms of their constituencies. 
Gueye's alliance with the SFIO was a stratagem to invigorate his 
party with a metropolitan ideological and organizational ap­
paratus in order to help win over his opponent's supporters.
Under the Popular Front, the political consciousness of 
African 'citizens' and 'subjects' in the Three Communes was 
heightened through socialist-organized activities in more ways 
than one. Initially, the squabbling between the factions of the 
SFIO provided the evolues with invaluable insight into the 
dynamics of French politics— a dimension they had not witnessed 
before. In addition, Africans witnessed open criticism against 
the administration, the very principle of colonialism and the 
French heads of state. However, the Senegalese elite before the 
Second World War did not step out of the boundaries of assimila­
tion.
Les revendications extremes ne depassent point, 
toutefois, les limites d'une assimilation de plus en 
plus poussee vers une egalite absolue avec 1'element 
Europeen, et les jeunes Dakarois instruits sont sans 
doute ceux qui montreraient le plus d'hostilite envers 
une propagande a tendance nationaliste.278
2” . ihid.
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The relationship between Diouf and de Coppet grew 
increasingly antagonistic over the two-year period: the deputy 
expected the Governor-General to support him against the opposi­
tion, appoint administrators that would favour his policies and 
turn a blind eye to electoral fraud. De Coppet was not willing 
to perpetuate such relations. In addition, the development of 
Gueye's rival socialist movement further exacerbated the 
differences between Diouf and de Coppet. Notwithstanding his 
defeat in the deputyship elections of 193 6, Lamine Gueye had 
within a year won control of the colony and was cultivating the 
image of de Coppet's protege. Diouf witnessed a dwindling of his 
support and influence as the Popular Front and Gueye consolidated 
their own.
The Dakar-Niger crisis provided Diouf with perhaps the last 
opportunity to restore his power and play the administration and 
the 'Laministes' against each other. Thus, overnight, he found 
himself in a position of authority vis-a-vis de Coppet, the 
opposition and the French colonialists. While it is improbable 
that he engineered the strike, as Iba der Thiam claims, it is 
certain that he exploited it to discredit the opposition and oust 
the Governor-General, and with it the liberal politics of the 
Popular Front.
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Chapter III
THE WAR, VICHY AND THE BOISSON REGIME, 1939-1942
The Second World War in French West Africa constitutes a 
catalyst in a period of political and socio-economic crisis that 
unleashed forces and ideas which contested the status quo of 
colonialism and the de facto superiority of the European 
coloniser and put into sharp focus the development of black 
politics in the federation and the future relationship between 
France and her colonies. While Africans did not contest the 
principle of colonialism per se. the monolithic image of a France 
'une et indivisible' was forever shattered and with it a colonial 
order resistant to change.
Interpretations of Vichy rule generally fall into two main 
camps: the Vichyite and the Gaullist. Pro-Vichyite writers like 
Chenet and Martin du Gard274 have praised Boisson's lucid policy 
of neutrality for safeguarding the colonial territories (and by 
extension France) from German, British and Gaullist encroachment. 
Africans are hailed for their unfailing loyalty to the Vichy 
government throughout the duration of the war: They defended 
Dakar in September 1940 and willingly placed metropolitan needs 
for foodstuffs and raw materials above their own, stoically 
enduring the deprivations. The reported absence of African
274. P. Chenet, Qui a sauve l'Afriaue?, (Paris: L'Elan,
1949) and Maurice Martin du Gard, La carte imperiale: Histoire de 
la France Outre-Mer. 1940-1945. (Paris: Editions Andre Bonne, 
1949), La chronique de Vichv. (Paris: Flammarion, 1948), Le drame 
de 1'Afrique Francaise: Choses Vues. 1940. (Paris: Sequana,
1941).
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opposition and unrest in AOF is often cited as conclusive 
evidence of African loyalty towards France.
While the Vichyite interpretation did not survive the fall 
of the Petain-Laval regime, the axiom of African loyalty became 
an integral part of Free French war propaganda and postwar 
historiography. In fact, the Gaullist rendition of events has 
influenced scholars of both leftist and conservative persuasions 
who share the conviction that Vichy was an interlude of unprece­
dented authoritarian rule characterized by racial discrimination 
and ruthless exploitation of African peoples.
Le gouvernment de Vichy a replonge le Senegal 
dans les tenebres... quatres annees d'engouement, 
d'obscurantisme total ont fait reculer le Senegal 
d'un demi siecle qui ont sape les libertes 
democratiques et syndicales au profit de l'Etat 
Frangais autoritaire, paternaliste, totalitaire, 
corporatiste, catholique, mais surtout raciste...275
Africans are portrayed as passive and helpless victims of an 
aberration of French colonial rule delivered by the Free French 
who restored 'republican liberties.' Their alleged exemplary 
loyalty toward Free France exceeded even French expectations: 
they had fought for France, defied capitulation, resisted the 
Vichy regime and awaited for the opportunity to serve and save de 
Gaulle's France.
African resistance is interpreted strictly within the
27 .^ Falilou Diallo, "Le Senegal sous Vichy 1940-43:
contribution a 1'etude du regime politique du gouvernement de
Vichy au Senegal," Memoire de Maitrise, (University of Paris 1,
1980), pp. 2-3.
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Vichy/Free France framework. There is no hint to the effect that 
it might have been a manifestation of opposition to colonial rule 
rather than a protest against a particular metropolitan faction 
or else that it could have expressed a determination to protect 
self-interests.
The recent Marxian interpretation formulated by James Giblin 
has identified and challenged the presence of neo-Gaullist 
elements (such as African patriotism) in most contemporary 
historiography of Vichy rule.276 Giblin interprets Vichy as a 
period of African popular resistance to capitalist imperialism 
during which
.... a common people asserted themselves in the 
process of historical transformation and 
contributed to the molding of social and economic 
relations.277
It is further argued that Vichy interrupted the course of French 
colonial history and was instrumental in the formation of an 
African national bourgeoisie. While this interpretation sheds
276. In his essay, "The Image of the Loyal African During 
the Second World War and its Postwar Use by the French Communist 
Party," Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines, vol. 141, no. 2, 
(1980), pp. 319-326, Giblin criticises Denise Bouche, "Le retour 
de l'Afrique Occidentale Frangaise dans la lutte contre l'ennemi 
aux cotes des allies," Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre 
Mondiale. no. 114, (1979), pp. 41-68? D.B. Marshall, "Free
France in Africa: Gaullism and Colonialism," in P. Gifford and 
W.R. Lewis (eds.), France and Britain in Africa. (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 663-712; Hubert Deschamps,
Roi de la Brousse. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1975), and others 
for relying on Gaullist assumptions.
277. Jim Giblin, "The Vichy Years in French Africa," M.A. 
thesis. (McGill University, 1978), p. 24.
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some new light on the period, the material has been made to fit 
into a Marxist framework all too readily. Thus, Giblin's 
analysis of the economic effects of the war and particularly the 
shift of African production from export to subsistence crops 
which he interprets as a form of African resistance to colonial 
rule, is inaccurate.
The absence of literature on Vichy rule in French West 
Africa accounts for the fact that many gaps remain regarding 
AOF's military and economic involvement in the war, the nature of 
the impact of the Vichy regime on the colonies and the African 
response. Many questions still surround the reported 
"enthusiastic response"278 of Africans to the recruitment 
campaign of 1939, the African contribution to the war effort and 
its implications for French-African relations after the war.
What was the impact of wartime conditions and Vichy policy­
making on everyday life in Senegal? For whom did Vichy make a 
difference? How important was the military dimension of the war 
to colonial policy-making? What were the repercussions of the 
abortive British-Free French attack on Dakar? These are among 
the questions this chapter will attempt to address and 
contextualise.
AFRICAN MILITARY CONTRIBUTION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
The new colonial minister, Georges Mandel, was a
278. Mortimer, o p . cit., p. 45.
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conservative in the Radical Party. He had vehemently opposed the 
Munich agreements and aspired to a post in the Ministry of 
National Defense before reluctantly accepting colonial office.
His arrival at Rue Oudinot was eloquently described by the 
Governor Hubert Deschamps: "Moutet lui montra. sur l 7enorme globe 
terrestre du bureau ministeriel. ou se trouvaient les colonies 
francaises.»27^ Mandel was instructed to enforce war measures 
following the September 1938 session of the Council of Ministers.
a) Conscription.
Mandel generalised conscription in AOF so that by November 
1939, the number of recruits surpassed the total number of 
Africans enlisted throughout the First World War (180.000 
men).280 According to decrees promulgated during the interwar 
years, the draft applied to all males between the ages of 19 and 
28. In reality, the absence of public records in rural areas
27.9. Hubert Deschamps, Roi de la Brousse, op. cit., 1975, p. 
185. On Mandel7s career and activities as colonial minister see 
F. Varenne, Mon Patron. Georges Mandel. (Paris, 1947), p. 149: 
"La question coloniale ne l7avait jamais passionne: il connais-
sait peu le ministere de la Rue Oudinot." Claudine Cotte, "La 
politique economique de la France an Afrique Noire 1936-1946," 
These du H i e  cycle, (University of Paris VII, 1981), p. 45 
argues that "Sa premiere et quasi-unique preoccupation est de 
faire de son unique ministere un ministere militaire et s'achar- 
nant jour apres jour et sans desemparer a mettre I 7Empire a meme 
de repondre aux besoins de la Metropole."
280. "Observations sur les rapports sur le recrutement pour 
1940," Directeur des Affaires Politiques et Administratives to 
Chef de Cabinet Militaire, June 11, 1940, 4D 4 14. ARSD; see 
also Myron Echenberg, "'Morts Pour la France7: the African
Soldier in France during the Second World War," Journal of 
African History, vol. 26, no. 4, (1985), p. 364, for more
detailed information on recruitement during the two wars.
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allowed chiefs to recruit anyone between 16 and 40 years of age 
for the 1939-40 campaign.
Mobilization figures for the Vichy period fluctuate con­
siderably: administrative reports claim that between 80.000 to
100.000 West Africans were sent to the European front and another
118.000 were held as reservists or recruits in AOF.281 The 
historians Michael Crowder and Suret-Canale place those figures 
at 80.000 and 100.000 respectively, while Joseph Ki-Zerbo has 
raised the numbers of recruits and reservists to 127.320 for AOF. 
15.500 for AEF and 34.000 for Madagascar.282 Robert Cornevin has 
calculated that a total of 63.000 were sent to war and 24.000 
were reported either dead or missing at the time of the armis­
tice .283
281. "Observations sur les rapports sur le recrutement pour 
1940," Directeur des Affaires Politiques et Administratives to 
Chef de Cabinet Militaire, June 11, 1940, 4D 4 14. ARSD.
282. Michael Crowder, "The 1939-1945 War and West Africa," 
in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), History of West 
Africa. vol. 2, (London: Longmans, 1974), p. 598; Joseph Ki- 
Zerbo, Histoire crenerale de l'Afriaue Noire d'hier a demain. 
(Paris: Hatier, 1978), p. 470.
283. Robert Cornevin, "Le Corps des adminstrateurs de la 
France d 'Outre Mer durant la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale,"
Colloque: Les prodromes de la decolonisation de 1'empire frangais 
1936-1956, op. cit.. 1985, p. (8? see also Frederick Pedler in 
Main Currents of West African History, 1940-1978. (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1979), p. 5, cites that 65.000 soldiers were 
mobilized between 1939 and 1940.
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Table 1. 284
Men Incorporated into_____ Military Service
AOF and Senegal
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Senegal 11.143 2 . 045 4.700 2.428 2. 318 285
AOF 57.279 16.346 20.050 10.719 9 .908 5.290
Table 2. 285 
Recruitment in Senegal: January to June 194 0.
January 1940: 2.055
February & March: 1.900
May : 2.2 00
June: 2.000
Total: 8.155
Black fighters were grouped into seven African and three 
colonial divisions (out of a total of 80 French divisions), 
comprising nearly 9% of the French armed forces as opposed to 3% 
during the Great War.286 After the armistice and the subsequent 
demobilization of French forces, the disproportionate number of 
African to French soldiers (now serving in the Free French 
forces) increased even further. It has been estimated that by
284. in Giblin, "Vichy in...," op. cit. 1974, p. 144.
285. Figures exclude Dakar recruitement. Rapport Politique 
Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 2 . ARSD.
286. Echenberg, "'Morts pour la France7..," op. cit., 1985, 
p. 364.
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September 1944, 20.000 black Africans formed the backbone of the 
Free French army and no less than 2 0% of de Lattre's forces which 
fought on the side of the Allies.287 In terms of recruits and 
casualties (over 200.000 black African recruits of which 12% died 
in battle),288 the African military contribution in the Second 
World War far exceeded that of the Great War.
Senegal's oriqinaires served either in the 6th Regiment 
d'Artillerie Coloniale (RAC). or in the Regiment Mixte de 
l'Infanterie Coloniale de 1'AOF under the same conditions as the 
Europeans. By contrast, the 'subjects7 who belonged to the 
second section of the contingent had inferior living quarters, 
food and clothing. Under Galandou Diouf's instigation, the 
French government created a third, 18-member college
for veterans in the Conseil Colonial on April 8, 1939, in order 
to encourage enlistment.289 'Faire tirailleur7 was a 'svmbole de 
promotion7 and a unique opportunity to acquire the status, 
prestige and privileges of French citizens. As the Conseil 
convened only occasionally and was stripped of executive power,
287• Ibid.
288. Ibid., p. 365.
289. Decree of April 8, 1939; Affaires Politigues, File 
635, Dossier 1, ANSOM; see also Mandel report of April 8, 1939 
to President Lebrun in the same dossier; Session Ordinaire du 
Conseil Colonial, November 3, 1939; 13G 45 180. ARSD; thereafter, 
the Colonial Council was composed of 26 councillors elected by 
French citizens; 18 chiefs chosen by the chefs de canton and 18 
councillors elected by veterans and subjects. Among the benefits 
accorded to the veteran councillors were exemptions from personal 
tax, prestations and the indigenat, see Phillipe Roques,
"L'Armee et l7Empire," Notre Combat, vol. 2, no. 6, (February 9, 
1940), p. 10.
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the reform was hardly comparable to the Diagne Laws of 1916 which 
had conferred French citizenship on the veterans.
Yet, convinced that it was only a matter of time before they 
would qualify for citizenship, a large number of 'subjects' raced 
to enlist as volunteers. Their enthusiastic and patriotic 
response to the war was, as Abdoulaye Ly has argued, a political 
bluff, a "reaction interessee.1,290 When assigned to 'subject' 
ranks, they bitterly protested, contesting the legitimacy of the 
'subject/citizen' dichotomy.291
Mamadou Dia is a case in point. Despite his efforts to 
enlist as a volunteer, he was rejected on the grounds that there 
were no provisions for the admission of subjects in the military. 
Dia remarked that
Depuis que 1'element sujet est dignement represente 
dans toutes les branches de 1'administration, depuis 
qu'il forme la majorite de 1'elite indigene, il parait 
[word erased] de s'arreter ces reglements qui ne 
s'adaptent plus aux conditions actuelles de 1'evolution 
des populations et ne tiennent guere compte surtout 
des necessites du moment.292
The 'citizens' felt threatened by the pressing demands of the 
educated 'subjects' and when they were not dispatched to the 
front, they feared that "... on veut se passer de nous et 
reprendre les droits de citovens qui nous auraient ete
290. Abdoulaye Ly, Interview in Dakar, July 17, 1984.
291. Renseignements, October 10, 1939, 21G 74 17. ARSD.
292. Letter of Mamadou Dia to Governor Parisot dated 
September 12, 1939, 13G 103 180. ARSD.
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octroves...»293 When due to insufficient stock they were given 
the clothing and food of ordinary soldiers, the 'citizens' took 
the issue to the Conseil Colonial.
In Dakar, mobilization caused "le desordre et la 
pagaille"294 as tirailleurs flocked to the capital overnight from 
all over AOF before being sent to the front. According to 
Maurice Maillat who was at the time serving in the 6th RAC. the 
first convoy left Dakar on September 6, 1939 with 2.000 men for 
Casablanca, followed by an additional 56 convoys with 69.268 
soldiers.295
b) Prisoners of War. (POWs).
The First and Sixth Colonial Divisions fought the battles of 
Aisne and Argonne while the Fourth and Fifth Divisions defended 
the Somme in May 1940. Approximately 20.000 African soldiers 
were taken prisoners of war (see appendix 1), out of which only 
half survived captivity.296 After a year of imprisonment in 
Germany, they were usually transferred to front-stalaqs, labour 
camps in Vichy France, where they worked in arms manufacturing
293. Renseignements, Inspector Fessaguet, September 10 and 
12, 1939, 21G 74 17. ARSD.
294. Maurice Maillat, Dakar sous la flamme de guerre 193 9- 
45, no date, mimeographed, irregular pagination, p. 3.
295• Ibid., irregular pagination.
296. Echenberg, "'Morts pour la France'..," op. cit.. 1985, 
pp. 364, 371; see also his section on prison and repatriation 
camps, pp. 371-375.
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and mining industries for token wages.297
According to a government circular, POWs quickly became 
demoralised due to the frequent transfers from camp to camp; 
inadequate food, clothing, blankets and shoes; the fear of more 
cold winters in captivity; and the absence of news from their 
families.298 The tirailleur Ibrahima Teligne from the cercle of 
Kedougou who fought with the 201 RAC and was taken prisoner of 
war in Mericourt described his experience as follows:
Les prisonniers... marcherent pendant six jours, 
pas nourris pendant ces six jours; sur les flanes de 
la colonne marchaient les soldats allemands qui piquaient 
des tirailleurs a la baionnette oil leur donnaient des 
coups de crosse... tout refus d'obeissance etait 
sanctionnee par la mort immediate; ... des prisonniers 
noirs abbatus a coups de fusils pour avoir ramasse des 
colis de victuailles jetes par dessus les murs par les 
Frangais. Des tirailleurs ayant reussi a quitter le 
camp et y revenir avec des pommes de terre obtenues 
dans la ville ont ete immediatement tues.299
Pulmonary disease was widespread among African POWs. Some 
were able to end their captivity on medical grounds (i.e. L.S. 
Senghor), while 5.000 others found their way to occupied
297. See Appendix 1, on prisoner of war camps in France.
298. Circular of January 19, 1942, 2D 28 24. ARSD. Some 150 
Senegalese soldiers were held since 1940 in a Prisoner of War 
camp in the lie de Walcheren in the Low Countries who, according 
to a French official, "qui sont dans le denuement le plus 
complet, ne regevant ni nouvelles, ni colis de leur pays."
Delegue General Adjoint Burin des Roziers to Minister of 
Colonies, French Red Cross, January 22, 1944; Affaires 
Politiaues. File 870, ANSOM.
299. Statement of Ibrahima Teligne June 25, 1941, 2D 28 24.
ARSD.
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Paris.300 The lack of interest on the part of the French 
authorities in the fate of the demobilized soldiers and the long 
delays in wage or indemnity payments demoralized Africans 
further. According to Boisson, this made POWs particularly 
vulnerable to German propaganda such as the following:
Le gouvernement Frangais se desinteresse du sort 
des prisonniers coloniaux apres les avoir entraines 
dans une guerre contre leur gre. Ils insinuent que, 
durant leur captivite et tandis qu'ils sont prive et 
demuni de tout, les Frangais devalisent leur pays et 
laissent leurs families dans la misere. Les Allemands 
se posent en defenseurs des opprimes.301
According to the same source, the Germans claimed they had 
approached French authorities with the intention of negotiating 
the repatriation of POWs but the latter "font maintenant la 
sourde oreille car elles craicrnent des revoltes au moment du 
retour des prisonniers dans leur pays. Elies preferent done les 
laisser a leur triste sort dans les camps."302 Admiral Platon 
was particularly alarmed with the rumours of the preferential 
treatment Germans accorded to African prisoners such as 
privileged employment within the camps, food supplements and 
transfers to warmer camps in the southwest of France.303 
According to one account, in Berlin, Germans
300. Echenberg, "'Morts pour la France'..," op. cit.. 1985, 
p. 372-3.
301. Boisson circular of January 19, 1940, 2D 28 24. ARSD.
302. Ibid.
303. Platon letter dated February 14, 1941, 2D 28 24. ARSD.
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...constitueraient des groupes d'indigenes qu'ils 
habillent, nourissent bien... promenent dans la capitale, 
de cafe en restaurant auxquels ils donneraient merae des 
femmes. Ils les feraient egalement parler a la radio.304
Though such instances were rare, the colonial administration 
manifested an attitude of suspicion and hostility toward POWs and 
returning soldiers in general, to the point where it ordered a 
close surveillance of all repatriated tirailleurs.
c) Demobilization.
Following the declaration of the armistice in July 1940, the 
disbandment of the Black Army began with the demobilization of 
approximately 75.000 tirailleurs. allowing Boisson to maintain an 
army of only 33.000 to 40.000 men.305 Inculcated with new and 
often radical ideas, the returning soldiers promptly took up the 
issue of equality. They formed committees which engaged in 
passionate discussions on what they considered to be the ar­
bitrary and artificial distinction of peoples into 'citizens' and 
'subjects.' Why, it was asked, were residents of the Three 
Communes born with rights superior to the inhabitants of the 
interior? While not contesting French supremacy, 'subjects' 
demanded the abolition of the special status of the
304. Note of the Inspector General of the Administrative 
Police, January 31, 1941, Affaires Politiques. File 870, ANSOM. 
See also Platon report of February 14, 1941, 2D 28 24. ARSD.
305. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 2 , ARSD; 
Chenet, Qui a Sauve l'Afrique?, o p . cit.. 1949, pp. 124-25.
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'citizens.'306
Ils paraissent beaucoup plus raisonnables qu'on 
le croit; ils demandent pour les gens de leur couleur 
une distinction basee sur le merite de chacun; ils ne 
demandent pas l'egalite avec la race blanche.307
THE MYTH OF THE LOYAL AFRICAN. PART I .
Three days after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, the 
Governor General of AOF, Leon Cayla, sent the following telegram 
to Mandel:
Dans heures graves que vit la nation, les 
populations de l'AOF font preuve du plus ardent 
patriotisme - STOP - de plus en plus nombreux 
sont les volontaires qui desirent se joindre aux 
mobilises - STOP - jamais la Federation ne s'est 
sentie plus proche de la mere patrie vers laquelle 
vont toutes ses pensees.308
The colonial authorities in Senegal retorted that
La guerre a dresse la colonie tout entiere 
contre l'ennemi commun: proclamations des chefs,
preche des marabouts, 'tracts' des lettres, engage­
ments volontaires depassant toutes previsions, 
traduisent l'enthousiasme general et la seule idee 
du moment 'combattre Hitler', et pour cela, aller 
en France, revetir 1'uniforme, sans distinction 
d'origine, de statut.309
306. Renseignements, July 11 and 15, 1940, 21G 74 17, ARSD.
307. Renseignements, July 15, 1940, 21G 74 17. ARSD.
308. Journal Officiel AOF. September 9, 1939. The Annual 
Political Report of 1939 mentions 534 volunteers recruited during 
that year.
309. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal, Affaires Indigenes, 
1939, 2G 39 34. ARSD.
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and the security forces recorded similar reactions:
Faisant abstraction de toute controverse 
politique, les indigenes de tout age, de toutes 
conditions, unis comme un seul bloc, n'ont 
exteriorise qu'une seule idee, leur amour propre 
pour la mere patrie.310
Unfailing patriotism, spontaneous mass enlistment, organic unity 
of the French family— all the elements that appear in the above 
statements coalesced into the myth of the 'loyal African.'
Police reports further argued that the orioinaires were 
fiercely anti-German, fearing Nazi racism (apparently Hitler's 
references to blacks as 'half-savages' were well known) and 
conscious of the implications of German colonial rule on their 
preferential status.311
Si par impossible, la France etait vaincue... 
c'est vous, Bambaras, Senegalais, ou Mossis, qui 
seriez les premiers victimes de sa defaite et ... 
sous la ferule allemande, vous assisteriez a un 
veritable retour a 1'esclavage... Nous nous 
battrons pour nous memes... 312
Thus argued Galandou Diouf, stressing that if necessary, he could 
raise an African contingent of two million men. If this state­
ment rings of Blaise Diagne, it is because Diouf no doubt saw in 
the war an opportunity to increase his power exponentially, by
31°. Renseignements, September 4, 1939, 21G 74 17. ARSD.
311. Renseignements, July 11, 1940, 21G 74 17. ARSD.
312. Galandou Diouf quoted in Philippe Roques, "L'armee de 
1'empire,11 op. cit. . p. 5.
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becoming Commissaire des Colonies (a position equal to that of 
Governor-General) as Diagne had done before him.
The deputy organized a solidarity meeting in Dakar and 
called for an end of all political squabbling^ in the interest of union 
The preservation of the elite's interests was signalled as a key 
factor of African loyalty to France and was highlighted in the 
deputy's speech: "A la Chambre des Deputes... i'ai autant de
droits que le plus blanc et le plus francais des deputes. La 
France nous a tout donnee."313
The marabouts had similarly a lot to lose from this war.
For this reason, they actively participated in the mobilization 
of soldiers and of public opinion. "If you pray for France, you 
pray for yourselves and for Islam" was the message the holy men 
addressed to their talibes.314 El Hadj Drame, the Tijani 
marabout from Louga and Seydou Nourou Tall from Kaolack among 
others, organized mass rallies where they warned their disciples 
of German brutality and extolled French virtues.
The 'citizens' and the marabouts who responded 
enthusiastically to the war were two groups whose hard-earned 
privileges would be seriously jeopardized by a French defeat. 
Conversely, educated 'subjects' (teachers, civil servants, etc.) 
who also responded with fervor to France's enlistment call
313. Renseignements, October 16, 1939, 21G 74 17. ARSD.
314. Renseignements, November 25, 1939, 21G 74 17, ARSD;
See also the speech of Seydou Nourou Tall in Kaolack, Renseigne­
ments, October 193 9, 21G 74 17. ARSD; the marabout El Hadj Drame 
of Louga referred to the Germans as the "eternels ennemis du 
genre humain"; La Justice. (October 9, 1939).
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constituted the one group for which the war could substantially 
improve their position and further their ambitions.
THE ARMISTICE IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA.
According to the Franco-German armistice of June 18, 1940, 
French authorities had to: free Axis subjects in all French
territories (article 19); dismantle the French fleet except for a 
small fraction which was deemed essential for the protection of 
colonial interests (article 8); and collaborate with the Germans 
"d'une maniere correcte" (article 3).3153
Rumours of an armistice with Germany were circulating in 
Dakar since May 1940. Fearing Axis occupation, the African elite 
was even talking of forming a republic with U.S. help, to 
continue the war on the side of the British in the event of a 
French capitulation.316 The evolues equated French weakness with 
ministerial instability and anxiously contrasted the British, 
French and German systems of colonial rule.317
The sudden announcement of the armistice on June 21 came as 
a shock and a 'grand deuil' to Europeans and urban Africans. 
"L'espoir etait si bien ancre dans tous les esprits que les 
bruits d'armistice furent accueilli avec une veritable
315. The Franco-German Armistice Convention of June 22, 
1940, 2D 14 2 . ARSD.
316. Renseignements, June 20, 1940, 21G 74 17. ARSD.
317. Ibid.. and July 9, 1940, 21G 74 17. ARSD.
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stupeur."318 There was a general disbelief that the hitherto 
omnipotent France had so readily given up the struggle.
Moreover, amidst contradictory radio broadcasts and censored 
newspapers, no one actually knew what was happening on the 
European front. As the Vichyite historian Maurice Martin du Gard 
noted, MLe drame de l'Afrique ce fut de ne rien savoir de ce qui 
se passait en France..." 319
The American Paul Atkins, while in Dakar, made a succinct 
observation regarding the French reception of the armistice:
One reaction on the part of many of the 
Frenchmen... was that it could not fundamentally be 
their fault. Such a major catastrophe to a proud 
nation... could only be the result of a betrayal, 
either on the part of their own government or on the 
part of the Allies. 320
The dissolution of the Third Republic and the institution of 
the fascist-type regime under the auspices of Marshall Petain, 
the hero of the Great War, split the colonial corps in two main 
factions, the Vichyites and the Gaullists. A 'crisis of con­
sciousness' troubled many French administrators who were torn 
between obeying the legitimate rulers that had betrayed France 
and embracing, what must have seemed, a risky resistance movement
318. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 194 0, 2G 40 1. ARSD; 
see also F.J. Amon d'Aby, La Cote d'Ivoire dans la Cite Africai- 
ne. (Paris: Larose, 1951), p. 39.
319. Martin du Gard, Le drame de l'Afrique frangaise: Choses 
vues, o p . cit.. 1941, p. 5.
320. Paul M. Atkins, "Dakar and the Strategy of West 
Africa," Foreign Affairs, vol. XX, no. 2, (1942), p. 361.
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of dubious credibility.
However, by and large, the colonial administration was 
dominated by right-wing individuals who, after the liberalisation 
of the Popular Front era, saw in Vichy a rare chance to restore 
authoritarianism in the empire. Members of the colonial lobby 
like Governor Brevie and Gaston Joseph (Director of Political 
Affairs in the Government-General of AOF) considered themselves 
above party politics and served the Vichy regime without any 
qualms.
As a rule, colonial administrators sided with Vichy out of a 
reluctance to endanger or jeopardize their positions, but there 
were some who fervently committed themselves to the ideals of the 
National Revolution (the Governor of Senegal, Georges Rey, is an 
example). A minority of officers in the higher echelons of the 
corps sided with de Gaulle (who was little known at the time) but 
not necessarily out of ideological opposition to Vichy. 
Allegiances were confused. Men like Governor Louveau were 
Petainist and Gaullist at once, out of conviction that Petain was 
playing a double game and that the two leaders had some secret 
accord between them.321 Finally there were also left-wing 
Vichyites, anti-German Petainists, right-wing Gaullists, and 
every other shade of political affiliation.
A substantial portion of the European community in Senegal
321. Jean Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical 
Africa 1900-1945. (New York: Pica Press, 1971), pp. 464-65.
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was in favour of joining the resistance. 322 For instance, the 
business community of AOF for which the armistice was 
synonymous with a disruption of trade and ultimately ruin, was 
pro-British. 323 Similarly, for privileged Africans, the 
resistance was a means to restore the status quo ante and 
protect their self-interests rather than a demonstration of 
patriotism towards France.
Mustapha Malick Gueye, the President of the Conseil 
Colonial, defied the armistice and sent a telegram to Mandel 
explaining that Africans were determined "de ne jamais recon- 
naltre capitulation gu'elle [la population s6n6galaise] est 
unanime k repousser."324 G. Diouf, the L6bous, the veterans, the 
students at the William Ponty school, the Amicale des 
Instituteurs Indigenes du Sdndgal— in other words, all those 
who had something to lose from a French capitulation, such as 
the originaire and 6volu6 groups rejected the armistice. Their
322 . See Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal and Dakar, 193 9 
and 1940, op. cit., for pro-Allied sentiments of Europeans. Jim 
Giblin in hiS( "A Colonial State in Crisis: Vichy 
Administration in French West Africa," unpublished seminar 
paper delivered at the School of Oriental and African Studies 
Conference on Africa and the Second World War, (1984), p. 10 
cites U.S. intelligence sources testifying to this.
323 . Arthur Marder, Operation Menace: The Dakar Expedition
and the Dudley North Affair, (London: Oxford University Press, T9TET7“pT~MV -----------
324 . Telegram of June 1940, Affaires Politiques, File 872, 
ANSOM.
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slogan was "Senegal restera France ou ne sera pas."325
With the benefit of hindsight, Maillat has explained how 
decolonization became inevitable after the overnight collapse of 
France. A weakened, divided and defeated metropole, the 
nightmare of the colonial lobby, was for the first time revealed 
as such to Africans fighting in Europe or witnessing the struggle 
of Frenchmen against Frenchmen (Vichyites against Gaullists) at 
home. The myth of the indivisible France suffered an irreparable 
blow and its demise unleashed new forces.
II faut bien le dire aujourd'hui alors que 
l'Afrique a acquis son independance que celle-ci 
etait devenue ineluctable depuis cette armistice; 
nous avons perdu la face et notre prestige d'hommes 
blancs, ceci a ete ressenti chez tous les peuples de 
couleur meme si plus tard nous avons figure parmi 
les vainqueurs de 1945, pour eux nous sommes restes 
les vaincus de 1940.32°
The colonial administration argued that the armistice had the 
reverse effect, namely that the ensuing uncertainty and in­
stability clustered Africans closer around France and vice- 
versa. In reality, the colonial administration's token 
demonstrations of solidarity with the African population— such as
325. Renseignements, October 10, 1939, 21G 74 17, ARSD;
See evolue telegrams and letters to the Governors in 13G 103 
180. ARSD; and in Affaires Politiaues. File 872, ANSOM; also 
Abdel-Kader Diagne, La resistance Francaise au Senegal et en AOF 
pendant la Guerre 1939-45. (Thies, n.d. [circa 1950]), pp. 7-9; 
see also "Voeu du Conseil Municipal de St. Louis," June 25, 1940, 
13G 103 180. ARSD.
326. Maurice Maillat was a Railroad Inspector who served in 
AOF for 28 years. He was drafted in the 6e RAC in 1939 and was 
demobilised in September 1940, op. cit., p. 2.
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colonial personnel tours in remote villages and the creation of 
radio stations in the Medina of Dakar broadcasting patriotic 
messages in Wolof— were merely aimed at giving a semblance of 
continuity and control.327
PIERRE BOISSON: HIGH COMMISSIONER OF BLACK AFRICA
(June 1940-November 1942).
Pierre Boisson represents a case apart from the majority of 
colonial administrators who wavered between the Vichy/Free French 
camps. Born in 1894 to a family of school teachers, Boisson 
began his career as a teacher in Evian. During the First World 
War he fought in Artois, Argonne and Verdun, lost a leg, and was 
taken prisoner of war in Germany. After the war, he entered the 
Ecole Coloniale where he graduated top of his class. In 1920, 
he was appointed to the Government-General of the Congo, follow­
ing which he was awarded a licence in Law. Consequently, he 
served in Africa and Indochina and became the chef de cabinet for 
the Sarraut, Maginot, Reynaud and other governments. In 193 3, he 
began climbing the echelons of the colonial administration first 
as High Commissioner in Cameroon, then as Secretary-General of 
AOF and Governor-General par-interim in AOF in 1938. Lastly, in 
1939, at the age of 45, he became Governor-General of French 
Equatorial Africa.328
327. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1940, 2G 40 1. ARSD.
328. Boisson's biographical sketch is based on the "Brochure 
Pierre Boisson," Service d'Information de la France Libre, 1943, 
Papiers Boisson. Archives Privees 30, File 4, ANSOM; see also 
Boisson's testimony of January 27, 1944, ibid.. File 1; and 
Martin du Gard, La carte imperiale: Histoire de la France
137
Boisson is undoubtedly among the most controversial figures 
in French colonial history. The Vichyite historian Martin du 
Gard claims that he was obeyed, loved and respected by Africans 
and Europeans alike "pour n'etre iamais pris au piece de 1 'ambi­
tion. 1,329 For his Vichyite colleague, Daniel Chenet, the High 
Commissioner "beneficie incontestablement du preiuae 
f a v o r a b l e ."330 conversely, pro-Germans and Gaullists condemned 
him for being a collaborator and an egotist:
Traitor to his past [as a wounded veteran 
of the 1914-1918 war], traitor to himself, traitor 
to the Republic, traitor to the country, traitor by 
a monstrous pride which finally deprived him of all 
lucidity by letting him believe in his own 
infallibility.331
The Marxist historian Suret-Canale rightly argues that Boisson 
does not qualify either as a Gaullist or a Vichyite. Rather, he 
is portrayed as an intelligent but stubborn man with unlimited 
ambition and pride.
Boisson did not believe in Vichy. He believed 
only in himself. Vichy's position, the isolation of 
French West Africa, and the reliance on 
authoritarianism in the 'New State', gave him a full­
ness of power which no other proconsul preceding
him had e n j o y e d . 3 3 2
d'Outre-Mer, op. cit.. 1949, chapter VI on Boisson, pp. 29-102.
329. Martin du Gard, La carte imperiale, op. cit., 1949, p.
102 .
33°. Chenet, op. cit., 1949, p. 38.
331. Governor Louveau quoted in Suret-Canale, French 
Colonialism..., op. cit., 1971, p. 465.
332^ Suret-Canale, ibid., p. 466.
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Part of the reason why Boisson remains such a controversial 
figure is because the circumstances of his appointment to the 
post of High Commissioner of Black Africa remain obscure as are 
his political motives in accepting the post. For this reason, 
before making any further assessments on Boisson's policy-making, 
it might be useful to examine the events leading up to his 
proconsulate.
From the end of May 1940 onward, while serving in Cameroon, 
Boisson had been actively campaigning for the continuation of the 
war.333 The day the armistice was signed, he defied capitula­
tion: "Si la patrie ne veut plus se battre. l'heure est venue
pour 1'Empire de rendre a la patrie un peu de ce qu'elle a fait 
pour lui et de continuer la lutte."334 During the week of June 
18-25, Boisson was in daily contact with the governors of Africa 
and on the 24th, he expressed his determination to form a resis­
tance bloc pending his receiving 'further instructions.'3353
In effect, Boisson was not willing to take any initiative 
that could later hold him responsible for organizing a resistance 
movement to Vichy. Hence, he awaited the decision of General 
Nogues (Commander-in-Chief of the North African army and Resident 
General of Morocco) and the French fleet. When the Army Com­
333. Papiers Boisson. File 7, Circulars no. 85 and 61C, ANSOM.
334. Boisson quoted in P.H. Siriex and J. M. Hertrich,
L'Empire au Combat. (Paris: Office Frangais d'Edition, 1945), p.
16. See also Boisson's interrogation of January 11, 1944, in 
Papiers Boisson. File 1, ANSOM.
335. Papiers Boisson, File 7, ANSOM.
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mander-in-Chief Maxime Weygand ordered Nogues not to involve the 
French Fleet in dissident activities, the 'African Bloc' opera­
tion dissolved in thin air.336
On June 25, when Tunis and Algiers pledged their allegiance 
to the Vichy government and began to enforce the measures 
dictated by the armistice, Boisson did not follow suit. The 
Governor-General of AOF, Cayla, insisted that even without North 
Africa, a black African bloc could be formed but Boisson vacil­
lated, allegedly awaiting reliable news and further instructions. 
On June 26, he received notification of his appointment as High 
Commissioner of Black Africa following which his attitude changed 
dramatically.337
The following day, he ordered all administrators to ban
336. Robert Paxton, Vichv France: Old Guard and New Order. 
(New York: 1972), p. 41; and Giblin, "The Vichy Years..,11 op. 
cit.. 1978, p. 36.
337. In reality, Boisson was never responsible for all those 
territories. After Eboue sided with de Gaulle, he was no more 
than a Governor-General of AOF.
The details of Boisson's nomination remain obscure. Some 
sources cite an official telegram being dispatched to Boisson. 
Others claim he was informed by a personal message or by the 
Colonial Inspector Tezenas du Mentcel; see Papiers Boisson. File 
2, ANSOM.
During his trial in 1944, Boisson argued that when he found 
out that AOF, Syria and the Fleet were executing armistice
regulations, he decided not to side with the Allies. In his own
words, "Je proteste, et je protesterai toute mon existence... 
contre 1'inculpation que cette nomination avait eu une influence 
quelconque si petite soit elle sur ma nomination. Comment peut- 
on penser que dans les circonstances si pleines d'angoisse que 
nous vivions, j'ai pu un seul instant me preoccuper d'interet de 
carriere?", ibid.. File 1. See also the Papiers du Comite
d'Etudes de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale, for the correspondence
of General Schmitt, Chapter XI, p. 17 on Boisson's nomination.
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meetings and demonstrations.338 In addition, he wired Cayla a 
message informing him that he had not heard from North Africa but 
that AOF, Cameroon and Madagascar could still proceed with the 
formation of a resistance bloc. A telegram received the same day 
from the Colonial Minister Riviere ordered him to enforce the 
armistice regulations. Boisson did not respond. The same 
evening, de Gaulle dispatched a telegram inquiring whether he 
would rally to the Conseil de Defense de la France d'Outre Mer. 
Boisson's radio broadcast relayed that AEF would await further 
instructions and remain united.
Je n'ai jamais congu, je ne coingois pas pour 
l'Afrique Equatoriale une attitude qui soit 
differente de celle qui sera prise pour 
l'Afrique du Nord, par l'AOF et nos autres 
possessions.3 39
On June 28, he denied having been nominated High Commissioner and 
later claimed that he was only notified on July 9.340 On July 20 
he arrived in Dakar, and three days later, replaced Cayla who was 
transferred to Madagascar. AOF had already taken sides with 
Vichy yet, even at that point in time, Boisson could have rallied 
French Africa to the Allies, but not without personally putting 
at stake the security of the French territories. As Giblin has 
argued, if Boisson had had the backing of a senior military
338. Order of June 26, 1940, Papiers Boisson, File 7,
ANSOM.
339 ^ Speech of June 27, 1940, Papiers Boisson, File 7, ANSOM.
340. "Je demens formellement..." were his words; in ibid., 
File 3; see also File 2.
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official like Nogues or Weygand, he might have led Black Africa 
to dissidence.341 Under the circumstances, however, he was not 
prepared to jeopardise France's control of Africa nor did he
a
trust de Gaulle whom he regarded/a British puppet.342
Moreover, the British attack on the French fleet in Mers-el- 
Kebir on July 3 and 4 which inflicted heavy casualties on the 
French side, coupled with the attack on the battleship Richelieu 
in Dakar on July 8, signalled the rupture of French Africa's 
diplomatic relations with Britain and AOF's formal adherence to 
Vichy.343 On July 6, Boisson made a radio broadcast announcing 
that the African bloc had not been constituted; neither the 
French fleet nor the North African army had rallied to the 
British side, and AEF was not in a position to form a resistance 
movement in isolation.344 The Gaullist historian Michel Deveze 
has interpreted Boisson's vacillation in terms of personal 
ambition, fear of compromise, suspicion verging on hostility to
341. Giblin, "The Vichy Years..," op. cit.. 1978, p. 37.
342. Boisson later justified his action in terms of not 
wanting to "faire une geste qui soit prejudiciable a la 
France." Interrogation of January 11, 1944, Papiers Boisson. File 
1, ANSOM.
343. Cayla to Colonies Clermont, July 8, 1940, Affaires 
Politiaues. File 928, ANSOM; see also Annet, Aux Heures.., op. 
cit.. 1952, p. 34; Chenet, op. cit., 1949, p. 34, and Suret- 
Canale, French Colonialism.., op. cit.. 1972, p. 465. On July 
7, a British destroyer had asked permission to enter the port of 
Dakar in order to communicate a message to the Governor-General. 
The French refused, and the following day the British attacked 
the Richelieu but the five auxiliary crews refused to fight.
344. Papiers Boisson. File 3, ANSOM.
the British and loyalty toward Petain.345
To conclude, Boisson was a Petainist, anti-German, right- 
wing colonialist who was unwilling to take any risks that might 
imperil the integrity of the French empire or his own career. If 
de Gaulle's movement was closely associated or dependent on 
Britain and on left-wing radicalism and was prepared to risk the 
fate of the empire, Vichy was for Boisson the safe option, the 
reliable old guard that upheld tradition, authority and stability 
above all.
THE PURSUIT OF NEUTRALITY IN THE WAR.
Over the next three years, Boisson became a key figure in 
French colonial policy. The two axioms in his policy-making were 
"conserver et defendre." which equalled neutrality vis-a-vis the
Germans, the Free French as well as British and U.S. expans­
ionism. The institution of a fascist order was of secondary and
possibly rhetorical importance for Boisson, but the same can not
be argued for his collaborators (see Georges Rey's policies 
below).346 Colonial control was a real political factor under 
Vichy. In fact, the raison d'etre of the Petain government was 
to preserve imperial unity against foreign aggression in exchange
34 .^ Michel Deveze, La France d'Outre-Mer: de 1'Empire 
Colonial a lxUnion Francaise. 1938-1947. (Paris: Hachette,
1948), p. 170.
346_ pile 3, Papiers Boisson. ANSOM; Martin du Gard, La 
Carte Imperiale, op. cit.. 1949, p. 103. Giblin argues that the 
institution of the New Order was not an issue for the Boisson 
administration. This is certainly not true of Georges Rey, and 
it would be interesting to see if other administrators in AOF 
took the opportunity to enforce quasi-fascist measures.
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for limited autonomy in unoccupied France, as well as imperial 
status in a reconstructed Europe.347
British, U.S. and Free French fears of a potentially German- 
controlled Dakar led to exaggerated reports regarding the German 
presence in the AOF capital.348 The German Armistice Commission, 
headed by Dr. Klaube and composed of a dozen officers, arrived in 
Dakar at the end of June 1940 to obtain the release of German and 
Italian subjects. Boisson freed 1.814 Italian and 165 German 
prisoners interned in the Sebikotane camp in Senegal.349 The 
only other German who set foot in Dakar was Mulhausen, an 
official from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs who under­
took a two week visit (in September 1942) under strict surveil­
lance from Boisson himself.
Notwithstanding the constant pressure on the High Commis­
sioner to accept various German teams of technicians, jour­
nalists, etc., Boisson always found a way to frustrate their 
plans, and on that account threatened to resign three times.350
347. Giblin, "A Colonial State in Crisis..," o p . cit.. 1984,
p . 2.
348. See the correspondence of General Schmitt, Papiers du 
Comite de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale, "La Legende de 'Jamais un 
Allemand a Dakar grace a Boisson,'" Archives Privees, File 357, 
ANSOM. In general, most Allied writing during the war exag­
gerated Axis influence in Dakar.
349. Report of August 20, 1940, Affaires Politiaues, File 
357, ANSOM, for the names and professions of all German 
prisoners.
350. Thomas C. Wasson, "The Mystery of Dakar: An Enigma 
Resolved," Foreign Affairs Service Journal, vol. XX, no. 42, 
(April 1943), pp. 214-17; see also, Martin du Gard, La Carte 
Imperiale, o p . cit.. 1949, pp. 141-42; Chenet, op. cit., 1949,
144
He also opposed the Protocol of Paris of May 1941 which would 
have granted the Germans the right to use Dakar as a submarine 
base.351
THE BATTLE OF DAKAR.
By 1939, Dakar was the most important port of call in the 
African coast (a 'station service de l'Atlantique SudM  with 
highly developed facilities for the provision and refuelling of 
ships sailing around the Cape of Good Hope to India, Australia or 
else destined to South America.352 It was also equipped with an 
airport and was a major base for the French fleet. Its strategic 
location, only 1.620 miles (4 hours by plane) from Brazil meant 
that particularly for the Americans,
The formerly obscure town of Dakar has became (sic) 
a key point of the world-wide battlefield of the Second 
World War. As the global nature of the war becomes 
more and more evident, Dakar assumes a new 
significance.353
Roosevelt referred to the AOF capital as the "Atlantic fortress" 
and deemed essential that the U.S. consulate in the city re-open 
after the fall of France.354 The gold reserves of the Bank of
pp. 106-119.
351. Maillat, op. cit.. irregular pagination.
352. Atkins, op. cit., 1942, pp. 360-61.
353. Emil Lengyel, Dakar: Outpost of Two Hemispheres.
(New York: Garden City Publishers Co, Inc., 1943), preface.
354. Canadian Press Release, (November 10, 1942). The U.S. 
Consulate in Dakar had closed down in 1921 for financial reasons, 
see Wasson, "The Mystery of Dakar," op. cit.. April 1943, p. 170;
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France kept in Kayes further enhanced Dakar's significance.
For the Germans, Dakar was important as a potential air and 
submarine base for raids on North and South America particularly 
against British sea communications in the Atlantic. Grand 
Admiral Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and the 
German Naval War Staff, had repeatedly brought Dakar to Hitler's 
attention in the summer of 194 0. On July 15th, the Fiihrer had 
demanded authorisation to occupy the ports of North and West 
Africa but Petain had categorically refused. Darlan was subse­
quently warned that Vichy should be ready to defend French 
African territories according to the armistice regulations.355 
After this incident, the German Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces shifted his attention to Europe, and Dakar was left to the 
attention of the Armistice Commission alone.
'OPERATION MENACE.'
While Churchill was anxiously seeking a show of force to 
draw German attention away from the U.K. and obtain access to 
African ports for the Royal Navy, the British and Free French 
intelligence networks relayed favorable messages regarding an
and Marder, Operation Menace.., op. cit., 197 6, p. 7.
355. Peter Matthews, "Selling out the French Empire," Free 
Europe, vo. 4, no. 42, (June 13, 1941), p. 52; Maillat, o p . 
cit.. n.d, irregular pagination; Helmuth Stoecker (ed.), German 
Imperialism in Africa From the Beginnings until the Second World 
War, (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1986); and A. Kum'a Ndumbe,
"Black Africa and Germany During the Second World War," in Africa 
and the Second World War. Reports and Papers of the Symposium 
organized by UNESCO at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from 10 
to 13 November 1980, (UNESCO 1985), pp. 51-76.
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immediate takeover of Dakar.356 In fact, for de Gaulle, Dakar 
was a possible centre of operations and seat for the resistance 
movement.357 Sensing that the British were going to undertake 
the operation with or without his support and fearing their 
annexationist designs, he conceded to the takeover on condition 
that it be peaceful— using a mixture of 'persuasion and 
intimidation./358
De Gaulle had formulated a plan ("Operation Scipio") with 
Major General Spears and Major Morton, but the British premier 
presented on August 6 a new, more optimistic scheme to which the 
Service Chiefs reluctantly agreed. Over the next two weeks,
the Force Commanders Vice Admiral Cunningham and Major-General 
Irwin opposed de Gaulle's plan of a surprise attack on Dakar and 
discussed possible alternatives. Ultimately,
Churchill's initial plan of August 6 was adopted.359
Faulty intelligence reports, security leaks, growing doubts 
on the part of the Force Commanders, Vice Admiral Soymerville, 
the Naval Staff, and low morale amongst officers and crew were
356. Churchill's first choice had been Casablanca but it was 
well defended. According to Gaullist intelligence reports, the 
Dakar garrison comprised 70% Gaullists, 20% undecided (neutral), 
and 10% Vichyites; see Maillat, op. cit., n.d., irregular 
pagination, and Marder, Operation Menace, op. cit.. 1976, pp. 8-9.
357. Algiers was his first choice but it was too close to 
the Germans.
358. Marder, op. cit., 1976, pp. 20-21.
359. For the initial text of Operation Menace see Amiral 
Thierry d'Argenlieu, Souvenirs de Guerre: Juin 1940-Janvier 
1941. (Paris: Plon, 1973).
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not promising signs for the launching of "Operation Menace." In 
fact, Churchill almost cancelled it on September 15 for an 
alternative 'Konakry-Dakar' operation. The Service Chiefs 
opposed the new plan following which the Force Commanders, de 
Gaulle and Spears who supported "Operation Menace" were 
eventually allowed to proceed. In addition, after Cunningham 
chased away three French cruisers from Dakar to Casablanca on 
September 18, the Allied Commanders and the Admiralty's morale 
were momentarily boosted and "Operation Menace" was launched.360
The expedition arrived before Dakar on September 2 3 at 
approximately 5:00 a.m. Low visibility due to heavy fog was one 
of the decisive pointers that the initial plan was not going to 
proceed as smoothly as foreseen. The Commandant Major de 
Boislambert (a Gaullist dissident) who had left Bathurst on 
September 22, to summon the cooperation of the French army in 
Dakar, sabotage telecommunication systems and prepare the ground 
for the arrival of de Gaulle's emissaries (Phase 'Happy' of 
"Operation Menace") failed to carry out his mission.
De Gaulle's intelligence sources grossly overestimated the 
support for the Free French in Dakar and the disposition of the 
French army— those two factors being at the base of Boislambert's 
mission and of "Operation Menace" as a whole.361 Instead of 
welcoming de Gaulle's messengers, Boislambert went into hiding.
360. Marder, op. cit., 1976, chapters 3,4,5. The cruisers 
were headed for Libreville where they were going to suppress 
dissidence.
361. ibid., pp. 108-9.
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The second stage of "Operation Menace" involved a surprise 
landing on the airfield of Ouakam to be followed by a desertion of 
the Vichy air force to the resistance. The outcome was similarly 
disastrous. Meanwhile leaflets with slogans such as "We are here 
to defend Dakar alongside you. We are here to bring food to 
Dakar" signed by de Gaulle, were dropped on the city.362 When 
the Gaullist emissary Thierry d'Argenlieu landed in Dakar to 
deliver the Anglo-Free French call to dissidence to Boisson and 
his military staff, he was shot and wounded by the Vichy 
authorities.
The leaflets had virtually no impact in Dakar. However, 
several African and European veteran politicians organized small 
demonstrations in favour of the Free French and Boisson arrested 
the mayor of the capital, Alfred Goux, and the President of the 
Chamber of Commerce Turbe, along with 10 more Gaullists.363 De 
Gaulle's broadcasts warned that an 'enormous Allied force' would
362. Ibid., p. 110. One other slogan read:
Dakar is threatened by the enemy and by famine I 
We must save Dakar for France!
We must resupply Dakar.
This is why French forces under my orders have arrived 
at Dakar.
Powerful Allied forces are ready to support them.
I urge the civil and military authorities to co-operate 
with me.
I ask that all elements of the land, sea, and air 
forces remain at their posts and contact the French 
troops which are coming to reinforce them.
I invite the population to demonstrate their patriotism 
by remaining calm and welcoming my troops.
363. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1940, 2G 40 1. ARSD? 
and Affaires Politiaues. File 357, ANSOM.
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be deployed if Dakar resisted. The ultimatum and a first 
bombardment of the city followed.364 The African Hospital, the 
barracks of the Sixth RAC regiment, the Porthos vessel in the 
Port of Dakar and several houses in the Plateau (the European 
section of the city) the Medina as well as Goree were hit. For­
tunately, panic gave way to a systematic evacuation of women and 
children (Dakar had no shelters), thus minimizing the casualty 
toll.
Amidst confusion, faulty communication and disillusionment, 
the chiefs of "Operation Menace" now resorted to 'Plan Charles' 
with a landing in Rufisque. After a second ill-fated venture,365 
the British issued their final ultimatum to Boisson: "Votre 
attitude nous donne raison de censer cue Dakar peut a tout moment 
etre livree par vous a l'ennemi commun..."366 to which Boisson 
replied, "La France m'a confie Dakar. Je defendrai Dakar 
iusctu'au bout."367 On September 24, the second day of the Battle 
of Dakar, phase 'Nasty' was put to action. A relatively 
inconsequential air bombardment was followed by the sinking of 
the Ajax Vichy submarine and a partial neutralisation of the
364. Bulletin d'Informations des Troupes du Groupe de l'AOF 
- Transmissions et Proclamations de De Gaulle, September 30,
1940; Affaires Politiques, File 357, ANSOM, has a very detailed 
chronological exposition of the events.
365. Jacques Mordal, La Bataille de Dakar. (Paris: 1956), 
pp. 120-27.
366. Ultimatum de l'Admiraute Britannique au Gouvernement et 
a la population de Dakar, 13G 103 180. ARSD.
367. in ibid.
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battleship Richelieu. On September 25, the British decided to 
abandon "Operation Menace" and sail to Freetown as Dakar 
celebrated but not without heavy casualties.
Administrative reports estimate that as many as 175 died and 
350 were wounded in the battle of Dakar.368 Another source cites 
166 dead, of which 74 Africans (12 soldiers, 2 marines and 60 
civilians), 92 Europeans (82 marines, 2 soldiers and 8 civilians) 
and 340 wounded (233 Africans, 107 Europeans).369
Soon afterwards, Boisson began a systematic prosecution of 
Free French sympathizers, African and European, condemning 115 to 
death, 60 to forced labour, 354 to prison sentences.370 He also 
began reconstituting a military force of 100.000 well-trained 
African soldiers, a batallion of Europeans, a half-brigade of 
Foreign Legionaires ships and airplanes.371 A few years later, 
while being tried for treason, Boisson claimed that this military 
force was part of a strategy leading to the AQF resumption of the 
war on the side of the Allies.
The importance of the defense of Dakar for the Vichy 
government was evident in the statement of the two German 
generals of the Grand Etat Major to General Hutzinger:
368t Figures are from the Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 
1940, 2G 40 1 . ARSD; Bulletin d 'Information des Troupes du 
Groupe de l'AOF, o p . cit.. lists 166 dead and 340 wounded.
369. Marder, o p . cit., p. 158.
370. Siriex et Hertrich, L'empire au combat, o p . cit.. 1945, 
p . 69.
371. Papiers Boisson. File 2, ANSOM? and also Martin du 
Gard, La carte Imperiale, op. cit.. 1949, pp. 137-40.
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...moins de 8 jours apres 1'occupation de 
Dakar par les Anglais, celle de l'Afrique du 
Nord par les Allemands aurait ete accomplie.
Si vous n'etes pas capables, vous Frangais, de 
defendre l'Afrique Frangaise, nous porterons 
immediatement la guerre sur ce continent.372
For De Gaulle, the Dakar affair was a considerable setback for 
his movement, as was the case with the British (and their 
relations with Roosevelt). Colonel John A. Watson, a participant 
in "Operation Menace," later argued that
If "Menace" had had its fair share of luck, it 
might have resulted in one of the most spectacular and 
fruitful operations of World War II and might well have 
changed the course of that war to the advantage of the 
Allies.373
The Dakar affair helped Vichy gain prestige and credibility 
within AOF as de Gaulle and his resistance movement were in large 
part discredited. But there was a price attached to the victory: 
Africans, while praised for their loyalty, would carry with them 
lasting impressions of what they had witnessed first hand: 
division, enmity and full-scale war between Frenchmen followed by 
the subsequent disgrace of a French General. In addition, the 
internal 'reforms' enforced right after the British-Free French 
attack on Dakar began exposing a state in crisis.
372. Quoted in Paul Beaudoin, Neuf Mois au Gouvernement. 
(Paris: La Table Ronde, 1948), p. 398.
373. Watson quoted in Marder, o p . cit.. p. 158.
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CONCLUSIONS
In order to obtain much needed succour from their African 
colonies, the French tried to portray the Second World War as a 
colonial conflict:
...la guerre actuelle n'est pas seulement une 
guerre pour la transformation radicale de l'Europe,... 
c'est une guerre pour le partage du monde entier, une 
guerrre coloniale.374
In Senegal, African 'subjects1 welcomed the war as an opportunity to
serve in the army and qualify for the special privileges that
they hoped, to the 
were bestowed on veterans, leading finally, ''the acquisition of
French citizenship. For African 'citizens,' the draft was a
necessary evil— a means of ensuring that by fighting in Europe,
their privileges at home would be safeguarded. The colonial
administration had repeatedlv criticised the Blaise Diagne laws . 
of 1915 and 1916 which had integrated the oricrinaires in the regular
army, and entrenche_d their French citizenship status, 
as a grave error committed under the pressure of wartime 
conditions. For this reason, African 'citizens' feared that the 
government could, at any time, strip them of their preciously- 
acquired status.
The armistice came as a shock to many urban Africans who had 
hitherto perceived France as an invincible power. In addition, 
fearing the worst, the African elite, (oriqinaires, marabouts. 
and aspiring 'subjects') which had a great deal to lose from the 
war, was in favour of joining the resistance and fighting on the
374. Pierre Mille, Notre Combat. (November 10, 1939).
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side of the Allies. Meanwhile, the colonial administration was 
in a state of disarray, misinformed and bewildered by France's 
collapse and divided into Gaullists and Vichyites.
The High Commissioner, Pierre Boisson, was a rigid and 
unimaginative civil servant of little vision and virtually no 
leadership qualities. In many respects, he was no more than a 
soldier who knew how to obey orders but could not take 
initiative. This was probably why he was appointed by Vichy in 
the first place and why the details of his nomination remain 
obscure. Gaullist criticism of his policy of neutrality is 
groundless but can be explained in terms of the resentment the 
Free French nurtured for Boisson after the abortive attack on 
Dakar. Archival sources clearly demonstrate that no Germans, 
Italians, or Britons set foot in AOF during Boisson's 
proconsulate.
Dakar was a strategically important region which had been 
heeded as a possible center of operations by the Germans and de 
Gaulle alike. The ill-conceived and poorly-planned attack on 
Dakar by the British and Free French forces was only a minor 
setback for the Allies, but it cost many African and European 
lives in Dakar, caused extensive damages in the capital, and 
marred the image of the Allies.
Under Vichy, the African elite's perceptions of the 
Europeans as colonisers and superior people were considerably 
shaken. African soldiers had witnessed French reluctance to 
fight in the war as well as the humiliation of capitulation and
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German occupation. During the Dakar affair, Africans at home had 
observed Frenchmen opening fire against their fellow countrymen 
or fiercely denigrating each other. They had seen political 
leaders like the President of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce,
Turbe, and the mayor of Dakar, Goux, arrested and tried for anti- 
French activities. They had become familiar with the implica­
tions of the terms 'dissidents' and 'collaboration.' In other 
words, they had become aware of the crisis the French colonial 
state and administration found itself in.
Africans who had been sent to the front and had fought side 
by side with Europeans returned with a heightened consciousness 
of their inferior status at home and a deeply rooted belief in 
equality between blacks and whites— the kind they had experienced 
in the trenches. Often, these soldiers had acquired radical 
ideas which were not compatible with the stereotype of the "loyal 
African" perpetrated by the colonial administration.
The 20.000 African prisoners of war who had been held in 
Germany in frontstalaqs had endured disease, malnutrition and 
deprivations of all sorts. Upon returning to Africa, they were 
treated with suspicion and hostility by the local authorities 
which were apprehensive of the effect of German propaganda on 
their colonial subjects. Yet the myth of the loyal African was 
preserved intact, largely because it was a vital component of 
French colonial policy-making throughout the war which, if put in 
question, could irreparably upset the relative calm in AOF and 
the delicate balance of assimilation politics. Subsequently, the
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loyal African myth was perpetuated by the Gaullists who based the 
Free French movement in Africa and sought legitimacy wherever 
they could find it.
African military involvement in the Second World War far 
exceeded the continent's contribution during the Great War: It 
has been estimated that over 200.000 black Africans were 
recruited and as many as 25.000 died in battle. However, as 
Leopold Sedar Senghor eloquently argued in 194 5 , the war had 
equally catastrophic repercussions on imperial Europe:
Voici que meurt 1'Europe des Empires 
Et c'est l'agonie d'une princesse pitoyable.
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Chapter IV.
THE IMPACT OF VICHY RULE IN SENEGAL, 1940-1942
Notwithstanding the fact that the Second World War was a 
turning point in the history of Senegal, the effects of Boisson's 
policy-making and the African response have gone by largely 
unnoticed. Vichy undoubtedly marked what the historian Jean 
Suret-Canale has called the "golden age of the 'true' 
colonialists,"375 to which it might be added that it was an era 
of contradictions compounded by the regime's attempts to reverse 
the tide of colonialism from the reformist spirit of the Popular 
Front toward a more authoritarian variant of colonial rule. In 
the name of national security, Boisson and the Governor of 
Senegal, Georges Rey, suspended local government and all forms of 
black political activity from party politics to trade union 
activity and the existing press.
Vichy's resolve to restore 'authority' and 'discipline' in 
the colony went even further: Boisson and his associates wanted
to crush the trade union movement, impose harsher measures in the 
Native Penal Code, and reinforce the regime of the indigenat. 
Perhaps most sinister of all ware the Vichy regime's efforts to 
strip African veterans of their citizenship rights on the grounds 
that their contribution to the Great War had been negligeable.
375. Suret-Canale, French Colonialism.., op. cit.. 1971, p. 
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And yet, the regime was considerably more popular than both 
Frenchmen and Africans have admitted to date.376 Michael Crowder 
attributes Vichy's popularity to the regime's own version of 
assimilation.377 It is difficult, however, to find a consistent 
pattern of assimilation in Vichy policy-making. In addition, the 
colonial dimension of Vichy ideology, to the extent that one 
existed, was not monolithic. While several administrators 
fervently espoused the National Revolution, others acquiesced to 
it, while still others opposed it quietly. The contradiction in 
the dictates of Vichyite colonialists testifies to the disparity 
of views.
That Vichy demonstrated a desire to incorporate Africans (Jtm) 
a Petainist morality is largely true, and its systematic 
propaganda was particularly effective in the protectorate.
However, the fact that Vichy encouraged young Africans to 
participate in the Legion and express their thoughts in the 
state-controlled press was not necessarily a sign of the regime's 
desire to assimilate. More importantly, it was an expedient 
tactic to preserve AOF free of internal unrest and dissidence by 
mustering support where it could find it. If anything, assimila­
tion was anathema to Vichy colonialists like Boisson and Rey, 
but their efforts to mobilise African support were pivotal to 
keeping AOF neutral and sovereign from foreign aggressors.
376. Crowder, Senegal, op. cit.. 1967, p. 40.
377. Crowder, Senegal: A Study in French Assimilation Policy, 
(London: Methuen, 19 67), p. 41.
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In the Three Communes, African 'subjects' made the best of
the suspension of 'citizen' politics. Thus, it was no accident
that most Africans who contributed to Vichyite publications were
'subjects.' They immediately seized the opportunity to express
their point of view, which at times steered clear of assimilation
and sounded more like necrritude. Vichy also fared well among the
peasantry because the decline of the peanut economy— while a
the
major setback to^war effort— led to a boom in the cultivation of 
subsistence crops which benefitted a substantial number of 
Africans.
The argument that Vichy attempted to turn back the clock of 
colonial reform by defying assimilation raises more questions 
than it answers on the emerging attitudes of African 'subjects' 
toward assimilation and on the relationship between 'citizens' 
and 'subjects' in the wartime and postwar period, some of which 
will be addressed in the chapters that follow.
THE SUSPENSION OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.
The decree of September 8, 1939 suspended elections and 
revisions of electoral■lists on the grounds that overseas 
electoral campaigns were too tumultuous and likely to cause 
unrest— particularly in view of the introduction of the new 
veterans" college in the Conseil Colonial.378 The following 
month, the power of the municipal councils and mayors was
373. Expose schematique de la situation politique de la 
federation AOF au cours de l'annee 1939, Affaires Politiaues.
File 928, ANSOM.
159
transferred to the French administration, thereby excluding
Africans from local politics and laying the ground for Vichy 
policy-making.
BOISSON'S 'POLITIQUE D'ACTION ET D 'AUTORITE'.
a) Policy changes within the French Colonial Administration.
Boisson wanted to expand the colonial administration by at 
least half its size and improve its training and specialisation, 
in order to "encadrer la masse" which essentially meant 
exercising tighter control of colonial peoples.
L'Afrique pour les taches qui lui incombent n'a 
pas la moitie du personnel qu'il lui faudrait. Quand 
je constate que neuf sur dix de nos subdivisions sont 
tenues par un seul fonctionnaire qui cumule tous les 
emplois, je dis que nous occupons le pays mais que 
nous 1 'administrons pas.379
Vichy scorned the Ecole Coloniale for being "une grande Ecole que 
sur le papier" (thus, leaving its director and former Governor 
Delavignette virtually free of supervision) but recommended that 
colonial studies be incorporated into primary education and the 
baccalaureat in order to combat ignorance and indifference to 
colonial affairs.380
379. Boisson, Circular no. 600: Trois directives de
colonisation Africaine, (Dakar: Imprimerie du Gouvernement 
General, 1941), pp. 1-2.
380. On the Ecole Coloniale during the Vichy years see 
William B. Cohen, "The French Colonial Service in French West 
Africa," in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (eds.), 
France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial 
Rule. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 491-515? see 
also "Directives pour un programme d'equipement administratif et 
economique de l'AOF," January 15, 1942, 13G 81 180. ARSD.
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The decree of October 16, 1940 gave the High Commissioner 
the power to 'temporarily remove7 any individual threatening 
national security— lending Boisson a free hand to reshuffle the 
colonial corps and dismiss Jews, Freemasons and dissidents. By 
July 1, 1941, he had replaced 160 administrators (140 Europeans 
and 20 Africans) on the grounds of inefficiency, incompetence or 
participation in subversive activities.381 In addition, four 
governors, nine administrators and the Secretary-General of AOF 
(all Freemasons) were dismissed in 1942, while the administrator 
of Dakar, Martinet, committed suicide for fear of exposure.382
The Governor of Senegal, Parisot, was replaced by Georges 
Rey in February 1941. Rey had fought in the First World War at 
the age of 16, attended the Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cvr 
and served in the Colonial Infantry. From officer in the Ivory 
Coast, he was promoted in 1925 to administrator until 1938 when 
he became Directeur des Services Economiques du Gouvernement 
General in Dakar. As chef de cabinet of the Government-General 
in AEF during the war, he refused to join the dissident movement
381. Boisson circular, "I/Esprit Nouveau", no. 517, August 
11, 1942? see also Weygand's letter to Boisson dated January 6, 
1941, Affaires Politiaues. File 638, Dossier 4, ANSOM. Weygand 
who was Delegate-General of AOF wanted Boisson to prosecute "ceux 
dont I7influence nefaste risquerait de ralentir le regroupement 
national"? Hubert Deschamps was almost removed from office for 
his zealous support of the Popular Front government.
382 . Affaires Politigues, File 639, Dossier 12, ANSOM? and 
also Robert Cornevin, "Les corps des administrateurs de la France 
d 7Outre-Mer durant la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale," Collogue: Les
prodromes de la decolonisation de l7empire Francais 1936-56. 
Paris: (October 1984), p. 9.
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and transferred to the Ivory Coast.383
Rey was an enthusiastic Vichyite who fervently believed in 
Petain's National Revolution and went out of his way to impose 
quasi-fascist policies. His first speech as Governor of Senegal 
was indicative of his loyalties:
Nous avons a instaurer un ordre nouveau, et 
de toutes nos forces travailler au relevement de 
la France. Que nos mots d 7ordre soient, Travail, 
Discipline, Union... Je ne veux plus de strategies 
de veranda, plus de politiques d'apres boire, plus 
de censeurs ni de conseilleurs. Plus de critiques, 
de discussions.., plus de classes ni de parties... 
Lui seul, le Marechal, a les elements de decision; 
nous, nous avons seulement le devoir de le suivre, 
ou qu'il nous mene... en lui apportant notre 
confiance totale... aveugle... 384
Throughout his governorship, Rey forcefully tried to 
systematically dismantle municipal government and political 
parties and to strip 'citizens7 of their privileges. In most 
cases, he encountered opposition from Boisson who favoured a more 
gradual return to authoritarian colonial rule.
Champion of "une politique mieux adaptee aux necessites de 
l7action et de 1 7autorite... qui me paraissait entrer complete- 
ment dans le programme de Revolution Nationale instauree par le 
Chef de l 7Etat."385 Rey had grandiose projects of administrative
383. Senegal. (November 28, 1943).
384. Prise de commandement de la colonie du Senegal par 
Georges Rey, February 6, 1941, Affaires Politiques. File 635, 
Dossier 2, ANSOM; see also Paroles prononcees devant le Conseil 
de Notables de St. Louis, February 12, 1941, ibid.
385. Rey Report, February 28 and May 3, 1941; 13G 1 17.
ARSD.
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and political 'reorganization7 for the Three Communes.
k>) Political and Administrative Reconstruction.
Vichy extended the metropolitan municipal regime of November 
1940 overseas, including the abolition of elections, professional 
associations, and the installation of officials appointed by the 
administration in local government.386 One of the first measures 
implemented by Boisson was the suspension of the government of 
Dakar which had been in favour of the continuation of the war on 
the side of the Allies (Goux, mayor of the capital, and Turbe, 
president of the local chamber of commerce had been arrested 
during the attack on Dakar for their pro-Gaullist sentiments and 
activities). According to the High Commissioner, the prestige of 
the municipal council had been irreparably compromised during the 
Dakar affair. On September 28, 1940 it was replaced by a 
special municipal delegation composed of civil servants appointed 
by Boisson and headed by administrator-in-chief Martine.387 
According to administrative reports, Africans did not protest the 
suspension of the municipality but 'welcomed7 the new delegation 
(due to divisions within the Dioufist party).388
386. Unsigned, undated report, "Projet de decret sur la 
reorganisation municipale des communes de plein exercice du 
Senegal, Affaires Politiques. File 838, Dossier 12, ANSOM.
387. Commissariat National a l7Interieur et au Travail, 
January 20, 1943, Report on Boisson; Fapiers Boisson. File 4, 
ANSOM; and Journal Officiel de l7AOF. September 28 and October 
5, 1940.
388. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 4 0 28; ARSD, 
Report of High Commissioner 1940, Affaires Politiques. File 928, 
Dossier 2, ANSOM; and Affaires Politiques. File 635, Dossier 4,
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Rey suspended the government of St. Louis on the grounds of 
financial incompetence and loose electoral morals, which had 
contributed toward what he called "un etat archaioue et anarchi- 
que incompatible avec l7effort de renovation et d /oraanisation 
que l 7Etat exige presentement de tous.1,389 No warning, discus­
sion or consultation with other governors preceded this decree.
Next, nine out of 14 mixed communes (the exceptions being 
Louga, Thies, Diourbel, Kaolack, and Ziguinchor) were also 
abolished on the pretext of financial and political incompetence. 
While in the past municipal councillors were either designated by 
the governor of Senegal or elected by restricted suffrage 
according to the degree of evolution of the particular commune, 
only the former option applied thereafter.390 Mayors, their 
assistants and municipal councillors of communes with less than 
50.000 people were designated by the Governor of Senegal and the 
High Commissioner. The municipal council and its members could 
be dismissed at will by administrative order on the grounds of 
national security.391 Rey recognized that the suppression of the 
mixed communes would cause great problems which he expected would 
be resolved within a greater political, economic and administra­
tive reorganization of the Federation.
ANSOM.
389. Rey Report, 13G 1 17. ARSD.
390. Decree of September 25, 1941; Affaires Politiques. File 
63 5, Dossier 6, ANSOM; and Rey Report, 13G 1 17. ARSD.
391. Journal Officiel du Senegal. October 23, 1941, pp. 
587-589.
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Central to the reconstruction of political organization in 
the colonies was the abolition of the Conseil Colonial. Rey 
argued that the council, "lent, formaliste. onereux. paperas- 
sier," was not fulfilling the functions it was created for—  
functions that could be more efficiently performed, according to 
Rey, by the Permanent Commission of the council to avoid "^ e f ­
fervescence au'un parlement local ne manque pas de propager au 
sein de la masse."392 In the past, Conseil Colonial sessions 
were not unlike political forums where policies and crises were 
discussed at length and reforms were proposed, often stirring 
serious agitation and criticism of the French administration.
For this reason, Rey was in favour of dissolving the council and 
presenting it as a fait accompli to the municipal councillors.393
The decree of September 27, 1940 adjourned the Conseil 
Colonial and transferred power to the Permanent Commission. Rey 
subsequently insisted that "une administration active et 
d 7autorite serait incompatible avec les inconvenients inherents 
au regime politique que conserve la Commission permanente du
392. Rey Report, March 21, 1941 and February 28, 1941; 13G 
1 17. ARSD.
393. "Si mesure envisagee avait ete prise par voie
d 7autorite... [le] fait accompli aurait ete accepte dans reaction 
d 7aucune sorte. Par contre, necessite de prendre avis de la 
Commission Permanente du Conseil Colonial pourrait permettre a 
cette Assemblee de discuter un projet, eventuellement de lui 
faire opposition et de toute fagon de lui donner une publicite 
peu propice a creer un climat favorable a la reforme." Rey to 
Boisson, January 5, 1942, 13G 1 17. ARSD.
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Conseil Colonial,"394 demanding the outright dissolution of the 
Conseil Colonial in favour of what he called, an "advisory 
administrative commission."
Boisson was asked in 1941 to consider the dissolution of the 
circonsrintion of Dakar but the plan was abandoned on account of 
the heavy financial burden the capital would inflict on the 
economy of the Federation.395 Another project of reform under 
joint study by the Etat Major des Colonies and Boisson was the 
abrogation of the Diagne . law- of 19IS,
under the pretext 
of the 'mediocre military value7 of the originaires and their 
reportedly feeble contribution to national defense during the 
1914-18 campaign. It was argued that the Diagne laws had been 
ratified in the Chamber of Deputies "par un vote de surprise"396 
without prior consultation with the Government-General of AOF.
But it was also acknowledged that the abrogation of the laws
394. Rey Report, February 2, 1941 and March 21, 1941; 13G 1 
17. ARSD; Journal Officiel de l7AOF. October 12, 1940; see also 
letter from Boisson to Secretary of State for the Colonies dated 
April 14, 1941, Affaires Politiques. File 635, Dossier 6, ANSOM.
395. According to Boisson: "Ce serait par surcroit rendre 
plus lache 1 7encadrement de la population du Senegal, mesure 
particulierement inopportune au point de vue politique." Note 
pour la Direction de Contrdle, no date, Affaires Politiques.
File 638, Dossier 12, ANSOM. Again Boisson was a mediating force 
caught between a reactionary Colonial Ministry in France and an 
equally reactionary Colonial Corps overseas.
396. See letters of Admiral Platon to Boisson, March 27, 
1941; and Boisson7s reply May 5, 1941; Affaires Politiques. File 
636, Dossier 4, ANSOM. "Elle [la loi] a ete votee dans un elan 
de generosite, en pleine guerre...", letter of Directeur Politi­
que to Etat Major des Colonies, March 20, 1941, in ibid.
166
would constitute a great political error in time of war. 
Therefore, until such time as bold action against privileged 
Africans could be taken, colonialists like Gaston Joseph urged 
a return to authoritarian rule.
Une politique indigene equitable mais ferme, 
une discipline rigoureuse... rendront possible une 
reprise en mains des Senegalais des Quatre Communes. 
Chez eux, la notion des droits et des devoirs a ete 
pervertie par une presentation politique devenue plus 
puissante que le pouvoir gouvernemental local. La 
restauration de l 7autorite pourra avoir rapidement 
raison de ces ecarts.397
Other measures implemented by Vichy included the temporary 
dissolution of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce followed by the 
replacement of its elected members with government-appointed 
officials, and the adjournment of the Conseil du Gouvernement de 
1 7AOF.398 Political parties were effectively neutralised but not 
dissolved, despite the wishes of Weygand and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Meetings and associations were banned and 
strict control of organized activity was exercised thereby 
bringing political activity to a complete halt.399
397. Letter of Directeur Politique Gaston Joseph to Etat 
Major des Colonies dated March 20, 1941, Affaires Politiques. 
File 636, Dossier 4, ANSOM.
398. Decree of November 10, 194 0; Journal Officiel de
17AOF. (November 30, 1940), and Cheikh Faty Faye, "L7Opinion 
Dakaroise 1940-1944," Memoire de Maitrise. University of Dakar, 
1973 .
399. Letter of Weygand dated November 27, 1941, 21G 84 17.
ARSD.
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c) Trade Union Activity.
Union activity was minimal during the war in Senegal as well
as in AOF and in France. The dissolution of the CGT following
of war
the declarationAdid not provoke any reactions amongst the
unionised.400 Only nine unions and professional associations 
engaged in union activity to protest against meager salaries and 
the spiralling rise in prices.401 The strikers succeeded in 
obtaining a raise in the minimum salary from 8 to 9 francs per 
diem in May 1940, to 10 francs in July 1940.402
In 1941, there was only one strike and the workers7 demands 
for a salary raise were found exaggerated and unjustified by the 
Boisson administration. Those who refused to return to work were 
replaced.403 While livrets de travail were maintained under
400. Administrative reports argued with relief that "Les 
beaux jours du syndicalisme sont revolus... Les fonctionnaires et 
les employes de Commerce Europeens, attaches a l 7idee syndicale 
parce qu7elle representait pour eux... le seul moyen legal de 
defense, se sont rendu compte que la force du nombre etait 
souvent exploitee pour des fins politiques personnelles et 
qu7elle presentait a la colonie un reel danger: celui d 7etrainer
des mouvements xenophobes et de provoquer, parfois la lutte des 
races." Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 194 0, 2G 40 1 . ARSD.
401. The Dakar-Niger auxiliary workers, the workers of 
Podor, the teachers of the cadre commun secondaire. the students 
of the Ecole d 7Apprentissage Blanchot (St. Louis), the marine 
workers, the Podor Public Works employees, the SOCOSAC workers 
and the employees of the Direction de l7Artillerie in St. Louis. 
Transmission de l 7Inspecteur Colonial Chef de Mission Moretti,
May 1, 1939, Affaires Politiques. File 633, Dossier 4; ANSOM; 
also Rapport Annuel, Police et Surete, Dakar 1939; 2G 39 20.
ARSD; and Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 41 1 . ARSD.
402. Journal Officiel de l7AOF. June 29, 1940; and Rapport
Politique Annuel, Dakar 1941, 2G 41 19. ARSD.
403. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1941, Affaires
Politiques. File 579, ARSD.
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Vichy, the working day was extended from 9 to 10 hours and the 
administration recommended that the 1942 Labour Code prohibit 
strikes and lock-outs and create a "patrimoine corporatif 
commun. *'404
d) Indiaenat and Prestations.
Vichy abolished indiaenat exemptions, except in cases of 
distinction for active participation in the economic development 
of the country.405 In March 1941, a Native Penal Code was 
promulgated defining all offenses and fixing minimum and maximum 
penalties. It was hoped that this measure would render arbitrary 
sanctions obsolete.406 However, in practice, punishment became 
more severe: uLes peines d'emprisonment sont trop fortes, les 
amendes trop lourdes et les interdictions de seiour trop 
freauentes et trop longues.11407 The death pen/alty, hard labour 
of up to 25 years, fines and confiscation of property became more
404. Ibid.
405. The decree of July 2, 1941 removed exemptions for 
AOF women; the veterans' exemptions had ceased to exist in 
February 41; see Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1941, 2G 41 19. 
ARSD. See also Journal Officiel du Senegal. June 17, 1941; 
Affaires Politiaues. File 636, Dossier 14, ANSOM.
406. "L'incertitude de la coutume livree trop frequemment le 
justiciable a l'arbitraire et entraine, de la part des jurisdic­
tions, des erreurs, des divergences, des contradictions, dans
1'applications des peines. Le progres le plus reel de ce Code 
Penal... consiste dans 1'enumeration et la definition de toutes 
les infractions punissables, dans la prevision d'un maximum et 
d'un minimum..." Report on Penal Code, Journal Officiel du 
Senegal. March 27 to April 3, 1941, pp. 208-221 and Rapport 
Politique Annuel, Dakar 1941, Affaires Politiaues. File 579, 
ANSOM.
407. Amon d'Aby, op. cit.. 1951, p. 72.
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frequent forms of punishment under Vichy. Boisson remained in 
favour of 'native justice.'
....dans un pays elementaire comme 1'est 
l'AOF, la separation des pouvoirs n'a pas de raison 
d'etre. L'indigene connait le 'commandant', et r)
trouve tout naturel que ce soit lui q\j(eyregle ses /
affaires de justice. La justice indigene est 
d'ailleurs une excellente ecole pour connaitre 
1'indigene.408
In September 1940, the High Commissioner established a 
military tribunal in Dakar which over the next 2 6 months handled 
226 cases, condemning 115 men to death, (73 in absentia  ^ and 60 
to forced labour (4 in absentia).409 In 1940, 44.370 days of 
hard labour were assigned while in 1941 their number rose to 
65.099. The crime rate rose considerably under Vichy and prisons 
which were designed to hold 4 00 men were forced to take up to 
754.410
Two more cercles (Podor and Matam) introduced the system of 
additional taxation (introduced by the Popular Front as an 
alternative to the prestations. (see chapter I) in 194 0 so that 
out of 14 cercles only Kedougou and Tambacounda still enforced 
the regime of the prestations. However, on January 1, 1942, the 
additional tax in the full and mixed communes increased by
408. Rapport de tournee, November 19, 1941-December 2,
1941, Papiers Boisson. File 2, ANSOM.3
409. Commissariat National a l'Interieur et au Travail, 
January 20, 1943, Report on Boisson, Papiers Boisson. File 4, 
ANSOM.
410. Rapport Annuel, Dakar 1941, Affaires Politiaues. File 
579, ANSOM.
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50%.411 The rural population was also hard hit during 1942 by 
the increase in the personal tax, which ranged from 18% in 
Lower Senegal to 4 0% in Diourbel. The Societes de Prevovance 
fees (which the peasants considered another form of taxation) 
increased by 11% in Kedougou to 49% in Diourbel even though 
peanut production plummeted to its lowest since the economic 
depression of the 1930s.412
e) The Press.
By 194 0, L'AOF. Le Senegal. Le Courrier de l'Ouest Africain. 
Le Periscope Africain. and most other newspapers had ceased to 
appear.413 Only Paris-Dakar and the Bulletin de la Chambre de 
Commerce survived. After the law of December 12, 1941 which 
stipulated that all publications had to be authorized by the 
government, only four new newspapers appeared and all were 
tightly controlled by Vichy: Senegal (Bulletin d 'Information et
de Liaison^, Jalons (Revue d'Afriaue Noire). Dakar-Jeunes 
fHebdomadaire de la 'Jeune France Africaine' Petainiste. and La 
Legion.414 Le Senegal carried speeches by Petain, articles on
411. Rapport Politique, Senegal 194 0, 2G 40 2, ARSD and 
Rapport Politique, Haut Commissariat, 1940, Affaires Politigues, 
File 928, Dossier 2, ANSOM; Journal Officiel du Senegal. February 
1942, p. 138.
412. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1942, 2G 42 1 . ARSD. 
Peanut production for the years 1941-42 was 199.412 tons.
413. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1939, Affaires 
Indigenes, 2G 39 34. ARSD.
414. Before the armistice La Gazette du Tirailleur, and 
I/Union, were also published. The latter was published by 
Telemaque Sow and Ibrahima Diouf and only circulated two issues.
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the Legion and the scouts, as well as patriotic poems written by 
administrators and imbued with Vichy ideology. Jalons rejected, 
at least in theory, the doctrines of both the extreme right and 
left which wavered between
mepris extreme ou assimilation systematique...
Le noir ... ce n'est pas le 'bon sauvage' de Rousseau, 
il n'est pas le 'singe humain'.... c'est un enfant 
terriblement complique, et s'il est enfant, c'est un 
enfant grand pour son age!415
Boisson himself wrote in Dakar-Jeunes that Africa was the land of
blacks and whites who should learn to coexist, appreciate and
love one another,416 urging African intellectuals like Mamadou
Dia and Ousmane Soce Diop to contribute to Vichy publications.
Yet, familiar themes ran parallel to Vichy's seemingly
benevolent disposition toward Africans: the raison d'etre of
colonialism, it was argued, was to advance native societies under
the firm guidance and control of France. Authority and coercion
were strongly recommended for the effective subjection of the
African
rural populations. In the urban centres, theAelite would 
participate in the political process but only under European 
leadership. For this reason, Jalons argued, "en aucun cas. il ne 
faut favoriser les contacts des ieunes Europeens avec les
See Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1940, 2G 40 1. ARSD.
415. "Les Noirs et nous: Dedain ou assimilation?", Jalons, 
(November 1941), pp. 9-11; see also no. 9, (May 1942), pp. 33-37.
416. Dakar-Jeunes, no. 1, 1941.
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indigenes.1,417 And yet, Vichy propaganda projected an ideal 
brotherhood between blacks and whites colourfully disguised in a 
cult of youth, patriotism, order, discipline and hierarchy. The 
ideological contradictions do not need to be highlighted any 
further: ultimately, Vichy's policy of benevolent paternalism
sought to erode assimilationist values which it equated with 
anti-colonialism.
While extolling French colonialism, evolue 'subjects' seized 
the opportunity to write in the Vichy press, rejecting (even if 
indirectly) assimilation and exploring instead African history 
and culture: "h'essentiel est gue notre culture plonge ses
racines dans nos anciennes traditions et gue nous apprenions a 
etre fiers de notre Afrigue ingenument sauvage."418
ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS OF THE WAR. 
a) Vichy Economic Planning
With the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, the French empire 
resumed the role of manpower, foodstuff and strategic raw 
material reservoir for a weakened and divided France. A tight 
economic relationship between the metropole and the overseas 
territories and a planned economy were regarded as prerequisites 
for victory. The nationalization of foreign trade and mise-en- 
valeur of the colonial territories featured prominently on
417. P. Merlin, "Au sujet de la colonisation," Jalons. no.
6, (January-February 1942), pp. 15-23.
418. Mamadou Dia, Dakar-Jeunes. no. 10, (March 12, 1942).
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Vichy's colonial agenda.419
A Five Year Plan (1939-1944), "destine a concourir 1'inten­
sification de la production coloniale en fonction des besoins de 
la Metropole et d'une facon plus generale a ameliorer la balance 
commerciale francaise"420 was formulated by the Colonial Minister 
Mandel in 1938. Subsequently, he assigned the Conseil Superieur 
de la France d'Outre Mer421 the task of working out the details 
of the plan. Divided in three parts, (agriculture, public works 
and mines), the programme dealt almost exclusively with 
metropolitan needs "... et dans certains cas particuliers et 
exceotionnels, les travaux... permettent d'assurer un minimum de 
conditions vitales aux indigenes."422 The Governor-General's 
version of the plan conveniently omitted the financial require­
ments of the programme and mise-en-valeur was conveniently 
shelved.
Vichy economic development planners formulated corporatist 
plans according to which the colonies would assume a new role in 
a reconstructed Fascist Europe (the role of protected markets for 
French capital and manufactured goods, as well as of agricultural
419. Cotte, "La politique economique..," o p . cit., 1981, p.
47.
420. Letter Mandel dated October 10, 1938, Affaires Politi- 
ques, File 2984, Dossier 6, ANSOM.
421. Composed almost exclusively of professionals of the 
colonial lobby such as Vivier du Streel, Edouard de Warren, Le 
Neveu, etc.
422. Quoted in Cotte, "La politique..," op. cit.. 1981, p.
112.
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producers).423 The reorganisation of the imperial economic 
structure would be state controlled via the Groupements Profes- 
sionnels et Comites d'Organisation Coloniales (GPC's). However, 
GPC's were not created in Dakar until November 1942 and began 
operating in April 1943 under the Free French.
The mise-en-valeur programme in Senegal identified exhaus­
tive peanut cultivation and soil erosion as the main problems of 
the colony's economic structure. The intensification of millet 
and cereal production was recommended to redress the ailing 
economy along with the introduction of agricultural machinery and 
technology. With the help of hydraulic projects, Vichy planners 
argued, the Fleuve region in northern Senegal would become a 
showpiece of development. New lands would open up to the 
cultivation of subsistence (rice, millet and maize) and in­
dustrial crops (cotton). It was argued that "la monoculture 
senegalaise. maintes fois denoncee et gui rend le pavsan du Sine 
tributaire des cours mondiaux n'existera plus."424 In some 
respects, Vichy economic policy-making foreshadowed the develop- 
mentalist approach of the 1950s and 1960s which in theory 
advocated a return to the land, yet in practice championed
industrialisation.
423. Rene Maunier, Elements d'economie coloniale. (Paris:
194 3) ; Bertrand Mounier, L'organisation de l'economie imperiale 
par les comites coloniaux, (Paris: 1942), pp. 267-68; Giblin,
"A Colonial State..," op. cit.. 1984, pp. 2-3. Vichy fell before 
any of the plans were enforced; see Giblin, "The Vichy Years," 
op. cit.. 1978, p. 69.
424. Senegal, Notice sur le plan general de developpement 
economique et social, no date, 13G 81 180. ARSD.
175
b) The Decline of the Peanut Economy.
The effects of the war were immediately felt in Senegal as 
imports plummeted and prices rose by 40-50% against the fixed 
price of peanuts. Despite the drain in manpower, production did 
not decrease and the peanut trade continued.425 However, a 
recurrent dilemma for the administration throughout the war was 
how to increase peanut production to meet the needs of the French 
war effort and stimulate rice production to make up for the 
limited supplies of exorbitantly priced imports. The colonial 
authorities expected that
[Les cultivateurs] pousseront leur effort 
a la limite de leurs forces pour produire au maximum 
de quoi ravitailler la metropole et assurer leur propre 
subsistance.426
After the armistice and the introduction of the British 
blockade, commercial activity diminished and the first measures 
to reduce consumption were enforced (rationing of food, [June 24, 
1940, food cards [July 18]). The colonial administration was 
forced to concentrate its efforts on the intensification of the 
cultivation of food crops in order to minimize the consumption of 
imports and prolong the available stocks to the maximum. But, it 
also feared that the drain in manpower (7 0.000 peasants had been 
mobilised in AOF and the number of migrant workers, navetanes.
425. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 19 39, 2G 39 35.
ARSD, and Gellar, "The Politics of o p . cit.. 1967, p. 91.
426• Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1939, 2G 39 35,
ARSD.
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had sharply declined from 64.460 in 1939 to 39.324 in 1940), 
combined with the fall of peanut prices could negatively affect 
groundnut production.
While production did not decrease substantially during the 
first year of the war (420.000 tons in relation to the 1930-39 
average of 460.000), food shortage was acute, malnutrition spread 
rapidly and rumours of famine circulated.427 The purchasing 
power of the African (in steady decline since 1936) dwindled 
sharply:
Jamais dans l'histoire du Senegal, meme pendant les 
annees de la crise 1930 a 1934, semblable effondrement 
du pouvoir d 7achat avait ete constate.428
Table 4.429
Rice Imports in AOF 
in tons
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
41.101 
62.253 
62.753 
23.759 
1.362 
4 .408 
2.903
The price of staple foodstuffs, with rice serving as a barometre 
for the purchasing power of urban Africans, rocketed in the space
427. Ibid., and Report of January 23, 1940, 2D 14 6 . ARSD.
428. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 35. ARSD.
429. Senegal imported most of the rice destined to AOF. 
Annuaire Statistigue de l7AOF. 1949, pp. 264-5.
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of three months from 1.17 francs per kg to 3 francs; the price 
of bread rose from 1 franc to 1.50; milk from 3 to 5 francs and 
charcoal from 15 to 40 francs per kilo.430 NOSOCO would not sell 
sugar by the kilo unless its clients also bought half a pound of 
coffee.431 The price of cloth increased by 70-100% and was sold 
at 9 francs per metre in Dakar and 16 francs in Thies.432
A hundred kilograms of groundnuts which bought 116 kgs of 
rice in 1936, only bought 34 kgs of rice in March 1941. Until 
1938, the advantageous price of peanuts had allowed Africans to 
buy rice and other foodstuffs. In 1940, 1 hectare of peanuts was 
equal to 500-600 kgs of rice, while 1 hectare of millet yielded 
only 350 kgs of rice. When in 1940, 1 hectare of peanuts 
procured only 2 00-250 kgs of rice, peasants switched immediately 
to the cultivation of cereals. In the Sine-Saloum for example, 
millet and peanut production were evenly distributed.433
In 1941, a severe drought contributed to the lowest yields 
in peanut production since 1931 (199.412 tons) and affected the 
millet, rice and cotton crops.434 Imports fell by 33% and 
exports rose by only 7.4% in relation to 1940 but a food crisis 
was averted with small quantities of rice from Indochina and
430. Renseignements, December 22, 1939, 2D 14 6 . ARSD.
431. Report of December 29, 1939, 2D 14 6 . ARSD.
432. Galandou Diouf's letter to Mandel, Le Senegal. April 
18, 1940, and Report of August 12, 1940, 2D 14 6. ARSD.
433. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 35. ARSD.
434. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1941, 2G 41 27. ARSD.
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Madagascar, millet from the Soudan and maize from Dahomey and 
Togo. In the interior, peasants endured the requisition system 
which was set up to extract oil products, cotton, rice and rubber 
destined for the war effort and for troops in North Africa.
In 1942, the peanut harvest yielded an all time low of 
112.900 tons and more peasants shifted cultivation from 
groundnuts to subsistence crops. But the fact that Africans 
abandoned peanut production does not necessarily have to be 
interpreted as a form of popular resistance to capitalist 
relations of production. Africans did not find it profitable to 
cultivate peanuts because they could not buy much with it. 
Moreover, more than any other government before it, the Vichy 
regime encouraged the cultivation of subsistence crops to 
compensate for the acute food shortages, to prevent mass unrest 
and contribute to the war effort (much of the foodstuffs were 
requisitioned). The shift in cultivation from export to 
subsistence crops was rather a response to the crisis— much like 
the response to the depression of the early 1930s.
c) The Foundations of Industrialisation
Eager to prevent the development of an African colonnat. 
Vichy encouraged a 'return to the land.7 Boisson underscored the 
potentially crucial role of chiefs not as simple auxiliaries or 
intermediaries but as "les premiers agents de notre administra­
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tion aupres des populations indigenes.11435 With the decree of 
June 20, 1940, chiefs were appointed by the colonial authorities, 
thus further tightening administrative control over the 
protectorate.436
L'Afrique est paysanne. Elle doit, dans sa 
necessaire evolution, demeurer paysanne et ce 
serait une erreur de la proletariser en 
17 industrialisant.437
'Limited industrialisation7 was the official Vichy colonial 
economic strategy.438 The British blockade which had critically 
affected the peanut trade economy and curtailed the volume of 
exports to France, contributed to the stimulation of industrial 
development, particularly the processing and machine finishing of 
the groundnut.
Prior to the Second World War, the French government had 
been under constant pressure from metropolitan processing plants 
to discourage oil production in AOF. The ensuing paradox 
acknowledged by the administration was that despite the fact that
435. Circulaire no. 265 au sujet du decret 10/4/35 in 
textes reorganisant l 7indigene en AOF, Goree 193 6, Commission 
Guernut, File 59, Dossier B32, ANSOM; and Rapport de tournee, 
November 19, 1941-December 1, 1941 Nemo and Platon, Papiers 
Boisson. File 2, ANSOM.
436. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 2 . ARSD.
437. Boisson, "Directives pour un programme d 7equipement 
administratif et economique de l7AOF," November 15, 1942, 13G 
81 180. ARSD.
438. See Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Vichy et
17industrialisation aux colonies," Revue d 7Histoire de la 
Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale, no. 114, (1979), pp. 69-94.
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Senegal had plenty of potentially edible oil of superior quality, 
cotton oil was imported for local consumption. The reason behind 
this disparity was that French oil industries were hostile to 
colonial industrialisation and anxious to avoid competition by 
ensuring that the colonies remained mere producers of raw 
materials. Those materials were exported and finished in France 
and then returned overseas as costly merchandise. French oil 
industries argued that every new oil plant in Senegal cor­
responded to the closing down of a French industry but eventually 
agreed with great reluctance to the production of oil overseas 
for local consumption.439 In 1939, exports of unshelled nuts for 
the first time exceeded the export of shelled groundnuts and the 
President of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce boasted that "Le 
Senegal est outille, s'il est besoin exporter sous forme 
d'arachides decortigues la totalite de sa recolte.»440
As a result of the war, the export of shelled nuts was 
banned in February 194 0, the metropolitan demand for oil rocketed 
(several oil plants in France were destroyed) and the situation 
was reversed: unshelled nuts and peanut oil incentives were 
extended to producers; and 31 fixed and 32 mobile shelling 
industries were installed in the main producing centres of the
439. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1939, 2G 39 35. and 
Gellar, "The Politics of..," op. cit.. 1967, p. 99; Suret- 
Canale, French Colonialism.., op. cit.. 1971, pp. 592-93.
440. Allocution du President de la Chambre de Commerce de 
Dakar to Weygand, March 1941, Affaires Politjgues. File 638, 
Dossier 4, ANSOM.
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peanut belt.441 In 1941, the French oil industry Lesieur which 
had vehemently opposed oil processing in Senegal (and whose 
Dunkirk plant was destroyed in the war) set up a plant in Dakar. 
The rationale was that local industries were no longer 
competitors but "complements necessaires" to the French imperial 
economy.
Table 5.442
Peanut and Peanut Oil Production in Senegal 
1938-1941. in tons
Shelled Nuts Unshelled Nuts Peanut Oil
1938
1939
1940
1941
365.732
99.724
59.000
142 .999 
291.235
149.000
5.681
14.000 
20.800
45.000
The isolation that the war inflicted on French West Africa 
stimulated the manufacturing of processed foods which had 
hitherto been imported from France. Flour and canned tuna 
factories were amongst the important new industries. Other 
plants included the Bata shoe factory in Rufisque, a wood 
industry in Casamance, two cigarette factories and the Ateliers 
et Chantiers de Dakar.
441. See decree of February 1940 in Journal Officiel de
17AOF. February 3, 1940; and Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 
1942, 2G 42 24. ARSD.
442. Rapports Economiques Annuels, 1938-1941; 2G 3 8 41; 2G 
39 35; 2G 40 35; 2G 41 27. ARSD.
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One of the consequences of this import-substitution 
industrialization was that the Bordeaux import-export firms lost 
the monopoly of economic activity they had previously enjoyed and 
began declining, as exports to France plummeted and the govern­
ment bolstered the new local industries.443 New banks such as 
the Credit Lvonnais and the Societe Generale were founded while 
others established overseas networks.
While the number of Senegalese firms with 50 or more 
employees did not increase substantially between 1936 and 1945 
(from 13 to 19),444 smaller industries proliferated. In addi­
tion, heavy industries such as Lesieur Oil which set up plants in 
Senegal during the war were to become the backbone of Dakar's 
industrialisation in the postwar era.445
THE IMPACT OF VICHY IDEOLOGY AND PROPAGANDA.
Vichy rule in Senegal was premised on the assumption that 
assimilation had accorded Africans rights and privileges they had 
usurped and that it was urgent to modify the existing framework 
of African political participation. The suspension of political 
rights and the dwindling economic supremacy of the evolues had 
reduced the elite to 'subject7 status. The oricrinaires were no 
longer distributed the food rations accorded to Europeans? they
443. Rapport Annuel, Dakar 1941, 2G 41 19. ARSD; see also 
Gellar, "The Politics of..,11 op. cit. . 1967, p. 100.
444. Giblin, "The Vichy Years..," op. cit.. 1978, p. 91.
445. Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule, o p . cit.. 
1968, p. 498.
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no longer shared their living quarters, food and uniforms in the 
army; and they were excluded from certain train compartments, 
building entrances and queues on a colour basis.446
It has been argued that Vichy practiced racial discrimina­
tion to an unprecedented extent. Yet, in reality, discrimination 
mostly affected the 'citizen' minority, insofar as they were no 
longer treated as a privileged group. For the 'subjects,' the 
status quo remained more or less unchanged.
The political scientist A. Zolberg has contended that
Vichy's most important contribution was that it forced the
African elite to identify, for the first time, with the
'subjects.'447 This argument is debateable for, according to
administrative reports, the oricrinaires refused to identify with
the
the 'subjects' and believed thatAstate of affairs was only 
temporary.448 The reverse might, however, be argued: it was the 
urban 'subjects' who became more conscious of the diminishing gap 
that had set them apart from the privileged assimiles for nearly 
two centuries, as they witnessed the structure of assimilation 
and social stratification erode. Boisson even went as far as to 
claim that 'subjects' expressed satisfaction with the Vichy 
measures "disant meme volontiers crue les elections creaient des
446. Rita Cruise O'Brien, White Society in Black Africa. 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1972), p. 64.
447. Aristide R. Zolberg. One Party Government in the Ivory 
Coast, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 61.
448. Boisson letter to Vichy dated October 23, 1940, 13G 17 
17, ARSD.
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privileges et aue ce serait un bien de les voir abolir fsic)."449
For Vichy, the loyalties of the African elite were ques­
tionable throughout the war years. 'Dangerously isolated' and 
vulnerable to foreign subversive influences, the assimiles had 
protested vehemently against the armistice only to pledge full 
support to Boisson and Petain a few weeks later.450 The 
underlying suspicion that educated Africans were in fact pro- 
British during the entire duration of the war persisted in 
administrative reports.451
For this reason, it was argued that "1'elite doit etre la 
preoccupation essentielle de l'Ordre Nouveau en Afrique.1,452 
Closer ties with the originaires would ensure that the 
administration would "shape" and control their development in 
order to neutralize any independent action on their part.453 
Apart from political parties, municipal politics and trade 
unions, the only other means of expression of evolue interests 
had been the literary, athletic and semi-political associations.
449. ibid.
450. Affaires Politiques, File 639, Dossier 5, ANSOM, for 
loyalty letters and telegrams toward Vichy.
451. See for instance, Renseignements, November 15 and 16, 
1940, 2D 14 3 . ARSD; Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 
40 2 , ARSD; Berthet Report, 2D 14 8 . ARSD; Boisson to Vichy, 
October 23, 194 0, 13G 16. 17 17. ARSD; Renseignements, October
15, 1940, ibid., ARSD.
452. Rapport Annuel, Dakar 1941, 2G 41 19. ARSD.
453. "Pour que 1'elite indigene ne se separe pas de nous, il 
faut que nous sachions la former... mais aussi que nous sachions 
la retenir..." Boisson circular, no. 600: Trois directives de 
colonisation, op. cit.. p. 3.
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According to Vichy legislation, all associations had to be 
authorized by Boisson, whose strategy was to strip them of 
political vestiges so that they would be "soutenufsl et guidersi 
par les administrations locales."454 Only 11 associations were 
created during Boisson's proconsulate and most of them were 
athletic clubs.
Conversely, a plethora of scout groups ('eclaireurs.' 
'archers,' etc.) sprang up across the country and a Maison de 
Jeunesse was founded in Rufisque. Schools became imbued with the 
cult of Petain and a military atmosphere conducive to 
"1'enseiqnement patriotique." reigned. Physical education, 
agriculture and 'formation morale' became the three most impor­
tant courses on the school curriculum.455 Amadou Ali Dieng still 
remembers the "ecoles galeres" which forced African school­
children to cultivate plots of land daily as part of their 
education.456 A contemporary observer spoke of the new horizons 
that Vichy education would usher schoolchildren to: "Deia l'essor 
remarquable de 1'education physique et de la preparation
454. ibid.. Boisson became the president of many associa­
tions such as the Cercle Amicale William Pontv.
455. Examinations such as the brevet sportif populaire were 
introduced in schools; See Directives pour un programme d'equipe- 
ment, 13G 81 180. ARSD. On the education system during the Vichy 
period see Peggy Sabatier, "African Culture and Colonial 
Education: The William Ponty School cahiers and Theater," Journal 
of African Studies. (1985), pp. 1-10.
455. Interview with Amadou Ali Dieng, Dakar, June 1984.
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militaire ouvre une ere nouvelle.»457
Under instructions from Rey and Boisson, the Legion 
Francaise des Anciens Combattants d'Afrigue Noire encouraged the 
creation of scout groups such as the Pasteur des Cadets de St. 
Louis. the Cadets de Dakar, Eclaireurs de St. Louis, the Troupe 
Lvautev des Eclaireurs de France, etc. which organized campfire 
festivities, marches, parades— all in an atmosphere of military 
discipline and patriotism.458 Vichy's extensive propaganda 
network was largely responsible for their popularity. Radio 
broadcasts, 'causeries,' and newspaper articles popularised 
Vichy's message to young legionaires, and it seemed to have a 
powerful effect on young Africans.
a) The Legion Francaise des Anciens Combattants d'Afrique Noire 
To minimize political dissent (particularly on the part of 
the evolues and the returning soldiers), and mobilise public 
opinion on a greater scale, Vichy created a hierarchically 
structured organization which absorbed all the existing veteran 
associations.459 Article 2 of the Legion's statutes defined it 
as
Le mouvement unique d'action civique ouvert aux 
citoyens desireux de s'associer aux anciens combattants 
pour servir les principes de la Revolution Nationale et
457. Marius Leblond, Comment utiliser nos colonies. (Paris: 
Editions Jules Tallandier, 1940), p. 21.
458. Senegal. no. 7, (April 15, 1942).
459. Journal Officiel de l'AOF. February 22, 1941, p. 207, 
and Giblin, "The Vichy Years..," op.cit., 1974, pp. 53-55.
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assurer leur application dans tous les domaines.460
Founded at the end of 194 0 under the auspices of administrator- 
in-chief Martinet and Governor Martine, the Legion appointed 
Boisson as president and held its first meeting, quite 
significantly, at the Conseil Colonial quarters. Soon after­
wards, veterans assembled at the stadium of the Lycee Van 
Vollenhoven in a "grandiose et emouvante ceremonie" where they 
swore allegiance to the Petain government with the slogan "une 
foi-un chef-une discipline."461 Boisson set the tone of the 
festivities: "La doctrine du Marechal s'impose en bloc: elle 
reguiert votre adhesion totale. . .,l462
The High Commissioner distributed 4.600 membership cards 
(1.600 to 'citizens' and 3.000 to 'subjects') and in less than 
six months, the Legion boasted 3.000 African and European 
members.463 The professed objectives of the Legion were to crush 
dissidence; restore African faith in France's "mission 
civilisatrice" ; make French public opinion aware of the impor­
tance of the African bloc; and "eliminate at all cost" Jews,
460. Boisson circular, March 8, 1943, 13G 8 17. ARSD.
461. Rapport Annuel, Dakar 1941, o p .cit.. ARSD, and Affaires
Politigues. File 579, ANSOM, and Paris-Dakar. (June 19, 1941).
462. Paris-Dakar. (June 19, 1941).
463. Boisson letter to Colonies Vichy dated March 15, 1941,
13G 8 17. ARSD. See also Senegal. no. 7, (April 15, 1942).
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Freemasons and communists.464
The elite of the Legion formed nuclei to assist the 
administration in enforcing order and in recruiting legionaires 
from different strata of the population to participate in the 
municipal councils and the nearly defunct governments of the 
mixed communes as well as to assume positions of leadership as 
mayors, presidents of special delegations, etc. Boisson per­
sonally appointed candidates to their posts, and by the end of 
1942, 115 out of 143 councillors were legionaires.465 Civil 
servants who refused to join were accused of "une attitude 
inadmissible" for refusing to promote the ideals of the National 
Revolution and fired on those grounds.466
Table 6.467
Legionairo Participation in Municipal Councils 
Commune Municipal Councillors Legionair es
St. Louis 17 17
Kaolack 18 10
Thies 18 17
Ziguinchor 18 8
464. Boisson propaganda instructions to Legionnaires, March 
25, 1941, 13G 9 17. ARSD, and Affaires Politigues. File 639, 
Dossier 12, ANSOM.
465. Boisson letter to Secretary of State for the Colonies 
dated June 8, 1943, 13G 8 17. ARSD; see also Boisson circular 
dated February 9, 1942, o p .cit.
466. Telegram of Boisson to Colonies Vichy dated June 14,
1941, Papiers Boisson. File 1, ANSOM; and letter of Georges Rey 
to Boisson dated August 15, 1941, 13G 104 180. ARSD.
467. Berthet, Directeur General-Affaires Politiques, 
Administratives et Sociales, letter to Boisson dated September 5,
1942, 13G 8 17. ARSD.
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Louga
Diourbel
18
18
12
12
12
16
15
11
9
12
M'Bour
Fatick
Tivouane
Total number of councillors: 
Total number of legionaires:
143
115
Yet, behind Boisson's eagerness to champion the cause of the 
Legion and integrate it into the political life of the colony lay 
a concern over its possible politicization. The High Commissioner 
was determined to harness the movement to serve the purposes of 
the administration. Thus, he resisted the entrance of 
legionaires in the police and in the garde cercles and excluded 
them from matters relating to the "politigue indigene."468 When
in late 194 2, the Legion began demanding more autonomy in order
a
to embark o n c o u p de force' against the enemies of the National 
Revolution (more imaginary than real), Boisson resigned as 
president and relations between the Legion and the administration 
became strained thereafter.469
Yet, during that year, Governor Rey boasted that
[La Legion] tient dans le pays et a la colonie une 
place de premier plan et on ne concevrait plus la vie
468. Boisson circular, March 8, 1943, 13G 8 17. ARSD.
469. Boisson letter dated September 15, 1942, Affaires 
Politigues. File 639, Dossier 2, ANSOM; see also Boisson letter 
to Platon dated October 9, 1942, ibid.. and Conclusion de la 
Direction des Affaires Politiques, November 6, 1942, Affaires 
Politigues. File 639, Dossier 12, ANSOM.
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du Senegal sans la Legion...470
La Legion ... a groupe a elle seule a peu pres 
toute l'activite locale...471
On account of their attachment to the values of authority, 
discipline and camaraderie. veterans were chosen as the most 
effective agents to unite Frenchmen and revive in them
"[L'] amour de la Patrie, [1'] attachement au sol 
natal, [la] cohesion, [le] respect de la famille, Tie] 
gout du travail..., [la] soumission a 1'autorite.473
The figures below demonstrate that 'subjects' in Dakar were not 
keen on joining the Legion, in sharp contrast to subjects in the 
protectorate who enlisted as veterans or volunteers. More 
'citizens' were listed as volunteers than veterans, though 
pressure on the part of the administration might have contributed 
to it. Veteran 'subjects' in Dakar showed the least enthusiasm 
in the Legion while volunteer 'citizens' from the protectorate 
joined more massively than any other category.
470. Senegal. no. 10, (May 10, 1942); and no. 7, (April 15, 
1942) .
471. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1942, 2G 42 1. ARSD.
47 .^ Boisson propaganda instructions, March 25, 1941, 13G 8 
17, ARSD.
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Table 7.473
The Legion in 1942.
Veterans Volunteers
Citizens Subjects Citizens Subjects
Dakar 1. 848 241 2 .282 259
Senegal 1. 249 1.923 2 .771 2 .413
Veterans formed groups such as La France de Petain. Service 
d'Ordre Legionnaire (SOL), Groupement des Vigilances Franpaises. 
Jeunesse Boisson.474 The most important and popular of all was 
the SOL, a paramilitary group with distinct collaborationist 
tendencies.
Une force reelle, une elite agissante... a 
l'interieur ... de la Legion, qui soit vraiment, grace 
a sa formation politique... l'instrument revolution-
473. 13G 8 17. ARSD. The table also includes figures from 
all AOF colonies.
474. Affaires Politiaues. File 929, Dossiers 1 and 4, ANSOM; 
La France de Petain was authorized in September 1941. The 
Groupement des Vigilances Francaises was never authorized. It 
championed a systematic campaign against Jews, Freemasons, and 
Communists. Its members eventually adhered to France de Petain. 
Directeur de Surete Generale de Dakar to Boisson dated May 31, 
1949, Affaires Politigues. File 929, Dossier 4, ANSOM. The 
Jeunesse Boisson was formed by a Senegalese teacher from the 
Ecole Libre France-Afrigue. but was refused authorization on the 
grounds that it was an "association de divertissement"; 21G 82 
17, ARSD. Other groups like the Parti Populaire Francais which 
were furthering the cause of Vichy were also active during this 
period but only semi-clandestinely, for Boisson never allowed 
extreme right-wing metropolitan parties to establish branches in 
AOF. See Report of Surete Generale, 13G 104 180. ARSD and Papiers 
Deschamps. Report of October 7, 1943, ANSOM.
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naire par excellence.475
SQL members had to undergo extensive physical and political 
training before taking the ceremonial oath of allegiance to the 
National Revolution.476 SOL groups were formed in St. Louis, 
Thies, Kaolack, Kedougou, Ziguinchor and Diourbel.477 Its 
statutes comprised 21 points, among which
Contre 1'egalitarisme 
contre la vaine liberte 
contre la condition proletarienne 
contre la lepre juive
pour la purete frangaise 
pour la civilisation chretienne 
pour le corporatisme frangais 
pour 1'autorite.478
SOL sympathizers were grouped in the Amis de la Legion and the 
Volontaires de la Revolution Nationale.479 Legionaire houses were 
built across the country to provide study groups and hold soirees 
for fundraising purposes. Conferences, kermesses. prayers, and
475. Instruction generale sur le recrutement du SOL, Papiers 
Boisson, File 4, ANSOM and Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 
1942, 2G 42 1 . ARSD.
476. SOL recruitement form, July 22, 1942, prepared by the 
chief of SOL. Grebert, Affaires Politigues. File 2557, Dossier 6, 
ANSOM.
477. See detailed membership list in Papiers Deschamps. 
ANSOM.
478. Causerie du SOL, March 21, 1942, Papiers Boisson. File 
4, ANSOM and Paris-Dakar. (July 10, 15 and 22, 1942).
479. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1941, Affaires 
Politigues. File 579, ANSOM.
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ritualistic ceremonies effectively conveyed the impression that 
Vichy was a rigorous and solid movement. In addition, parades 
and official ceremonies were elaborate and colourful— an integral 
factor of the Vichy appeal: "Grace a la Legion les fetes 
officielles... qui etaient oarticulierement froides, riqides, 
devenues vibrantes, chaudes. spontanes. . .
The success of the propaganda was not limited to the urban 
centres. Eager to prevent dissidence and foster an image of 
legitimacy, Vichy had addressed itself and appealed to the youth, 
particularly the 'subjects' of the protectorate. By involving 
'subjects' in the ritualistic politics of the Legion, Vichy 
increased its popularity. The prestige and appeal of the Legion 
dwindled rapidly after AOF rallied to the Allies in November 
1942. The majority of its members resigned, its leaders were 
severely criticised and the campaign of denigration that followed 
raised new issues of contention amongst Europeans and Africans 
alike.
AFRICAN RESISTANCE.
The resistance movement in Senegal began in a systematic 
fashion only after the attack on Dakar in September 1940 with the 
foundation of the clandestine section of the France Combattante 
de Bathurst headed by Lieutenant Montezan. Its 314 European and 
African members (mostly 'citizen' teachers, merchants, civil 
servants) were led by a Muslim reformer and former municipal
480. Senegal, no. 10, (May 16, 1942), Governor Rey article.
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councillor Abdel-Kader-Diagne and the European Saussin.481 A 
second resistance network operated under the leadership of the 
Mouride marabout Bassirou M'Backe of Kaolack. The objective was 
to carry messages from Bathurst to Dakar, oppose Vichy policy and 
prepare the ground for the future deployment of the Free French 
forces in Dakar.482
Within two months of operation of the resistance rings, 13 
Africans and Europeans were arrested and condemned to death by 
the military court of Dakar but later their sentences were 
reduced to 20 years of forced labour. Eleven other Gaullists 
were condemned from two to four years imprisonment and 
confiscation of property. Some 568 civilians were prosecuted on 
charges of dissidence and 36 were tried by the Military Tribunal 
of Dakar.483 Special anti-dissident squads were founded in AOF 
to combat dissidence, and 11 concentration camps operated in the 
federation, two of which were in Senegal.484 Six dissidents were 
executed in Fann, one of them only 11 days after AOF had sided
481. Abdel Kader Diagne, La resistance francaise au Senegal 
et an AOF pendant la guerre. (Thies, no date [circa 1950]), pp.
4, 20.
482. ibid., p. 6, and Rapport de Abdel Kader Diagne sur la 
dissidence, September 22, 1943, Affaires Politiaues. File 883, 
Dossier 14, ANSOM. See also Giblin, "The Vichy Years in ..," 
op.cit., 1978, chapter 4 on Smugglers and Spies: Resistance to 
Vichy in French West Africa.
483. Telegram of Boisson to Bureau Menees Antinationales 
dated November 4, 1941, Papiers Boisson. File 4, o p .cit.. ANSOM.
484. Cornevin, "Le corps des administrateurs..," op.cit., 
1984, p. 7. There was one concentration camp in Guinea, one in 
Dahomey, one in the Ivory Coast, two in Togo, four in Sudan and 
two in Senegal, see Papiers Boisson. File 4, ANSOM.
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with the Allies. The composition and leadership of those 
resistance networks ('citizens,' marabouts. etc.) points to the 
fact that for Africans, resistance had more to do with regaining 
their lost status than with supporting a particular metropolitan 
faction.
Another example of resistance was the flight of the Floup 
and Diola ethnic groups of Lower Casamance into Portuguese 
Guinea. In July 1942, they refused to provide recruits and 
foodstuffs requisitioned by the administration. The chief of the 
Floup, Alinsitoue, advised her people
....de ne pas obeir au blanc, de lui refuser les 
hommes pour le service militaire, les achats forces 
paddy pour la constitution de reserves, enfin de ne pas 
entretenir les routes pour qu'il ne puisse controler ce 
qui ce passe dans la region.485
These isolated rebellions took over a year to suppress and were 
directed against colonial rule rather than against Vichy.
CONCLUSIONS
The Second World War signalled the abrogation of African 
political participation and the return to colonial 
authoritarianism. The climate of change and promise of reform 
which characterised the Popular Front era came to an abrupt halt. 
It was the wartime measures of the Third Republic, and not the 
Vichy regime as has often been assumed, which suspended elec­
tions, municipalities and associations, thereby paving the ground
485. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1942, 2G 42 1 . ARSD 
and 17G 124 17. ARSD.
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for Vichy's authoritarian policy-making. Boisson's regime was in 
a sense the culmination of policies already set in motion by a
colonial administration in crisis.
Threatened by enemies and allies alike, Boisson pursued a 
policy of neutrality in the war, carefully maneuvering around 
potential foreign and domestic aggressors. The pressure of 
maintaining West Africa neutral far outweighed the urgency of 
implementing the New Order, Yet Boisson and the Governor of 
Senegal Georges Rey clearly wanted to rectify a colonial situa­
tion which they believed had gone too far under the Popular 
Front. The control of African political, social and economic 
activity was central to their decision-making. In addition, they 
turned a blind eye to the practice of the indicrenat which
intensified during this period and endorsed the Native Penal Code
that was harsher than previous legislation.
Not all aspects of Vichy rule, however, had a negative 
effect on Africans. In economic terms, Africans fared better 
under Vichy than under previous administrations and certainly 
better than under the Free French. The decline of the peanut 
economy forced the colonial administration to concentrate its 
efforts on the cultivation of food crops in order to compensate 
for the acute food shortages as well as to prevent mass unrest.
In addition, the British blockade curtailed the volume of exports 
to France and Vichy was compelled to encourage colonial in­
dustrial development, particularly the processing and machine 
finishing of the groundnut.
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The Popular Front had been an urban movement which had 
addressed itself and appealed to the African elite. The Vichy 
regime stripped the oriainaires of their privileged status, poli­
tical, economic and social. Anxious to appeal to African loyalty, 
it addressed itself to all Africans. The populist style of 
politics it introduced, namely boy-scout patriotism, parades, the 
cult of discipline and hierarchy, etc. integrated a segment of 
veteran 'subjects' from the protectorate and a large number of 
African youths who had hitherto been excluded from political 
participation into the colourful patriotic festivities that 
abounded under Vichy. The Legion and the press further 
popularized Vichy ideology.
On the other hand, the oriainaires whose hard earned rights 
had been abolished were left with a bitter taste of Vichy rule 
but also with a determination to safeguard their interests. It 
was they who got involved in the resistance movement and later 
welcomed the 'return' of the federation on the side of the 
Allies.
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Chapter V.
FREE FRANCE IN SENEGAL, 1943-1945
The 'return' of French West Africa to the allied camp in 
November 1942 signalled the beginning of the most exacting and 
trying phase of the war for the federation. The resumption of 
the war effort intensified to an unprecedented extent, blurring 
the differences between two colonial administrations which 
claimed to be diametrically opposite. For instance, the 
Vichyite Boisson sounds remarkably similar to his socialist 
successor, Hubert Deschamps in the following speeches:
Pendant deux ans, nous avons assist^ la France; 
maintenant, il faut la d^livrer. Nous avons 6t6 choisis 
par le destin pour etre les ouvriers de ce soutien et de 
cette d^livrance .486 
and
La liberation de la Patrie doit seule occuper nos 
efforts et nos pens£es. Ceci est le combat pour la 
liberty.487
The conditions under which AOF 'returned' to the war, the 
'restoration of republican liberties'— to use some of the 
vocabulary that permeates the literature of that period— and 
the disastrous battaille de l'arachide had far-reaching 
consequences on the African milieu.
486 . Boisson quoted in Paris-Dakar, (March 20, 1943) .
487 . Deschamps, Discours prononc£ par Deschamps &
l'ouverture de la session ordinaire du Conseil Colonial, August 
23, 1943, p. 7.
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The new element introduced in the war equation by the Free 
French was not, as the administration professed, the 
reinstitution of republican liberties. In fact, according to the 
African press, the oppressive habits of the Vichy regime were far 
from eradicated:
...rien ne parait change. On croit vivre aux temps 
heureux du Petainisme a outrance, meme regime dic­
tatorial, memes procedes policiers...488
The Africans' worst fears were confirmed when returning soldiers 
who had risked their lives for France faced a hostile administra­
tion and, when they protested, were brutally suppressed in 
Thiaroye.
It was the 'battle for groundnuts' which constituted the 
crux of Free France's policy-making, depleting African human and 
economic resources and indirectly committing itself to postwar 
reform as compensation. The sacrifices which Free France imposed 
on the African population coupled with French political division 
and the mishandling of domestic crises (such as Thiaroye) shook 
France's increasingly brittle grip on her colonies. Besides, 
there were other forces working against the colonial system. For 
instance, American and Soviet anti-colonialist ideology were 
putting increasing pressure on France and were infiltrating the 
insular social fabric of the oriainaires.
Political activity resumed in 1943 when the municipalities 
were restored and patriotic associations began shaping the
488. Reveil. (December 15, 1944).
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political map of the colony. The polarisation between Europeans 
and Africans and the formation of patriotic associations along 
racial lines were the distinguishing feature of political activity 
in the immediate postwar period.
THE 'RETURN' OF AOF IN THE WAR.
The events leading up to the 'return' of AOF in the war have 
been largely neglected by contemporary historiography, and the 
transfer of power from Boisson to Cournarie has been dealt with 
as a clean break of policy. A closer look at the period reveals 
that the "ralliement11 was not a 'spontaneous' manifestation of 
patriotism and that the proconsulates of Boisson and Cournarie, 
following AOF's resumption of the war, were in fact a continuum 
which was broken very gradually.
On the evening of November 8, 1942, notwithstanding the 
Anglo-American invasion of North Africa, Boisson renewed his 
allegiance to Petain.
L'Afrique du Nord a ete attaquee, ce matin, a 
l'aube par des forces Americaines et Britanniques.
Nous connaissons le pretexte invoque. Nous entendons a 
nouveau ce que nous avons entendu en Septembre 1940.
Notre tour, sans doute, ne tardera pas. II nous 
trouvera prets a executer l'ordre du Marechal.489
An emissary was sent to Morocco on November 10th, to inquire into 
General Nogues' position. He returned four days later to find
489. Note de renseignements sur les evenements de Novembre 
1942 en Afrique du Nord et en AOF, Commandement en chef des 
forces terrestres, aeriennes, maritimes de l'AOF, 13G 104 180. 
ARSD.
201
that, despite the fact that news of the German invasion of 
unoccupied France had reached Dakar, the colonial administration 
remained loyal to Vichy.490 The previous day, Boisson and 
General Barreau (Commandant en chef des forces terrestres. 
maritimes et aeriennes de l'AOF] had informed Admiral Darlan by 
telegram that they would neither accept defeat, military 
occupation and disarmament, nor a Gaullist presence in AOF.491 
Darlan, who aimed to regroup the empire and undermine the 
Gaullists at all cost, repeatedly underscored his close ties with 
Petain to Boisson and Barreau.492 Meanwhile, the envoy reported 
that, according to a secret telegram sent by Petain, the Generals 
Nogues and Darlan were collaborating under the Marshall's orders.
With the exception of Barreau who was in favour of siding 
with the Allies, the military authorities in AOF remained 
apprehensive over what course of action to take. An Inquiry 
Commission dispatched to Algiers to investigate into the authen­
ticity of the secret telegram returned to Dakar on November 22, 
having confirmed the emissary's findings.493 Boisson was swayed
490. Note du General Barreau, Affaires Politiques, File 30, 
Dossier 2, ANSOM.
491. "II serait impossible d'accepter la venue sur le 
territoire de l'AOF et dans ses eaux territoriales d'elements 
Gaullistes quels qu'ils soient." Affaires Politiaues. File 872, 
ANSOM.
492. Darlan proclamation of November 15, 1942, Algiers, 13G 
104 180. ARSD; and Elements de base de la position prise par 
1'Amiral Darlan, Affaires Politiaues. File 872, ANSOM.
493. Compte rendu de la mission du General Blaizot a Alger, 
December 21, 1942, Affaires Politiques. File 872, ARSD? and 
Pierre Queille, Histoire diplomatique de Vichy. (Paris: Albatros,
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but the military stalled further.494 The following day, the High 
Commissioner addressed the historic telegram of llralliementM to 
Darlan: "Considerant qu'en aaissant ainsi nous restons fideles a 
notre serment au Marechal, l'AOF se range sous vos ordres.1,495
Having pledged allegiance specifically to Petain and Darlan, 
Boisson essentially continued to serve the same men he took 
orders from under Vichy and he proudly boasted that AOF's 
realignement was but a minor shift of policy. His decision was 
predictable, if not inevitable: as was the case in 1940, he had 
acted only after a superior officer, Darlan, had committed 
himself first to a course of action. Thus AOF merely followed in 
the footsteps of North Africa.496 According to Boisson, the 
decisive consideration in his decision was "le souci de 1'unite1* 
with Darlan, the Navy and the military authorities.497
1976), pp. 259, 271.
494. Chenet, op. cit.. 1949, pp. 147-150.
495. Telegram of Boisson to Darlan, Affaires Politiaues.
File 872, ANSOM? see also Ordre Generale, November 23, 1942, 
General Barreau, 13G 104 180. ARSD. The same day, Petain had q
addressed the following message to AOF: "II n'est plus que ses c
territoires et ceux des Somalis qui soient libres. Soldats, 
marins, aviateurs, j'avais confie l'AOF a votre garde, vous avez 
rempli votre mission. II depend encore de votre heroisme et de 
votre fermete que dans la tourmente, il existe une parcelle de 
terre d'Afrique sur laquelle flotte seul le drapeau de la 
France... vous resterez fideles a mes ordres..." 13G 104 180.
ARSD.
496. Papiers Boisson. Private Archives 30, File 5, ANSOM, on 
the 'return' of AOF to the Allied camp? also Faye, op. cit.,
1973, p. 78.
497. Paris-Dakar. (November 22, 1942).
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J'ai rallie l'Afrique Noire parce que j'etais 
desormais coupe de toutes relations sures avec le 
gouvernement... La France etait toute entiere occupee 
et le Gouvernement etait sur la contrainte de l'en- 
nemi... Dans ces conditions, il m'appartenait de jouer 
la carte Africaine, je l'ai joue estimant que le moment 
etait venu en ralliant l'Afrique Noire.498
As in 1940, Boisson was accused by the Gaullists of pursuing 
a policy of "attentisme" which was equal to collaboration in 
disguise. The High Commissioner retorted that the culmination of 
his policy of neutrality was the realignment of a united and 
militarily intact AOF to the Allied camp.499
The treaty of December 7, 1942, signed by Darlan, Boisson 
(member of the Imperial Council500) and Eisenhower, stipulated
498. Boisson interrogation of January 21, 1944, Papiers 
Boisson. Archives Privees 30, File 1, ANSOM.
499. Mission militaire de la France Combattante, Rapport sur 
Boisson, Accra, December 5, 1942, Papiers Boisson. File 4, ANSOM; 
and Interrogation of January 27, 1944, "Une politique se juge a 
ses resultats," ibid.. Files 1 and 2. In Boisson's words:
"L'AOF est rentree dans la guerre contre l'Allemagne en bloc 
unanime, de son plein gre, sans sedition interieure, sans que 
soient entamees, pour si peu que se soit, les principes d'ordre 
et de discipline...mais plus encore, a 1'accomplissement des 
taches de guerre. Elle y est entree avec une armee coloniale 
reconstitute...Dakar est devenue... une base navale militaire de 
premiere ordre... avec une aviation navale inexistante a 1'armis­
tice... tout ce potentiel de combat et de victoire a ete rassemble 
sans qu'aucune contre partie ait ete accorde aux Allemands. [Au 
niveau politique] on y voit l'AOF, terre frangaise, traiter 
d'egal a egal avec les Allies... sur le plan moral,... le 
prestige frangais y est demeure intact aux yeux de ses 15 
millions d'indigenes... Je l'ai preserve des exagerations des 
ultras de la Revolution Nationale." Interrogation of January 27,
1944, ibid.
500. The other members of the Imperial Council were Generals 
Bergeret, Nogues, Giraud, and Yves Chatel (Governor-General of Algeria;
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that AOF and Togo had 'spontaneously7 adhered to Darlan.501 On 
account of the peaceful and bloodless nature of AOF's 'return7 to 
the war, Boisson was in a better position to negotiate with the 
Allies. The aforementioned treaty guaranteed French sovereignty 
over the colonies, wherein Free France reserved the exclusive 
right to promulgate orders and decrees.502 In return, AOF ports, 
airports and other strategic military resources were put at the 
disposition of the Allies. Technical experts were also invited 
in, on condition that no foreign military force be permanently 
stationed on French African soil.503
The 'return7 of AOF in the war generated considerable unrest 
in Dakar. The Vichyite Governor of Senegal Georges Rey defied 
the Gaullists and the "ralliement":
Que chacun sache bien que l'AOF, en se rangeant 
sous les ordres de l'Amiral Darlan n'a fait aucun pas 
en faveur du Gaullisme et n'abandonne aucun des 
principes de la doctrine du Marechal. Je suis dispose 
a tolerer aucun desordre ou aucun retour sous une forme
501. Declaration du ralliement de l'AOF aux cotes des 
allies, December 7, 1942, Affaires Politiaues. File 877, Dossier 
1, ANSOM.
502. Fleet remained under full French control while the
U.S. and Britain pledged not to enforce measures pitting 
Frenchmen against their own people.
503. Declaration du ralliement de l'AOF aux cotes des 
allies, December 7, 1942, Affaires Politiaues. File 877, Dossier 
1, ANSOM. The treaty was followed by a convention signed on 
March 28, 1943 whereby U.S. forces were granted: access to the 
territory adjacent to Dakar (to be used as a petrol reservoir); 
permission to construct an airport at Yoff and a temporary 
aviation terrain in Bargny (near Rufisque) and install a fighter 
plane assembly line in Ouakam. Telegram of June 16, 1943, 5D 202 
100. ARSD.
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quelconque aux agitations politiques d'avant guerre.504
The festivities of June 18, 1943 during which a demonstration of
1.000 Africans and 500 Europeans vented violent anti-Boisson 
sentiments, revealed deep-seated divisions among the civilian 
population, a lack of confidence in the government's control of 
the situation and confusion over the legitimacy of the regime. 
According to one report, most Africans surmised that ”11 n'v a 
plus de chef a Dakar, puisaue tout est permis. II n'v a plus de 
gouvernement.11505 Governor Rey reported similar reservations in 
military circles:
Dans milieu militaire, signale tres confidentielle- 
ment malaise qui provient ignorance oil l'on est, de la ^ 
forme que prendra la participation de l'AOF a la guerre 
et crainte que l'armee noire ne soit pas engagee en 
formations homogenes mais envoyes par petits 
paquets.506
In Dakar, pressure for the dismissal of the "Gouverneur 
General de la collaboration1 (as Boisson was often referred to) , 
mounted.507 After a three month 'leave,' Boisson was tried and 
imprisoned until his death on June 20, 1948508 and Pierre
504. Note de service de Rey dated November 25, 1942, 13G 104 
180. ARSD.
505. Report of the Chef de Surete, June 21, 1943, Affaires 
Politiaues. File 872, ANSOM.
506. Rey to Boisson dated January 2, 1943, 13G 5 17. ARSD.
507. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 15. ARSD.
508. For details see Chenet, op.cit.. 1949, p. 177 and 
Papiers Boisson. Files 1 and 2, ANSOM.
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Cournarie was appointed Governor-General of AOF in July 1943. 
Vichyite historians have argued that he fell victim of de 
Gaulle's vengeance dating back to the humiliating Free French- 
British attack on Dakar.
After Boisson's deposition, a wave of purges jolted the 
colonial corps and an array of Vichyite administrators were 
dismissed from office. The socialist Hubert Deschamps who was 
appointed Governor of Senegal on January 4, 1943,509 was removed 
less than a year later, after being accused of racism and 
collaboration for speaking against de Gaulle. Born in Royan in 
19 00, Deschamps had fought as a volunteer in the Great War in the 
Orient. After teaching for a brief period in a lvcee in 
Casablanca, he studied and taught at the Ecole Coloniale. and 
served in French Somalia and in the Ivory Coast.510 A fervent 
supporter of the Popular Front, he claimed that he had not opted 
for Vichy as much as acc&ted legality. Yet, it was decided that 
he had compromised above the call of duty. He was recalled on 
December 10, 19 4 3 and was replaced by Charles Dagain.
As usual, the lower echelons of the administration were not 
affected by the purges, partly because mobilisation had created a 
serious manpower shortage thereby limiting replacements to the 
absolute minimum. These purges were invariably followed by a
509. Deschamps claimed that he was appointed in Senegal for 
political reasons: 11. . . il y a eu au Senegal un mouvement ultra- 
vichiste extremement violent et il fallait deserrer cette espece 
d'etau..." Proces d'epuration d'Hubert Deschamps, February 1945, 
Papiers Deschamps. ANSOM.
510. Senegal, no. 48, (February 6, 1943).
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public denigration of Vichyite 'collaborators.' Petain was 
reduced overnight from respected hero to traitor while de Gaulle 
was portrayed as the saviour of France.511 The complete reversal 
of roles of France's leaders exposed a fundamentally divided 
France with little control over its destiny, making a lasting 
impression upon urban Africans.
a) Mobilisation.
During the second half of the Second World War 80 battalions 
of tirailleurs. (approximately 100.000 men), sizeable cavalry and 
artillery forces, and a Foreign Legion battalion were sent to the 
European front.512 Senegal's recruits [2.194 men in 1943 and 
2.318 in 1944]513 participated in Marshall Juin's landing in 
Italy which liberated the south east of France and in de Lattre's 
forces that fought in Tripoli, following which they entered Paris 
along with Marshall Leclerc's colonial troops.514
511. Marianne Cornevin, Histoire de 1'Afriaue contemooraine 
de la deuxieme guerre mondiale a nos jours. (Paris: Payot, 1978),
p. 81.
512. Rapport du Colonel le Masle, Chef d'Etat Major du 
General Magnan, General Commandant Superieur, May 13, 1946, 2D 23 
14. ARSD and Chenet, op. cit.. 1949, pp. 166-167.
513. Only 66 volunteers enlisted as opposed to the 
anticipated 440. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 
16, ARSD; see also Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1944, 2G 44 
20. ARSD.
514. Falilou Diallo, "Histoire du Senegal de la Conference 
de Brazzaville a la fondation du BDS, 1944-1948," These de PEA. 
(University of Paris, 1983), p. 40? Echenberg, "'Morts pour la 
France'" op. cit.. 1985, p. 374; see also Jean-Noel Vincent 
(Chef de Batallion), Les Forces Francaises dans la lutte contre 
l'axe en Afriaue. (Paris: Ministere de la Defense, 1983).
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Under the Free French, mobilisation proceeded relatively 
smoothly partly because, as Cornevin has argued 11 Le recrutement 
se fut de facon behucoup plus moderee durant cette periode du 
fait que les Allies armaient les unites francaises avec 
reticence."515 Some opposition, however, did surface amongst 
African 'subjects' who protested against the privileges accorded 
to 'citizen' tirailleurs: "Ils revendicrueraient un traitement 
strictement egal pour tous les noirs.1,516 In turn, to neutralise 
the threat from below, the originaires overstated their 
privileges and assimilation to France and turned to the colonial 
administration for support. However, the colonial authorities 
appeared condescending or else ignored the special legislation 
regarding registration and mobilization procedures on the 
'citizens'' behalf. Yet, "malgre leur desir. les autorites n'ont 
pas ose toucher au statut des originaires."517
b) The 'Restoration' of Republican Liberties.
After Darlan's assassination on December 19, the Imperial 
Council unanimously appointed General Giraud head of French 
Africa. Giraud annulled laws, orders and decrees enforced under 
Vichy and reestablished "la legalite republicaine"— in other
515. Marianne Cornevin, op. cit.. 1978, p. 11.
516. Berthet letter to CFLN dated February 10, 1943,
Bulletin de Renseignements, June 1943, 13G 17 59. File 3, ARSD.
517. Etat d'esprit de la population indigene, March 3, 1943, 
Bulletin de Renseignements, Comite National Francais, File 3, ANSOM.
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words, the pre-1940 status quo.518 A Commission de Validation 
Speciale was founded in May 1943 to reinstate the rights of 
individuals who had been disgraced, fired or imprisoned under 
Vichy on charges of dissidence.
Elected assemblies were reinstituted, but their functions 
were adjourned until the end of hostilities.519 The municipal 
councils of Dakar, St. Louis and Rufisque and the mixed communes 
were revived in March 1943 and the Conseil Colonial convened for 
the first time since the war on April 2, 1943.520 Second degree 
communes such as Ziguinchor and Kaolack were reinstituted in 
April 1943 while 12 mixed communes of the first degree were re­
established in November 1943.521
Alfred Goux, who had been arrested during the Dakar episode 
of September 1940, resumed the post of mayor on July 8, 1943 and 
his municipality convened for the first time since September 194 0 
on May 2 0^. In St. Louis, Mustapha Malick Gueye was appointed 
mayor on April 8. Before long, however, 10 municipal councillors 
petitioned for M.M. Gueye's resignation on the grounds of
518. Denise Bouche, "Le retour de l'AOF dans la lutte contre 
l'ennemi aux cotes des allies," Revue Historiaue de la Deuxieme 
Guerre Mondiale. Special issue: L'Afrique pendant la Guerre 1939- 
1945, vol. 29, no. 114, (April 1979), pp. 46-7.
519. Laws of March 27 and August 1943, Journal Officiel de 
l'AOF.
520. The ordinance of March 14, 1943, promulgated in AOF two 
weeks later, revived the municipalities? see Rapport politique 
Annuel, AOF 1943, 2G 43 1 . ARSD? and "L'AOF depuis le 
debarquement..," op. cit.. 1945, pp. 4-5.
521. Rapports Politiques Annuels, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 16. 
and 1944, 2G 44 20. ARSD.
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collaboration with Vichy. When their demands were not met, they 
resigned, and the Governor suspended the municipality (June 12) 
and replaced it with a five member (all originaires) special 
delegation.522
The Conseil Colonial523 met in a special session in October 
to elect a delegate to the Assemblee Consultative Provisoire in 
Algiers. Ely Manel Fall was elected for his exemplary loyalty to 
France but also because he was a 'subject.'524 Nine colonial 
councillors petitioned for the annulment of his appointment on 
the grounds that, according to existing legislation, only French 
'citizens' could run for office. Moroever, Fall had been elected 
by only 14 members (out of which 13 had been chefs de canton) 
when at least half of the assembly (23 members) were required to 
endorse him.525
The Free French administration argued that "ce retour aux 
traditions frangaises de liberte est le gage de 1'union de tous
522. Dagain letter to Governor-General of AOF dated June 16, 
1944, Affaires Politiques, File 872, ANSOM; Letter Cournarie to 
Pleven dated April 10, 1944; Pleven to Dagain dated July 13,
1944; and Dagain to Pleven dated August 14, 1944 in ibid.
523. T]ie council held its first session on August 23, 1943 
and the permanent commission was reelected with Adama Lo as 
president; Senegal. no. 56, (September 1943).
524. Fall was chef de canton of M'Bayar, colonial councillor 
from 1921 to 1925 and 1936, officer of the Legion d'Honneur. See 
Senegal, no. 58, (November 1943).
525. Petition de neuf membres du Conseil Colonial du Senegal 
en suite de la designation de Ely Manel Fall a 1'Assemblee 
Constituante Provisoire, Affaires Politiques. File 874, Dossier 
9, ANSOM.
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les Frangais.1,526 but in fact Europeans remained divided into 
Petainistes. Giraudistes. and Petainistes-Giraudistes. who had 
supported Vichy and now wanted to arrest the Free French 
movement;527 and Gaullists (traders, the business community) who 
interpreted CFLN policy-making as a return to the "regime 
traditionnel" which they contrasted to Vichy's "regime 
d'exceotion.»528 Despite the colonial administration's allusions 
to unity, the persisting factionalism of French public opinion 
had a strong impact on the African urban milieu: "une inouietude 
en resulte... sur la sincerite et la profondeur de 1'union entre 
Francais de tout appartenance politique..."529
For the traditional elites (originaires, chiefs, marabouts. 
veterans), the restoration of republican liberties was 
essentially tantamount to the reinstitution of their citizenship 
privileges which had been suspended under Vichy. Equality of 
rights between Europeans and African 'citizens' (including equal 
treatment in recruitement, salaries, benefits and employment) and 
the postwar status of the colonies were the dominant themes of 
the Conseil Colonial agenda during 1943.
The evolues were aware of U.S. and British pressure on their
526. Deschamps quoted in Senegal. no. 52, (May 1943).
527. Bulletin Mensuel de Renseignements Politiques, March 
1943, Deschamps Report, 2G 43 118. ARSD, and Papiers Deschamps. 
Deschamps instructions to Dagain, November 30, 1943, ANSOM.
528. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 194 3, 2G 43 16. ARSD.
529. Rapport Berthet, administrateur en chef des affaires 
politiques, administratives et sociales d'AOF, February 10, 1943, 
Comite National Francais. File 3, ANSOM.
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rulers for the implementation of reforms. Some argued that 
France no longer exercised any authority over AOF but was reduced 
to receiving orders from the Allies.530 Governor Deschamps 
reported that Africans were alarmed at the prospect of a German 
defeat, following which France could become tributary to Britain 
and the U.S. for its war materials and food supplies. If 
reparations were demanded, an impoverished France might even 
consider "renting11 its colonies. "Les colonies ne serviront- 
elles oas dans ces conditions de 'monnaie d'echange'?1,531
The marabouts, (who were favourable to Giraud), alone 
amongst the elites, were somewhat dissatisfied with the return of 
republican legislation which they equated with political 
squabbling and division amongst Muslims. The cessation of 
political acitivity under Vichy rule had improved religious 
observance, united the talibes and reinforced the authority of 
the marabouts. Thus, "les chefs religieux voient dans la remise 
en viaueur des anciennes lois une diminution de leur prestige et 
de leur influence aupres de la masse indigene."532
For the evolue 'subjects' (civil-servants, teachers, nurses, 
and interpreters), whom the war had thrusted to the forefront of
530. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, March 194 3, 
Senegal, Deschamps Report, 2G 43 118. ARSD.
531. ibid.
532. Bulletin Mensuel de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal 
March 1943, Deschamps Report, 2G 43 118. ARSD.
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the political arena,533 the question of citizenship could not be 
put off any further and the future status of the colonies became 
an increasingly contentious issue particularly because it was 
inextricably linked to the question of citizenship. A sense of 
isolation from France which translated itself into an "esprit de 
revendication" was signalled by the administration.
Ils suivent avec une attention inusitee l'actualite 
tant politique que militaire... [et] le futur regime 
des peuples coloniaux. Ainsi s'affirme plus ou moins 
ouvertement, leur souci d'acquerir des le temps de 
guerre des garanties supplementaires pour une condition 
plus favorable, en interpretant et exagerant selon leur 
concepts particuliers les principes Frangais 
republicains dont ils se reclament.534
They were highly critical of the right to citizenship by birth 
and called for "1 'extension de la gualite de citoven a tous les 
indigenes de l'AOF pour recomoenser leur participation a 1'effort 
de guerre actuel."535 "Citizenship based on merit or no citizen­
ship" was their motto.
'Subject' associations such as the Association Amicale 
Interprofessionnelle des Ouvriers du Sine-Saloum. and the 
Jeunesse Combattante Senegal, presented their demands to high
533. Catherine Akpo, "Les elites Africaines d'AOF face a
1'administration Gaulliste, 1943-1946," Collogue: Les prodromes 
de la decolonisation dans 1'empire francais. 1936-1956. October 
4-5 1984, Institut d'Histoire Present, Paris, conference paper, 
p. 2.
534. Bulletin de Renseignements, Dakar, August 5-September 
5, October 23, 1943, Affaires Politigues. File 2557, Dossier 6, 
ANSOM.
535. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques Mensuels, April 
1943, Senegal, Deschamps Report, 2G 43 118. ARSD.
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officials visiting Dakar.536 The Sine-Saloum workers addressed a 
petition to de Gaulle in November 1943 demanding the 
reinstitution of the Conseil General; the extension of French 
citizenship to all Africans; the restoration of the Mandel decree 
of April 1938 exempting veterans from native justice; and the 
right of persons tried in native courts to be defended by- 
attorneys of their choice.537 The administration categorically 
opposed the reinstitution of the Conseil General on the grounds 
that it would not represent all strata of the population,538 and 
the accession of all Africans to French citizenship as a 
"premature" reform.
A delegation led by Lamine Gueye and Thierno Amat M'Bengue 
(former publisher of Clarte and secretary of the permanent 
commission of the Conseil Colonial) went to Algiers in January 
1944, to meet de Gaulle and discuss "le retablissement des choses 
anterieures."539 Gueye was cynical about the disposition of the
536. Giraud visited the AOF capital in January 1943, and de 
Gaulle in January 1944. Bulletin de Renseignements Mensuels 
Politiques, January 1943, 2G 43 118. File 872, ARSD.
537. Note sur les revendications des indigenes du Sine- 
Saloum, January 23, 1943, Affaires Politiaues. File 872, Dossier 
3, ANSOM.
538. "II s'agit, en effet, d'une institution metropolitaine 
artificiellement transportee en Afrique Noire et qui ne peut 
pretendre constituer une representationo veritable de 1 'opinion 
indigene." ibid.. Deschamps also opposed the Conseil General, see 
his letter to the Governor-General of AOF. 17G 159 28. ARSD.
539. Gueye quoted in letter of Pleven to Cournarie, January 
21, 1944, Affaires Politiaues. File 872, ARSD.
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administration which interpreted his demands as anti-French.540
II nous apparait aujourd'hui qu'on ne fait pas ici 
tout ce qui devrait etre fait pour le resserrement des 
liens qui nous unissent les uns aux autres; pour 
montrer aux quinze millions d'indigenes de l'AOF le 
vrai visage de la France? pour les persuader que les 
discriminations raciales sont et doivent demeurer le 
privilege exclusif de nos ennemis communs.541
The demands included: the abolition of the Code Penal 
Indigene;542 equal treatment for European and African civil- 
servants;543 the extension of CFLN measures to those who had been 
wronged by Vichy;544 fair compensation for lands confiscated 
under Vichy;545 effective action against racism?546 and the
540. Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar 1943, 2G 43 15, ARSD.
5 4 Gueye letter to de Gaulle dated November 26, 1943, 
Affaires Politiques. File 872, ANSOM.
542. Gueye argued that Africans got more severely punished 
for specific violations after the Code was introduced; for 
instance, unpremeditated homicide corresponded to two years 
maximum imprisonment in French law and five years in native penal 
law? the same applied for theft, fraud, etc. Moreover, the Code 
Penal Indigene had introduced new crimes that did not exist in 
French law such as opposition to the authority of chiefs; Letter 
Gueye to de Gaulle, January 26, 1943, Affaires Politiques. File 
872, ANSOM.
543. Gueye called for the suspension of the March 6, 1943 
decree according to which an African civil-servant of equal 
grade and seniority to a European received indemnities 8 times 
lower than his European colleague, ibid.
544. Gueye argued that as late as July 4, 1943 no African 
had benefitted from the CFLN legislation, ibid.
545. Vichy had confiscated Lebou property. Theoretically, 
the Lebous could claim back their land or obtain compensation for 
it but in practice, Gueye argued, Africans did not have the money 
for such trials and were thus offered ridiculously low compensa­
tions without being able to protest, ibid.
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reorganization of the Conseil Colonial;547
What becomes apparent from those petitions is that the 
oriainaires and the educated 'subjects' had near identical 
grievances and objectives despite the fact that they were not 
acting as one group nor identifying the common ground between 
them. On the contrary, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
the war had in some ways put into sharp focus the divisions 
separating them. What is striking during this period is the 
resolve of the 'subjects' to press for the acquisition of 
citizenship, as rightful compensation to the war effort. The 
return of 'subject' soldiers from Europe imbued with American and 
Soviet anti-colonialist ideas encouraged them further.
THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN ANTI-COLONIALISM.
The U.S. and the Soviet Union, France's allies in the war, 
did not consider the French colonies as permanent de facto 
appendages of the European powers. Their anti-imperialist
546. Gueye mentions "brimades systematiques contre les 
indigenes,... refus de leur vendre des denrees de premiere 
necessite, reservees... aux Europeens, 1'installation dans les 
magasins de deux caisses, l'une pour la clientele Europeenne
1'autre pour la clientele indigene, separation systematique des 
deux elements dans les files de stationnements, amenagements dans 
les trains de wagons speciaux pour voyageurs Europeens et pour 
voyageurs indigenes.." Deschamps had initially undertaken a 
campaign against racism, see for instance, his Circulaire contre 
le racisme. but it was not properly enforced. In response to 
Gueye's letter, the Free French administration replied that Vichy 
had not practised discrimination, ibid.
547. The administration had a permanent majority in the 
Conseil Colonial (via the chiefs it appointed) and Gueye 
pointedly noted that "c'est par une cruelle derision qu'on 
continue a ranger le Senegal parmi les colonies pourvues d'une 
assemblee deliberante..." ibid.
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ideology exerted considerable pressure on the French government 
to implement reforms overseas and the infiltration of those 
influences ushered educated Africans into a new forum of ideas.
From July 1940 onward, the U.S. had (with Soviet approval) 
campaigned for the internationalisation of colonial territories. 
The Atlantic Charter, signed by Churchill and Roosevelt in August 
14, 1941, pertained to, in the American president's words,
...not only to the parts of the world that border 
the Atlantic, but to the whole world; disarmament of 
aggressors, self-determination of nations and peoples, 
and the four freedoms— freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, freedom from want, freedom from fear...548
A special committee on Africa, the War and the Peace Aims was 
formed in the U.S. to report and document Africa's main problems 
(poverty and backwardness), propose reforms and emphasize the 
growing U.S. responsibility in African and world affairs:
The American share in the victory of the present 
war will give the Government of this country added 
power and responsibility for bringing about a just 
settlement in all parts of the world, including Africa, 
insofar as political adjustments or new arrangements 
may appear advisable.549
The Charter championed self-government, the end of all forms of
exploitation, economic interdependence and the protection of
labour. The European powers were encouraged to welcome
nationalist movements and set a timetable for self-government in
548. Roosevelt quoted in the Atlantic Charter and Africa 
from an American Standpoint. (New York, 1943), p. 30.
549. ibid., pp. 28-29.
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four stages, beginning with progressively greater representation 
of Africans in the civil-service, the legislative and the 
executive councils.
The Committee exerted pressure on the Allies to accept self- 
government? substitute the term "trusteeship" with "guardianship" 
for African territories "as it rightly implies that the 
relationship is not permanent but has, as its purpose the fitting 
of the ward for self-government as soon as his education and 
experience permit"550 and allow international inspection in 
African territories. Apparently, the Charter had considerable 
impact in Senegal where the administration acknowledged that 
certain "extremist elements" went as far as to "parler 
d 7independance Senegal en application Charte Atlantiaue."551
Yet, American anti-colonial propaganda ran parallel to the 
imperial ambitions of the U.S. military in AOF. Boisson had 
always been suspicious of Americans, and despite the treaty of 
December 7, 1942 which guaranteed French sovereignty, Admiral 
Glassford7s mission which arrived in Dakar two days later was 
viewed with distrust. The task of the mission was to supervise 
the installation of U.S. military bases in Dakar. Yet, the 
colonial administration argued that
Les Americains se sont...naturellement installes en 
force dans toute cette partie de l7Afrique. On doit 
meme constater qu7ils paraissent en quelque sorte avoir
550. ibid., p. 105.
551. Rapport Politique Mensuel, Dakar, September 1944, 2G 44 
139. ARSD.
219
reserve a leur influence et leur autorite Dakar et tout 
le territoire de l'AOF.552
Six months later, Roosevelt entrusted Glassford with
...build[ing] ... Dakar as one of the prime United 
Nations strategic strongholds. It was intimated to me 
in no uncertain terms, that Dakar itself should be 
taken over eventually by the UN to be administered by
the US, as a delegate of the UN.553
The possibility of annexing Dakar to the U.S. was briefly 
considered by Roosevelt and Anthony Eden (the British Foreign 
Minister) in March 1943 but dropped at the Tehran Conference of 
November 1943. Yet, as late as June 1944 and until the invasion 
of France which changed the course of the war, Americans 
continued to nurture annexationist ambitions vis-a-vis Dakar.
One last point of interest is the impact of black American 
soldiers stationed in Dakar who made a great impression on the 
population and were responsible for ”un ferment d'idees 
revendicatrices.»554 The creation of the United Nations in May 
1945 with the right to self-determination of all peoples as its 
first article further boosted the anti-imperialist climate.
THE IMPACT OF SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND THE FORMATION OF THE GEC.
The Soviet variant of anti-colonialism which inextricably
552. "La politique coloniale des USA: Etude de Vichy," 
October 1943, Affaires Politiaues. File 2661, Dossier 3, ANSOM.
553. Quoted in Giblin, "The Vichy Years..," op.cit., 1984,
p. 8.
554. Bulletin de Renseignements Mensuels, March 1943, 
Senegal, 21G 147 108. ARSD.
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linked political emancipation with the defense of peace could 
not, for political reasons, be dismissed by the Allies. The PCF 
officially supported independence but set restrictions of 
"economic readiness" for decolonization, French communists, who 
had constituted an important component in the resistance movement 
and in the postwar coalition government, painstakingly organized 
cercles d'etudes [which later became Groupes d'Etudes 
Communistesl during 1943 under the supervision of the PCF 
colonial affairs expert Lozeray.555 The origins of these groups 
can be traced back to the Groupe Social, an informal group led by 
a teacher of the William Ponty in Dakar during the Popular Front 
era. ^ 56
After the "ralliement." a handful of French communists in 
Dakar (workers and union leaders of the Svndicat de 1'Arsenal de 
Dakar, one of the few mixed trade unions, such as Molinari, 
Cardie, Ospizy) began organizing GEC. Other influential members 
of these communist cells included Graziello (a lawyer and member 
of the patriotic association Comite Federal de France 
Combattante), and Quadrelli (an engineer). Since no African 
members were allowed until the end of 194 5 (as demonstrated in 
chapter 1), the GEC were initially exclusively European political 
formations.
One of Dakar's GEC leaders, Jean Suret-Canale, defined the
555. Interview with Jean Suret-Canale, himself a leading 
member of the GEC in Senegal, November 1, 1984, Paris.
556, ibid.
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groups as "ecoles politiques" that initially offered weekly 
courses such as 'Communism and the Colonial Problem', 'Communist 
Policy in Black Africa7, and 'The RDA (Rassemblement Democratique 
Africain) as Instrument of the Struggle Against Colonialism.'
They stressed a pragmatic and action-oriented oulook free of 
theoretical abstractions.
Les cours elementaires de GEC ne tendent nullement 
a 1 'enseignement abstrait de quelques formules passe­
partout; ils tendent a eclaircir les problemes 
africains du moment...[pour] apporter a chaque 
membre...les notions qui lui sont immediatement 
indispensables pour bien accomplir sa tache militante 
dans 1'action de masse, qui est pour lui, un imperatif 
absolu.557
The GEC sprung to the forefront of the political arena in the 
postwar era and became instrumental to the formation of the RDA.
THE REVIVAL OF POLITICAL LIFE: PATRIOTIC ASSOCIATIONS.
A mosaic of patriotic associations mushroomed throughout 
Senegal during 1943 and 1944, providing the first outlets for 
political activity after Vichy. They were first spurred by 
European Gaullists who, following the dissolution of the Legion 
Francaise des Anciens Combattants en Afrique Noire (February 12,
1943), sought to organize networks of support for the CFLN. The 
administration was dismayed with partiotic associations which it 
dismissed on the grounds that they Mse paraissent du titre de 
patriotiaues. fmaisl n'en avaient gue le nom et certainement pas
557. Introduction aux cours elementaires des GEC au Senegal,1947, 
Papiers Suret-Canale. Institut d'Histoire du Temps Present, Paris.
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l'esprit."558 it quickly became clear that their real purpose 
was to resume political activity and prepare the ground for the 
forthcoming elections.559
With few exceptions, (see Appendix 2) African and European 
associations developed separately. Africans were determined not 
to be excluded from the political process or be dominated by 
Frenchmen and according to several reports, relations between 
Europeans and Africans were "deplorable.1,560 European associa­
tions fluctuated between the two extremes of the political 
spectrum or else encompassed the most incongruous combinations of 
ideological affiliations. The Cadets de Gascogne, for instance, 
which were presided by an SFIO member, were widely known as 
notorious anti-Gaullists. Some of its members were fervent 
Legionaires while others were at once Petainists and Gaullists.
Patriotic associations were not always clearly distinct 
entities and allegiances were often confused. Branches of the 
same association sometimes adopted different statutes, thereby 
reinforcing rivalries and personal vendettas. Many individuals 
were frequently members of more than one association or else they 
shifted from one group to the other. Fusions between associa­
tions were common and instrumental to the formation of alliances
558. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 16. ARSD.
559. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, June 1943, 
Deschamps Report, 13G 17 59. ARSD.
560. Rapport Mensuel Politique, Dakar, October 1944, 2G 44 
139. ARSD. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, June 
1945, 2G 45 144. ARSD.
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and political parties in 1945. France Combattante. for instance, 
gradually gathered the support of 16 trade unions, the Combat AOF 
and the Association des Anciens Militaires.561
The need for unity, the purge of Vichy elements from the 
administration and private enterprise and the resumption of 
political activity were the focal points of most associations.562 
The purge of Vichyites was initially a focal point of political 
activity for evolues and Europeans alike, as the Boisson ad­
ministration became a convenient scapegoat for past and present 
ills. In some instances, Africans were able to use the purges to 
express grievances that were only remotely related to Vichyite 
policies, and press for reform. For example, Lamine Gueye 
attributed all of Senegal's financial and social problems to 
Vichyite 'agents and crimes'563 and shrewdly manipulated the 
sensitive issue of collaboration. The administration similarly 
blamed Vichy for whatever problems it confronted, thus absolving 
itself from responsibility. More often than not, the purges 
degenerated into vendettas where personal differences and 
partisan rivalries rather than collaboration with Vichy were at 
stake. Even when the lack of administrative personnel obliged 
the authorities to use Legionaires and SOL members to staff its
561. Synthese inspection regionale de controle technique 
AOF, August 16, 1944, 21G 155 108. ARSD.
562. Etat d'esprit de la population du Senegal, 1943, 
Bulletin de Renseignements, February 10, 1943, Berthet Report, 
Comite National Francais. File 3, ANSOM.
563. Gueye in AOF, (November 17, 1944).
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ranks, the denigration of Vichy rule continued unperturbed.564
African associations tended to remain secret or else operate 
clandestinely to evade administrative control, primarily because 
they demanded full equality with Europeans:
[une] politique essentiellement revendicatrice, 
selon laquelle les autochtones doivent avoir les memes 
droits et les memes salaires que les 'blancs', et qui 
taxe de raciste tout individu mettant en doute la 
capacite des indigenes a tenir tous les emplois confies 
aux Europeens.565
Amongst the most prominent and infuential associations was the 
Union Reoublicaine Senegalaise led by Khayar M'Bengue (Lamine 
Gueye's uncle) and veteran politicians like Amadou Ba and Doudou 
Siby, who wanted to replace Mustapha Malick Gueye and his 
cohorts. The URS presented a comprehensive list of demands to 
Pleven on August 10, 1943, including equality of rights between 
Europeans and Africans, the Africanisation of the colonial 
administration and the civil service, and the right to vote for 
all Africans.
1. Egalite de fait entre tous les citoyens 
frangais sans distinction de couleur, dans l'armee 
aussi bien que dans les autres branches de l'activite 
(administration-commerce), car si 1'indigene veut 
rester Frangais, il entend l'etre totalement.
2. L'indigene doit avoir une large partie suivant 
ses capacites dans 1 'administration de son pays. II 
doit se substituer a 1'element Europeen moyen dont
1'incapacity est manifeste.
3. L'indigene veut avoir le libre choix de ses
564. See the Governor of Senegal's reply to Combat St. Louis 
patriotic association, no date, [circa 1944], 21G 1 1 . ARSD.
565. Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar 1944, 2G 44 19. ARSD.
225
dirigeants et de ses representants.
4. mise-en-valeur reele du Senegal.566
In Dakar, the association Jeunes Senegalais advocated a full- 
scale campaign to obtain 'complete equality' with the Europeans, 
while the Comite d'Etudes Franco-Africaines. (CEFA) and the Union 
des Jeunes called for the eviction of whites from Africa.567 The 
association IVe Reoubligue similarly specified the need to group 
together 'subjects' and 'citizens,' men and women, "a 1'exclusion 
des Europeens.1,568
The first explicit signs of the rift that separated European 
and African political activity were manifested during the 
elections to the administrative council of the Union Francaise 
des Anciens Combattants et Victimes de Guerre de l'AOF et du 
Togo. European candidates were excluded outright from the 
electoral process and the administration reported a dangerous 
anti-French climate.569
A similar phenomenon occured in the development of political 
parties. For instance, Graziani's efforts to revive the PSS in 
1943 failed, largely because Africans would not adhere to a
566. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Deschamps 
Report, August 1943, Service des Affaires Politiques, 13G 17 59. 
ARSD.
567. Etat d'esprit de la population evolue de Dakar, Rapport 
Politique Annuel, AOF 1943, 2G 43 1 . ARSD; and Bulletin de 
Renseignements Politiques, Senegal 194 5, 2G 45 144. ARSD.
568. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, December 1944,
2G 44 155, ARSD; also Rapport Mensuel, Dakar 1944, 2G 44 139. 
ARSD, and Diagne, "La Resistance..." on.cit., pp. 27-31.
569. Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar 1944, 2G 44 19. ARSD.
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European-led party. The Governor of Dakar reported that "le 
temps ou les Eurooeens pouvaient etre de chefs de file en matiere 
politique est revolu.1,570
One of the most significant consequences of the polarisation 
between Europeans and Africans and the formation of patriotic 
associations along racial lines, was that a few associations 
underscored the importance of 'citizen'-'subject' unity in the 
struggle for equality with Europeans.
As a rule, the administration attributed African unrest and 
demands for equality to wartime conditions (food shortages,
rampant inflation, lack of clothing, etc.) and it was assumed
that the end of hostilities would allow a return to normalcy.
Or else, it was interpreted as the work of "auelauos centaines 
d'evolues a l'esprit mal eauilibre. ..1,571 who manipulated 
discontent to further their own ambitions.
In 1944, the focus of African demands was defined even more
succinctly and forcefully in slogans such as "equal work, equal 
pay," and "equal sacrifices, equal rights" which the administra­
tion interpreted with consternation:
Sans etre 'autonomistes' les evolues cherchent a 
etre independants a franchir une etape dans 
l'affranchissement de 1'influence Europeene.572
570. ibid.
571. ibid.
572. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1944, 2G 44 20. ARSD.
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THE BATTLE FOR GROUNDNUTS.
According to the Free French, Vichy had isolated AOF from 
the world economy and established a unique relationship between 
the metropole and the overseas territories. In order to reduce 
commercial risks and avert popular unrest, the administration had 
bought the entire AOF agricultural and industrial produce at an 
artificially high price and sold it to the Allies at a con­
siderably lower rate. This accounted for a spurious prosperity 
which the Free French claimed would be reversed by reducing 
prices to world levels, decreasing export duties and increasing 
the head tax.573 The 'return' of AOF in the war did not thus al­
leviate the economic crisis that befell the Federation. If 
anything, it further exacerbated the abuses of the requisition 
system, the severe shortage of foodstuffs, the black market, 
recruitement and porterage. Alfred Goux described living 
conditions in Dakar under the Free French in a letter intercepted 
by the security police:
...le mecontentement augmente tous les jours tant chez 
les Europeens que chez les indigenes. La vie augmente 
de fagon extraordinaire. Le marche noir s'etale 
cyniquement partout, la police le voit et laisse 
faire... Les oeufs qui valaient 3 francs...en 
valent...6. La viande est hors de prix, et tout le 
reste est a 1'unison.574
When promises of the abolition of ration cards, access to 
adequate food and clothing supplies were not fulfilled, disil-
573. Giblin, "The Vichy Years..," op. cit.. 1978, p. 88.
574. Goux letter dated October 7, 1944, 21G 155 108. ARSD.
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lusionment crept in. Notwithstanding a crisis of potentially 
disastrous proportions, Governor Deschamps launched the 'Battle 
for Groundnuts.' Much has been written on the extensive demands 
of the war effort upon the Africans, but nothing illustrates the 
'mystique guerriere' of the groundnut operation more eloquently 
than a speech delivered by Deschamps to the chefs de canton. 
chefs de village and veteran delegates in the spring of 194 3.
Table 8.575
Deschamps 'Battle for Groundnuts' Speech.
Cette guerre est une guerre pour la paix des Noirs 
tout autant que pour celle des Blancs. C'est la guerre 
du Bien contre le Mai! Hitler, le roi des Allemands, 
est mechant comme le Diable. Nous savons par ses 
livres qu'il hait et meprise les Noirs et qu'il les 
considera comme des animaux. II voulait faire de vous 
des captifs...
II nous faut des arachides, des arachides et encore 
des arachides... Vous travaillerez plus que vous avez 
jamais travaille, veillards, vieilles femmes, hommes, 
femmes, enfants, tous vous ne devez plus penser qu'a 
une chose. Le travail de l'arachide. Chaque graine 
que vous mettrez dans la terre sera comme une cartouche 
qui aura tue un allemand. Chaque journee de binate 
sera comme un obus qui aura demoli un canon allemand.
Ce n'est pas pour les Blancs que vous le faites, 
c'est pour vos enfants et les enfants de vos enfants... 
C'est pour vous un devoir prescrit par Dieu d'aider les 
Allies par toutes vos forces. Celui qui mangera une 
graine de semence sera un mauvais homme qui aide les 
allemands...
Vous traveillerez meme quand le soleil est haut! 
Vous travaillerez beaucoup plus que d'habitude, car en 
meme temps que les arachides, vous devez produire votre 
nourriture pour l'annee prochaine.
Deschamps's message was simple: All Africans were to become
575. Deschamps speech, no date [circa May 1943], Papiers 
Deschamps. ANSOM.
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'soldats d'arachides.' and no sacrifice was big enough in this 
"African" war.576 On his part, the governor toured the peanut 
belt in late June and early July, distributing posters and giving 
numerous speeches to popularise what he called "flal graine 
maqiaue gui change notre sable en or."577 The Governor-General 
of AOF Cournarie and Rene Pleven, Commissar to the Colonies, also 
visited Senegal in August 1943 to boost the 'battle for 
groundnuts.'
An Economic Conference was convened in Thies in October 25, 
1943 to discuss the marketing of peanuts, setting a
production target of 400.000 tons for 1943.578 To this effect, 
the administration appealed to prominent marabouts like Mustapha 
M'Backe to convert all their lands into peanut growing fields.579 
In rural Senegal, troupes staged the highly popular "theatre de 
1'Arachide' with the support of the SIP. Deschamps 
enthusiastically argued that
Cette propagande a trouve dans le patriotisme 
senegalais une resonance profonde. C'est dans 
1'enthousiasme qu'a ete entame ce que, d'une metaphore 
qui a fait fortune, on a appele la 'Bataille de
576. The term 'soldats d'arachide' was used in Afrigue en 
Guerre. (August 1, 1943).
577. Deschamps, speech of opening session of Conseil 
Colonial. August 23, 1943, Papiers Deschamps. ANSOM.
578. La Ouinzaine. No. 4, (November 23, 1943); Senegal. 
(November 1943), no. 58, and Papiers Deschamps. ANSOM.
579. Afrigue en Guerre. (September 23, 1943), and Gellar, 
"The Politics of..," op. cit.. 1967, p. 97.
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1'Arachide./580
and the return to the monoculture economy was qualified as 11 le 
retour a des conditions economiaues normales."581
In order to supply the peasantry with adequate food 
supplies, the administration made obligatory the constitution of 
food reserves in September 1943, following which the SIP stocked
30.000 tons of millet and distributed 50.000 tons of foodstuffs.
A production plan was also drawn up whereby Guinea would export 
rice to Senegal and the Sudan would supply rice and millet. The 
British would furnish textiles, petroleum, coal and lorries while 
the U.S. would provide flour, sugar, milk and other staple 
foodstuffs.582
Many city dwellers returned to their villages to resume the 
cultivation of their fields while 45.000 navetanes from the 
Soudan and Guinea flocked to Tambacounda and Kaolack "grace a une 
intervention administrative.1,583 But the driving force behind 
the resumption and intensification of peanut cultivation was the 
escalation of forced labour and of the regime of requisitions.
In addition, lack of petrol and transport facilities rendered
580. Deschamps, opening speech to the Colonial Council, 
August 23, 1943, Papiers Deschamps. ANSOM.
581. Afrigue en guerre. (August 1, 1943).
582. Pedler, op. cit.. 1979, p. 49, and Gellar, "The 
Politics of..," op. cit.. 1967, p. 98 and chapter on The Peanut 
Economy and the War.
583. Deschamps instructions to Dagain, November 30, 1943, 
Papiers Deschamps. ANSOM.
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porterage frequent.
Pour une tonne de riz par exemple a transporter 
jusqu'a la gare la plus proche, a 300 kilometres, l'on 
requisitionnait 600 hommes qui porteraient 15 kilos 
chacun sur le crane pendant douze jours, puis 
reviendraient toujours a pied en dix jours, plus de 
trois semaines au total, mangeant qui sait quoi en 
cours de route...584
In 1943, only 274.000 tons of groundnuts were produced, imports 
plummetted from 260.000 tons in 1942 to 197.000 in 1943 and 
exports suffered an all time low with 87.000 tons compared with
199.000 tons exported in 1942.585 The "bataille de 1'arachide" 
proved to be a disaster partly because wartime propaganda
failed but also because there were no goods in the stores to 
serve as an incentive for the peasantry. Whatever foodstuffs 
were available were exorbitantly priced: for example, by selling 
100 kgs of peanuts an African bought
December 193 9
53 kgs rice 
60 kigs millet 
18 metres cloth
Table 9.586
December 1941
4 0 kgs rice 
63 kgs millet 
14 metres cloth
December 194 3
2 0 kgs rice 
72 kgs millet 
9 metres cloth
584. Jacques Richard-Molard, Afrigue Occidentale Francaise, 
(Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1952), p. 167.
585. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 58.
ARSD. Suret-Canale's figure of 460.000 tons of peanuts for 1943 
is inaccurate.
586. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 194 3, 2G 43 58. ARSD.
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Table 10.587
Price Index for Peanuts and Staple Foods
Dec. 1939 Dec. 1941 Dec. 1943
100 kgs of shelled nuts 
Rice per kg.
Millet per kg.
Cloth per metre
90 frs 
1.70 
1. 50 
5. 00
140 frs 
2.85 
2 .25 
10.00
188 frs 
9.00 
2 . 60 
20.00
The declining purchasing power of the Senegalese further 
deteriorated with rising taxes and the introduction of new taxes 
such as the 'special resistance tax' and the 'Emprunt de 
Liberation.11 The additional tax was raised to 15 francs and 
personal taxes to 50 francs per year. The war tax, created in 
August 1943, and set at 10 francs per person per annum amassed 
155 million francs.588 'Voluntary contributions' raised an 
additional 150 million francs (rural Senegal's share was
15.284.000 francs and Dakar's was 27.710.716 francs).589 As a 
rule, fiscal charges borne by Africans increased between 16% 
(Thies and M'Bour) and 75% (Kedougou).590
Local administrators were also coerced into meeting the 
demands of the operation: "La carriere d'un administrateur tenait
392-94 and Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 16.
ARSD.
589• Journal Officiel du Senegal. September 23, 1943, pp. 
266-67? Senegal. October 1943; La Ouinzaine. no. 5, December 12, 
1943 and Paris-Dakar. December 22, 1943.
590. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 16. ARSD.
ibid
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a la livraison au chef lieu du conticrent impose a son cercle. ,,59i
Most cercles were expected to produce arbirtrarily selected crops 
and meet unreasonable production targets. Senegal produced 3 
tons of rubber in 1941-42, 4 tons in 1942-43, 14 tons in 1943-44 
and a staggering 41 tons in 1944-45. The difference in produc­
tion targets under the Vichy and Free French administrations are 
clear.592 Richard-Molard eloquently describes the excesses of 
this system:
On en arrive et sous des menaces draconniennes au 
besoin suivies d'execution immediate, a des exigences 
folles. 'I/effort de guerre' justifie tout. Tel 
cercle est impose pour tant de tonnes de caoutchouc de 
lianes sans avoir de lianes sur son territoire.
L'indigene est done contraint d'aller a pied, tres loin 
parfois, acheter du caoutchouc ailleurs, a n'importe 
quel prix, pour echapper a la 'justice' et vient le 
vendre au commandant, au prix taxe, plusieures fois 
inferieur au prix d'achat.
Tel cercle est impose en miel. II n'en produit 
pas. Son commandant est puni pour avoir telegraphie a 
son gouvernement: "Accord miel. Envoyez abeilles."593
THE MYTH OF THE LOYAL AFRICAN: PART TWO
THE RETURN OF THE SOLDIERS AND THE THIAROYE MUTINY. 1944.
The Thiaroye mutiny of December 1, 1944 inflicted an 
irreparable blow on the myth of the loyal African and by exten­
sion on the myth of full scale assimilation as a feasible tenet 
of colonial rule. The tirailleurs had for centuries constituted
591. Richard Molard, op. cit. . 1952, p. 167.
592. Rapport Economique Annuel, 1945, 2G 46 26. ARSD. 
Richard-Molard,
593.A ibid. During 1944, 2.505 tons of rubber and 662 tons 
of palm oil were produced in Senegal; Rapport Economique Annuel, 
Senegal 1944, 2G 44 34. ARSD.
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an invaluable bastion of the colonial order, be it in the 
conquest and 'pacification' of French Africa or in frontline 
combat in the world wars. These soldiers enjoyed a formidable 
reputation and were aware of how indispensable they had been 
during France's most grave hours, having paid with their blood 
for the special relationship they enjoyed with France.
If to this background we add the horrid experience of 
African soldiers as prisoners of war in Europe and the renewed 
vigor of Gaullist propaganda hailing the return of republican 
liberties, the Thiaroye uprising assumes its full significance.
It also accounts for the fact that today, it still remains an 
open wound for many veterans who allude to feelings of 'dis­
belief', 'deception' and 'betrayal' when reminiscing on the 
tragic events.594 The French were never forgiven for spilling
the blood of those who stood by them during France's darkest
remembered as
hours. That Thiaroye isAone of the most sinister chapters of 
Senegal's history became evident recently when the accomplished 
writer and filmmaker Sembene Ousmane released the film "Camp de 
Thiaroye." in an attempt to deal with a painful episode that has 
marked a whole generation of Africans.
In the morning of December 1, 1944, a detachment of about 
1.200 tirailleurs awaiting demobilisation and repatriation at the 
barracks of the transit camp of Thiaroye, approximately 3 0
594. Interviews with Mustapha Fall and Ismael Diop, World 
War Two veterans, Dakar, February 1984.
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kilometres from Dakar, was reported "en etat de rebellion.1,595 
It refused to be disbanded before its demands for the settlement 
of outstanding back pay and bonuses were met. The commanding 
general who came to speak to them was taken prisoner, following 
which he promised to pay the soldiers what they were due and send 
them to their country of origin. The following day a fight broke 
out, resulting in 35 to 38 dead and another 35 seriously wounded. 
On the side of the police forces, only 3 French officers and one 
African soldier suffered minor injuries.596
The insurgents comprised the first contingent amongst 10.000 
African prisoners of war to return home after liberation. The 
four to five month delay in repatriation procedures effectively 
meant that instead of being welcomed as heroes, these men worked 
in military labour camps before being gathered in six centres de 
transit indigene.597 A month before the uprising in Thiaroye, 
the Colonial Minister had acknowledged that returning POWs had 
undergone fundamental changes in captivity:
595. Telegram Dakar to Colonies Paris dated December 12, 
1944, Affaires Politigues. File 3498, ANSOM.
596. Figures on the casualties vary: According to the Note 
sur les incidents deplorables du camp de Thiaroye, Dakar,
December 4, 1944 drafted by the Groupement d'Action Reoublicaine 
38 died. An intercepted letter written by Colas, of the Union 
des Svndicat Confederes de l'AOF to the Secretary General of the 
CGT dated December 14, 1944 cites 4 0 dead 21G 155 108; most 
reports cite 3 5 dead.
597. With no pay; see Myron Echenberg, "Tragedy at Thiaroye: 
The Senegalese Soldiers' Uprising of 1944," in Peter C.W.
Gutkind, Robin Cohen and Jean Copans (eds.), African Labour 
History. (London: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 109, 113-14.
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Separes depuis plusieurs annees de leur pays 
d'origine, places dans des conditions d'existence 
exceptionnelles, ces indigenes ont contracte des 
habitudes et des manieres de penser, ont acquis une 
mentalite qui tend a faire d'eux un element tres 
special.598
The French also feared that German propaganda (Nazi documents and 
paraphernalia were reportedly amongst the personal possession of 
POWs) might "susciter une revolte en AOF.1,599 It was recommended 
that ex-POWs be closely surveilled "afin que les indigenes qui 
nous reviendront en AOF aient a nouveau clairement conscience de 
la grandeur de la France."600
The political repercussions of demobilisation were already a 
serious concern for the administration, particularly in Dakar 
where 11 il peut se former. . . un grouoe relativement important 
d'anciens prisonniers susceptibles d'influencer defavorablement 
1 'opinion indigene.1,601 Ex-POWs were sent immediately to their 
final destination so as to avert concentration of large numbers 
of demoralised soldiers. It should also be noted that some of 
these soldiers were victims of de Gaulle's "blanchissement" 
strategy, whereby 2 0.000 tirailleurs were dismissed from the Free
598. Letter of Pleven to Cournarie dated October 1944, 
Affaires Politiques. File 3498, ANSOM.
599. Annexe du rapport du General de Perier sur les 
incidents de Thiaroye, n.d., Affaires Politiques. File 3498, 
ANSOM.
600. Telegram of Lt. Col. Semidei, directeur du cabinet, 
dated December 6, 1944, Affaires Politiques. File 3498, ANSOM.
601. Pleven to Cournarie dated October 31, 1944, Affaires 
Politiques. File 3498, ANSOM.
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French army in order to give a chance to French soldiers to share 
in the fruits of victory.602 These men were as demoralised and 
humiliated as the POWs for having been removed from the bat­
tlefield and deprived of participating in the final stages of 
liberation.
In late October 1944, to appease their "esprit assez 
vivement revendicateur" . the Colonial Minister promised to pay 
them back wages (a quarter of which they were to receive in 
France), demobilisation premiums of 500 upon arrival in West 
Africa, and give them civilian clothes.603 None of these 
promises were kept. Meanwhile, incidents of African POW unrest 
were being reported throughout France: 350 tirailleurs at Morlaix 
rebelled on November 4, 1944 but the uprising was suppressed a 
week later with 7 wounded. Similar incidents were reported at 
the Centre de Transition Indigene in Versailles the following 
month, in Marseilles in December and in several other places. A 
mutiny of the Bataillon de Prisonniers Seneqalais de la Base de 
Casablanca in Juen and other such episodes point to the fact that 
provisions for demobilisation and repatriation were chaotic and 
French commanding officers insensitive to the tirailleurs'
602. Echenberg, "'Morts Pour la France'," op. cit., 1985, 
pp. 373-74.
603. Minister of Colonies to Cournarie dated October 31, 
1944, Affaires Politigues. File 3498, ANSOM. French soldiers 
received back pay for the entire duration of the war and a 
premium of 5.000 francs, see Echenberg, "'Morts Pour la France'," 
op. cit.. 1985, p. 115.
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sacrifices.604
In Thiaroye, unrest had commenced at the end of November 
when a detachment of 500 men was ordered to leave for the Soudan. 
The men refused to be disbanded until they received their pay. 
After negotiations, the military authorities promised to reim­
burse them within three days. However, upon reception of an 
order to dispatch the contingent to Bamako, the promise was 
broken, but for a brief time the Commander of the AOF forces was 
taken hostage. On November 30, a bat/alion from St. Louis with 
tanks and heavy artillery encircled the camp.605
The tirailleurs were described as being arrogant, jealous 
and obstinate for demanding equal rights with their European 
colleagues. Moreover, the fact that some of them had substantial 
amounts of savings [the Bancrue d'Afriaue Occidentale had made 
transactions to the value of 18 million francs for 1.500 tirail­
leurs after the authorities forbade them to keep French francs] 
was resented by French soldiers.606 Letters of French soldiers 
to their families cited that this money had been illegally 
obtained, which also accounts for the fact that they saw no 
reason why African soldiers should be paid what was in fact due 
to them.
The colonial authorities identified the causes of the
604. Report of de Perier, op. cit.
605. Intercepted letter of Sergeant Boulard, op. cit.
606. Their savings came from wages earned in German camps, 
extract from a letter in Synthese de 1'inspection regionale des 
controles techniques AOF, December 1, 1944, 21G 155 108. ARSD.
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'mutiny' as a 'changement de mentalite' that Africans underwent
during the war which diminished the prestige and authority of the 
white man. According to Ousmane Sembene,
...before the war the African soldiers... had been 
your typical submissive colonial blacks. However, 
after having lived in Europe during some of its most 
difficult years they had come to know and appreciate 
Europeans and they realized that they were just 
ordinary people like everyone else. They lost their 
submissiveness. When they left for France they had 
been men without rights. Now, on returning to Africa, 
they were aware of their rights and more self- 
confident. Since they no longer had the same mentality 
it was not surprising that they had the courage to 
confront the colonial army and its commanding officer 
with their grievance.607
It was also argued that the haste in which embarkations were 
conducted was instrumental in the demoralisation of POWs: There
were inadequate provisions with regard to back pay, promotions, 
food and clothing.
Les retards dans les paiements et 1'octroi 
d'acomptes dans la metropole ont amene, chez les 
tirailleurs, une certaine mefiance et de la mauvaise 
humeur, qui one ete entretenues par l'inegalite de 
traitement entre les differents Centres de Transition 
des Indigenes Coloniales par 1'obligation d'echanger 
les billets frangais— juges des lors de mauvaise 
valeur— par la lenteur des remboursements des livrets 
de caisse d'epargne, certains perdus ou voles, et par 
le non remboursement des depots d'argent effectues dans 
les caisses du 'frontstalag.'608
Contact with black American soldiers had further radicalised the
607 . "camp de Thiaroye." Afrika, (November-December 1987), 
pp. 28-3 0. Interview with Sembene Ousmane on his new film.
608. Rapport du General de Perier, op. cit.
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discontented soldiers. The tirailleurs spoke with admiration of 
black Americans whose uniforms, pay and food rations were the 
same as those of their white colleagues.609 Apparently they had
even considered a U.S. intervention in the uprising.610
Yet, the official rendition of events left no doubt as to
the culpability of the insurgents:
Le pretexte de la rebellion aurait ete le non- 
paiement a certains d'entre ces ex-prisonniers de 
primes diverses auxquelles ils pretendaient avoir 
droit... Apres des negotiations extremement patientes 
des autorites militaires,... des coups de feu eurent 
ete tires sur les unites chargees du maintien de 
l'ordre.611
All blame and responsibility wete shifted to the ex-POWs and the 
central administration in Paris. It was even reported that the 
use of force could not have been averted unless the white man was 
willing to loose face and establish a precedent for future 
disasters. The concluding remark of General de Perier's report 
provides a rare insight into the mentality of French officers:
609. Letter of General Ingold dated December 30, 1944,
Affaires Politiques. File 3498, ANSOM and de Perier report, op. cit.
610. The following leaflet was distributed to U.S. 
authorities in Dakar after the uprising: "Million (sic) of 
Americans are died (sic) and others will died (sic) again, so 
that slavery, slaughter, and vandalish (sic) dissapaer (sic) in 
the world. At Dakar you assist indifferent to the wreth (sic) 
murder of 115 of your comrades in figth (sic). 'They were colored 
men perhaps' on 1st December 1944. If you allow those actions, 
for why do you figth (sic) Germane? (sic) All Negroes had 
expected in (sic) your nation but no (sic) they do not know." 
signed Poor Negroes (Rembember Abraham Lincoln and Miss Stone); 
Annex to de Perier's report, op. cit.
611. Synthese du Decembre 16, Inspection regionale des 
controles techniques AOF, 21G 155 108. ARSD. Emphasis mine.
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Ce qui frappe le plus dans le recit des acteurs, 
c'est 1 'unanimite avec laquelle ils soulignent 
1 'atmosphere de violence qui regnait, 1 'arrogance 
invraisemblable des mutins et le caractere de leurs 
menace; puis, une fois la sanction impitoyable du feu 
comprise, la soumission totale de ceux-ci subitement 
degrises de leur folie collective.612
In vain, associations such as the Groupement d'Action 
Republicaine. the Union des Syndicats Confederes d'AOF demanded 
the intervention of a civilian and military investigation 
committee and the dismissal of the responsible officers.
The trial of Thiaroye took place in February 1945 but 
despite Lamine Gueye's efforts to defend the insurgents, there 
were no acquittals. Out of the 34 men who were found guilty, two 
died, nine were given 5 to 10 years detention sentences, and 2 5 
were imprisoned from one to five years. Fifteen were granted
amnesty in June 1947.613
It is unlikely that the mutiny was deliberately provoked by
the colonial authorities as Suret-Canale has maintained.614 It
612. Rapport de Perrier, o p . cit.
613. Condamnations intervenues a la suite des evenements de 
Thiaroye, Affaires Politiques. File 3498, ANSOM; letter of 
Colonial Minister to the Governor General of AOF dated May 20, 
1947; Affaires Politiques, File 3498; letter of General de corps 
de l'armee, Commandant superieur de Boisboissel to the Colonial 
Minister, March 8 , 1945, ibid.
614. Suret-Canale, Afrigue Noire de la decolonisation aux 
independances. 1945-1960. (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1977), pp. 
14-15. In the author's words: "Y avait-il eu simplement mauvaise 
foi et incurie, ou provocation calculee?... L'etat major 
vichyste, partisan de la 'maniere forte', n'a-t-il pas delibere- 
ment cherche 1 'occasion de 'faire un exemple', pour mettre au pas 
les anciens combattants?"
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is more plausible to argue that the French did not anticipate the 
former POWs to be as determined to stand by their rights as 
turned out. Unfulfilled promises had been made before without 
similar consequenses. As a French officer unsympathetic to the 
African POWs but conscious of the irony of the situation wrote:
...hier ses hommes debarquaient a Dakar avec tous 
les honneurs militaires qui sont malgre tout du (sic) a 
des prisonniers de guerre, ils se tirent sain et sauf 
de la guerre de 40, ils viennent de faire tuer ici, 
dans leur pays par des gens de leur race...615
What was different about Thiaroye was not the response of the 
administration but the organized nature of the protest and the 
indisputable legitimacy of the insurgents' demands for "equal 
sacrifices, equal rights" which the authorities tried to dis­
claim.
Nous sorames Frangais... nous voulons etre traites 
a l'egal des Frangais... Nous considerer comme des 
Frangais de seconde zone c'est pratiquer un racisme 
indigne d'une democratie.616
Again, it was not unusual that the French were reluctant to 
acknowledge the gravity of the protest. The administration's 
lack of control over the development of events, quickly 
degenerated into the familiar 'politique de la tricrue. ' The
615. Intercepted letter of S^argent Boulard, op.cit.
616. Soldiers quoted in letter of Chef du ler bureau to 
Governor of Senegal dated January 26, 1945, 13G 44 17. ARSD. It 
was also reported that veteran 'citizens' and 'subjects' were 
being treated unequally, see Doleances des Anciens Combattants et 
Victimes de Guerre. 13G 44 17. ARSD.
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parallels with the administration's handling of the Dakar-Niger 
strike of 19 3 8 are abundant and worth bearing in mind.
CONCLUSIONS
Free French policy in Senegal took pride in the so-called 
'smooth' transition of AOF from neutrality to resistance and from 
Vichyite authoritarianism to the 'restoration of republican 
liberties.' It also boasted about the federation's extensive 
contribution to the war effort, the lack of unrest in the 
colonies and the unwavering loyalty of the Africans. In reality, 
the Free French desperately tried to differentiate themselves 
from their Vichyite predecessors. They put up a front of 
normality, even when they secretly feared the forces which the 
war had unleashed. For example, they suspected the returning 
soldiers of being a potentially revolutionary element.
The crisis within the colonial administration during and 
after the 'ralliement.' the economic fiasco of the 'battle for 
groundnuts,' the resumption of political activity along racial 
lines, the impact of U.S. and Soviet anti-colonialism, and the 
Thiaroye mutiny had indeed changed the old colonial order 
permanently.
The war had also radically altered the human geography of 
Senegal as the effects of the rural exodus had a profound impact 
on the evolution of postwar politics. Dakar's population, for 
instance, swelled from 100.000 to 165.000 in a four year
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period (1939-1944).617 The unrestricted influx of immigrants and 
troops into the capital created pressing problems; housing 
shortage led to the emergence of bidonvilles that sheltered 
Africans and Europeans alike. Europeans found themselves in 
similar and sometimes worse conditions than Africans. Inadequate 
water supplies and improvised sewage systems resulted in the 
spread of epidemics such as diphteria, smallpox and the 
plague.618
Having relied heavily on the empire for manpower, resources, 
and for the organization of the resistance movement, the French 
argued that the metropole had become inextricably linked to the 
empire: "C'est a tort que bien souvent on distingue la France de
son empire. II v la une locution inexacte et inaccentable. II 
s'acfit de la France tout court...11619 To this argument, Africans 
added that they expected a fair compensation for their 
sacrifices.
Les intellectuels attendent beaucoup de la situa­
tion actuelle des colonies allant (sic) au secours de 
la Metropole pour l'arracher a l'ennemi et lui redonner 
tout son eclat parmi ses rivaux. Ils pensent que ce 
sera pour eux la redemption du noir et qu'en cas de 
succes 1 'indigene africain aura conquis une place 
encore plus grande dans la famille frangaise et,
617. Bouche, "Dakar pendant la deuxieme guerre mondiale: 
Problemes de surpeuplement," Revue Francaise d'Histoire d'Outre 
Mer, tome lxv, no. 240, (1978), pp. 427-428.
618. ibid. This is an aspect of the war not examined in 
this study but deserves much attention.
General Catroux, Governor General of Algeria, June 6 , 
1943 speech, quoted in Ageron, France coloniale ou parti 
colonial? , (Paris: PUF, 1978), p. 276.
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partant, augmente son prestige dans le monde.620
African expectations did not fit strictly within the assimilation 
framework, as patriotic associations (most of which shared the 
slogan "equal sacrifices, equal rights) developed along racial 
lines.
The colonial authorities only rarely acknowledged that the 
war signalled the beginning of fundamental changes, let alone 
decolonization: "L'on devine que l'ecruilibre sur lequel on avait 
1'habitude de vivre a la colonie va etre modifie.11621 On the 
whole, administrators vacillated over the future of the empire 
from confidence to apprehension, envisaging at best a slightly 
more relaxed version of prewar colonial rule.
620. Bulletin de Renseignements Mensuels, April 1943, 
Deschamps report, 2G 43 118, ARSD.
621. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1944, 2G 44 20. ARSD.
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Chapter VI.
SENEGAL IN FRENCH POSTWAR COLONIAL POLICY-MAKING, 1944-1952
The history of Franco-African relations from 1944 to 1958 
marks the beginning of an open-ended debate over the question of 
why French West African postwar demands for equality with France 
excluded independence— in sharp contrast to the neighbouring 
British colonies. Even though this question will not be 
addressed specifically,622 the role of Lamine Gueye and L.S. 
Senghor in French postwar colonial policy-making and the dynamics 
of Senegalese politics during this period largely explain why 
independence was not a political goal in Senegal well after Ghana 
became a sovereign state.
Assimilation had defined the parameters of black politics in 
Senegal for nearly a century. In a sense, 'citizens' and 
'subjects' after the Second World War placed their demands for 
reform within the political process of which they were a part. 
Even the reaction against assimilation which became the 
distinguishing feature of Senegalese (and Senghorian) politics 
after the war did not transcend the boundaries of the existing 
system.
622. Michael Crowder's "Independence as a Goal in French- 
speaking West African Politics," in M. Crowder, Colonial West 
Africa: Collected Essays. (London: Frank Cass, 1978), pp. 283-
313, is an excellent response to this question.
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SENEGALESE ASPIRATIONS AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
The single most important new element in the Senegalese 
political arena after the war was that politics ceased to be the 
exclusive domain of originaire elites. 'Subjects' and 'citizens' 
alike demanded to be part of the decision-making process that 
would define the status of the colonies within the French Com­
munity. The slogan "equal rights for equal responsibilities," 
assumed a new immediacy particularly because after mobilisation, 
the chronic shortage of European manpower had granted Africans 
positions that had hitherto been reserved exclusively to 
Frenchmen but without according them the corresponding salaries 
and privileges.628 Education became inextricably linked with 
race equality after the war, largely because it was closely 
identified with mass naturalisation. Africans demanded easy 
access to the brevet elementaire et superieur, the baccalaureat 
and university education within Africa. The abolition of the 
anachronistic regimes of the indigenat and forced labour were 
deemed imperative along with the extension of full municipal 
status to Senegal's Three Communes.624
Those demands date back to the First World War. This time, 
however, it was not only an elite minority of 'citizens' who 
voiced these grievances but a sizeable segment of evolue 
'subjects.' According to the French journalist Louis Rouillon,
623. Akpo, "Les elites africaines.." op. cit.. 1984, p. 7.
624. Bulletin Mensuel de Renseignements Politiques, 
February 1944, 2G 44 155, ARSD.
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Africans were determined to oppose French rule until their 
grievances were met.
On note les prodromes d'une opposition a 
1'autorite Europeenne. Ces noirs estiment etre capables 
de participer a la gestion des affaires et n'acceptent 
plus passivement les directives et les ordres des 
agents de 1 'autorite... L'opposition ainsi exprimee 
n'est pas hostile a la France. Elle est plutot le 
moyen de suggerer des ameliorations...qui 
s'imposent.625
While 'subjects' who had been hitherto excluded from the 
political process and from the privileges of assimilation 
demanded integration with France, they also began questioning the 
direction of assimilation and its impact on African society. In 
fact, reaction against assimilation, which had briefly surfaced 
in the 1930's, became the distinguishing feature of Senegalese 
politics after the w a r . 6 2 6  Thus, it is no coincidence that 
negxitude’nationalism" was developed by a 'subject,' and a highly 
assimilated one at that [in Senegal, Senghor was referred to as 
toubab bu nuul (Black European)].
A pan-African type of nationalism identified as "1'esprit 
'Nouvelle Afriaue'11 also emerged during this period with an 
emphasis on inter-African assimilation.627 Mamadou Dia wrote of 
the 'splendid isolation' that politics in Senegal had hitherto
625. Louis Rouillon, X>^ Siecle. (November 15, 1945).
626. Michael Crowder, Senegal: A Study of French 
Assimilation Policy. (London: Methuen, 1967), p.49.
627. Louis Rouillon, "Effervescence en Afrique Noire et au 
Senegal," X>^ Siecle. (November 15, 1945).
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operated in, which accounted for its elitist, personalistic and 
client-patron characteristics. The war had placed AOF on an 
equal footing with Senegal thus acting as a catalyst for the 
development of inter-African political activity. As a 'subject,' 
Dia envisaged a pan-African movement which would neutralise 
France's assimilationist 'divide and rule' policy.
Ni fusion, ni assimilation, mais association...
La politique d'assimilation doit se poursuivre a
1'interieur de l'Afrique, entre elements Africains.628
Negritude nationalism was not the only form of reaction 
against assimilation. African exposure to radical, anti­
imperialist ideologies during the war and the rise of postwar 
nationalist movements in the colonies reinforced the urgency of
the elite's demands.629 Independence was not always a foreign or
forbidden ideal. It was reported, for instance, that the French 
retreat from Syria, Lebanon and Vietnam provoked anti-French 
demonstrations with placards such as "Africains. les Svriens nous 
montrent 1'exemple,'<63 0 rousing hopes that AOF would follow
628. Mamadou Dia, "Refonte Politique", AOF, (February 23, 
1945). Also a slogan of the French centre and right wing,
'association' for M. Dia was equivalent to autonomy.
629. According to the Colonial Minister, "Avant la guerre 
1 'indigene ne voyait rien d'autre que son propre pays et la 
France. Depuis, au contraire, il a acquis une certaine curiosite 
intellectuelle qui le pousse a regarder a l'exterieur." Letter 
to Governor-General of AOF dated April 1945, Affaires Politiaues. 
File 2097, Dossier 15, ANSOM.
630. Bulletin de Renseignements, "La Crise Libano-Syrienne," 
June 1945, Affaires Politiaues. File 2156, Dossier 5, ANSOM.
251
suit.631 An anonymous tract entitled "Liberte" was circulated in 
St. Louis in 1945, advocating
...le Combat pour 1'affranchissement du pays du 
ioug qui a trop dure de la torture des colonialistes 
antidemocrates [qui] tend a persister. A partir de ce 
jour est ne le Comite de Propaqande. un quotidien qui a 
cote de ses freres "AOF, Reveil, Clarte" luttera pour 
1 'independance. 632
While independence was not a goal in Senegalese politics in the 
mid 194 0s, it was used on several occasions by patriotic or­
ganizations, political parties and even by Senghor himself as a 
last resort— a threat, to impress upon Frenchmen that they could 
not go back on promised reforms.
Meanwhile, fearing the process of nationalism that assimila­
tion had set in motion, the colonial administration was dis­
traught over what it called "la psvchose revendicatrice 
rindigene! . . .d'une raison inavouee. ..1,633 A colonial administra­
tor eloquently summed up his dilemma: "du moment que 1 'indigene 
est a mon niveau, ie suis au niveau de 1'indigene."634
THE BRAZZAVILLE CONFERENCE, 1944.
The French African Conference, convened to set the 
guidelines of French postwar colonial policy-making, and the
631. Rapport Politique, Dakar, April 1945, 2G 45 126. ARSD.
632. "Liberte," December 1945, 13G 17 36. ARSD.
633. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, November 1945,
2G 45 144. ARSD. "On veut etre assimile a l'Europeen en solde, 
en indemnites, en presence, a 1 'hopital..."
634. Ibid.
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publicity surrounding it, heightened evolue expectations. The 
Senegal visit of four resistance leaders and members of the 
Consultative Assembly was an occasion of
outright denunciation of race discrimination.635 Similarly, de 
Gaulle's symbolic stopover in Dakar was met with angry calls for 
equality between Europeans and Africans and his ensuing meeting 
with Lamine Gueye was a cause of embarrassment.636
A first dissapointment set in when Senegal was not invited 
to participate in the Brazzaville Conference. Gueye protested 
that the protagonists of the conference were not qualified to 
deliberate on Africa's problems.637 Nevertheless, he conceded 
that Brazzaville's commitment to socio-economic reforms compen­
sated for the absence of a political settlement and for the 
exclusion of independence as a future political goal638 [it was 
explicitly stated that there would be no independence from 
France]. Disillusionment grew when it became apparent that the
635. Jules Moches (SFIO), Gazier (CGT secretary), Poimbeuf 
(delegate to the Christian unions) and Bissagnet; Bulletin
Mensuel de Renseignements Politiques, February 1944, 2G 44 155. ARSD.
636. According to F. Pedler "At the reception where hundreds 
of people filed past de Gaulle to shake hands, Lamine Gueye was 
in the line, and when he came face to face with the great man, he 
asked him in a loud voice what he proposed to do for Africans.
The great Charles drew himself up to his full height and said 
something sibylline in which justice was linked with discipline." 
Pedler, op. cit.. p. 50.
637. Lamine Gueye, Bulletin Hebdomadaire d'Information, 
Ministere des Colonies, no. 4, (August 27, 1945), Affaires 
Politiaues. File 129, Dossier 2, ANSOM.
638 Ibid. 
£  — --------
253
conference would merely extend the privileged status that Senegal 
had hitherto enjoyed to the rest of the federation.639 The
tone of the conference was vague and uncommitted:
C'est l'homme, c'est l'Africain, ce sont ses 
aspirations, ses besoins et...ses faiblesses...qui 
seront la preoccupation constante de cette raeme 
conference? c'est 1 'incorporation des masses dans le 
monde frangais, 1 'evolution de nos liens avec elle;... 
c'est l'ascension de la population Africaine vers la 
personnalite politique qui retiendra une participation 
tres importante et peut etre la plus longue du temps de 
la conference...640
The underlying assumptions were in principle assimilationist but 
not without discrepancies: colonial peoples would be granted the 
citizenship of a Greater France and would participate in the 
Constituent but not in the National Assembly? French citizenship 
would only be extended to evolues. As compensation, 'federal 
citizens' would take part, albeit on a restricted franchise, in a 
Federal Assembly and in local territorial assemblies which would 
be authorized to vote over the colonial budget.
Education received special attention in Brazzaville and was 
followed up by a conference in Dakar (in July 1944) under the 
auspices of the Governor-General Pierre Cournarie. An education 
plan focusing on 'village schools' was adopted, aiming at the 
creation of a "new black society developing from its own 
framework and customs but capable of adapting itself to the
639. Gellar, "The Politics of..," o p .cit., 1967, p. 105.
640. Pleven's speech quoted in Lamine Gueye "La Voix des 
Absents," AOF, (December 1, 1944).
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benefits of Western civilization"641 within 20 years. It was 
projected that 50.000 primary schools, 200 upper primary schools, 
75 ecoles normales and 50.000 trained teachers would cater to the 
needs of 2.500.000 African students. Universal education would 
be attained within 50 years, but no provisions for the creation 
of African universities were foreseen and it was stipulated that 
African languages would under no circumstances be permitted as a 
medium of instruction.642
The indiqenat and forced labour were abolished in prin­
ciple,643 while a series of decrees exempted veterans, holders of 
the Legion d'Honneur. and electors of the local assemblies from 
the regime of native justice.644 A Fonds d'Investissement pour 
le Developpement Economiaue et Social (FIDES) was created to 
finance overseas development. The establishment of a uniform 
African penal code was a half measure since it was based on the 
existing code. Trade unions were authorised throughout the 
federation and the -five day, 4 0-hour week was recommended along
641. Free France, vol. 6 , no. 8 , (October 15, 1944).
642- Ibid.
643. Decrees of December 20, 1945 and February 20, 1946 for 
the indiqenat. The regime was not entirely eradicated: "Pour 
rendre inoperante cette mesure on n'hesite pas a recourir a des 
procedes arbitraires tel que 1 'arrestation preventive et la 
detention durant 8 a 15 jours de pretendus prevenus qui sont 
ensuite relaches ou bien deferent les contravenants devant des 
tribunaux qui prononcent de lourdes amandes. Letter of Minister 
of Overseas France to the Governor General of AOF, April 8 , 1946, 
17G 139 17. ARSD.
644. Decree of October 12, 1945, Affaires Politiaues. File 
934, ANSOM.
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with a pension scheme. Yet the question of discrimination 
between Africans and Europeans in the administration, the 
economy and the military which constituted the main grievance 
of the evolues, was not 'addressed. 645 According to the colonial 
authorities,
La Conference de Brazzaville qui aux yeux des 
evolues n'a pas realise l'egalite qu'ils souhaitent, 
est battue en breche et tous, publiquement, affirment 
que ses recommendations ne realisant pas leurs 
aspirations legitimes, doivent etre abandonnbes.646
Lamine Gueye retorted that discrimination would be fought by 
all legal means until it was abolished. In 1945, he took the 
issue to the Minister for Overseas France:
J'ai fait comprendre au Ministre qu'on attendait 
rien de substantiel de cette Conference a laquelle le 
Senegal n'a pas ete rdpresente. La preuve en est, 
que, apr&s la Conference de Brazzaville, la premiere 
preoccupation du Gouvernement a ete d'attribuer 4.50 de 
zone (sic) aux fonctionnaires indigenes et 150 aux 
fonctionnaires Europeens. Cela est du vrai racisme M. le 
Ministre.647
Senghor responded more positively about’ the conference but 
expressed reservations with regard to their implementation of 
its recommendations: " [Les recommendations] sont un chef- 
d'oeuvre qui fera date dans l'histoire mondiale. Cependant
645 . The conference recommended that Africans have freer 
access to administrative posts, but the higher echelons 
remained the exclusive domain of the Europeans.
646 . Rapport Annuel d' Ensemble, Dakar 1944, 2G 44 19, ARSD.
647 . Lamine Gueye note dated May 22 1945, 17G 127 17, ARSD.
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1' indigene qui est en moi se dit: mais k guand 1' application?”648 
The Brazzaville recommendations did not provide a blueprint 
for decolonization. France's status as a world power was 
perceived to be inextricably linked with the empire and the 
French African Conference provided a rather abstract ideal of 
coexistence within a French Community: the concept of a "France 
une et indivisible" reigned supreme even though it was 
acknowledged that decentralization and greater colonial par­
ticipation in the administration of local affairs were impera­
tive. This set the context for the discrepancies in the 
constitutional proposals for a French Federation, Union and 
Community which were essentially modifications of the old 
assimilation-association models.
THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES OF 1945-1946.
Colonial representation and parliamentary participation in the 
ANC were the key issues in the redefinition of relations 
between France and the colonies as outlined in Brazzaville. 
Gueye and Senghor played a prominent role in French postwar 
colonial policy-making through their participation in various 
political commissions; their interpellations in the National 
Assembly debates; and their contribution to the overseas par­
liamentary groups and the ratification of laws. The shifting 
ground of French political parties had a direct impact on the
648 . Letter of Senghor, quoted in Ernest Milcent and Monique 
Sordet, Leopold Sedar Senghor et la naissance de l'Afrique 
Noire, (Paris: Editions Seghers, 19b9), p . 78.
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role of the Senegalese deputies in the French Parliament and by 
extension in Senegal. Thus, as long as socialists such as Moutet 
and Laurentie held key posts in the Ministry of Overseas France, 
Gueye was able to wield considerable influence in colonial 
policy-making in France while also enjoying the support of the 
administration in Senegal. However, when the SFIO began losing 
ground to the Mouvement Reoublicain Ponulaire (MRP) in late 1947, 
Senghor emerged as the dominant African leader in France and at 
home.
a) The Debate on Colonial Representation.
The French Provisional Government convened a preliminary 
Consultative Assembly as early as 1943 to deliberate on the 
colonial representation in the forthcoming Assemblee Nationale 
Constituante (ANC). The Conseil Colonial in Dakar requested two 
seats therein, but the Governor-General of AOF opposed the motion 
and appointed the 'subject' Ely Manel Fall.649
The debate over colonial representation in the ANC was an 
agonizing problem for the bureaucrats in Rue Oudinot as well as 
in Africa. The voluminous files of proposals and correspondence 
between colonial experts testifies to the magnitude of the task 
and the diversity of views.650 Colonial representation was
649. Cournarie had suggested that Senegal be allocated one 
seat and the rest of the Federation another. Cournarie to 
Pleven, December 31, 1943, Affaires Politiaues. File 874, ANSOM.
650. The colonial Minister, Giaccobi, wanted a single 
electoral college for the 'citizens' and the party list system 
for the 'subjects.' Giaccobi to Cournarie, April 26, 1945, 20G 2 
lt ARSD. The Governor-General of AOF argued against a single
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fervently debated in the Conseil Colonial of Dakar. The Comite 
de Coordination, a group of 20 patriotic associations led by 
Charles Cros, proposed that since AOF constituted a quarter of 
the French overseas population, it should be allocated a quarter 
of the total number of representatives and that Senegal should 
comprise a separate independent college from Dakar which merited 
special treatment, namely its own delegate.651 The Groupement 
d'Action Republicaine. the Front National and the Groupement de 
Defense des Victimes des Lois d'Exception d'AOF recommended that 
the colonial territories be granted one third of the total number 
of representatives of France.
A Commission d'Etudes de la Representation des Colonies was 
set up in February 194 5 under the auspices of the Colonial 
Minister Giaccobi,652 comprising 42 members (including 22
college that would essentially exclude French 'citizens' of 
metropolitan origin. He opposed the ballot system and proposed 
the division of AOF into three electoral circoncriptions voting 
in uninominal rolls. Senegal would constitute a separate 
circonscription on account of its large numbers of 'citizens.'
He also supported the creation of separate colleges for 
'citizens' and 'subjects,' and projected six 'citizen' colleges 
for the Federation along with restricted non-'citizen' electoral 
colleges. Cournarie to Pleven, June 16, 1945, and Cournarie to 
Giaccobi, May 2, 1945, 2QG 2 1. ARSD. Pleven envisaged seven 
deputies for AOF. one for Senegal. Pleven telegram to Cournarie, 
circa May 5, 1944, Affaires Politiaues. File 209, ARSD.
651. Motion signed by Charles Cros, President of the Comite 
de Coordination. June 10, 1945, 20G 24 17. ARSD; see also 
Affaires Politiaues. File 934? Laurentie agreed to a separate 
delegate for Dakar but the proposal was not taken up.
652. Rapport de CER, no date, 20G 2 1. ARSD; see also Bruce 
Marshall, The French Colonial Mvth and Constitution-Making in 
the Fourth Republic. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973),
p. 164.
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overseas deputies and professionals of the colonial lobby.) The
idee force behind the Commission was the principle of equality
between Europeans and Africans, 'citizens' and 'subjects.'651 It
was headed by Gaston Monnerville, a mulatto from Guiana/ until
1946, when the new Colonial Minister Moutet appointed Lamine
Gueye as president. Senghor also joined the ranks of the
Commission, and campaigned for universal suffrage, the single
college and proportional representation. The proposals ^ for a single-
chamber Constituent Assembly comprising 9 5 colonial deputies and tor 
a double chamber with 6 6 colonial representatives for the lower
' chamber and 29 for the Senate 
■ were rejected by de Gaulle and a minority within the 
Commission that was opposed outright to the representation of 
non-'citizens' in the ANC. Senghor became disillusioned.654 The 
double college was retained and only 3 3 overseas deputies were 
allocated to the ANC (two from Senegal). As the Commission did 
not have decision-making authority, its proposals remained 
'lettres mortes' and its importance remained, above all, sym­
bolic.
...1'element essentiel retenu par cette Commission 
et qui milite en faveur de cette representation est 
1 'affirmation du principe de l'egalite fondamentale de
653. Intercepted letter of Senghor, May 5, 1945, 21G 110 28.
ARSD.
654. De Serreys to Monnerville, May 17, 1945, 2QG 2 1.
ARSD. The government accepted the principle of universal 
suffrage and recognized that it should be adopted for the ANC but 
'circumstances independent of the government's will' like the 
absence of registration offices, the lack of time to put to 
operation an electoral process for large numbers of dispersed 
natives, etc. necessitated the imposition of restrictions.
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tous les hommes, de toutes les races dont 1 7union 
constitue la grande communaute frangaise.655
A referendum to decide whether French citizens wanted the 
ANC to have constituent powers was scheduled to be held parallel 
to the elections. Only 'citizens' were eligible to vote in the 
Referendum while 'subjects' could vote in the elections. Yet, 
the ordonnance of August 22, 1945 which for the first time 
allowed a segment of 'subjects' to voice their opinions was of 
considerable significance. The number of voters tripled but 
remained very low throughout AOF.
Table ll.656
The Franchise. October 1945 for AOF.
Citizen College Non-Citizen College
Registered 54.698 * 118.039
Voting 34.742 95.039
* 43.000 were Senegalese.
b) The 1945 ANC Elections.
The October 21, 1945 elections to the ANC consolidated 
Lamine Gueye's leadership in the political arena and ushered in a man
655. Expose des motifs, Ordinance of August 22, 1945,
Affaires Politiaues. File 934, ARSD.
656. Chef du Bureau to Governor of Senegal, January 26,
1945, 2QG 139 174. ARSD. Mortimer's figures are very different 
from the ones I quote: for AOF he cites 172.500 as entitled to 
vote, and 127.500 as actually voting; for Senegal, his figures 
are 69.000 and 47.000 respectively, o p . cit.. p. 58.
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hi^therto unknown to the Senegalese — Leopold S. Senghor—
to the forefront of 'subject' politics. The circumstances of
Senghor's nomination shed some light on his relationship with
Lamine Gueye and the SFIO over the next few years. In 194 5,
Senghor was a teacher in a lvcee near Paris, a lecturer at the
Ecole Nationale Francaise d'Outre Mer and an aspiring poet with a
first volume in the press. During this period, he focused his
activities on the negritude movement which he believed to be
instrumental to the formulation of a political doctrine.657 His
first involvement in politics can be traced to March 1945 when he 
the
formed*Communaute Imperiale Francaise, a group of Europeans and 
Africans who endorsed the Brazzaville recommendations.658
657. Jacques Louis Hymans, Leopold Sedar Senghor: An 
Intellectual Biography. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1971), p. 96.
658. General Bertin was the president of the group while 
Senghor was one of its vice-presidents. Senghor, intercepted 
letter, Paris, March 8 , 1945, 21G 110 28. ARSD. Another curious 
group which Senghor was accused of participating in was the 
Organisation Secrete de l'Afrigue Independante. which according 
to the security reports was formed in 1945. Behanzin, Apithy, 
Amorin (Senegal), and Lamine Gueye were reportedly amongst its 
members. The group held meetings in Paris to "servir de guide 
aux masses et leur inculquer l'idee de haine contre le blanc qui 
les exploite." in Report of June 2, 1945, 21G 111 28. ARSD. They 
had two papers, La Defense de l'Afriaue and L'Afrigue Libre and 
the authorities suspected they received aid from the USSR. The 
Governor of Senegal was for a long time paranoid over this 
probably fictitious group, which he once identified with the Bloc 
Africain. Cournarie, who received the numerous police reports on 
this group, did not take Maestracci seriously. Senghor found out 
about his alleged participation in this group only in November 
1945. See report of Lt. Colonel Labadie, June 2, 1945, June 20, 
1945, 21G 111 (28). Cournarie to Maestracci, June 22, 1945; 
Maestracci to Cournarie October 25, 1945 and Cournarie to 
Maestracci November 15, 1945, and February 21, 194 6 , 21G 111
(28). ARSD.
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Senghor only joined the SFIO 16 hours before he was 
appointed by the local party congress.659 His nomination was 
announced by Lamine Gueye during a visit to Paris in June. On 
Gueye's request, Abdoulaye Ly had convened a meeting of African 
students and intellectuals to discuss the nomination. The 
students felt betrayed because they considered Senghor to be a 
'Black Frenchman.'660 According to Ly, Senghor and Apithy were 
chosen f,en tant que membres de la resistance."661 It is more 
likely, however, that Gueye based his decision on the fact that 
he needed the support of the MRP and the colonial circles with
659. AOF. (November 4, 1948). The article protested that 
Senghor's nomination did not conform to SFIO rules (article 14) 
which stipulated that a candidate for the legislative elections 
had to be a member of the party for three years. Senghor was 
described as "ce jeune professeur qui bien qu'inconnu dans son 
pays ne symbolisait pas moins 1'avenir du Senegal." In his 
correspondence with Armand Angrand in early June 194 5, Senghor 
stated that he did not aspire to a political career and least 
of all a seat in the ANC: "Je n'ai pas d'ambitions politiques.
Si je viens en Juillet ce sera surtout pour poursuivre des 
recherches d'ordre linguistique et culturel..." Intercepted 
letter, Senghor to Angrand dated June 1, 1945, 21G 110 28. ARSD.
11 Je n'aime pas beaucoup la politique mais c'est mon devoir de 
sortir de mon tour d'ivoire en ce temps de crise ou se decide 
1 'avenir de colonies, mais... je ne serais pas candidat aux 
elections.." Intercepted letter, Senghor to Angrand dated June 9, 
1945, ibid.
660. Interviews with Abdoulaye Ly, July 17, 1984 and Amadou 
Ali Dieng, July 3, 1984 in Dakar. Bakary Traore has argued that 
African students wanted Ly as candidate. Bakary Traore, 
"L'evolution des partis politiques au Senegal depuis 1940," in 
Bakary Traore, Mamadou Lo et Jean Louis Alibert, Les Forces 
Politiques en Africme Noire. (Paris: PUF, 1966), p. 22. Ly did 
not allude to it during our interview.
661. Interview with Abdoulaye Ly, Dakar, July 17, 1984.
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which the young aqrege was well-connected.662 The liberal 
administrator Delavignette and his ENFOM contacts also played a 
role in Senghor's nomination. Gueye's protege had actually been 
Souley Diagne, a lawyer from Diourbel who had studied in Paris in 
the 193 0's and was secretary of the Association des Etudiants 
Quest-Africains of which Senghor was president.663
Lamine Gueye was elected deputy by 2 0.529 votes against his 
opponents Soce Diop (3.695 votes) and the Frenchman Maillat 
(1.227 votes). Senghor was elected with 14.107 votes against Ely 
Manel Fall (1.689), Charles Cros (1.350), Djim Momar Gueye and 
Pierre Diagne.664 The electoral campaigns focused on the 
abolition of the indiqenat. the vote of women, the local as­
semblies, but there was little mention of the constitution. The 
elections were reported as unusually tranquil, as there was no 
real struggle between the contestants. Everyone knew Lamine 
Gueye would easily win.665 As a result, a considerable number of 
citizens abstained: only 57.2% and 65.4% of 'citizens' voted as 
opposed to the 91.1% and 83.2% of 'subjects' who zealously
662. According to Amadou Ali Dieng, the MRP "colonialists" 
virtually imposed Senghor on Gueye. In Senegal, as a 'subject,' 
veteran and young socialist, he was also popular amongst many 
evolue groups; more details in chapter 7.
663. Interview with Abdoulaye Ly; for biographical informa­
tion on Souley Diagne, see Milcent, Senghor..., op. cit., 1969, 
p. 52. According to Pathe Diagne, Gueye's choice was Abdoulaye 
Sadji. Interview with Pathe Diagne, Dakar, June 9, 1984.
664. Rapport de 1'Activite des Services, Conseil du Gouver- 
nement AOF, December 1945, 2G 45 104. ARSD. The elections are 
dealt with in detail in chapter 7.
665. Ibid.
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exercised their voting rights.666
c) Gueve and Senghor in the Constituent Assemblies.
Created to deliberate on the constitution of the Fourth 
Republic, the ANC allocated 64 out of 586 seats to the overseas 
territoires, of which 10 to AOF (five seats for the 'citizens' 
and five for 'subjects'). The main issue in the assembly debates 
was how the republic would remain one and indivisible while 
allowing for the devolution of autonomy overseas. The Union 
proposal which was essentially assimilationist was supported by 
the right wing, while the motion for a Federation that was 
submitted by the left wing parties was premised on association.
The 53-year old Lamine Gueye, a veteran politician and 
lawyer, was at ease with the logistics of constitutional debates 
and parliamentary procedures. As a resident of France for over 
2 0 years, Senghor had influential connections in the government 
and was also at home in French political circles. Together with 
Apithy, they contrasted sharply to the rest of the AOF delegates 
who had never visited France and lacked a university education 
and knowledge of the logistics of the French political system.667
Lamine Gueye was the exponent of assimilation par excel­
lence. As the first African to obtain a French degree in law, he 
was a showpiece of France's assimilation policy. His law thesis 
had been devoted to the assimilation of the originaires ? in the
666. Ibid.
667. Milcent, Senghor.., op. cit., p. 89.
265
late 1930's he had merged the PSS with the SFIO and pressed for 
the recognition of Senegal as a French departement. The Lamine 
Gueye law of May 7, 1946 (discussed below) marked the peak of his 
political career, distinguishing him as the most influential 
leader in Black Africa. It also won him a minor cabinet post in  ^
the Overseas Ministry and a seat in the executive committee of 
the SFIO.668
Gueye rejected both federalism and integration in the 
Assembly debates. He argued that federalism presupposed a 
minimum of political, administrative and financial autonomy which 
was absent in the colonies. Conversely, full-scale integration 
was rejected on the grounds that overseas territories could not 
be ruled by French laws and decrees.669 Gueye pressed for 
complete assimilation in the sense of equal rights between 
Africans and Frenchmen,
Les revendications du Senegal sont tres simples: il 
ne reclame ni independance, ni autonomie. II accepte 
de tout coeur de participer a la vie frangaise, dans la 
bonne comme dans la mauvaise fortune... Mais en contre- 
partie, il reclame 1'assimilation totale a la 
metropole.670
668. Gellar, "The Politics of Development..." o p . cit.. 
1967, p. 123; see his section on the Senegalese deputies, pp.
12 3-131. Gueye was also on the executive committee of the 
Association des Pionniers de 1'Union Francaise. created in Paris 
in October 1945 by Moutet and Ginette Eboue. Report of August 7, 
1948, 17G 267 111. ARSD.
669. Gueye, Itineraire Africain, op. cit.. 1966, p. 142.
670. Lamine Gueye interview, Bulletin Hebdomadaire d'Infor­
mation, Ministere des Colonies, no. 41, (August 27, 1945), 
Affaires Politiaues. File 129, Dossier 2, ARSD.
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and a degree of decentralisation within the French Community.
Donnez-nous une autonomie plus grande et avec 
1'experience, le temps, nous arriverons a nous diriger 
seuls dans le cadre frangais.671
For the immediate future, Gueye wanted Senegal to be an 
integral part of the French Republic. This meant universal 
suffrage for all Africans; the abolition of the indiqenat; the 
reduction of the governors' authority to that of the metropolitan 
prefets; the replacement of the Conseil Colonial, which he 
called a 'caricature' of representation, by the Conseil 
General; the pursuit of an 'open door' economic policy without 
import taxes; trade-union freedom; and 'equal work, equal 
pay.'672 In Gueye's scheme of things, Senegal would retain its 
special status within AOF and he would continue to be the key 
figure in Parliament and in the Federation.
A victim of what Senghor later coined as 'the mystique of 
equality,' Gueye remained faithful to assimilation throughout his 
life: his position was no different in the mid-fifties than in
the prewar days. Gueye accepted assimilation ipso facto and did 
not question its underlying principles nor its implications, even 
when the electorate increased dramatically and his constituency 
no longer wanted assimilation at any price. Neither the Second
671. Gueye speech at Rialto meeting in Dakar, August 10, 
1946, Renseignements, August 11, 1946, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
672. AOF. Bulletin Hebdomadaire d'Information, no. 41, 
(August 27, 1945).
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World War nor the rise of nationalist movements shook his 
beliefs. There was no self-awakening in Gueye's thought.673 His 
political philosophy became increasingly anachronistic after the 
war and contributed to his eventual downfall.
Even so, Gueye's contribution to black politics in Senegal 
was of considerable significance insofar as he stretched as­
similation to its limit, raised the political consciousness of 
the urban elite and exhausted what the ideology had to offer.
With Gueye, the assimilation chapter of 'citizen' politics in 
Senegal came to an end.
L.S. Senghor, was a very different man from Lamine. A 
Serere Catholic 'subject' from Joal, he was educated in 
missionary and state schools and won a scholarship at the 
prestigious Lvcee Louis le Grand in Paris. Senghor was the first 
African to receive the Aqreqation de Grammaire from the Sorbonne 
in 1936. While teaching at the Lvcee Descartes in Tours, he 
became involved in trade union activities and was secretary of 
the Section de Tours du Svndicat du Personnel de 1 'Enseiqnement 
Secondaire as well as delegate to the national congress of the 
union. He helped found a "Workers' College," was an active 
member of the Comite de Vigilance des Intellectuels Antifascistes 
and voted communist in the 1936 elections.674 De Coppet offered
673. Irving L. Markovitz, "The Political Thought of Blaise 
Diagne and Lamine Gueye: Some Aspects of Social Structure and 
Ideology in Senegal," Presence Africaine. no. 72, (4 trimestre
1969), p. 22 and passim.
674. Milcent, Senghor.., op. cit.. 1969, p. 63 and Hymans, 
op.cit.. pp. 75-76.
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him the post of Director of Education in AOF in 1936 but Senghor 
declined.
During the same year, he developed the theme of active 
assimilation f'assimiler. non etre assimile') at a conference 
organized by the Chamber of Commerce of Dakar. Upon returning to
Paris, he attended the International Congress of the Cultural
Evolution of Colonial Peoples where he delivered a paper on the 
resistance of the Senegalese bourgeoisie to the Ecole Rurale 
Populaire. As a 'subject,' he attacked the bourgeoisie of the 
Three Communes for deriding the ERP (which he perceived to be an 
embryonic form of an ideal French-African culture), for an 
exclusively French education which did not recognize or respect 
cultural differences.675
During the Second World War, he served in the 23rd and 31st 
RAC and was taken prisoner of war until he was freed in June 
1942, following which he joined the resistance.676 In his first 
political essay presented at a colloquium in June 1943, Senghor 
rejected integration outright in favour of a federation with 
imperial citizenship and an imperial parliament with advisory as
well as executive powers. Senghor's concept of a federation
called for administrative decentralisation and political autonomy 
within the French Community and resembled the Communaute of 1958-
675. Later on he refuted this thesis.
676. Milcent, Senghor.., op. cit.. 1969, p. 74.
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59.677
Senghor's network of influential contacts proved to be of 
paramount significance to his career.678 Within a year of his 
arrival in Paris, he was regularly dining at the Diagne household 
in the company of French ministers and politicians who initiated 
him to French politics. While a student at the Lvcee Louis le 
Grand, he became best friends with Georges Pompidou (de Gaulle's 
envoy at the preliminary secret meetings with the Algerian 
nationalist movement, then President of the Fifth Republic) who 
introduced him to socialism.679 Another valuable friend was 
Robert Delavignette who later pressed for his nomination to the 
ANC. His association with French intellectuals like Sartre and 
Gide helped him found Presence Africaine689 in 1948— a literary 
review and movement which strove to disseminate and sensitize the 
French public to African culture and civilization. Lastly, as a 
Catholic, Senghor wrote for Esprit and developed close relations
677. Senghor, "Vues sur l'Afrique Noire ou Assimiler, non 
etre assimile," in Robert Lemaignen, L.S. Senghor and Prince 
Sisowath Youterong, (eds.), La Communaute Imoeriale Francaise. 
(Paris: Editions Alsatia, 1945), p. 85.
678. Janet G. Vaillant, "African Deputies in Paris: The 
Political Role of Leopold Senghor in the Fourth Republic," in 
Wesley G. Johnson, (ed.), Double Impact: France and Africa in the 
Age of Imperialism, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 141.
679. Hymans, Senghor.., op. cit., 1969, p. 24.
680. Presence Africaine originated as the Cercle du Pere 
Diop. an association which organized lectures and discussions, 
see Milcent, Senghor.., op. cit.. 1969, pp. 75 and Hymans, op. 
cit.. p. 114.
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with the MRP well into the 1950s.681
If we were to simplify Senghor7s political philosophy into a 
few basic principles those would be: cultural cross-breeding,
active assimilation and negritude. When transferred to the 
political sphere, cultural cross-breeding became federalism while 
economic cross-breeding led to his doctrine of African 
socialism.682 By exploring his African roots and personality 
Senghor sought to transcend what he called 'the false antinomy7 
of association/assimilation through 'active assimilation,7683 
flexibility, moderation and pragmatism.
Senghor belonged to a generation of Africans whose formative 
years had been shaped by the experience of the Popular Front, the 
Second World War, the rise of nationalist movements and the 
metropolitan debate on the originality of colonial cultures and 
religions. The combined effect of those influences was reflected 
in the pan-African nationalism inherent in negritude and it 
accounts for his ideological differences with Lamine Gueye.
Colonial debates in the ANC were poorly attended by the 
French deputies who were overwhelmed with metropolitan postwar 
economic reconstruction and political modernisation. Gueye 
protested that Africans were not taken seriously,684 while the
681. Vaillant, op. cit.. p. 143.
682. Hymans, op. cit.. pp. 138-39.
683. Senghor, "Vues sur 1 'Afrique..," o p . cit.. 1945, pp. 
84-85.
684. Journal Officiel. Assemblee Nationale Constituante.
(JOANC), February 12, 1946, p. 663.
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press in Senegal demanded "l'eqalite absolue avec les citovens 
metropolitains.»685 since independence had been categorically 
rejected at Brazzaville and strongly resisted by the coalition 
government fMRP. SFIQ, PCF), the African deputies focused ex­
clusively on the abolition of "abusive" legislation and the 
implementation of the measures adopted at Brazzaville. The 
prevailing sentiment, however, was that France was not doing 
enough for her colonies. Gueye spoke against racism, the 
indigenat686 and forced labour,687 and called for a purge of 
Vichy officials from the administration and for 'equal work, 
equal pay.'688 Senghor condemned the capitalist trusts 
(Unilever, SCOA and CFAQ) and demanded secondary and higher 
education opportunities for Africans.
At the recommendation of the Colonial Minister, Senghor was 
appointed to the Constitutional Commission where he quickly
685. Rapport Politique, Senegal, August 1946, 2G 46 124. ARSD.
686. The indigenat was still restricted to 'exceptional 
cases' which effectively meant that the final word remained with 
the colonial administrator. The Colonial Minister Soustelle 
issued a decree on December 22, abolishing the administration's 
prerogative to impose sentences and relegated responsibility to 
the courts. It was Moutet who dismantled the indigenat (in 
principle) on February 20, 1946 but its practice persisted.
687. Forced labour continued largely because the Native 
Labour Code of June 18 had not been enforced, but also because 
its ambiguities allowed for the continuation of the regime.
688. JOANC. March 26, 1946, p. 945.
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assumed the function of unofficial grammarian.689 However, the 
4 2 member Commission only had 4 overseas deputies and was thus in 
a disadvantageous position to influence colonial reform.690 
Socialist and Communist support was essential to offset the MRP's 
opposition to the overseas deputies' proposals.
Senghor underscored the limitations of the policy of 
assimilation, the need for respect of colonial civilizations and 
for interaction between colonial and French cultures. Since a 
Federation was not a realistic goal between politically, economi­
cally and technologically unequal states, Senghor's motion lay 
between the Unitarian and the federalist viewpoints and left an 
open door for the future.691
The proposal Senghor presented to the Assemblee Nationale on 
April 11, 194 6, which was adopted by all
African delegates and accepted by the Assembly a week later, was 
revolutionary. The proposed constitution virtually heralded the 
end of colonial rule and the formation of a French Union with the 
'free consent' of all member territories. Premised on Federal 
principles, the proposed constitution accorded a certain degree 
of autonomy to the overseas territories with a view to the 
creation of a Union of partners with equal rights. Thereafter,
689. His moderate federalist ideas and his friendship with 
Delavignette were largely responsible for his designation,
Hymans, op. cit., p. 14 6.
690. Marshall, o p . cit., p. 166.
69lt Mortimer, France and the Africans 1944-1960: A 
Political History. (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), pp. 77-78.
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the colonies would be treated on an equal footing with the 
metropole,692 and citizenship would be extended to all (though it 
was not specified if French or Union citizenship would be 
accorded). In addition, all Union territories would be 
represented in the Assemblee Nationale and the Conseil d'Union 
Francaise through deputies elected by universal suffrage.
The Commission's attempts to include separate provisions for 
the overseas territories in the constitution failed. Instead, 
the articles pertaining to the French Union were interspersed 
throughout the draft. Neither proportional representation nor 
universal suffrage were adopted. Instead, territorial assemblies 
with token legislative powers but with some authority over their 
budgets would be instituted. Despite its contradictions and 
shortcomings, the April Constitution was remarkably liberal. 
Senghor described it as Mun svsteme realiste et eauilibre. 
Refletant l'etat present de 1'evolution des territoires d'Outre- 
Mer. elle maintenait la porte ouverte sur 1'avenir.1,693 Lamine 
Gueye proposed an amendment whereby 'citizens' and 'subjects' 
would participate in the constitutional referendum. However, 
this was declared illegal and deferred until after the adoption
692. In Senghor's words: "Ce principe de libre consentement 
etait d'une importance capitale. II temoignait de la sincerite 
du peuple frangais et de son desir de mettre en application les 
principes de la democratic." in "Les Negro-Africains et 1'Union 
Frangaise," Revue Politique et Parlementaire. no. 568, (June
1947), p. 206.
693. ibid.. p. 206.
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of the constitution.694
The Referendum of May 5, 1946 defeated the constitution. 
Senegal, along with other overseas territories, voted favourably 
(28.718 against 2.522 votes) but the total vote had been 
10.584.359 for and 9.454.034 against.695 The political climate 
in France was changing rapidly while the spectre of war in 
Indochina and the widespread unrest in North and Tropical Africa 
convinced many Frenchmen that this was no time for colonial 
reforms. Yet, even though the first ANC failed to pass the 
constitution, it was responsible for the implementation of 
important legislation.
c) The Lamine Gueye Law of 1946.
The Lamine Gueye law of May 7, 1946 which extended citizen­
ship to all colonial subjects has been described by the historian 
von Albertini as the Lex Caracalla of France.696
A partir du ler Juin 1946, tous les ressortissants 
des territoires d'outre mer (Algerie comprise) ont la 
qualite de citoyen au meme titre que les nationaux de 
la Metropole et des territoires d'outre mer.697
The promulgation of this law was a landmark for Africans even 
though the extension of citizenship did not make all Africans
694. Ruth Schachter-Morgenthau, Political Parties in French 
Speaking West Africa. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 43-44.
695. Rapport Politique, Senegal, May-June 1946, 2G 46 124. 
ARSD; 13G 5 17. and 20G 2 1 . ARSD.
696. Albertini, op. cit.. p. 386.
697. On the Lamine Gueye law see 17G 107 17.
eligible to vote.
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[La loi] ne pretend pas assimiler purement et 
simplement un certain nombre de ressortissants 
frangais, ni annexer par voie de dispositionsgenerales 
certaines autres categories de ressortissants... [elle] 
proclame avant tout un principe d'egalite. II n'y a 
plus de sujets. II n'y a plus de regime colonial. Le 
retour a ce regime n'est plus possible.698
The administration argued that when the law which abolished 
colonial rule as hitherto known was applied full-scale, it would 
be nothing short of revolutionary.
il n'y a plus dans les territoires d'Outre Mer des 
categories differencies et hierarchisees d'habitants, 
mais une seule categorie: des citovens jouissant des 
memes droits publics.
II n'y a plus de politique coloniale,... il y a 
une pratique coloniale et administrative dans les 
territoires d'Outre Mer, laquelle se fera avec 
beaucoup d'empirisme; souvent meme sur les suggestions 
des interesses.
II faut l'appliquer [la loi] dans toutes ses 
consequences... la loi...a fait la revolution, il 
faut maintenant la faire vivre.699
The indigenat would be abolished; Africans would have free access 
to the public service; the bureaucracy would be restructured; 
all discriminatory legislation against African workers would be 
obliterated; the electorate would increase; a single college 
would be instituted; and elections would be held on a common
698. Report of Minister of Overseas France to Governor- 
General of AOF on Lamine Gueye Law, no date, circa May 1946, 
17G 152 17. ARSD.
699. Note sur la loi de 7 Mai, 1946, Berlan, Direction 
Generale des Affaires Politiques, Administratives et Sociales, 
July 1946, 17G 152 17. ARSD.
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electoral roll.700
Since all laws were associated with the rejected April 
Constitution, the electoral regime of August 22, 1945 re­
introduced the double college and the projected elections for the 
local assemblies were not held.701 While the rejection of the 
constitution had little to do with overseas issues, its liberal 
colonial articles were not adopted by the second ANC.
News of the MRP's opposition to the Gueye citizenship law 
deeply angered Senegal's evolues. A 900-strong meeting of 11 
associations and political parties ended with the slogan 11 rlei 
maintien des droits acquis, ou separation immediate.11702 Leading 
political figures such as Amadou Assane N'Doye, Alexandre Armand, 
Guy Etcheverry and Joseph Correa demanded autonomy and local 
parliaments without European representatives, or else the 
resignation of their deputies from the ANC and the use of 
violence for the satisfaction of their demands. Xbrahima Sow, 
secretary-general of the Bloc Africain claimed that the 
preservation of the first ANC proposal was a 'matter of life and 
death.' The PCF spokesman, Correa, went as far as to suggest 
that unless the colonial deputies' demands were met, they would
700. Notes Documentaires et Etudes, no. 314, May 29, 1946,
p. 6.
701. Gueye, Itineraire Africain, op. cit., 1966, p. 146.
702. Rapport Politique, Senegal July 1946, 2G 46 124. ARSD. 
The parties and associations present were the: SFIO. Bloc 
Africain. Parti du Peuple. Union Republicaine Socialiste du 
Senegal. Union des Svndicats. Victimes de Vichv. Anciens Combat- 
tants. Jeunessse Combattante. Fraternite Musulmane. Anciens 
Prisonniers 1939-44. Avenir and Progxes.
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take the issue to the United Nations and demand independence.703
Lamine Gueye assumed the role of the mediator. He argued 
that Africa should not seek a place outside a "cadre strictement 
francais"704 since what was at stake was not separation from 
France but "equal rights for equal responsabilities." Gueye's 
party colleagues did not endorse him. In fact, he had to go to 
great lengths to persuade them that the French Union would permit 
the devolution of local autonomy. In protest, many walked out 
during Gueye's speech. Senghor also estranged his colleagues 
when he cried in indignation "De cruoi oseriez-vous vous 
plaindre?"705 to which Gueye sarcastically added whether his 
audience expected to elect the president of the Republic. "Vous 
avez obtenue l'autonomie et ie ne comprendrais pas que certains 
continuent a la reclamer."7°6
In September 1946, a Comite d'Action des Partis de Gauche 
favour of
met in Dakar in a issued a manifesto rejecting autonomy, federalism 
and assimilation for 'African sovereignty./707 Telegrams were 
sent to Gueye and Senghor demanding a United Nations intervention 
if the single electoral college was not adopted by the second 
ANC. The telegrams were signed by virtually all Senegalese
703. Resume de la reunion a M'Both, August 8, 1946, 21G 91 
17, ARSD.
704. Ibid.
705. 21G 91 17.
706. Resume de la reunion a M'Both, August 8, 1946, 21G 91 
17, ARSD.
707. Renseignements, September 24, 194 6, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
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political leaders.708 What is significant about these incidents 
is that the African elite did not unanimously and unquestioningly 
endorse Gueye's and Senghor's views. The deputies encountered 
considerable opposition even from within their own party, the 
Bloc Africain. However, the electors of June 2, 1946 reappointed 
Lamine Gueye (31.288 against 925 for Maillat) and L.S. Senghor 
(20.718 votes without opposition) to the second ANC.709
The deliberations of the second ANC began in August 1946, 
against a background of independence movements well under way in 
Algeria, Indochina and Madagascar and a substantially 
strenghtened MRP in the coalition government, at the expense of 
the left which had supported colonial reform. Colonial deputies 
were now on the defensive. Lamine Gueye condemned the dual 
electoral college which would effectively reduce the number of
708. Senegal, Affaires Politiques, Syntheses mensuelles des 
informations sur les partis politiques, September 194 6, 2G 46 
125, ARSD; and Renseignements, September 23-24, 1946, 21G 91 17. 
ARSD. The participating parties were the: Bloc Africain. SFIO. 
Union Svndicale. MUR, Collectivite Leboue, CEFA. Ligue des 
Droits de 1'Homme. Front National. Anciens Combattants. GEC. MAA. 
MNA. PTI, Prisonniers de Guerre, and the Dakar municipality.
Ruth Schachter Morgenthau's analysis (Political Parties, op. 
cit.. p. 136) differs from mine on the following points: she
maintains that in 1945 there was a Comite d'Entente (the 
precursor to the Bloc Africain), grouping the SFIO. the MNA. the 
MAA, the GEC. the CEFA. etc. She also maintains that it was a 
response to the EGCF. I did not find evidence of such a Comite. 
probably because many of the parties she mentions did not exist 
at that time. For instance, the MAA and the MNA did not exist 
until August 1946. I do mention three Comites d'Entente (the 
Comite d'Entente of Cros in 1943, the Front National, and the 
Bloc S6n£qalais) but not of a Comite d'Entente as Morgenthau 
defines it except maybe for the aforementioned Comite d'Action 
des Partis de Gauche which became active in 1946 not 1945.
709. Rapport Politique, Senegal, May-June 1946, 2G 46 124, ARSD.
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overseas deputies to 20 and reintroduce dual citizenship. When 
he was told that the single college imperiled French representa­
tion, he bitterly remarked:
Voulez vous dire que si l'on envoyait ici des 
hommes comme Senghor ou Fily-Dabo Sissoko, ou moi- 
meme, ce ne serait pas de Frangais qui viendraient ici? 
Depuis quand?710
d) The Interaroupe des Elus d'Outre-Mer and the Etats Generaux 
de la Colonisation Francaise.
Rather than work with metropolitan parties as was the case 
during the first ANC, the overseas deputies formed the Inter- 
crroupe des Elus d'Outre Mer under the initiative of Lamine Gueye 
[who also became the president of the group], to protect African 
interests and preserve what they considered to be the minimum 
gains obtained in the April Constitution.711
L'intergroup des deputes des peuples d'outre-mer 
proclame le principe de liberation du pacte colonial 
sous toutes ses formes, et il s'engage a les combattre 
dans la constitution de l'Union Frangaise...il exprime 
son desir de voir la realisation des aspirations 
legitimes de chacun de ces peuples, afin de leur 
permettre de vivre librement et dignement dans l'Union 
Frangaise, qui doit etre une reunion de peuples libres, 
egaux et fraternels.712
The Interaroupe elaborated a 2 0-year timetable after which
710. Gueye quoted in Marches Coloniaux. (September 21, 
1946) .
711. Gueye, Itineraire Africain, o p . cit.. 1966, p.160.
712. Press release of July 22, Interaroupe meeting, 
reprinted in Marches Coloniaux. (July 27, 1948), p. 748.
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the overseas territories would be free to decide between federa­
tion, integration or independence from France.
Self-government, local assemblies with legislative powers, and a 
French Union with proportional representation were among its 
principle recommendations.
The Commission des Territoires d'Outre Mer accepted the 
proposal by a majority of one but the Radicals, the MRP, and the 
revived colonial lobby, Etats Generaux de la Colonisation Fran- 
caise (EGCF), fearful of ministerial instability and the rising 
nationalism overseas, stiffly opposed it. The rigorous ac­
tivities of the Comite de 1'Empire and the resurgence of colonial 
associations713 culminated in the convention of the EGCF on July 
30, 1946 to 'save the Empire.' Senghor noted with dismay that 
amongst the EGCF one even distinguished members of the MRP and 
the Rassemblement des Gauches Republicaines.714
In Senegal, the local EGCF (Comite d'Action de l'Union 
Francaise) exerted some control though not nearly as much as it 
did in the Ivory Coast and Cameroon. The Dakar Chamber of 
Commerce adopted a resolution against the Lamine Gueye law and 
proposed that overseas deputies only be allocated a consultative 
role.715 The Comite de 1'Empire Francais exerted pressure on the 
government to repeal the Conseil Colonial measures which exer-
ocised some control over their taxable profits and reinstore the
713. Albertini, op. cit.. p. 388.
714. Senghor, "Les Negro-Africains..," op. cit.. 1947, p. 207.
715. Gueye, Itineraire Africain, op. cit.. 1966, pp. 158-59.
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control of the Chamber of Commerce over peanut seeds.716
The EGCF opposed the single college, the Lamine Gueye Law, 
and abandoned assimilation in favour of decentralisation in a 
federal system with no colonial participation in government.
Since colonial peoples were not particularly interested in the 
franchise and parliamentary representation, argued the EGCF. the 
Parliament should be exclusively restricted to French 
citizens.717 They attacked the Interaroupe for being separatist 
and pressed the government to revise the colonial provisions of 
the rejected constitution. A divided and weakened Socialist 
party, led by Moutet, succumbed to MRP pressure and voted for 
some of the conservative proposals which swung the majority to 
the right.718
The ensuing Charter of the French Union which was submitted 
to the Constitutional Committee became, with minor modifications, 
Title VIII of the October Constitution.719 The Radical President 
Herriot condemned it as a blueprint of a "federalisme anarchiste 
et acephale11 that would reduce France to no more than 'a colony
716. L'Action du Comite de 1'Empire Francais. Principales 
interventions aupres des pouvoirs publics: Octobre 1944-Mars 
1946, (Paris: Editions de l'Empire Frangais, 1946), pp. 18, 69.
It was reported that Graziani visited Paris in order to contact 
the EGCF in November 1946 but there is no further information on 
his activities. Rapport Politique Mensuel, Dakar, November 4, 
1946, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
717. Marches Coloniaux. July 13, 1946 and June 1, 1946.
718. Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit.. p. 87.
719. Mortimer, op. cit.. p. 91-92.
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of her colonies.' 720 A series of radical revisions followed, 
culminating with Bidault's fait accompli before the 
Constitutional Committee which nearly reintroduced the double 
college, the union citizenship, and centralisation.721
Caught between increasingly unreliable socialists and 
reactionary colonialists, the Intergroupe left the Chamber and 
threatened to resign. Gueye, Monnerville, Abbas, Houphouet- 
Boigny and Cesaire were received by the French president, 
Moutet and Coste-Floret. Their disillusionment and 
determination are evident in Lamine Gueye's statement:
No, monsieur le President, there is no question of 
an attack on France, direct or indirect. The question 
is, are we Frenchmen like any other Frenchmen, or not? 
that's all. For example, why don't you declare that 
because there are so many Corsicans in Paris, therefore 
they must have a deputy of their own - and so on? Why is 
it only we who are subjected to special treatment? It's 
you who says that we are not Frenchmen like other 
Frenchmen; we had believed that we were. But that's the 
way it is, there's no point in our staying here. Of 
course you can issue decrees and order us about. We 
don't dispute that; but if you want to get us this way we 
say: 'No thank you...c'est fini...722
Bidault reluctantly agreed to maintain the Lamine Gueye Law and
delegate the electoral system of the overseas territories to an
organic law. Thus, the double college was not included in the
720 . JOANC, August 27, 1946, p. 334.
721. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 98.
722 . Tape recorded statement made by Lamine Geye, in 
Mortimer, op. cit., p. 99.
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constitution.723 In fact, Gueye almost succeeded in abolishing
it during the last debates of the ANC: the government had
momentarily agreed to accept the single college for AOF and Togo
the
but in attempting to extend it to AEF,Aopposition frustrated the 
reform altogether.724
In August 1946, during the height of the EGCF offensive, a 
disenchanted Senghor took everyone by surprise with a call for 
independence. He initially proposed a federal system along the 
lines of the Soviet Union, a Union of Equal French Socialist 
Republics, but then went as far as to "reclamer une Republioue 
Noire. . .1,725
[on peut]... preparer les cadres qu'exigera 
1'etablissement d'une autonomie a quoi nous sommes surs 
d'acceder... en assurant les blancs de notre indepen­
dence: il serait tout aussi sot que dangereux pour
eux, de vouloir faire marcher arriere. Nous sommes 
prets, s7il le fallait et en dernier recours, a 
conquerir la liberte par tous les moyens, fussent-ils 
violents.726
The political context accounts for Senghor's frustration 
and intransigeance. The resurgence of reactionary colonialism 
which dominated the second ANC posed a direct threat to the gains 
Africans had extracted from the April constitution. His espousal 
of independence might have even been a bluff to warn the French
723. Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit.. p. 87.
724. Mortimer, op. cit.. pp. 99-100.
725. Renseignements, October 22, 1946, 17G 139 19. ARSD.
726. Ibid.
/
/
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that if they pushed things too far, even the most accommodating 
deputies would revolt. When Senghor realized that African 
deputies had no bargaining power, he changed his tactics and 
opted for collaboration, reaffirming his loyalty towards 
France, denouncing secession and voting for the October 
Constitution. 'Nationalism' and 'autonomy' were dismissed as 
pompous and meaningless words:
...1'autonomie n'est pas une fin pour nous, mais un 
moyen. En d'autres termes, nous voulons moins nous 
debarasser de la tutelle de la M^tropole que de la 
tyrannie du capitalisme international. Nous pensons 
qu'une autonomie qui nous ramenerait simplement au regime 
feodal des castes ne resoudrait pas le probleme, bien que 
ce regime fut moins oppressif pour 1'homme que le systeme 
colonialo-capitaliste.
Nous ne sommes pas des revolt^s, mais des revolution- 
naires...727
Gueye similarly defended the status quo: "Nous pouvons tout
par la France, tout par le Rbpubligue, mais jamais rien sans la 
France et jamais rien sans la R6publique. 1,728 Thereafter, their 
efforts shifted toward the maximization of civil rights and 
economic reforms rather than the revision of the constitution.729 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC.
The Constitution of October 27, 194 6 which was adopted by the 
Referendum of May 6, 1946 was a highly compromised version of
727 . Senghor, "Les Negro-Af ricains. ., " op. cit., 1947, p.
208.
728 . Gueye editorial, Le Senegal, (January 13, 1947) .
729 . Hymans, op. cit., p. 152.
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the April constitution that dissatisfied the coalition, the 
overseas deputies and the colonialist circles. The French Union 
comprised the Republic and the associate states and territories. 
AOF was part of the Republic with 13 deputies and 19 (out of 315) 
senators in Parliament. The Assemblee de l'Union Francaise was 
only consultative and therefore of little consequence except as a 
training ground for African politicians.730
Senghor thought the constitution regressive: nLa nouvelle
Constitution est une charte octrovee. pour ne pas dire imposee, 
aux peuples d'outre-mer."731 The free consent clause was gone 
along with the referendum which would have given some say to the 
'subjects.' The all-important article 115 of the April Constitu­
tion instituting local assemblies elected by direct and universal 
suffrage was removed; instead, local assemblies would be in­
stituted by decree. Overseas territories no longer reserved the 
right to decide on their future status within the Union; the 
Assemblee de l'Union Francaise was virtually powerless and nearly 
all decisions emanated from Paris. Local assemblies were 
provisionally instituted by decree in October 1946. The law of 
August 1947 created the Grand Conseil in Dakar which was to vote 
the Federal budget of AOF, and advise the Governor-General. Each 
overseas territory elected five members to the Grand Conseil by 
proportional representation.732
730. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 101.
731. Senghor, "Les Negro-Africains,11 op. cit. . 1947, p. 207.
732. Mortimer, op. cit.. p. 103.
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The Constitution was received with apprehension and anger in 
Senegal. The newspaper Communaute of the Mouvement Nationaliste 
Africain which issued a special report on it, denounced it as 
hypocritical.733 There were contradictions not only between the 
preamble of the constitution and title VIII but also within the 
preamble itself. The colonial debate became more entangled and 
complex with the introduction of the concepts of 'autonomy,' 
'decentralization,' 'federation' and the 'community.' Still 
clinging onto the concept of a Greater France, the postwar 
government was essentially trying to fit decolonization therein.
The assimilationist and centralist political structure 
defined by the Constitution accounts for the apparentement of 
African political parties to metropolitan parties. In order to 
offset the rise of nationalist parties, the French actively 
harnessed local political activity and representation in the 
assemblies.734
THE BAMAKO CONGRESS OF 1946 AND THE BIRTH OF THE RDA.
It was the GEC of Dakar which first developed the concept of 
an African Popular Front.735 The occasion arose when African 
deputies in France became disillusioned with the SFIO and the MRP
733. Communaute, no. special October 9, 194 6, 21G 91 17, ARSD.
734:. Michael Crowder and Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, "French 
West Africa, 1945-1960," in J.F.A Ajayi and Michael Crowder 
(eds.), History of West Africa, volume two, (London: Longmans,
1974), p. 671.
735. Frangois Zuccarelli, Un parti politique africain:
L'Union Procrressiste Senegalaise. (Paris: R. Pichon et R. Durano- 
Auzias, 1970), p. 43.
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which sacrificed colonial reform for the sake of government 
unity. Those who had threatened to resign from the second ANC 
(Gueye, Houphouet-Boigny, Tchicaya, Apithy, Cissoko, Diallo, and 
d'Arboussier) drafted a manifesto in September 1946 calling 
African political movements to unite into a single Parti Democra- 
tigue Africain with inter-territorial bases which would be 
independent of metropolitan political parties. It was also 
agreed that the RDA might support a metropolitan party favourable 
to its cause.736
Without dissasociating himself from the SFIO, Lamine Gueye 
offered his support to the movement.737 Senghor, who was not 
present during the drafting of the manifesto, also joined. It 
was decided that a meeting would be scheduled right after the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in Bamako.
The RDA called for a freely consented union between Africans 
and Europeans, individual and cultural freedom and local democra­
tic assemblies.738 It denounced the MRP version of federalism as 
a cover-up for the return of authoritarian rule and assimilation 
"que nous reiettons formellement.1,739 It also rejected 
'autonomy' based on utopian perceptions of African realities:
736. Rapport de la Commission Politique, Rapporteur Acka, 
Bamako Conference, October 20, 1946, Paoiers Suret-Canale. [GEC- 
RDA], Institut d'Histoire du Temps Present, Paris; and Le RDA 
dans la lutte anti-imperialiste, (Paris: Impressions Rapides,
1948), p. 18.
737. Mortimer, op. cit.. p. 105.
738. Manifeste du RDA, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
73^. Ibid.
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"Repoussant assimilation, nous reclamons au sein de l'Union 
Francaise une association librement consentie. fondee sur 
l'eqalite des droits et des devoirs."740 It was repeatedly- 
stressed that the RDA adhered 'without ambiguity' to the French 
Union and that the alliance between African and French democratic 
forces was essential.741
The RDA protested against the constitution which condoned 
forced labour? forcibly integrated Africans into the French 
Republic contrary to the mandate of the San Francisco charter 
which France had signed? reinstituted the double college in some 
territories? reduced the role of the territorial assemblies and 
did not abolish rule by decree.742
With the exclusion of the Communists (who had now passed to 
the opposition), metropolitan parties shunned RDA invitations to 
the Bamako Conference. Moutet decided that if the RDA was not 
prepared to be under the wing of the SFIO. it should not exist at 
all. Gueye and Senghor had made arrangements to attend the 
Bamako Conference.743 In early October, however, Moutet in­
structed Gueye to abstain. Unwilling to jeopardize SFIO support, 
particularly in view of the upcoming elections, Gueye obeyed.
740. Rapport de la Commission Politique, Rapporteur Acka, 
October 20, 1946, Bamako Conference, Papiers Suret-Canale [GEC- 
RDA], Institut d'Histoire du Temps Present, Paris.
741. Gabriel d'Arboussier, "La grande esperance de Bamako," 
Action. (January 3, 1947).
742. Le RDA dans la lutte anti-imperialiste, op. cit..
1948, pp. 14-15.
743. Paris-Dakar, (October 9, 1946).
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Political and personal reasons induced Senghor to follow suit.
With the legislative elections only a few weeks away, Senghor 
needed Gueye's support if he were to be reelected. Moreover, 
since Gueye made certain that their fellow socialist Apithy 
abstained from the Conference, Senghor claimed that he could not 
have been expected to attend on his own:744
Je ne suis pas alle a Bamako, pour n'avoir 
pas ete dans les details de 1'organisation. Ayant 
rapidement signe un manifeste et voulant faire honneur 
a ma signature, je devais prendre 1'avion avec Fily 
Dabo, mais ce dernier m'informa au dernier moment qu'il 
ne se rendait pas a ce rassemblement. Je me refusais 
done d'y aller par solidarity.745
Back in Senegal, Senghor claimed that the Congress of Bamako was 
a manoeuver to oust Lamine Gueye and himself from power, and that it 
was on this account that he abstained.74^
As the SFIO and the MRP were from the very beginning hostile 
to the RDA, it was only to be expected that the Rassemblement 
looked to the PCF for support and that it became increasingly 
communist-influenced. In fact, Houphouet-Boigny later remarked 
that if Gueye had attended the Bamako Conference, he would have 
probably become the president of the group and "nous aurions
744. Milcent, Senghor.., op. cit.. 1969, pp. 98-99.
745. Senghor quoted in Police et Surete, Syntheses 
Politiques Mensuels, Senegal, March 1947, 2G 47 133. ARSD.
746. Rapport de Renseignements du SFIO, November 2, 1946, 
21G 91 17. ARSD.
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ecrit une autre page d'histoire.1,747 The irony was, however, as 
Senghor later acknowledged, that the goals of the RDA were 
similar to the SFIO.748 The fact that Senegal's deputies chose 
to accomodate the French government was a blow to Senegal's 
leadership in West Africa.749 It also illustrates how 
metropolitan politics affected the political agenda of the 
Senegalese deputies not only in France but at home as well. 
Senghor later admitted to the error he and Lamine committed by 
abstaining from the conference: "Mon tort a ete d'obeir a des 
ordres qui m'etaient impose de 1'exterieur.1,750 The absence of 
African socialists from Bamako defeated the original purpose of 
the Congress of an all-African rassemblement and paved the way to 
the 'balkanisation'751 of African politics.
THE INDEPENDANTS D'OUTRE-MER AND THE REVIVAL OF THE INTERGROUPE.
After Bamako, Senghor found himself increasingly isolated 
from the assimilationist and anti-clerical SFIO. He began 
frequenting the socialist Paul Alduy, Dr. Aujoulat and the
747. L'Afriaue Noire. (July 24, 1952) and Mortimer, op. 
cit.. p. 106.
748. Senegal, Police et Surete, Syntheses Politiques 
Mensuels, March 1947, 2G 47 133. ARSD.
749. Crowder and O'Brien, "French West Africa," op. cit.. 
1974, p. 675.
7^°. Senghor, opening speech of the Conqres Constitutif. 
Convention Africaine, Dakar, January 11-13, 1957, in Traore, op. 
cit.. p. 35.
751. Milcent, Senghor.., o p .cit.. 1969, p. 99.
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M R P . 752 Aujoulat had just returned from the United Nations 
sessions on the future of Togo and Cameroon, convinced that 
independence was not only inevitable, but imminent. At the same 
time, he also realized that no metropolitan party would concede 
to it. For this reason, he wanted to regroup the overseas 
delegates into an autonomous, strictly parliamentarian political 
group,753 and offer an alternative to the interterritorial SFIO 
and RDA.
Meanwhile, a full-fledged cabinet crisis erupted in France 
after the elections of November 194 6 when the PCF and the MRP 
divided the seats of the National Assembly between them.754 The 
French Republic was becoming increasingly threatened by the 
Gaullist Rassemblement du Peuple Francais (RPF) which was 
pressing for constitutional revision and the return of de Gaulle. 
War in Indochina, revolt in Madagascar and the Cold War were 
shaping the 'annee terrible' of 1947.
The Malagasy rebellion was brutally suppressed. Its three 
deputies were stripped of parliamentary immunity and were 
subsequently arrested. Gueye and Senghor did not vote with the 
SFIO as expected; thereafter, the latter took less and less 
notice of party discipline until he was removed from the 
executive committee of the party in 1948. Conversely, Gueye 
became further entrenched in the SFIO. In December 194 6, he
752. Ibid.. pp. 108-109.
753. Aujoulat interviewed by Milcent, ibid.. pp. 109-110.
754 ^ The newly elected National Assembly comprised igs PCF 
(and MUR), 167 MRP, 105 SFIO, 70 Radicals and UDSR, and 
71 right- wing group members.
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became Secretary of State and in March 1947, he was appointed 
president of the Grand Conseil of AOF. Thanks to Moutet's 
machinations, the SFIO got 12 out of 2 0 second college senators 
and 4 out of 12 first college senators in the elections to the 
Conseil de la Republiaue in January 1947. However, when at the 
end of 1947 the MRP assumed control of the Overseas Ministry and 
Moutet was replaced, Gueye's influence began to wane, and with 
it, the preferential treatment accorded to him by the Socialists.
With the support of the MRP and seven deputies, Apithy 
founded the Groupe des Independants d'Outre Mer in October 1948 
primarily for electoral purposes. Senghor joined in November 
1948, after resigning from the SFIO and breaking with Gueye. His 
resignation followed the Socialist party's opposition to a 
proposal that would have arrested the proceedings against the 
Malagasy deputies. Gueye resigned from the parliamentary 
socialist group only temporarily755 but Senghor, whose 
affiliation with the Socialists had been from the very beginning 
problematical, made a clear break.755 His personal differences 
with Lamine Gueye aside, he bitterly condemned the SFIO for 
voting against the single college, against equality for
755. Police et Surete, Synthese de 1'evolution politique et 
sociale, Dakar, September 1948, 2G 48 117. ARSD. Gueye argued 
that there was no proof whatsoever that the deputies had directly 
participated in the rebellion.
756. He accused Moutet of refusing to send an inquiry 
commission to Tananarive before the question of the removal of 
parliamentary immunity of the Malagasy deputies came up.
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veteran pensions and proportional representation.757
Like the Interoroupe and the RDA. the IOM did not envision a 
political future for the colonial territories outside the French 
Union.758 Aujoulat wanted to affiliate the group to the SFIO? 
Senghor proposed an affiliation with the MRP. An intense rivalry 
developed between the RDA and the IOM. the former accusing the 
IOM of ideological expediency and 'scandalous' administrative 
patronage
... un groupe sans principes qui constitue une 
alliance par le haut, une coalition d'interets 
individuels, roue a la sterilite et a 1'inaction, ou 
tout au plus a une action anarchique, incapable de 
resister a la moindre divergence, dont le nombre... 
s'accroit en raison de la diversite des interets des 
membres du groupe...759
To some extent, RDA criticisms were well-founded: the IOM did not 
have clearly defined goals. Its affiliation with the MRP had 
little to do with support for Catholicism, and until the 1951 
elections, its achievements were limited.780 Only in Senegal was 
an IOM member supported by a mass party. The IOM's sudden 
emergence as a pressure group in the Assemblee Nationale was 
primarily because its votes became decisive during the period of 
great ministerial instability of 1948-49. (The seven IOM votes
757. Ibid.
758. Paris-Dakar. (March 13, 1949).
759. Le RDA dans la lutte anti-imperialiste, op. cit.. 1948, 
p. 64.
780. One of its few achievements was Aujoulat's April 1950 
decree setting up an Institute for Higher Education in Dakar.
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were instrumental to the defeat of the Schuman and Quei^le 
governments.) 761
One of the underlying reasons of the RDA-IOM rivalry was the 
struggle for political and economic leadership within AOF between 
Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny. As the Fourth Republic began 
shifting to the right, African deputies reconsidered their 
parliamentary alliances. In June 1950, the RDA parliamentarians 
approached the IOM in order to create a comite d'entente. The 
protocol was signed by Houphouet-Boigny, Hamani Diori, Coulibaly 
and Mamadou Dia (who also signed for Senghor) and called for a 
concerted programme of action against the imperiled interests of 
Africans.762 The RDA agreed to sever ties with metropolitan 
groups and the IOM assumed that it would support IOM deputies 
throughout the Federation. The Independants eventually rejected 
the union proposal on the grounds that it was a carefully 
disguised political manoeuver to neutralize them.
The IOM declaration of October 1951 shifted emphasis away 
from the political and Senghor stressed the need to replace the 
myth of independence with inter-dependence.763
761. Mortimer, op. cit.. p. 130.
762. Protocole du Comite d'Entente, August 9, 1950, 17G 572
152, ARSD. Other members of the Comite were Aujoulat, Lisette, 
Tchicaya, Toure, etc. The protocol confirmed the autonomy of 
all members and their right to belong to their respective 
political parties and also "toutefois, pour la defense des 
interets Africains au sein de 1 'Union Frangaise elles doivent 
faire table rase du passe et unir leurs efforts pour une 
collaboration efficace."
763. "Le Programme des IOM," Paris-Dakar, (July 9, 1951).
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Le groupement des Independants d'Outre-Mer 
rappelle que 1'Union Frangaise attend une promotion 
technique et humaine autant qu'une structure juridique, 
et c'est pourquoi il donne la primaute aux realisations 
economiques et sociales sur les preoccupations 
politiques.... [il] preconise sur le plan politique, la 
restauration de la personnalite des territoires. Celle- 
ci s'affirme par une deconcentration des pouvoirs et 
une decentralisation administrative...764
The same month, the RDA terminated its alliance with the 
communists.76  ^ The RDA-IOM entente proposal was discussed again 
in October, but while the former was prepared to accept joint 
action in Parliament, some IOM territorial sections refused to 
merge with the RDA.7 6 6
This led to the revival of the old Intergroupe des Elus 
d'Outre Mer by Lamine Gueye in January 1951. Its avowed goal was 
a limited revision of the constitution (particularly Title VIII), 
and the implementation of constitutional promises.767 Its 
purpose, however, was little different from the IOM: "mieux 
servir 1'Union Francaise en la realisant."768
764. Printed in La Voix de la Guinee, (October 31, 1951), 
17G 267 111. ARSD.
765. Gabriel Lisette, Le Combat du Rassemblement Democrati- 
crue Africain. (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1983), p. 161.
766. Mortimer, op. cit.. p. 157.
767. Particularly with regard to the Labour Code; the
statute of the local assemblies; electoral, municipal reform, as 
well as reforms within the penal legislation; credits for FIDES; 
the statute of citizenship within the overseas territories; 
reforms within the health services and the statute of the native 
chiefs. Lamine Gueye, Reglement Interieur et Manifesto des elus 
d'Outre-Mer, 17G 267 111. ARSD.
768. Ibid.
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. ..ils se prononcent a nouveau contre tout systeme 
de colonisation fondee sur l'arbitraire, pour 1'acces­
sion des territoires non autonomes a un statut de leur 
choix dans le cadre de l'Union Frangaise et pour le 
respect des engagements internationaux pris a l'egard 
des Etats et des Territoires Associes. Ils sont plus 
que jamais resolus a batir et faire prosperer cette 
union de la France et des peuples d'outre-mer, basee 
sur l'egalite des droits politiques et sociaux, 
individuels et collectifs, sur le respect des libertes 
humaines, sur 1'existence d'assemblies gerant 
democratiquement les affaires locales et sur 
1'amelioration du sort materiel et moral des popula­
tions par le developpement economique, social, culturel 
des pays d'outre mer, suivant les necessites du monde 
moderne et selon leur propre genie.769
Gueye was elected president, Cros and Houphouet-Boigny were 
elected vice-presidents, Sailer secretary-general and Djim Momar 
Gueye treasurer.770
In February 1951, the Intergroupe organized a meeting in 
Treichville. Gueye, Babacar Diop (vice-president of the Union 
Assembly), Djim Momar Gueye (Union councillor) and Maurice Gueye 
(general councillor and mayor of Rufisque) were sent to represent 
Senegal. Lamine Gueye argued that since no political parties 
were in agreement as to how to defend African rights, unity was 
necessary. Union, continued Gueye, did not mean fusion or 
another rassemblement. Each party would maintain its indepen­
dence and ideology, but together they would effectively defend 
their interests within the French Union. The Intergroupe was 
above all
769. ibid.
770. Letter of Gueye dated January 18, 1951, 17G 267 111. ARSD.
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. ..un effort meritoire consenti par chacun de nous et 
il serait souhaitable que ce qui a ete fait sur le plan 
parlementaire puisse etre realise sur le plan federal 
et territorial.771
As the legislative elections approached, however, the Intergroupe 
lacked a platform.
Gueye's last claim to popularity and leadership was not with 
the Intergroupe but with the Second Lamine Gueye law of 1950 
which accorded equal treatment for Europeans and African civil- 
servants with regard to pay, recruitement, working conditions and 
benefits. The law was received enthusiastically in Senegal in 
1950, even though a decade later it proved to be anathema to the 
independent government's budget. In a sense, with the passing of 
the 1950 law, Gueye had fulfilled his platform of equal rights.
THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 1951.
The law of October 5, 1946 extended the franchise to former 
members of cooperatives and unions, wage earners, veterans, 
property owners, etc. but only three and half percent of AOF had 
been eligible to vote. In August 1947, the vote was extended to 
all those literate in French or Arabic. Senghor actively 
participated in a special overseas law which was presented to the 
Assemblee Nationale in April 24. According to this law, heads of 
households who paid taxes and mothers of two children would be
771. Rapport de Treichville, February 2, 1951, 17G 267 111.
ARSD.
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extended the vote.772 Fearing that the Conseil de la Republique 
would hold the law up until after the elections, Gueye, as leader 
of the Intergroupe. tried to pass a motion whereby Parliament 
could only be dissolved after the electoral overseas law had been 
approved.773 Despite pressure from the Queille government to 
withdraw the motion, the Intergroupe refused and voted against 
it.774 The law was debated again in May but the provisions had 
changed. African mothers were no longer eligible, the number of 
overseas deputies increased only slightly, while the double 
college was restored in AEF and Cameroon. Pressure from the 
Conseil de la Republique prevented the Assemblee Nationale from 
overriding the amendments.775
The extension of the vote, hitherto restricted to the urban 
elites, to women and to the rural areas was significant. The 
electorate increased from 44.292 registered voters in October 
1945 to 192.861 in November 1946 and 665.280 in June 1951.776 
The electoral law of 1952 for the territorial assemblies
eliminated the clause whereby heads of families must pay taxes in
order to vote.
The legislative elections of June 1, 1951 were a major
772. Mortimer, op. cit.. p. 163.
773. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 165; Schachter-Morgenthau, op.
cit.. p. 101-102.
774. Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 102.
775. Ibid.. p. 102.
776. Zuccarelli, op.cit.. p. 32.
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victory for the BPS at the expense of the RDA which lost three 
seats in the Assemblee Nationale. In Senegal, the trade union 
leader Abbas Gueye won a landslide victory over Lamine Gueye.
The Independants emerged as the single most important parliamen­
tary group. With 14 members in the Assemblee Nationale. it could 
now relinquish ties with metropolitan parties and officially 
constitute an independent group in Parliament. Senghor and 
Mamadou Dia envisaged the IOM becoming an inter-territorial party 
along the lines of the RDA. This would enable them to become 
less dependent on administrative support and to further Senghor's 
political programme. For Senghor, the IOM meant votes in the 
Assemblee Nationale and political dependents who could maximize 
his power and prestige.777 His appointment to the Council of 
Europe in September 1950, followed by his participation in the UN 
Trusteeship Council and UNESCO further enhanced his leader­
ship .778
The Independants received credit for the passage of the 
Overseas Labour Code which put African workers on an equal 
footing with the French regarding pay, unions, etc. When 
Aujoulat stood up to the government and refused to share the post 
of Secretary of State for Overseas France (which he had held 
under seven consecutive governments) the credibility of the IOM 
increased further. However, Senghor was unable to capitalize on
777. William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali 
Federation, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 60.
778. Vaillant, op. cit., p. 146.
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this gain. The party had neither territorial bases in Africa, 
nor a well-defined platform and Senghor's ambition did not 
materialize.
CONCLUSIONS
Postwar deliberations on the future status of the French 
colonies were from the very start a dissapointment for Senegal's 
evolues. Their demand for equal rights was not met at the 
Brazzaville Conference and the constitutional status of the 
colonies was of less importance in French postwar colonial 
policy-making than socio-economic reforms. The conference's 
evasion of political issues was accepted by the African deputies 
who focused instead on implementing the proposed reforms, 
eliminating the most pressing abuses of the colonial system 
(forced labour and the indigenat  ^ and ameliorating the standard 
of living of their people. Yet the single college and the 
concept of a Federal French community which were postulated at 
Brazzaville were to complicate the colonial debate between France 
and the colonies over the next decade.
Gueye and Senghor played a prominent role in postwar 
colonial policy-making as well as in inter-African politics. The 
Lamine Gueye laws and the Overseas Labour Code (for which Senghor 
received credit) testify to their contribution. If their 
demands, as outlined in the April Constitution, were not met, it 
was for a variety of reasons: ministerial instability in France;
divisions within cabinets and metropolitan parties; a government 
plagued by a weak executive that could not stand by its programme
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in periods of crisis; and the resurgence of the parti colonial in 
the Chamber of Deputies.
The parliamentary affiliation of African deputies with 
metropolitan parties which characterized the first ANC did not 
always work to their advantage. For instance, Lamine Gueye's 
influence began to wane as a result of his identification with 
the socialists who had heavily yielded to the wishes of the MRP. 
The second ANC reflected the conservative swing to the right in 
metropolitan politics. Rather than ally with metropolitan 
parties, African deputies formed independent groups to defend 
their interests and exert pressure on the government to extract 
reforms. Gueye formed the Intergroupe while Senghor later led 
the IOM. However, division, rivalry and metropolitan politics 
reduced the effectiveness of their actions, particularly in the 
case of the RDA following the Bamako Congress of 1946. Senghor 
broke from Lamine Gueye and subsequently rivalled Houphouet- 
Boigny for political leadership in West Africa.
The reaction against assimilation became increasingly 
evident after the constitution of 1946 was endorsed. The 
persisting discrimination with regard to salaries, indemnities 
and overall opportunities was attributed to assimilation which 
was often coined as a "duperie eternelle.1,779 Equality of rights 
did not necessarily imply a desire for integration. For the 
first time there was talk of progressive federal autonomy as the
779. Le Senegal. (November 25, 1946).
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...seule realite du moment... qui consistera, avec 
1'assentiment et l'aide de la France republicaine, a 
abolir ici toutes methodes de colonialisme, en faisant 
acquerir...a notre elite africaine,..cette education 
politique et cette experience qui feront d'elle de bons 
dirigeants et de bons gerants de la chose publique.780
The next two chapters will outline the process by which 
metropolitan politics and parliamentary alliances affected Lamine 
Gueye's assimilation politics and the rise to power of Senghor's 
prewar 'subject' constituency.
780. Ibid.
Chapter VII.
CITIZEN POLITICS OF THE LAMINE GUEYE ERA:
1945-1948
Postwar Senegal experienced an explosion of political 
activity which reflected in part the dynamics of change set in 
motion by the Second World War. Two interrelated features of 
political change stand out during this period: The end of 
European influence in Senegalese politics at the local level 
(exemplified in the defeat of the Bloc Frangais and the eclipse 
of the PSS); and the increasing dependence of African leaders 
on metropolitan parties for support. In the case of Lamine 
Gueye who became the dominant political figure after the war, 
the shifting ground of French politics and his subsequent 
identification with the SFIO proved to be a great liability 
that largely contributed to his downfall.
In prewar Senegal, Europeans like A. Goux, (former mayor of 
Dakar and Diouf' s chief lieutenant), Graziani (founding member 
of the PSS), members of the Chamber of Commerce, and the 
colonial administration had played a pivotal role in local 
politics. After the war, when the aforementioned tried to 
reconstitute political parties along prewar lines (assuming 
they could still play a dominant role in the Senegalese 
political arena), they failed altogether.
Conversely, as a result of the constitution of the 
Fourth Republic, politics emanated from Paris rather than 
Dakar, and thus the ties of African leaders to metropolitan
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parties became all the more significant.781
Initially, Gueye succeeded in uniting the various patriotic 
associations, political and interest groups with little, if any, 
outside support. The Bloc Africain was a popular movement with a 
mass base and loyal following that enjoyed great electoral 
success. To some extent, the platforms of the contestants for 
the 1945 legislative elections were not all that dissimilar. As 
was the case with the 1936 legislative elections, it was the 
constituencies of the parties which differed markedly. Gueye did 
not appreciate this fact and tended to rest on his laurels 
instead, neglecting the needs of an expanding electorate which 
did not look favourably upon his relations with the colonial 
administration and his assimilationist loyalties. Gradually, he 
came to rely on his socialist friends (particularly Wiltord, and 
to a lesser extent Bechard) to neutralise his opponents.
In turn, the colonial administration sought to harness the 
Bloc Africain by inextricably tying Lamine Gueye to the SFIO, 
thereby diminishing the influence of the Bloc Africain as a 
coalition party. Eventually, the Bloc Africain became synonymous 
with the SFIO and with Lamine Gueye. By 1947, the former had 
become absorbed in the latter but not without a price: the SFIO 
showed signs of disintegration such as diminishing support 
amongst its constituency, internal factionalism and poor 
organization.
781. Crowder and O'Brien, "French West Africa..," op.cit.. 
1974, p. 671.
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After the absorption of the Bloc Africain by the SFIO, 
opposition parties proliferated and the climate was ripe for a 
leader to unite Gueye's political opponents in a new party. Many 
of these splinter parties spoke of independence but used it 
as a device to extract concessions rather than as a political 
goal. The most important of those groups were the GEC and the 
Senegalese section of the RDA or UPS.
Until the formation of the Bloc Democratiaue Senegalais 
which united the opposition under its banner, an erratic 
political climate prevailed in Senegal. A colonial administrator 
described it as follows: "Le Senegal est. en AOF, le berceau de 
la politique et cette politique v a ses meandres. ses voltes- 
faces sensationnelles. ses ieux d'alliances compliguees."782
Alliances with metropolitan political parties tied Gueye to 
increasingly unpopular policies which ultimately benefitted his 
opponent Senghor. It took a crisis to polarize the situation 
irreversably: the Dakar-Niger strike of 1947-48 sealed the fate 
of Lamine Gueye and the SFIO while providing Senghor with a 
timely opportunity to launch his own party.
PATRIOTIC ASSOCIATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES.
By October 1943, African patriotic associations had 
coalesced into political formations to contest the municipal and 
legislative elections. The plethora of associations and the
782. Bulletin d'Information, Senegal, October 1948, 17G 139 
17, ARSD.
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rivalries among their leaders created an erratic political 
climate of shifting alliances. Four groups, named after their 
leaders, emerged in the political arena: the Groupement Graziani 
(PSS),783 and Groupement Cros (Comite de Coordination des 
Associations Patriotiques de St. Louis)784 which gathered little 
support, and the Groupement Goux (also known as Bloc Frangais)785 
and Groupement Lamine Gueve (SFIO) which dominated local 
politics.
Alfred Goux, the former mayor of Dakar, became leader of 
Combat AOF. a patriotic association regrouping the clientele of
783. The PSS attempted to regroup its old adherents but few 
responded to its call despite the fact that its platform was very 
similar to Gueye's: greater representation in local elected 
assemblies; creation of additional communes de plein exercice; 
universal suffrage; the reinstitution of the Conseil General; and 
the creation of a federal AOF Chamber of Commerce in place of the 
Conseil du Gouvernement; Clarte. (May 11, 1945) .
784. The full name of the coalition was Comite de 
coordination des associations patriotiques. republicaines. 
socialistes. Franco-Sovietiaues et syndicates, and it comprised 
the following groups: Amicale des condamnes. internes et victimes 
de Vichv; Amicale des instituteurs. institutrices. moniteurs. 
monitrices indigenes; Association corporative du personnel PTT; 
Association des anciens combattants; Association des auxiliaires 
des cfouverneurs; Association des grands mutiles de St. Louis; 
France-URSS de Thies; Liaue des droits de l'homme de St. Louis; 
SFIO St. Louis; I\^~RepubIiaue; Svndicat des employes de commerce. 
Industrie, et des banques; Svndicat des fonctionnaires des cadres 
superieures oricrinaires AOF; Syndicat des services civils? URS; 
Svndicat du petit commerce et artisanat; in AOF, (January 26, 
1945). Charles Cros was previously head of the Federation des 
Victimes de Vichv AOF et Togo.
785. The programme of the Comite d'entente focused on the 
purge of Vichy legislation; the extension of citizenship to 
certain categories of evolues? nationalisation of banks, mines, 
transport and other key industries; equality between African and 
European civil-servants; and a federal structure for France and 
her colonies. AOF, (January 26, 1945) and Renseignements, July 
30, 1945, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
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the Dioufist party.786 Under the instigation of Colonial 
Commissioner Pleven and Monod (head of IFAN and chief of a number 
of patriotic associations such as the Federation de la France 
Combattante AOF. see appendix 2), he united the Groupement 
d'Action Republicaine. Croix de Lorraine. France Combattante. and 
a faction of the PSS787 into the Union Federale de la France 
Combattante. which adopted the name Comite d'Entente des 
Groupements Patriotiques de Dakar in August 1943.788 Goux and 
the colonial administration envisaged a French-dominated party 
that would fill in the vacuum created by the war. However, the 
Bloc Francais failed to draw Africans to it, and Lamine Gueye 
refused to join it when he found out that Goux intended to run 
for office in the 1945 elections.
LAMINE GUEYE AND THE BLOC AFRICAIN.
While Goux maneuvered to put together the Bloc Francais. 
Lamine Gueye unobtrusively worked behind the scenes and did not
786. Goux initially attempted to seize the leadership of all 
patriotic associations by projecting himself as de Gaulle's 
emissary. Telegram of the Government General of Dakar to 
Colonies Alger, August 3, 1943, Affaires Politiques, Dossier 
2257, File 6, ANSOM. However, his prewar collaboration with 
conservative colonial administrations had compromised him in the 
eyes of the African electorate; see Gellar, "The Politics of..." 
op. cit.. 1967, p. 104.
787. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 16. ARSD.
788. Goux became president, Graziani and Turbe were elected 
vice-presidents. Handwritten report, no date [circa August 
1945], 17G 127 17. ARSD.
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officially enter the political arena until September 1943.789 
From February onward, however, he mounted a carefully planned 
campaign which the colonial authorities described as a "lent 
acheminement qui est veritablement comme un chef d'oeuvre de 
patience, de finesse et d'astuce politique."790 Gueye kept a low 
profile for several months, waiting for the right moment to 
launch his campaign and secure administrative support. The 
opportunity presented itself in the form of a meeting with de 
Gaulle in Algiers which Gueye used as a platform to establish 
himself as the most experienced and competent African postwar 
leader.791
In February 1944, he reconstituted the Socialist Federation 
"exactement dans la liane suivie par notre direction centrale 
d'Alger.1,792 but without incorporating Europeans in the party.
789. Renseignements, October 25, 1943, 17G 127 17; Bulletin 
de Renseignements Politiques, February 1944, 17G 127 17. ARSD.
790. Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, 17G 139 17. ARSD.
791. Later he claimed that this meeting prompted the General 
to stop in Dakar on his way to the Brazzaville Conference. 
Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, Senegal, 17G 139 17. ARSD. 
During his first public meeting at the Rex theater in Dakar,
Gueye reiterated the promises obtained from de Gaulle,
(abolition of the indigenat. purge of Vichy administrators and 
educational reforms), rather than hold a campaign meeting, a 
tactic which the colonial administration described as working in 
his favour.
792. Letter of Lamine Gueye to Cournarie dated February 28, 
1944, Affaires Politigues. File 872, Dossier 3, ANSOM. When the 
Governor-General of AOF Cournarie insisted that the SFIO needed 
administrative authorization, he protested to the Colonial ? 
Minister: "Je ne veux pas surout que notre existence oh?" la 
cessation de notre activite dependent de la seule volonte d'un 
Gouvernement local ou, si l'on aime mieux, de notre docilite 
envers lui." Ibid.. and letter of Gueye to Colonial Minister
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The Dakar section of the SFIO Federation met for the first time 
in October 1944 and elected Gueye secretary-general. The 
executive committee of the party included veteran politicians 
such as Adama Lo (president of the Conseil Colonial), Armand 
Angrand (an influential publisher), Magatte Ba and Bibi N'Diaye.
Over the next two years, Lamine Gueye reorganized the prewar 
socialist electoral committees in the protectorate and 
established a network of alliances with patriotic associations. 
The administration noted that "Le Bloc Senegalais est une 
organisation puissante. disposant d'un reseau d'agents repartis 
dans les plus petits villages de la colonie.793
An important victory was won in January 1945, when Gueye 
integrated the Union Republicaine Senegalaise (URS) (former Foyer 
Africain), an association founded by his uncle Khayar M'Bengue, 
to the SFIO.794 A number of young 'subjects' had initially 
resisted the fusion with the SFIO. a party they believed served 
predominantly European interests.795 In November 1944, an URS
dated March 11, 1944, in ibid. A tense and antagonistic 
relationship began developing between Gueye and Cournarie.
793. The administration interchanged the names Bloc Africain 
and Bloc Senegalais but it should not be confused with the Bloc 
Senegalais established by the young evolues in St. Louis in 
opposition to Gueye's Bloc (as discussed below). Rapport sur 
les elections pour 1'Assemblee Legislative, no date, signed 
Maestracci, 13G 44 17. ARSD.
794. Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, Senegal, 17G 139 
17, ARSD.
795. "Ces indigenes tiendraient le parti SFIO comme un parti 
Europeen, sans attache avec le pays..." Bulletin de 
Renseignements Politiques, September 1944, Senegal, 2G 44 155, 
ARSD.
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faction headed by Salzmann united with St. Louisian associations 
such as Espoir and Avenir to found a rival Bloc Senegalais which 
would operate independently of veteran politicians like Lamine 
Gueye, Goux and Mustapha Malick Gueye and favourable to young 
leaders such as Amadou Cisse (of the Delegation Speciale de St. 
Louis.)796 To accomodate the demands of young evolues who 
demanded greater participation in political life, Gueye founded 
the Union des Jeunes which he incorporated to the SFIO in 
November 1944, with Amadou Boubacar Sarr as president.797 
Finally, in January 1945, the URS unanimously decided to rally to 
Lamine Gueye and thus, "L'URS est morte. le Bloc Africain est 
ne."798
Lamine Gueye subsequently united trade-unions, youth 
organizations, patriotic associations and political groups under 
the banner of the Bloc Africain. to support his candidacy in the 
deputyship elections in the form of a united African front 
against the resurging colonialists in France.799 He neutralised
796. Renseignements, November 1944, Dakar, 21G 116 48. ARSD.
797. The Union des Jeunes originated under Vichy rule (1942- 
43) under the name Maison des Jeunes which later became Jeunesse 
Rufisgoise. Renseignements, September 30, 194 6, 17G 534 144. 
ARSD. Its avowed goal was to "lutter pour 1'amelioration du sort 
des noirs." Rapport Politique, Dakar, November 1944, 21G 116 48. 
ARSD.
798. Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, 17G 139 17. ARSD.
799. Synthese des partis politiques en AOF, Durand to the 
Governor-General of AOF dated July 24, 1946, 17G 267 111. ARSD. 
Contrary to what Ruth Schachter-Morgenthau has argued in 
Political Parties.., o p . cit.. pp. 136-37, I found no evidence of 
a Bloc Africain comprising the MAA, and MNA in 1945 (according
to archival sources, the two parties were created in 194 6) . Nor
310
the PSS by integrating it into the SFIO800 and rallied the 
support of the Lebou and Wolof notables; the chiefs in the Fouta 
Toro; the Conseil Colonial; the Lebanese and Syrian communities 
and the President of the Chamber of Commerce, Tascher.801
The Bloc Africain was run primarily by young evolues who 
envisaged an inter-territorial party led by Lamine Gueye.802 
Abdoulaye Ly has described the Bloc Africain as a nationalist 
movement and symbol of change, progress and unity at a time of 
resurging colonialism in France.803 In the words of El Hadj Bibi 
N'Diaye,
...la creation du Bloc Africain a ete decidee pour 
obtenir une union totale et solide de la masse 
africaine, freiner le joug colonialiste, lutter pour 
des interets communs, refaire une Afrique neuve sans 
distinction de race, de couleur et de religion.804
There is considerable evidence that the administration was
did I find evidence of a power struggle between the GEC and the 
SFIO leaders in Senegal in 1945 over the leadership of the Bloc.
I do not think there was such a power struggle, in Senegal at 
least, largely because Lamine Gueye7s leadership of the Bloc 
Africain was not seriously contested by any group or party— the 
communists did not exert much influence on local politics until 
after the Bamako Conference (a year later).
800. The fusion took place in December 1944. Graziani did 
not join the bloc because he resented Gueye's dictatorial powers. 
Renseignements, June 25, 1945, 2QG 3 1 . ARSD.
8°i. Rapport Politique Mensuel, Senegal, March 1946, 2G 46 
124. ARSD.
802. Renseignements, May 12, 1947, 21G 111 28. ARSD.
803. Interview with Abdoulaye Ly, Dakar, July 17, 1984.
804. Renseignements, May 12, 1947, 21G 111 28. ARSD.
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fearful of the Bloc; Oswald Durand, (who was appointed Governor 
of Senegal in April 1946) reported that the Bloc Africain engaged 
in subversive activities in Matam, Louga, Thies and Dagana, to 
impress on its constituency that 11 il n'v aurait plus ni Chef de 
Canton, ni Commandant de Cercle et au'il ne fallait plus 
obeir. "805
In order to arrest the nationalist impetus of the Bloc. the 
colonial administration sought to neutralise it806 by supporting 
Lamine Gueye, a committed socialist, so as to enable him to 
control and harness the party. In other words, after failing to 
rally support for Goux's Bloc Francais. the colonial 
administration backed Gueye to stunt the development of what they 
perceived to be a potentially dangerous and unpredictable 
nationalist movement.
What ensued was not far from the colonial government's 
expectations. By 1946, the Bloc Africain had become synonymous 
with the SFIO and with Lamine Gueye.807 Metropolitan news and
805. Letter of Governor of Senegal Durand to the Governor- 
General of AOF dated August 14, 1946, 13G 36 17. ARSD.
806. According to Ly, the administration tried to make the 
platform of the Bloc obsolete. This was, according to the same 
source, one of the reasons why the colonial authorities conceded 
to the implementation of legislation such as the abolition of the 
indiaenat and forced labour in Senegal. Interview with Abdoulaye 
Ly, Dakar, July 17, 1984.
807. Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar 1944, 2G 44 19. ARSD. 
According to the administration, the Bloc Africain and the Union 
des Jeunes "...ne sont, en realite, que des instruments de 
propagande crees en vue de soutenir la politique de Maitre Lamine 
Gueye en vue des elections municipales prochaines."
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views dominated AOF (the party's daily newspaper which had a 
circulation of 3.000) columns, thus eliminating the possibility 
of diverging views within the party. French socialists like 
Georges Mayer repeatedly dismissed the nationalist overtones of 
the Bloc and underscored its subordination to the SFIO— a 
subordination of Africans to Europeans— while still promising 
equality;
Le Bloc Africain n'est pas le Bloc des Noirs, mais 
le Bloc de tous les Frangais habitant 1'AOF...
L'Africain veut etre l'egal du metropolitain et fera 
tous ses efforts pour cela, afin de cooperer avec 
lui..., il sait qu'il a besoin de ses conseils... il 
sait que se sont les metropolitains qui formeront et 
developperont son intelligence. C'est pour cela que le 
Bloc Africain a ete cree.°08
As early as 1945, Senegal had become "le fief inconteste 
d'un parti politique: la SFIO. a telle enseigne que ce parti v 
est a peu pres entre dans les moeurs. qu'il v fait pour ainsi 
dire partie de la maison...1,809 The SFIO was very active 
throughout the mid 1940s, owing to the stimulus of continuous 
elections. While Gueye spent much of his time in France, Senghor 
indefatigably toured the protectorate and heard peasant 
grievances against the chefs de canton and the Societes de 
Prevovance.810 steadily building a massive following for the
808. Georges Mayer (secretary general of the SFIO-AOF), AOF, 
(July 20, 1945).
809. Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, Senegal, 17G 139 
17, ARSD.
810. Renseignements, Police et Surete, Senegal, November 16, 
1945, 13G 36 17. ARSD.
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party.
THE SFIO REACHES ITS APOGEE. 1946.
The municipal elections of 1945 were a triumph for the SFIO 
both in the communes de pleine exercice and in the mixed 
communes. In Dakar, Lamine Gueye was elected mayor after the 
Bloc Senegalais d'Union Socialiste. Patriotiaue et Antifasciste 
won a landslide victory (8.590 votes) against Goux (Parti 
Dioufiste. Republicain et Antifasciste) and Graziani (951 and 240 
votes respectively.)811
In St. Louis, there were two socialist electoral lists 
(Union Socialiste Patriotique Anti-Fasciste and the Bloc 
Senegalais d'Union Socialiste. Patriotique et Anti-Fasciste), 
apparently in order to double the representatives of the party. 
The Bloc candidates Telemaque Sow and Salzmann won with 2.306 
votes over Aby Kane Diallo and Charles Cros (1.601 and 211 votes 
respectively).812 Only in Rufisque was the socialist candidate 
Ousmane Soce, defeated by Maurice Gueye (1.220 against 2.770 
votes.)813
The Bloc Francais suffered an irreparable defeat and
811. Gellar rightly points out that Goux's defeat marked the 
end of the days when politicians had to be closely associated 
with both the colonial administration and the large trading 
companies to win. Gellar, "The Politics of op. cit.. 1967,
p. 108.
812. Telegram of Maestracci to the Governor General of AOF, 
June 30, 1945 and undated post-election telegram, 20G 3 1 . ARSD; 
and Renseignements, July 30, 1945, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
813. Paris-Dakar. (July 4, 1945) and 2QG 3 1. ARSD.
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virtually all Europeans in the Senegalese arena were eliminated 
from positions of leadership. Only the SFIO could afford to have 
men like Bonifay and Georges Mayer on its electoral lists. The 
jeunes of Thies apparently went as far as to interpret the 
electoral results as "une victoire africaine. et un prelude a 
1' eviction des Europeens.1,814
Gueye's triumph in the municipal elections prepared the 
ground for an easy victory in the legislative elections. The 
Bloc Africain won with 20.529 votes against Soce (now campaigning 
as a Radical Socialist) and Maillat, Union Republicaine (3.695 
and 1.229 votes respectively). Senghor also won with 14.914 
votes over Cros815 (1.340 votes), Ely Manel Fall (1.670), Djim 
Momar Gueye and Pierre Diagne even though, according to 
administrative reports, Senghor was still unknown to many voters 
who supported him out of party discipline.816
The platforms of the contestants were remarkably similar.
814. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, November 1945, 
2G 45 144. ARSD.
815. Cros contested the elections as an independent 
Socialist and member of the Front National. He had the support 
of some teachers, the group Souci du Lendemain and many chiefs 
who were weary of the jeunes within the SFIO (three days before 
the elections, however, the majority of chiefs rallied over to 
the Bloc Africain). His platform included accession to 
citizenship of 'deserving subjects'; suppression of the 
indigenat; equal treatment between 'citizens' and 'subjects' in 
the army; equal work-equal pay; greater representation in the 
Assemblee Nationale. Rapport sur les Elections pour 1'Assemblee 
Legislative 1945, Maestracci report, no date, 13G 44 17. ARSD; 
and 20G 24 17. ARSD.
816. Elections Legislatives 1945, 20G 2 1 . ARSD and Cathala 
(Chef de Service) report, Thies, October 1945, 13G 44 17. ARSD.
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Their demands evolved around the extension of citizenship to all 
Africans, equal work-equal pay, a new constitution with greater 
powers for the territorial assemblies and increased autonomy over 
finances.817 Gueye and Senghor's profession de foi was based on 
a simple formula:
Une seule categorie de Frangais ayant exactement 
les memes droits puisque tous sont soumis aux memes 
devoirs, y compris celui de mourir pour la meme 
patrie.818
The extension of the women's vote to French citizens overseas was 
the cardinal issue in the legislative elections. The Colonial 
Commissioner Rene Pleven openly opposed the reform819 and the 
Governor-General agreed with him, claiming that Muslims were 
hostile to the extension of the vote and the rest of the 
population was indifferent. Lamine Gueye who originally shared 
Cournarie's views, suddenly (and obviously for political reasons) 
became a champion of the women's vote and stirred considerable 
turmoil amongst the jeunes in Dakar and St. Louis.
Patriotic associations organized demonstrations and sent 
delegations to Paris, headed by Cros, Khayar M'Bengue, Telemaque 
Sow, and Salzmann. Finally, Cros and Lamine Gueye got credit
817. Senghor focused on the abolition of the indigenat and 
on educational reforms while Djim Momar Gueye was the only 
candidate to campaign on economic issues. The platforms of 
Senghor, Ely Manel Fall, Cros, and Djim Momar Gueye can be found 
in 2OG 24 17. ARSD.
818. Afriaue en Guerre. (October 20, 1945).
83.9. Telegram of Pleven to Cournarie dated October 20, 1944, 
Affaires Politiques. File 211, ANSOM.
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for the promulgation of the decree of May 1945 which stipulated 
that female 'citizens' were eligible to vote on the same grounds 
as male voters. Two women were elected colonial councillors.820
In the legislative elections of November 1946, Gueye and 
Senghor beat the RDA (Correa and Abdoulaye Sadji) and the Front 
Intercolonial (Sylvere Alcandre and Mathurin) with 128.284 votes 
versus 1.180 and 654 votes).821 It was reported that "cette 
victoire complete du parti SFIO est surtout due a la personnalite 
des candidats qu'il representait"822 and that Lamine Gueye in 
particular would have been elected no matter which party he 
represented.
The last minute adhesion of the Parti Travailliste Indepen­
dant and the Parti du Peuple further demonstrated the leverage 
and influence Lamine exercised in the political arena, even over 
the opposition. Gueye weighed carefully which allies he had to 
entice at all cost and which he could afford to ignore. For 
instance, his opposition to the Mouvement Autonomiste Africain 
and the Mouvement Nationaliste Africain won him the support of
820. AOF rapports sur l'activite des services, Conseil du 
Gouvernement, December 1945, 2G 45 104. and Affaires Politiques. 
File 211, ANSOM.
821. Rapport Politique Senegal 1945-46, Wiltord August 28, 
1947, Affaires Politiques. File 2142, Dossier 3, ANSOM. Also 
Synthese mensuelle sur la situation politique au Senegal,
November 1946, 21G 91 17. ARSD. The Paris-based Front 
Intercolonial called itself a Mouvement d'emancipation des 
peuples assuietis. For more information see Senegal, Surete, 
Syntheses Politiques, January 1947, 2G 47 133. ARSD.
822. Senegal, Affaires Politiques et administratives, 
Syntheses des informations sur les partis politiques, November 
1946, 2G 46 125. ARSD.
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the chiefs who feared a possible diminution of their authority in 
the event that young radicals (who sought fundamental reforms of 
the power structure in rural Senegal) predominated. His indif­
ference towards the RDA can be attributed to the fact that the 
Rassemblement was virtually inactive during the campaign, thereby 
posing no direct threat on the Bloc Africain.
In the Conseil General823 elections of December 15, 1946 the 
union formula which had been very popular in the legislative 
elections was absent and individual candidacies proliferated (15 
in the Sine-Saloum alone). Gueye had, in effect, shattered the 
opposition's attempts to form a front against him. Those who had 
been defeated in previous elections now struggled for power in 
the Conseil General. Senghor organised the elections alone 
(Gueye was in Paris) and faced considerable opposition from the 
old guard SFIO militants who were weary of Gueye's alliance with 
his former opponent, Djim Momar Gueye of the PTI. Djim M. Gueye and 
Lamine who had been hitherto openly hostile towards each other 
were by late 1946 close allies. Senghor and the jeunes SFIO of 
Kaolack were also highly suspicious of this relationship.824
823. The Conseil General had been reconstituted in early 
1946. Its deliberations were now "definitive" and could not be 
overruled by the Governor-General. It was reported that this 
reform "marque une nouvelle etape vers la decentralisation 
politique et vers l'egalite complete des droits conformement a 
une politique d'assimilation respectueuse des particularites 
locales." Bulletin Hebdomadaire, Ministere des Colonies, March 
11, 1946.
824. Ibid.
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The Bloc d'Union Socialiste Renublicaine got 80% of the vote,825 
and 42 out of 60 councillors were socialists826. Lamine Gueye 
was elected president of the Conseil. Louis Le Gros and Paul 
Bonifay vice-presidents.
The municipal elections of October 19, 1947 were a further 
triumph for the SFIO827 even though the Dakar election was 
contested and annulled after the intervention of the Rassemble- 
ment Populaire Francais (Gaullist party) and the RDA.828 In 
St.Louis, Mar Diop defeated Aby Kane Diallo (3.607 versus 2.607 
votes) and Legros but deep divisions surfaced within the 
socialist party.829
THE DECLINE OF THE BLOC AFRICAIN.
As long as Moutet was Overseas Minister, Lamine Gueye had an 
indispensable ally who accorded him preferential treatment in 
return for support of socialist policy in Africa and in the
825. For electoral results in the four circonscriotions, see 
Rapport Politique, Senegal 1945-46, Wiltord, August 28, 1947, 
Affaires Politiques. File 2142, Dossier 3, ANSOM.
826. Etiquette politique des conseillers generaux, December 
15, 1946, 17G 267 111. ARSD.
827. In Dakar, the SFIO got 28.450 votes as opposed to the 
RDA (1.963) and the RPF (1.768 votes); in Rufisque, the SFIO won 
by 13.938 votes over de la Rocca (72 votes); in St. Louis, the 
SFIO got 3.607 votes versus Aby Kane Diallo (2.607). Note sur 
les elections municipales du Senegal, October 23, 1947, Affaires 
Politiques. File 2143, Dossier 2, ANSOM.
828. Rapport Politique, Senegal, 4e trimestre 1947, 2G 47 
134. ARSD.
829. Senegal, Police et Surete, Synthese Politique, October 
1947, 2G 47 133. ARSD. The divisions within the SFIO will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
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French Parliament. For instance, Moutet had prohibited Gueye and 
Senghor from attending the Bamako Conference. In return, he 
acquiesced to the appointment of Gueye's friend, Wiltord, as 
Governor of Senegal. (It is also possible that Gueye played a 
role in the appointment of Paul Bechard, a close friend of his, 
as Governor-General of AOF and successor to Rene Barthes.)
Wiltord was a Gouadeloupian former colonel in the French army and 
secretary-general of the government of Senegal. He became 
friends with Lamine Gueye (whose wife was from Gouadeloupe) and 
hoped for a promotion which curiously materialized while Governor 
Maestracci was on vacation.830 Gueye's loyalty to the socialist 
government also earned him the post of Secretary of State to the 
Presidency of the Council in Leon Blum's cabinet.
The dissolution of the unity of the Bloc Africain reflected
the growing divisions of Africans in France following the Bamako
Conference831 and can be partly attributed to the intervention of
the socialist administration. While the RDA did not necessarily
present a threat to the Bloc Africain in Senegal, it most
done so
certainly could have') if it ever became a united inter­
territorial party. This was one of the reasons why the Colonial 
Minister Moutet firmly dissuaded Gueye and Senghor from attending 
the Bamako Conference. Moutet's fears were partly the result of
830. Bakary Traore, "L'evolution des partis politiques au 
Senegal depuis 194 6," in Bakary Traore, Mamadou Lo, and J.L. 
Alibert, Forces Politiques en Afrique Noire. (Paris: Presse 
Universitaire de France, 1966), p. 26.
831. Gellar, "The Politics of...," op. cit.. 1967, p. 148.
320
the intense competition which had developed between the SFIO and 
the PCF in France over the leadership of the left as well as over 
the control of the trade union movement and of the overseas ter­
ritories.832 Equally decisive to the eclipse of the Bloc was the 
movement's lack of a specific platform and the resignation of its 
GEC members who shifted to the RDA.
Le Bloc Africain n'est pas un parti politique 
organise mais un rassemblement d'electeurs autochtones 
dirige par les intellectuels, entrainant derriere eux 
la masse des travailleurs avec leurs syndicats et 
associations diverses. II se confond d'ailleurs avec 
le parti SFIO dont tous les membres appartiennent au 
Bloc Africain.833
Gueye's increasing dependence on the socialist administra­
tion (particularly the Governor of Senegal, the Governor-General 
of AOF and the Colonial Minister) allowed him to ignore the 
internal divisions of the SFIO, the increasing isolation of the 
party from its constituency and the growing opposition of the 
'subjects' to his prewar political habits. As long as the 
socialists fared well in France, Gueye's leadership was secure. 
However, when in May 1947, the PCF left the tripartite coalition 
and joined the opposition, Moutet lost control of the Overseas 
Ministry (November 1947), the catholic (and conservative) MRP 
began dominating metropolitan politics and Gueye's political
832. Ibid., p. 118.
833. Synthese des partis politiques en AOF, July 3, 1946, 
Durand to the Governor-General of AOF, 17G 267 111. ARSD. Thus, 
the Bloc did not disintegrate as Schachter-Morgenthau argues, 
op. cit.. p. 138 but was absorbed into the SFIO.
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machine crumbled.
THE SFIO POLITICAL MACHINE.
The SFIO appealed to oriainaires. civil-servants, the Dakar 
and St. Louis Lebou community, and traders representing rural 
Africans.834 Bakary Traore has also argued that what 
distinguishes the SFIO clientele is that it was a colonial- 
administrative bourgeoisie bred on assimilationist principles.835 
Last but not least, as long as the socialists formed part of the 
coalition government, Gueye enjoyed a significant advantage over 
his opponents in the protectorate, as the chiefs were essentially 
in the service of an administration friendly to him and sensitive 
to his needs.836
His prewar political habits led him to believe he could 
maintain power solely on the basis of bush representatives and a 
favourable administration. However, the prewar monolithic party 
structure and outlook of the SFIO did not respond to the needs of 
the 'subjects' who were being progressively franchised. Even­
tually, the SFIO came to rely almost exclusively on Gueye's 
charismatic personality and network of connections with
834. Interview with Amadou Ali Dieng, Dakar, July 3rd, 1984.
835. Traore, op. cit.. p. 28.
836. Michael Crowder and Donal Cruise O'Brien, "French West 
Africa, 1945-1960," in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), 
History of West Africa, vol. 2, (London: Longman, 1978), p. 678- 
79.
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notables.837 The bureaucratic structure of the party was 
deficient. Lacking a permanent base, the SFIO was forced, 
whenever necessary, to solicit the help of influential figures or 
groups. Only 6.000 of its members paid regular membership fees 
so that the party was financed mostly by individual contributions 
or salary percentages from municipal employers who owed their 
positions to Gueye.838
Lamine Gueye did not change his strategy even when the 
electorate increased fivefold. His main preoccupation was not 
how to adapt to a changing political climate and build a mass 
following but how to play the opposition parties against each 
other or else to recruit those he could not eliminate. For 
instance, Charles Cros, Ousmane Soce Diop and Alioune Diop, all 
opponents of the Bloc Africain at one time or other, became 
senators in 1947, thereby excluding representatives from the 
interior. The increasing impatience of the 'subjects' with 
Gueye's 'citizen' politics, the emergence of new centres of 
political activity in the protectorate, divisions within the 
SFIOr and Gueye's embarassing neutrality in the 1947-48 Dakar- 
Niger strike eventually contributed to the eclipse of the SFIO.
AN OPPOSITION IN FLUX.
After the absorption of the Bloc Africain by the SFIO,
837. William J. Foltz, "Senegal", in James S. Coleman and 
Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (eds.), Political Parties and National 
Integration in Tropical Africa. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1964), p. 19.
838. Ibid.
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opposition parties proliferated even though their existence was 
often ephemeral and relatively inconsequential. The administra­
tion reported that: "on constate un flechissement des partis 
extremistes et une tendance tres nette des partis africains a se 
detacher des partis metropolitains correspondents."839 These 
opposition parties were essentially a reaction against the 
alliance (and eventual absorption) of the Bloc to the SFIO. 
Independence was advocated by virtually all those groups but in a 
very particular manner: as a last resort and antidote to the 
assimilation politics of Lamine Gueye's party. Separation from 
France was more of a tactical device utilized to emphasize the 
readiness of the opposition to go to any length in order to 
extract reform and not be neutralised by socialists at home or in 
France.
Some opposition parties lacked clearly defined programmes 
and were not even consistent in their role as opposition parties. 
They shifted their allegiance constantly, often randomly opposing 
or else adhering to the Bloc Africain or the SFIO. More often 
than not, opposition leaders sought political favours and seats 
in the local elected assemblies without being overly concerned 
about political affiliations. For this reason, they did not 
succeed in forming a united front against Lamine Gueye until 
Senghor formed the BPS.
839. Undated, unsigned report, 1947, Affaires politiques. 
File 2255, Dossier 1, ANSOM.
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a) The Mouvement Autonomiste Africain (MAA).
Formed in the summer of 194 6, the MAA was primarily a party
of intellectuals led by Amadou Ba, a civil-servant based in
Dakar. The party's professed goal was African 'sovereignty' 
within a French federation allowing for autonomy and africanisa- 
tion.848 Its opposition to assimilation coalesced in the slogan 
"autonomie immediate integrale." The party participated in the 
RDA Bamako Conference841 but as soon as the Rassemblement 
rejected autonomy, it sought an alliance with Gueye (with the 
exclusion of Ba). Gueye eventually lured the MAA into the SFIO 
without according its members seats in the local assemblies.842 
As a result, Ba and Etcheverry (MUR), formed a front against the 
Bloc Africain at the end of 1946.843
b) The Mouvement Nationaliste Africain (MNA).
The MNA was created in August 194 6 in Dakar by Pierre Diagne
(a civil servant and leader of the patriotic association Associa­
tion Amicale des Anciens Militaires Coloniales de Carriere) who 
published the paper Communaute. Diagne's loyalties shifted from
840. Renseignements, September 17, 1946, 21G 91 17. ARSD for 
a full report on the MAA's programme.
841 . Renseignements, October 21, 194 6, 17G 139 17. ARSD.
842. Renseignements, October 1, 194 6, 21G 91 17. ARSD and 
October 30, 1946; and Affaires politiques et administratives, 
Synthese mensuelle des informations sur les partis politiques, 
October 1946, 2G 46 125. ARSD.
843. Renseignements, November 23, 194 6, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
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the Front Intercolonial844 to the Bloc Africain and to Djim Momar 
Gueye. According to Suret-Canale, the MNA was essentially a 
'divide and rule' party and for this reason, the administration 
considered it "une eventuelle soupape de surete. sans aucun 
danger pour elle....11845 and allowed it to publish anti-French 
propaganda in Communaute.846 The party rejected assimilation and 
federation outright, but it also espoused and rejected immediate 
independence intermittently.847
c) The Communist Groups (MUR. PPS, PTI, PODT. CEFA).
A plethora of communist groups emerged after the war.848 
While the PCF did not discourage nationalist movements overseas, 
it more or less rejected independence: "les colonies francaises 
fsontl absolument incapables d'exister economiquement et par 
consequent politiguement comme nations independantes."849
844. Rapport Politique, October 1946, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
845. GEC Cours no. 1, Senegal 1948, Papiers Suret-Canale. 
Institut d'Histoire du Temps Present, Paris.
846. While by contrast, it did not authorize the publica­
tion of the RDA paper for 18 months.
847. Communaute. (August 16, 1946 and July 30, 1947).
848. For instance, the Amis de la Liberte which also 
operated under the name Amis de l'Humanite; in St. Louis a Comite 
de Coordination affiliated with the PCF was created at the end of 
1946. Bulletin de Renseignements, Dakar, December 1944-January
1945, 17G 139 17 and Rapport Politique, Senegal, 4 trimestre
1946, 2G 46 126. ARSD.
849. Henri Lozeray, Cahiers du Communisme. no. 6, (April 
1945), pp. 71-76, quoted in Roger de Benoist, L'AOF de la 
Decolonisation a 1'Independance. p. 33. Stalin's argument was 
less explicit than Lozeray's : "La question de la reconnaissance 
du droit a la separation ne doit pas etre confondue avec
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Among the most prominent communist groups was the Mouvement 
Unifie de la Resistance (MUR). Founded in 1943, the 70-member 
strong MUR was led by the journalist Guy Etcheverry. Abdel Kader 
Diagne (president of iV^Republique). Ibrahima Sarr and Alioune 
Seek were amongst its prominent members850 along with the Tribune 
Libre group of Doudou Siby and Latyr Camara.851 From the 
beginning, the party was divided into several factions, and this 
accounts for its shifting support, first for the SFIO until 
September 1946, and then for the MAA.852
Another communist group was the Parti du Peuple S£n£cralais 
(PPS). The PPS organized communal demonstrations with the Bloc 
Africain to protest against MRP policies with slogans such as "ou 
la France nous accepte dans son sein ou nous demandons notre 
autonomie11 and "si le aouvernement francais marche avec nous, ca 
va. sinon la separation immediate."853 Khayar M'Bengue (initial-
1'utilite de la separation dans telles ou telles conditions." 
quoted in GEC cours no. 1, 1948, Papiers Suret-Canale. Institut 
d'Histoire du Temps Present, Paris.
850. Renseignements, March 22, 1946, 17G 127 17. ARSD. See 
also Synthese des partis politiques, AOF, July 3, 1946, Governor 
Durand to the Governor-General of AOF. 17G 267 111. ARSD.
851. Tribune Libre was a weekly paper with a circulation of 
200, aimed at uniting socialists, communists and independents 
into a Mouvement Unifie de la Jeunesse Africaine. See Tribune 
libre, (June 22 and September 28, 1946), 13G 102 180. ARSD.
852. Senegal, Affaires politiques et administratives, 
Synthese mensuelle des informations sur les partis politiques, 
September 1946, 2G 46 125. ARSD.
853. Synthese mensuelle sur 1'evolution politique des 
groupements politiques, patriotiques et autres du Senegal, July 
1946, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
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ly one of Gueye's lieutenants and head of URS) formed the PPS in 
March 194 6, with Aby Kane Diallo (former St. Louis mayor and 
president of the Conseil Colonial! as vice-president, Abou Sarr 
Lalla secretary-general and Moustapha Malick Gaye (ex-mayor of 
St. Louis and president of the Conseil Colonial!.854 Members of 
the PPS were often affiliated with the Bloc Africain. M'Bengue 
claimed that the PPS was the official communist party even though 
it is clear that neither Mustapha Malick Gueye nor Aby Kane 
Diallo could ever be described as communists and their adherence 
to this party was suspicious.
The Parti Travailliste Independant (PTI) of the Sine-Saloum 
was founded in October 1946 by Djim Momar Gueye. After adhering 
to the MAA, Djim sought an alliance with the SFIO. However, the 
conditions laid down by Lamine Gueye included the dissolution of 
the party, integration with the SFIO and public acknowledgement 
of the PTI's submission to the socialist party.855 In the spring 
of 1947, the PTI was approached by the RDA and agreed to 
represent the Rassemblement in Kaolack but a few months later, 
Djim's party once again joined the SFIO.856 Like the 
Socialist party, the PTI was also divided between ieunes and
854. ibid.
855. Djim wanted to become Lamine's right hand in case 
Senegal was allocated more than two deputies in Parliament. 
Senegal, Police et Surete, Synthese politique mensuelle, March 
1947, 2G 47 133. ARSD.
856. Senegal, Police et Surete, Synthese mensuelle 
politique, March 1947, 2G 47 133; and Rapport Politique, 4e 
trimestre, Senegal, 2G 47 134. ARSD.
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vieux; the former supported integration with the socialists, 
while the latter rejected it.
The Parti Ouvrier et Democratique de Thies (PODT), a 320- 
member strong party was a staunch opponent of assimilation that 
appealed to the Union des Jeunes as well as to union leaders like 
Lamine Diallo (secretary-general of the Dakar unions) and 
Frangois Gning (veteran socialist and Dakar-Niger union leader) 
who left the SFIO in late 1946. Sourys (publisher of Reveil! who 
founded the party in October 194 6, openly sought to create a 
communist party to “grouper et unir les habitants du territoire 
en vue de la realisation d'un programme politique d'emancipation 
des travailleurs."857
The Comite d'Etudes Franco-Africaines was created in May 
1945 to study African political, socio-economic and cultural 
issues858 and organize professional groups and trade-unions.
Armand Angrand was elected president and Joseph Correa (also in the 
GEC) secretary-general. Sadji Abdoulaye (a teacher and member of 
the RDA! headed the Louga section and Frangois Gning led the 
Thies branch. Fall Papa Gueye (a teacher), Lamine Gueye,
Senghor, Graziani, Ousmane Soce Diop, and Houphouet-Boigny 
adhered to the group. CEFA rejected separatism:
Nous voulons cooperer avec 1'administration de 
notre pays sous l'egide de la France titulaire, dans 
l'ordre et la legalite republicaine, comme une proba-
857. Synthese sur la situation politique au Senegal, 
November 194 6, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
858. Statuts de la CEFA. 21G 71 17. ARSD.
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tion fraternelle de notre nationality frangaise.859
When in March 194 6, the CEFA dropped its support for the MAA and 
the MNA in order to appeal to a wider audience, its influence 
dwindled sharply.
THE GRQUPEMENTS D'ETUDES COMMUNISTES.
Most important of all the communist groups were the Groupe- 
ments d'Etudes Communistes (GEC) which were instrumental to the 
formation of the RDA. During 1944-45, the GEC had been reluctant 
to admit Africans in their ranks, fearing that if the latter 
outnumbered them, they would take over the party and create a 
Bloc Africain type of movement. By the end of 194 6, however, 
Africans had not only infiltrated the GEC but had outnumbered the 
Europeans. Yet, GEC following remained miniscule (30 members 
most of whom were trade unionists or RDA supporters).860 Based 
in Dakar, the GEC also had a section in Thies and scattered 
members in Kaolack, Ziguinchor and St. Louis. Joseph Correa 
served as secretary-general until 1947 when he joined the RDA. 
Other leading members included Suret-Canale and his wife, Gerard 
Cauche (the administrator of Dakar) and Sourys (leader of the 
PODT).
Suret-Canale believed that the identification of the RDA 
with communism was an obstacle to the transformation of the
859. Clarte, (December 1944).
880. Interview with Jean Suret-Canale, Paris, November 1,
1984 .
330
Rassemblement into a mass party. For this reason, he and the
secretary-general of the RDA Doudou Gueye recommended that GEC 
activities be restricted exclusively to educating and providing 
an ideological platform for the political orientation of the 
RDA.861
... vous avez interet a ne donner pour le moment 
aux GEC qu'une activite tres reduite. L'essentiel pour 
le moment est d'elargir le RDA d'y faire entrer... des 
non communistes resolus a mener la lutte contre le 
colonialisme. C'est seulement dans la mesure ou cet 
elargissement sera realise que le GEC prendra un sens; 
qu'il pourra remplir sa fonction et determiner la ligne 
d'action du RDA...882
The GEC advocated independence on the condition that the process 
play a positive role in the world anti-imperialist struggle.883 
But, it was argued, independence was not necessarily what 
Africans wanted:
Les communistes affirment que, dans le moment 
present, les pays d'Afrique Noire n'ont pas interet a
881. Doudou Gueye, Sur les Sentiers du Temple, (Ventabren: 
Les Rouyat Editions, 1975), pp. 28-29, quoted in Roger de 
Benoist, L'Afriaue Occidentale Francaise de 1944 a 1960, p. 103. 
The GEC cours no. 2 defined the GEC as "un organisms d'education 
et de direction." Papiers Suret-Canale, op. cit. The task of 
the GEC was to educate its members in Marxist-Leninist theory; to 
study political and economic conditions in the individual African 
territories; to explain the strategy and tactics of the 
Rassemblement; and to popularize communist and Soviet ideology. 
The immediate objective was to fight for the implementation of 
the Constitution. GEC cours no. 2, Senegal 1948, Papiers Suret- 
Canale, op. cit.
862. Letter of Suret-Canale to G. Sossa of Thies dated 
March 1, 1947, 17G 267 111. ARSD.
883. GEC Cours no. 1, Senegal 1948, Papiers Suret-Canale, 
op. cit.
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se separer de la France... les communistes sont pour le
maintien et la realisation dans le cadre prevu par la
Consitution, de 1 'Union Frangaise 864
Until such time, the task of the communists was to form a 
national front against imperialism (rather than local communist 
parties) uniting the working class, the peasantry and the 'honest 
intellectuals' in association with the 'less determined' elements 
of the population.865 An alliance with the working class in 
France was deemed both critical and indispensable.
THE RASSEMBLEMENT DEMOCRATIOUE AFRICAIN fRDA).
The Union Democratique Seneaalaise (Senegal section of the 
RDA, founded in June 1947),8^8 had 30 sections throughout the 
protectorate, organized with support from the CEFA and the GEC. 
The Louga branch operated under cover of an agricultural 
cooperative (Abdoulaye Sadji who had been ousted from the SFIO 
became its leader) and was one of the most important local 
branches of the party. in St. Louis, the Tribune Libre group of 
Latyr Camara had organized the local UPS; the Anciens Combattants 
et Victimes des Deux Guerres. (presided by Auguste Gomis)887
864. GEC Cours no. 2, Senegal 1948, Papiers Suret-Canale, 
op. cit.
855. Ibid.
866. See Statuts de l'UDS, 21G 71 17. ARSD.
867. The following month Frangois Gning became president of 
the group; see report of August 1987, 2D 24 28. ARSD; and 
Senegal, Police et Surete, Synthese mensuelle politique; 2G 47 
133, ARSD; also Senegal Surete, Synthese politique mensuelle, 
March 1947, 2G 47 133. ARSD.
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founded the RDA-Ziguinchor which attracted an important follow­
ing, while in Thies the Parti Ouvrier et Democratique founded an 
RDA section that failed to win the support of the Dakar-Niger 
workers.
Table 12.868
Principal RDA Sections and Membership in Senegal. 1948.
Town. Membership.
Louga 170
Kebemer 12
Podor 60
M'Boumba 15
Kas-Kas 7
N'Dioum 8
Matam 32
Bakel n. a.
Diourbel 12
Bambey n. a.
Kaolack 50
Gossas 40
Guinguineo 40
Fatick 25
Tambacounda 90
Goudiry 20
Thies 9
Ziguinchor 150
Total: 738
Outside Dakar, the party had 900 members in December 1948 (the 
above table does not include membership in the Three Communes) 
and gained an additional hundred during the Dakar-Niger 
strike.869 Doudou Gueye was elected secretary-general, Joseph
868. Liste des membres et status du Congres RDA. July 30, 
August 1, 1948, 17G 539 153. ARSD.
869. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal, 1949, 2G 49 27. ARSD.
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Correa (an influential trader) and Abdoulaye Gueye became joint 
secretaries, Joseph M'Baye (a teacher) was allocated propaganda 
duties, and Gerard Cauche became the administrative secretary of 
the party.
The UPS was directed mostly at intellectuals, teachers, 
civil-servants, professionals and young 'subjects'870 who, 
dissatisfied with socialist politics, had taken up the cause of 
the more radical politics of youth associations.871 Cheikh 
Diallo, former president of the Union des Jeunes and the Union 
des Svndicats Africains was one such case. Assimilation was the 
prime target of the RDA:
Nous sommes contre 1 'assimilation
parce que l'Afrique noire a une histoire, une
civilisation, des croyances et des traditions
propres que nous voulons defendre.
parce que les Africains ne descendent pas des
ancetres Gaulois;
parce que 1'assimilation que l'on nous propose est une 
tromperie, un mensonge.
parce que la soi-disante assimilation de Lamine Gueye 
et Senghor accepte pour l'Afrique: 
le regime des decrets...
le suffrage restreint, contraire a toute democratie... 
une representation diminuee a l'Assemblee Nationale... 
parce que la soi-disante assimilation du Senegal est une 
manoeuvre colonialiste pour diviser les Africains en 
citoyens majeures et citoyens mineurs;
parce que nous voulons une vraie democratie africaine; 
assemblee territoriale a pouvoirs reels, college unique pour 
tous les territoires, egalite des droits et des devoirs dans 
Union Frangaise librement consentie.872
870. Interview with Amadou Ali Dieng, July 3, 1984, Dakar.
8*71. Traore, op. cit. . p. 90.
872. Tract of November 1946, 17G 559 153. ARSD.
334
The UPS called for total emancipation873 within the French
union. But total emancipation did not signify independence.
Le RDA... preconise une politique africaine 
essentiellement frangaise devant conduire les Africains 
a la maturite politique et a la reconnaissance de leurs 
aspirations legitimes d'etre des hommes libres.874
Rather, it entailed complete equality with France
[Le RDA] ... fera de notre Afrique une terre libre 
et heureuse au sein de 1 'Union Frangaise que nous avons 
contribue a fonder enfin sur 1'egalite des droits.875
and an end to colonialist abuse and domination
Le RDA veut combattre la politique de person- 
nalite, le colonialiste oppresseur dont 1'administra­
tion s'est faite la complice, 1'implantation des partis 
metropolitains en AOF qui creent une lutte nefaste des 
classes.876
Nous reclamons le libre droit des peuples a 
disposer d'eux-memes, 1'egalite des droits et des 
devoirs sans distinction de race et de religion, un 
cadre unique pour les fonctionnaires autochtones ou 
metropolitains, 1'unification des pensions pour tous 
les anciens combattants, le droit pour les Africains de 
s 'administrer eux-memes et 1'abolition de 1'oppression
873. Rapport Politique, Dakar, 2 trimestre 1947, 2G 47 134.
ARSD.
874. Senegal, Police et Surete, Synthese politique 
mensuelle, March 1947, 2G 47 133. ARSD.
875. RDA poster, Senegal, Police et Surete, Synthese 
politique mensuelle, August 1947, 2G 47 133. ARSD.
876. Senegal, Police et Surete, Synthese politique, July 
1947, 2G 47 133. ARSD.
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capitalists.877
The UDS's efforts to recruit trade-unionists and young 
radicals dissatisfied with the SFIO met with little success. The
Thies section of the UPS attracted only 9 members. The party
also failed to gain a grassroots base, even though its motto was 
from the beginning "conauerir la brousse."
Early on, it was apparent that the RDA was not going to be a
mass party and serious contender to the SFIO.878 The UPS
attributed this to financial restraints, the lack of regular 
contact between the local sections and the central committee, and 
the absence of a precise political agenda.879 The colonial 
authorities maintained that the Senegalese were hostile to a 
party in which they were not the driving force. In addition, the 
political maneuvers of Lamine Gueye and Senghor had neutralised 
the movement from the beginning. The SFIO accused the RDA of 
being a "mouvement de division." an anti-Senegalese and anti- 
Muslim party.880 As a result, on the eve of the municipal
877. Senegal, Police et Surete, October 1948, Synthese 
politique et sociale de Dakar, 2G 48 117. ARSD.
878. Gellar, "The Politics of..," op. cit.. 1967, p. 149.
879. Trait d'Union, no. 1, (July 1948), Papiers Suret- 
Canale, op. cit. In 1947, the RDA founded the Universite 
Populaire Africain with Suret-Canale, Gaziello, Fode Sakho, 
Ousmane Ba; 13G 5 17. ARSD.
880. Rapport Politique, Senegal, 3e trimestre 1947, 2G 47 
134. ARSD.
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elections of 1947, the UPS considered allying with the RPF881 
against Lamine Gueye. After the elections, the RDA once again 
sought a rapprochement with the SFIO and in October 1948 it 
proposed a union with the Senahoristes of the party.882 To 
conclude, unlike in Guinea and the Ivory Coast where the RDA 
filled a political vacuum, in Senegal it remained an isolated 
party of intellectuals.
OPPOSITION POLITICS IN THE PROTECTORATE.
New centres of political activity such as Sine-Saloum (the 
heart of the peanut belt) and Thies (the Dakar-Niger head­
quarters) began competing for supremacy with the communes de 
pleine exercice after the war.883 Dissatisfaction with the Bloc 
Africain and with Gueye's dictatorial powers (Lamine was mayor of 
Dakar, president of the Conseil General and the Grand Conseil. 
leader of the SFIO and the Bloc Africain and deputy to the French 
Parliament), had by the end of 194 6 resulted in the mushrooming 
of opposition parties aimed at breaking up Gueye and Senghor.
Parallel to the proliferation of opposition parties, there
881. The Rassemblement Populaire Francais was created in 
Dakar in the first half of 1947 by P. Franchi. It had 5.000 
members and published L'Eclair. Abou Sarr Lalla (one of the 
party's few African members) was vice-president, Aby Kane Diallo 
was secretary, Frangois Gning vice-president of the Thies 
section, and Goux and Graziani headed the Dakar section of the 
party. The RPF never became an important contender for power.
882. Roger de Benoist, AOF, op. cit.. p. 117.
883. Senegal, Affaires Politiques et Administratives, 
Syntheses mensuelles des informations sur les partis politiques, 
September 194 6, 2G 46 125. ARSD.
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emerged a series of organisations to defend ethnic or local 
interests outside party politics: the Societe des Oricrinaires du 
Oualo, the Association Toucouleur. the Assocation du Sine-Saloum 
de Kaolack, the Association des Natifs Oriainaires du Baol.884 
the Bloc Thiessois. the Comite Independant du Sine-Saloum. the 
Licrue des Fluviaux. the Union des Sarakholes. are but some 
examples.885
The peanut economy also became a crucial element in 
political life due to the demands of the new electorate and the 
increasingly decisive [and political] role of the marabouts.
While before the Second World War the peanut trade was entirely 
regulated by the colonial authorities, the BAO, the Chambers of 
Commerce and the large trading companies, by 194 6 there was 
increasing pressure to introduce change. The SFIO (and later the 
BPS] campaigned for greater African participation in the regula­
tion of the traite. higher prices for African producers and 
better opportunities for African merchants.886
If Sine-Saloum underscored the peanut factor in electoral 
politics, Thies, the hotbed of the trade-union movement, became 
the center of the opposition.
884. Senegal, Surete, Synthese politique sur 1'evolution de 
la situation politique, January 1947, 2G 47 133. ARSD; Rapport 
Politique, Senegal, 2e trimestre 1947, 2G 47 134. ARSD.
885. Senegal, Police et Surete, Synthese politique, October 
1947, 2G 47 133. ARSD.
886. Gellar, "The Politics of..," o p . cit.. 1967, p. 156-57.
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Thies est une sorte de tribune libre ou les futurs 
grands orateurs du Senegal viennent essayer leur voix 
sans que leurs propos prennent 1'importance et la 
portee qu'ils auraient ailleurs.887
The impetus of the opposition movement was accelerated by
the Dakar-Niger strike which exposed the SFIO's subservience to
the colonial government and demonstrated just how isolated and 
»
removed from its constituency the socialist party had become.
THE DAKAR-NIGER STRIKE OF 1947-48.
The trade union movement resumed its activities at the end 
of 1943,888 but as was the case before the war, and despite the 
OGT's instructions, unions were founded along racial lines.889 
While the colonial administration was engulfed by the war effort, 
Africans demanded salary increases to offset the spiralling 
inflation and wage freezes effected during the hostilities.890 
The Dakar-Niger workers threatened to strike twice during the war
887. Affaires politiques et administratives, Senegal, 
Syntheses mensuelles des informations sur les partis politiques, 
September 194 6, 2G 46 125. ARSD.
888. See Suret-Canale, "Strike Movements as Part of the 
Anti-Colonial Struggle in French West Africa," Tarikh. vol. 5, 
no. 3: Protest Against Colonial Rule in West Africa, 1978, p. 53.
889. Rapport Annuel Senegal, Inspection du Travail, 1943,
2G 43 22. ARSD. The European unions formed the Union des 
Syndicats Europeens Confederes de l'AQF and the Africans founded 
the Union des Svndicats et Associations Professionnels.
890. Salaries had increased in France since liberation but 
not in Africa. Suret-Canale, "The French West African Railway 
Workers' Strike, 1947-48", in Peter Gutkind, Robin Cohen and Jean 
Copans (eds.), African Labor History. (London: Sage Publications, 
1978), p. 129.
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(October 1943 and late 1944).891 Pressure for salary rises 
persisted in 1945 but the African unions had no common platform 
with which to confront the management and the administration.892
L'annee 1945 peut etre placee sous le signe d'une 
constante tension sociale qui se resolut en Decembre en 
un conflit ouvert d'une rare ampleur.... Pour tout 
esprit averti... la crise etait previsible.893
The administration reported "une veritable psvchose de la crreve" 
in the public sector following the general strike in Nigeria,894 
and the Labour Inspector warned the government of the potentially 
explosive situation created by the 'salaires de famine.' While 
the absolute minimum required for the subsistence of a family of 
four was officially estimated at 2.330 francs monthly, wages 
fluctuated from a minimum of 337.50 for apprentices, to a maximum 
of 1.743.75 francs for metallurgical workers.895
A delegation of the Union des Svndicats Confederees 
Africains sent a resolution to the Governor-General demanding 
union participation in the revision of minimum wages and equality
89 The employees of the Thies air base struck for half a 
day while the dockers-charbonniers struck for over a month in 
1944.
892. Rapport Politique, Dakar et Dependances, February, 
March, April and June 1945, 2G 45 126. ARSD.
893. Rapport Annuel, Dakar et Dependances, Inspection du 
Travail, 2G 45 46. ARSD.
894. Ibid.
895. Rapport Annuel, Dakar et Dependances, Inspection du 
Travail, 2G 45 46. ARSD. Masons earned 1.12 5 francs;
metal workers earned 675 francs monthly; taxi drivers
1.125 francs and unskilled workers made 562.50 francs monthly.
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of benefits for European and African civil servants (not 
including expatriation premiums) .896 The administration tried to 
persuade the management to consider salary increases but was 
met with categoric rejections. A strike was imminent.
In the meantime, moderate union leaders had been replaced 
with radical and younger men like Lamine Diallo (Union des 
Syndicats Indigenes) , Papa Jean K3. (Syndicat des Employes de 
Commerce et de 1'Industrie), and Abbas Gueye (Union of Metal 
Workers). Conversely, the ultra-conservative Roux had become 
president of the Union Intersyndicale d'Entreprises et d'In­
dustries d'AOF, thereby aggravating relations between employers 
and wage earners.
A general strike broke out on January 14 , 1946 . 897 The
demands of the strikers were pronounced unreasonable by the 
administration, the strike injustifiable as well as incompatible 
with CGT recommendations. Salary increases were generally 
obtained but the issue of equal wages with Europeans remained 
unresolved. Cournarie argued that the problem was not one of 
salaries but of an impoverished economy which had sustained the 
exigencies of the war effort but was in urgent need of French
896 . Bulletin Hebdomadaire, Ministere des Colonies, January 
28, 1946, ARSD.
897 . The opposition paper Cl arte reported in January 25, 
194 6 that "... t les greves actuelles revetent u n ■ caractere 
nettement politique axe, non comme il se devrait, sur le 
principe de la lutte des classes, mais sur le plan racial, avec 
tendance a deborder sur le plan international: c'est en effet,
le probleme de la souverainete qui est pose..."
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support:
II serait vain d'attendre une solution totale de 
la seule fixation des salaires, meme si elle donne, 
lorsqu'elle est etablie satisfaction aux travailleurs. 
Le probleme des salaires ne peut etre examine sans 
celui du ravitaillement et des prix... Le moment est 
venu ou l'AOF, qui a fourni un tres lourd effort de 
guerre et qui en sort tres apprauvrie, doit non 
seulement etre autorisee a "tourner" pour elle-meme, 
mais encore il est necessaire que la metropole lui 
fournisse une aide substantielle en personnel, en 
materiel et en credits.893
Between August and December 194 6, there were four strikes and one 
threat of a strike of an increasingly anti-colonial character.899 
The strikers demanded the abolition of racial discrimination in 
salaries and labour legislation.900 In the hope that the crisis 
would dissipate with the emergence of a single trade union 
movement led by the CGT, the administration chose not to become 
involved in the conflict. However, as long as the CGT incor­
porated exclusively European unions, Africans were reluctant to 
join.
The anti-colonial character of the postwar strike waves was 
most apparent in the Dakar-Niger strike of 1947-48. On October 
10, 1946, the secretary general of the Dakar-Niger union had
898. Rapport Cournarie sur la greve generale de 1946, 
February 3, 1946, K 42 1, ARSD.
899. The printers, the African workers of the Arsenal, the 
teachers, metal workers, the dockers and coal miners; 
the Dakar-Niger workers struck in September for 24 hours.
Rapport Annuel, Dakar, Inspection du Travail, 2G 45 46. ARSD.
900. Suret-Canale, "Strike Movements..," op. cit.. 1978, p.
55.
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convened with the High Commissioner and obtained promises of 
salary increases ranging from 12-20%; the integration of all the 
diploma holders and contract workers into the cadres reouliers; 
and the creation of a single staff system for Europeans and 
African auxiliaries.901
A Commission Consultative Paritaire was established in 
November 1946 to introduce the single staff system and a single 
union.902 The management formed a union which opposed the single 
staff system, resigned from the CGT and demanded the suppression 
of the parity commission. In addition, it found the demands of 
the African workers unreasonable and feared the political 
implications inherent in the proposed reforms.903
The railway administration wanted to fire 3.000 African 
auxiliaries.904 In protest, the African delegates left the 
commission and, after fruitless negotiations with the colonial 
administration, decided to strike on April 19, 1947 for 24 hours. 
Moutet tried to defuse the crisis by seemingly siding with the 
parity commission: "que les Europeens le \euillent ou non, le
901. Rapport Politique, Senegal, 4e trimestre 1946, 2G 46 
126, ARSD.
902. The Commission included representative members of the 
Regie. European and African personnel, and the administration and 
was presided by Governor Villedeuil. Rapport de l'Inspecteur 
General du Travail Pellison, January 24, 1948, K 457 179. ARSD.
903. Rapport du Capitaine Pont Jean, Commandant de la 
Section de Gendarmerie de Bamako, October 11, 1947, K 365 26. 
ARSD.
904. Meeting of September 25, 1947, Cotonou, K 365 26. ARSD. 
The total railway work force was approximately 17.000 men.
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cadre unique sera cree et les auxiliaires seront maintenus."905
Subsequently, Moutet ordered Barthes to implement the single 
staff system within a month.
The parity commission resumed its work. The railway 
administration conceded to the new system, provided it came into 
effect from January 1, 1947 onward for the agents de cadre and 
from October 1, 1947 for the auxiliaries.906 The strike 
progressed smoothly, and the same evening a motion was signed 
recognizing the single staff system. The shift to the right in 
the French government, however, encouraged the management to 
obstruct the implementation of the single staff system.907
The administration's director, Cuneo, threatened the workers 
that if they did not follow conciliation and arbitration 
procedures, the strike would be declared illegal and anti-strike 
action would be enforced. A conference was held on October 6, 
1947 with Governor-General Barthes, Wiltord, Paolini (Governor of 
Dakar), Cuneo, Pillot (Director of the Dakar-Niger) and the
905. Meeting of September 25, 1947, Cotonou, K 365 26. ARSD.
906. Ibid.
907 . Suret-Canale, "Strike Movements..,11 op. cit. , 1978, p. 
55. Cuneo argued that "...loin de constituer une position 
retrograde ou reactionnaire, la division en categories des 
indemnites de zone apparait comme une mesure qui repond aux voeux 
des organisations syndicates en prolongeant sur le plan des 
difficultes de vie, particuliere a chaque localite la hierarchie 
de la remuneration en fonction de la hierarchie des respon- 
sabilites... L'unification entre ouvriers Europeens et ouvriers 
Africains, ne resultera ni des reglements, ni des declarations 
publiques mais seulement d'une unification de rendement subordon- 
nee, avant tout, a 1'instruction professionnelle et a 1'education 
morale. Cuneo letter to Pallison dated February 28, 1948, k 457 
179. ARSD.
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military authorities to discuss security measures that would 
ensure the protection of Europeans during the strike.
A few days before the strike, the marabout Seydou Nourou 
Tall tried to dissuade Ibrahima Sarr (secretary-general of the 
African Railway Worker's Union and leader of the strike) and also 
met with Lamine Gueye and Senghor, requesting that they not get 
involved.908 Lamine Gueye's newspaper, AOF, sought to defuse 
the conflict and adopted a conciliatory tone:
II s'agit de tenir parole et de prouver par la que 
l'Union Frangaise n'est pas ce 'cliche sentimental'... 
mais bien une communaute vraie d'interets, ce qui 
implique l'egalite reelle.
Quand, de partout, germent des idees separatistes, 
nous verrons, nous, demander une integration plus 
effective dans la communaute frangaise, avec l'accrois- 
sement des devoirs qui en resulte, n'y a-t-il pas la 
quelque chose d'emouvant, une attitude de nature a 
faire reflechir une concience frangaise?909
Sarr met with the Governor-General Barthes on October 9, in 
what proved to be a futile meeting. The Governor-General sought 
to divide the railway workers and avert the strike. He rejected 
the integration of auxiliaries in a single staff system and 
opposed salary increases. According to Sarr, Lamine Gueye 
refused to get involved,910 most likely because he was under 
pressure from the socialist administration not to support the 
strikers.
908. Renseignements, October 29, 1947, K 457 179. ARSD.
909. Diop Boubacar Obeye, AOF. (September 12, 1947).
910. Meeting of October 9, 1947, K 365 26. ARSD.
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The workers decided to strike for an indefinite period on 
October 10 (the day before the President of the French Union was 
due to arrive).911 Barthes reluctantly tried to mediate in 
the conflict but his disposition toward the strikers was far from 
favorable:
Greve sans conflit juridique ouvert entre la Regie 
et ses employes Africains... le Haut-Commissaire, 
decide a aider a la conciliation, estime que si la 
greve est declenchee, les responsables syndicalistes 
cherchent uniquement a creer le desordre et tombent de 
ce fait sous le coup de la loi... 912
Most administrators considered the demands of the strikers 
"presqu'entierement inacceotables.1,013 Barthes held the workers 
responsible for their predicament and argued that from there on, 
"seule la federation des cheminots africains a estime que la 
greve devait se poursuivre. seule elle est responsable de la 
situation actuelle.11914 The administration failed to make the 
African delegates obey the orders of a mediator, the strike was 
declared illegal and Ibrahima Sarr was arrested and imprisoned.
The strike was almost total. By November 1, only 38 African
911. Suret-Canale, "The French West African Railway..," op. 
cit.. 1978, p. 136. Another reason for the strike was that 
contrary to the agreement between the director of the railway and 
the African workers, the layoff procedures were held to be 
discriminatory. Report of Diop Boubacar Obeye, AOF, (September 
12, 1947) .
912. Proces verbal de la Conference du 6 Octobre 1947, K 
365 26 r ARSD.
913. Pellison to chef du service central du travail et de 
la main d'oeuvre, November 4, 1947, K 457 179. ARSD.
914. Barthes letter dated December 31, 1947, K 457 179. ARSD.
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workers remained in their posts out of a total force of 
17.000.915 The administration acknowledged that the strike was 
carried out in an "entente et... une cohesion qui ont marque une 
etape nouvelle dans la vie sociale Africaine.1,916 Few strike 
breakers were reported and Djim Momar Gueye along with Ibrahima 
Seydou N'Daw provided trucks to ensure the strikers had adequate 
food supplies.
After its calls for a return to work failed, the administra­
tion recruited workers and soldiers, and nearly implemented 
wartime legislation for the requisitioning of goods and person­
nel.917
...cette greve... trouble l'economie de l'AOF; 
compromet le ravitaillement de la metropole et itiene a 
une dangereuse impasse... Que des limites et ... des 
interdictions soient apportees au droit de greve quand 
il met, et c'est le cas, la vie sociale en peril....918
Finally, it was the deterioration of the strikers' movement
as well as the increasing apprehension of the administration and
big business that contributed toward the resolution of the
conflict on March 16, 1948. While not a full victory for the
strikers, the administration agreed to rehire the workers it had
fired and revoke all penalties. A salary increase of 20% was
granted but the strikers were not paid for the days they had
915. Rapport de 1'inspecteur general du travail Pelisson,
January 24, 1948, K 457 179. ARSD.
916. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1948, 2G 48 30. ARSD.
917. Note sur la greve des chemins de fer et des wharfs en
AOF, December 1947, Affaires Politiques. File 2255, Dossier 1, ANSOM.
918. Ibid.
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struck. Moreover, while the single staff system was recognized 
in principle, in practice the privileges of the Europeans 
remained intact. Similarly, integration applied only to those 
possessing the requisite qualifications. Even though the 
strikers' demands were not satisfied, the administration did not 
succeed in contesting their right to strike and arresting the 
development of the union movement.919
As with the Dakar-Niger strike of 1938-39, politics played a 
significant role in the the rail crisis of 1947-48. Lamine Gueye 
remained conspicuously silent throughout the crisis and did not 
come forth in favour of the strike. However, contrary to what 
Suret-Canale has argued,920 that was not the position of his 
party. The SFIO met on November 13, 1947 and expressed its 
sympathy and solidarity with the strikers, denouncing the 
intransigence of the railway administration and its efforts to 
inflict a mortal blow on the African trade union movement. It 
also called for a united front in the Assemblee Nationale, the 
Assemblee de 1'Union Francaise and the Conseil General to help 
find a just solution to the conflict.921 Gueye chose to maintain 
discipline with the Colonial Minister (who prolonged the crisis), 
rather than with his own constituency and lost considerable 
credibility as a result of the strike. Gueye's acquiescence to
919. Suret-Canale, "The French West African..," op. cit., 
1978, p. 150.
920. Suret Canale, "The French West African Railway..," op. 
cit., 1978, p. 145.
921. AOF. (November 14, 1947).
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the Colonial Minister's intransigence effectively meant that he 
lost whatever support he had from the union movement to the 
RDA.922 Moreover, as the tone of the strike increasingly became 
one of opposition to French colonialism, the SFIO became 
awkwardly identified with the establishment.
Senghor's role in the conflict was a little more forthright: 
On November 26, 1947 he sent a letter to the Colonial Minister 
arguing that
Le malentendu vient de ce que les promesses 
verbales faites par le Ministre de la France d'Outre- 
Mer d'alors n'one pas ete toutes consignees dans le 
protocole de greve...
Les revendications relatives a la suppression des 
discriminations raciales me sembles (sic) fondees, si 
l'on peut discuter sur le taux des soldes....
...on ne peut parler de cadre unique s'il y a 
discrimination a l'interieur meme de ce cadre, dis­
crimination que condamne d'ailleurs la Constitution de 
la IV*3 Republique.923
Senghor also pressed Coste-Floret to send an investigative 
commission to arbitrate the conflict.924 As will be seen in the
922. For a vivid account of the strike and Lamine Gueye's 
compromising role see Sembene Ousmane, Les bouts de bois de 
dieu, (Paris: Presse-Pocket, 1971).
923. Letter of Senghor to the Minister of Overseas France, 
November 11, 1947, K 457 179. ARSD.
924. Senegal, Police et Surete, Synthese politique 
mensuelle, December 1947, 2G 47 133. ARSD. Apparently, Guy 
Etcheverry and the RDA agreed with Senghor's proposal. See also 
Senghor's letter of November 26, 1947 to Coste-Floret, K 457 179. 
ARSD. Senghor demanded the intervention of "un fonctionnaire qui 
serait charge de regler le differend en s'appuyant non pas sur la 
lettre du protocole de fin de greve mais sur 1'esprit de la 
constitution de la Republique qui proclame que 1'Union 
Frangaise est une union fondee sur l'egalite des droits et des 
devoirs, sans discrimination de race ni de religion."
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following chapter, it is probably no coincidence that Senghor's 
Condition Humaine began to appear during the strike; nor that he 
founded the BPS shortly after the resolution of the conflict.
The RDA had at first refrained from supporting the strike. 
However, in October 1947, the party received an order to back the 
strike without taking an active part in the conflict.925 
The following month, Cauche and Etcheverry held several talks 
with Sarr during which the union leader expressed his 
disillusionment with the socialists and asked for the RDA's 
assistance.926 Houphouet-Boigny and d'Arboussier repeatedly 
appealed to the High Commissioner to find a constructive solution 
to the crisis with motions carried by the Grand Conseil and the 
Assemblee de 1'Union but with little success.
CONCLUSIONS
In many respects, Lamine Gueye's deputyship marked the end 
of Senegalese politics as hitherto known— an era dominated by the 
assimilation politics of the privileged elite of 'citizens' in 
the Three Communes. That Gueye emerged as the dominant postwar 
leader is not surprising; no one else had his experience, network 
of connections and charisma. His smooth takeover of the Bloc 
Africain further testifies to his ability as a leader and to the 
wide support he enjoyed among the people. The first
925. Renseignements, October 6, 1947, K 457 179. ARSD. 
Suret-Canale erroneously argues that the RDA defended the 
strikers throughout the strike.
926. Renseignements, November 25, 1947, K 457 179. ARSD.
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landslide victories of the Bloc took place without the backing of 
the administration and commerce.
If anything, Gueye's increasing reliance on the socialist 
administration in Paris and in Dakar for electoral support proved 
to be detrimental to the Bloc Africain (which was absorbed by the 
SFIO) and ultimately, to his deputyship. After abstaining from 
the Bamako RDA Conference, he was under considerable pressure to 
justify the inconsistency of his actions. His argument was that 
he had never really agreed with the initial manifesto of the 
party but that his signature had been used without his 
knowledge.927
In reality, his party was already in a state of disarray and 
the opposition took full advantage of it. The SFIO was ridiculed 
as "une foire d'empoicrne" and "le parti de la pagaie."928 After 
the eclipse of the Bloc Africain. the SFIO dominated political 
life but only thanks to Gueye's metropolitan friends:
La force SFIO ne reside plus que dans l'appui 
administrative et 1'influence que celui-ci lui permet 
aupres des elements qui en sont restes a l'epoque ou le 
Bloc [Africain] et Lamine representaient, effective- 
ment, un atout dans la lutte contre le colonialisme.929
In addition, the SFIO had structural problems which Gueye did not 
tend to even when the electorate increased fivefold. The
927. Affaires politiques et administratives des informations 
des partis politiques, Senegal, October 1946, 2G 46 125. ARSD.
928. Renseignements, August 26, 1946, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
929. Trait d'Union, no. 1, (July 1948), Papiers Suret-Canale, 
op. cit..
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combined effect of the anti-assimilation climate, the emergence 
of new centres of political activity in the protectorate, 
divisions within the SFIO. and the 1947-48 Dakar-Niger strike had 
had a devastating and irreversible effect on the SFIO and on 
Gueye's leadership.
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Chapter VIII.
LEOPOLD S. SENGHOR'S RISE TO POWER, 1948-1952
Leopold S6dar Senghor's rise to power ushered the colony 
into a new era of politics which featured the prewar 'subjects' 
of the protectorate on an equal basis with the 'citizens' of 
the Three Communes and was anti-assimilationist rather than 
integrationist in outlook. The reasons underlying the rupture 
between Gueye and Senghor were multi-faceted, ranging from the 
ideological to the tactical. Rather than being a contest 
between two leaders, it was a conflict between two 
constituencies rivalling for power and two styles of politics 
competing for predominance, roughly corresponding to prewar and 
postwar Senegal.
Within a few years of his landslide election in 1945, the 
opposition had succeeded in portraying Lamine Gueye as a 
dictator and nepotist who had sold out to the colonial 
administration and was little concerned with his constituency 
and with the future of his party. The crisis within the SFIO 
culminated in 1948, when mass resignations from the party 
proliferated as disillusioned socialists flocked to opposition 
parties. Senghor's break with Lamine Gueye essentially sealed 
the fate of the SFIO in Senegal and the timely formation of the
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BPS (in the midst of labour unrest) at once met a favourable 
response.
The BPS quickly won the support of a broad spectrum of 
disenchanted socialists and, even more importantly, 'subjects' 
in the bush. In fact, Senghor made a point of identifying his 
party to be specifically "au service des populations de la 
brousse." 930 Since the Three Communes were the strongholds of 
SFIO, Senghor focused his attention on the protectorate, 
and particularly on the marabouts, the war veterans, various 
ethnic and regional groups and 'subject' peanut traders.
Senghor's "politique pro-paysanne" offered a sharp contast 
to Gueye's urban politics of assimilation. Senghor addressed 
the most pressing issues of the 'subjects' in the interior of 
the colony, such as the extension of the vote in the protec­
torate and democratically run agricultural cooperatives. In 
the Three Communes, he won the support of the Lebous by 
appointing a relatively unknown labour leader, Abbas Gueye to 
run in Pakar against Lamine Gueye. In addition, he effectively 
neutralised the RDA which could have potentially been an 
obstacle to the IOM in the French Parliament.
Within a little over a year, the BPS had built a mass base 
across the country and had gone on the offensive vis-^-vis the
930, Senghor, Condition Humaine. (May 31, 1949).
354
Wiltord administration which openly supported Gueye. And yet, 
convinced that Senghor had committed the biggest political 
mistake of his career by breaking with Lamine Gueye, the upper 
echelons of the colonial administration refused to take the BPS 
seriously up until April 1951.
By 1950, the SFIO was in total disarray and Lamine Gueye was 
particularly ill-prepared for the legislative elections of June 
1951. His party suffered a crushing defeat, largely due to the 
new electoral voting system which introduced proportional 
representation favouring the BPS but also due to the decisive 
support of the marabouts who overwhelmingly supported Senghor. 
After the 1951 elections, the path was open for the BPS to 
consolidate its gains.
'CITIZENS,' 'SUBJECTSf ANP THE SFIO.
After May 1946, when the status of 'subjects' was abolished 
and all Africans legally became 'citizens,'931 the division 
between 'citizens' and 'subjects' declined but did not become 
obsolete. For instance, even though the single electoral 
college qualified all Africans to the Conseil G6n6ral, 35 out 
of 50 councillors were 'citizens.' 932 Candidates were nominated 
through the SFIO and were usually Wolofs, L£bous, Creoles or
m . Voting rights were not extended, however, to all Africans.
m t Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit.. p. 141.
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Europeans from the Three Communes. Lamine Gueye was held 
responsible for perpetuating discrimination against the former 
'subjects,' by delegating positions of power within the SFIO 
almost exclusively to oriqinaires.
A new element in the 'citizen'/ 'subject' equation' which 
transpired during this period was that the vocabulary used by 
the administration to describe the schism between Africans 
changed somewhat, to underscore the generation gap and 
increasing radicalism of aspiring 'subject' dvolu6s. For 
instance, the word 'citizen' was often substituted for the term 
vieux, while 'subjects' were now referred to as jeunes. Other 
times, the division was depicted as one between ules inquiets1 
and "les impatients," the 'citizens' being the "vieux inguiets" 
and the 'subjects' the "jeunes impatients."933
The latter demanded rights effective immediately: " [ils 
ddmandent1 des avantages toujours plus affirm6s. La presse est 
rev61atrice de cette soif d'avancer qui voudrait rompre tres 
vite avec les vieux cadres sans mesurer le plus, souvent ce qui 
les remplacerait. 1,934 The socialist Governor of Senegal,
Wiltord, was apprehensive of this young generation of Africans 
whom he considered potential radical nationalists. He inferred
m. Rapport Politique, Senegal, 1945-46, by Governor Wiltord (August 28, 1947), 
Affaires Politiques. File 2142, Dossier 3, ANSOM.
**. Ihid.
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that French interests could only be safeguarded by creating a 
buffer zone of "une aristocratie des fonctionnaires, ” 935 which 
was precisely the constituency Lamine Gueye represented.
In Senegal, the division between jeunes and vieux was most 
pronounced within the SFIO, acting as a barometer that denoted 
the level of disintegration within the party. Sharp 
differences had developed between young radicals and veteran 
socialists of the Thi&s SFIO branch as early 1946, when the 
Socialist Party was in its heyday. Led by Abdoulaye Sadji,
Abdul Karim Sow, A. Angrand and Gomis, the jeunes deeply 
resented the politics of Lamine Gueye and his oligarchy. 936 They 
proposed the dissolution of the Mouvement des Jeunes, which 
they perceived to be an ineffectual and marginal group within 
the SFIO created to appease rather than encourage political 
participation of former 'subjects.' They further projected the 
reconstitution of the SFIO on new foundations, giving greater 
powers to 'subjects' and younger leaders. 937 To this effect, 
they formed a new executive committee with Sow as president.
The vieux angrily demanded that Lamine Gueye reassert the
w5. Ibid.
W6. Renseignements, August 6, 18, 1946, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
”7. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, October 1945, 2G 45 144. 
ARSD.
357
authority of the veteran socialists and neutralize the jeunes.938 
Fearful of the radicalism of the former 'subjects' and 
compelled by Lamine Gueye, the administration dismissed four 
young radical civil servants who refused to comply with the 
orders of Frangois Gning, the veteran trade union leader who 
unfailingly backed the socialist administration.
Massive resignations from the SFIO occurred in late 1948, 
particularly on the part of the jeunes of Thids, Diourbel and 
Sin6-Saloum. Condition Humaine (the newspaper of Senghor's 
party) meticulously recorded every resignation. At times, 
entire SFIO branches resigned en masse (like, for instance, the 
Nioro du Rip section) 939 . The popularity of the SFIO dwindled 
even further when in 1948, the party's lieutenants became 
embroiled in a financial scandal; Amadou Ba and El Hadj Bibi 
N'Diaye were accused of creating bogus posts in the 
municipality of Dakar (Lamine Gueye's fief) in order to appoint 
their partisans. Such scandals were not rare in Senegalese 
politics but compounded with the aforementioned factors, they 
increased the resentment of the 'subjects' vis-£-vis Lamine 
Gueye.
938. Rapport Politique, Senegal, August 1946, 2G 46 124. ARSD and Syntheses sur 
revolution de la situation politique des groupements politiques patriotiques du S6n6gal, 
August 1946, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
”9. Condition Humaine. (October 28 and November 16, 1948).
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The crisis within the party became so acute that, disil­
lusioned with the SFIO, several vieux joined the ranks of the 
RPF and the PODS or else sided with the jeunes.940 Gueye was in 
France at the time and his cohorts were at a loss over what 
course of action to take. Eventually, the executive committee 
convened (almost clandestinely) to discuss the crisis and lay 
down a strategy. The schism within the SFIO was exacerbated 
irrevocably when the alliance between L.S. Senghor and Lamine 
Gueye came to an end in 1948.
THE GUEYE-SENGHOR RIFT AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE BPS.
The first rumours of a Gueye-Senghor split circulated in 
August 194 6 during the French parliamentary debates where the 
former's assimilationist ideology conflicted with the latter's 
federal philosophy (as discussed in chapter 7).941 Some believed 
that Gueye was being conciliatory in order to gain a seat at 
the Cour Supreme de Justice. It is more likely that he was 
simply not prepared to break discipline with the central 
committee of the SFIO, to which he owed much of his support.
In early 1947, Lamine Gueye decided not to support the 
election of Mamadou Dia to the Conseil de 1'Union, contrary to
M0. The BPS had not yet been created. Renseignements, Thies, October 23, 1948, 
21G 11 1. ARSD,
W1. Renseignements, August 31, 1946, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
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his earlier promise to Senghor. Dia was a 'subject' teacher 
from Khambole who had graduated from William Ponty and then 
received a baccalaur6at from the Lyc6e Faidherbe (the first 
African 'subject' ever to receive a bac). He had taught 
primary school in Senegal for several years but as a 'subject,' 
was barred from entering the cadre commun sup&rieur.942 In many 
ways, Mamadou Dia epitomised the condition of the Senegalese 
postwar 6volu6 'subjects' who were frustrated with Gueye's 
politics that obstructed their careers and excluded them from 
political life. In fact, teachers like Mamadou Dia were to 
become the backbone of the BPS cadres in rural Senegal in the 
1950s.
Senghor finalised his break with Gueye when the latter 
endorsed Moutet's refusal to dispatch an inquiry commission to 
Tananarive, before parliamentary immunity was revoked for the 
deputies of Madagascar. 943 While personal antagonism and 
ideological differences explain in part the fragile and uneasy 
relationship between the deputies, the split between Gueye and 
Senghor reflected deeper divisions within the Socialist Party. 
This became fully apparent at the SFIO Congress held in Kaolack
W2. Biography of Mamadou Dia in letter of Pierre Diallo dated September 14, 
1939, 13G 103 180. ARSD. See also the first chapters of Mamadou Dia’s 
autobiography, Mdmoires d’un militant du tiers monde. (Paris: Publisud, 1985).
W3. Police et Suretd, Senegal, Synthese politique et Sociale, 2G 48 117. ARSD.
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in September 21, 1948 where Gueye defended further 
centralisation of party organization while Senghor demanded 
more effective representation for economic, ethnic and interest 
groups. Backed by powerful allies, Senghor denounced the 
"politique de personnaIit6" of the SFIO and the segregation 
between the first and second college representatives, urging 
structural changes and the establishment of a permanent party 
base in Dakar.944 He also condemned Lamine Gueye's choice of 
Djim Momar Gueye whom he had ousted from the party in 1946, as 
SFIO candidate to the Assemblee de 1'Union Frangaise. Even 
though he did not override Gueye, Senghor succeeded in 
obtaining authorisation to found his own newspaper, La 
Condition Humaine. Gabriel d'Arboussier of the RDA noted
...la division voil£e, mais r^elle entre Lamine 
Gueye et Senghor, les divisions entre socialistes au 
Conseil G6n6ral, entre socialistes et ind^pendants, la 
division a Kaolack au sein m§me du parti SFIO entre des 
fractions d'int6r£t personnels... La F6d6ration 
socialiste est partag^e entre les unionnistes prets k 
venir au RDA et les "jusqu'au boutistes" qui sont prets 
meme ci employer des moyens violents.945
On September 27, 1948, Senghor addressed his letter of 
resignation from the socialist party to Guy Mollet and to the
SM4. Bulletin d’Information, October 1948, 17G 139 17. ARSD. Senghor was 
backed by the delegates of Thies, Kaolack, Casamance and the Fleuve region.
W5. Gabriel d’Arboussier report, December 8, 1947, quoted in de Benoist, L’AOF, 
op. cit.. 1982, p. 119.
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secretary-general of the SFIO in Dakar:
Mes raisons sont de deux sortes... La premiere est 
que 1'organisation de la F6d6ration socialiste d'AOF est 
une organisation dictatoriale "ad majorem Lamini 
gloriam... fortunamque", c'est-&-dire une organisation 
qui a pour but d'asseoir le pouvoir personnel de Lamine 
Gueye. La s^conde est que la SFIO, sur le plan 
parlementaire, ne defend plus que les int^rets 616ctoraux 
m6tropolitains.946
During an'SFIO meeting in October 1948, Senghor argued that 
socialist policy vis-£-vis the Malagasy rebellion, the African 
war veteran pension scheme and proportional representation had 
led him to resign from the party.947
Subsequently, Senghor resigned from the SFIO parliamentary 
group "non pour d£fendre la d^mocratie k Madagascar, mais pour 
la d^fendre en Afrigue Noire" 948 and accused metropolitan parties 
of treating overseas territories as voting machines. It was 
then that he made public his intention of forming the BPS and 
joining the Ind^pendants d'Outre-Mer (IOM) . The issue of 
Condition Humaine which published Senghor's resignation letter 
also announced the formation of the Bloc D6mocratigue 
S6n6galais (BPS) .949
M6. Condition Humaine. (October 5, 1948),
W7. Renseignements, October 7, 1948, 21G 11 1. ARSD.
m . Senghor quoted in Bulletin d’Information, October 1948, 17G 139 17. ARSD.
ws>. Condition Humaine. (October 5, 1948).
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Lamine Gueye tried to appease Senghor and during the same 
month, he proclaimed before the party that there were no 
substantial differences between them. 950 In the same vein,
Gueye's party newspaper, AOF, initially refrained from 
attacking Senghor; rather, it alluded to a "crise politique 
grave"951 within the SFIO but welcomed the creation of Condition 
Humaine. However, in October 1948, after Senghor allegedly 
tried to obstruct Gueye's election to the presidency of the 
Grand Conseil, AOF launched a fierce campaign against Senghor 
and his allies.
Senghor founded the BPS with a team of powerful associates 
on his side. There was Mamadou Dia, who became his chief 
lieutenant and secretary-general of the party; 952 then, there was 
Boissier-Palun (a Dakar-based lawyer and relative of Senghor's) 
and finally, Ibrahima Seydou N'Daw, the powerful diaraf 
(political party boss) of Sin6-Saloum (and former SFIO leader 
of the region). According to Dia, right after Senghor's 
resignation from the SFIO, the founding members of the party
950. Compte rendu de la reunion politique du SFIO k M’Both, October 20, 1946, 
21G 91 17. ARSD.
951. AOF. (September 30, 1948).
952. According to Dia, "II est vrai que les statuts du B.D.S., c ’est mon oeuvre. Et 
aussi, Forganisation du parti. C’est moi qui a organisd le B.D.S. en errant les sections, 
les unes apres les autres. Senghor, e ’etait le leader, il cautionnait, lors de ses tournees; 
mais, celui qui organisait, c ’dtait moi." op. cit.. 1985, p. 61.
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acted swiftly to establish bases of support in the interior:
Sans plus attendre, Ibrahima [Seydou N'Daw] m'a dit: 
"Maintenant, tu vas passer la commande des cartes et, 
dans une semaine, tu reviendras les retirer, et aller 
cr£er les sections." Une semaine apr&s, je suis revenu 
prendre les cartes dont 1'impression avait 6t6 pay6e par 
Boissier et je suis parti dans une camionnette, 
sillonnant les routes du S6n§gal et errant region apr6s 
region, les sections du B.D.S. ... j'ai commence par la 
section de Fatick, qui fut la premiere section B.D.S. 
Apr&s ce fut Kaolack. A partir de ce moment jusqu'au 
premier'congr^s du nouveau parti, & Thi&s, le 17 avril 
1949, le pays essentiel, dans un sursaut rev^lateur de sa 
volont6 de changement, basculera en faveur du B.D.S.953
Following the Madagascar incident during which Gueye 
temporarily resigned from the Socialist Party, Lamine 
desperately tried to give a semblance of independence from the 
colonial administration, suggesting that if the central 
committee of the SFIO rejected further affiliation with the 
Senegalese section, an autonomous Socialist Party would be 
created.954 Before long, however, Gueye had returned to the 
ranks of the SFIO and did not break discipline with the party 
thereafter.
With the benefit of hindsight the rift between Senghor and 
Gueye seems inevitable because their alliance was never solid. 
The division between the two leaders grew increasingly sharp,
953. Mamadou Dia, op. cit.. 1985, p. 41.
954. Bulletin d’Information, October 1948, 17G 139 17. ARSD.
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as Senghor (primarily for electoral reasons) brushed over 
similarities and deliberately accentuated their differences. 
Gueye belonged to Blaise Diagne's generation for which 
assimilation reigned supreme. An intellectual with no close 
links with the peasantry, Lamine only occasionally toured the 
interior in his stiff 3-piece suit, leaving his representatives 
to maintain support in the bush.955
And thus, in Abdoulaye Ly's words, the "malentendu 
tragique" : In 1945, Lamine Gueye, proud to finally be the
deputy of the first college, had presented Senghor to his 
constituency as the "d£put6 de la brousse," in other words, 
"their" deputy, on the grounds that the latter had been born in 
the bush and notwithstanding the fact that his father was a 
notable assimi!6. 956 Senghor used this title to his advantage 
and "s'impose d'aller en brousse" 957 in his khaki suit, closely 
interacting with the peasants, reassuring them that for the 
BPS, peanut prices, democratically run cooperatives and forced 
labour were far more important issues than French citizenship.958 
The young deputy also craftily exploited the fact that he was
955. Interview with Abdoulaye Ly, Dakar, July 17, 1984.
956. Ibid.
957. Ibid.
958. Condition Humaine. (October 19, 1948).
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not fluent in Wolof to differentiate himself from the urban 
Wolof assimil^s who dominated the SFIO and the municipalities. 
According to Abdoulaye Ly, Senghor capitalised on the fact that 
in Wolof, there is no distinction between autonomy and
independence. 959 This enabled him to appeal to virtually
everyone, leading Ly to conclude that "Senghor jouait la carte 
chauvine. "96°
Another paradox and example of Senghor's brilliant states­
manship was that even though in France he was affiliated with 
the MRP which was to the right of the SFIO, in Senegal he 
claimed to stand to the left of the SFIO and was largely 
perceived that way. This discrepancy did not jeopardise his 
rise to power. On the contrary, it helped him win over a large
part of Gueye's constituency and gradually, the support of the
French colonial administration. Part of the explanation lies 
in Senghor's intellectual make-up which differed markedly from 
Gueye's. "Senghor 6tait plus branch^e dans les r6alit6s du 
pays," claims Abdoulaye Ly. Being more aware of social 
problems and champion of nigritude (which was in a sense 
antagonistic to the experience of blacks in the Three Communes)
959. Ly interview, op. cit. Ly claimed that people like himself joined the BPS 
because they strongly opposed the SFIO’s assimilationist ideology and found Senghor’s 
espousal of autonomy closer to independence.
960. Interview with Abdoulaye Ly, Dakar, July 17, 1984.
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rather than assimilation, Senghor offered a sharp contrast to 
his former patron.
BPS MEMBERSHIP, DOCTRINE AND TACTICS.
To the SFIO's "politique citadine," the BPS put forth a 
"politique pro-paysanne" which was also directed against the 
chefs de canton. Senghor's agents against the chiefs were the 
marabouts whose influence and power he used extensively in his 
campaigns and who were largely responsible for his victory in 
the decisive legislative elections of 1951. For the marabouts, 
the BPS presented a rare opportunity to extend their religious 
leadership and influence into the political sphere in a far 
more substantial manner than in the prewar years. In addition, 
after being inundated with complaints from their talib6s with 
regard to the SFIO, they welcomed Senghor's reported commitment 
to specific socio-economic issues affecting peanut policy and 
rural life in general.
Another significant source of support for Senghor was the 
L6bou community. By October 194 6, Amadou Assane N'Doye, one of 
Gueye's most influential lieutenants, had sided with Senghor,961 
and before long, Thierno Amath M'Bengue, Ibrahima Thiaw and 
Maurice Gueye (former mayor of Rufisque) also pledged
m . Renseignements, October 29, 1046, 21G 91 17. ARSD.
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allegiance to the BPS. Two powerful L6bous, Ousmane Diop and 
El Hadj Ibrahima Diop, who had initially intended to remain 
neutral in the Gueye-Senghor rift, used their leverage to 
promote Senghor's list to the Conseil de la R6publigue 
elections in 1948 which featured the L6bou Fod6 Sakho as the 
BPS candidate.962
Senghor also campaigned extensively among the war veterans, 
indefatigably touring the interior in his khaki suit calling 
for equal pensions with the Europeans— a demand that Gueye had 
opposed so as not to break discipline with the SFIO. In 
addition, he easily procured the support of the railroad 
workers in Thi&s and Tambacounda after the Dakar-Niger strike 
of 1947-48 during which Lamine Gueye was accused of betraying 
the strikers. In order to offset Lamine Gueye's tight grip on 
Dakar, the BPS appointed the L6bou labour leader Abbas Gueye to 
run against him in the legislative elections of 1951. The risk 
was considerable but the labour leader's victory was 
spectacular. 963 The administration reported with dismay that 
"beaucoup, dans les milieux ouvriers (cheminots en particulier) 
melent 1'action politique pure £ 1'action syndicale souvent
962, Police et Suretd, Senegal, Synthese sur Involution politique et sociale de Dakar, 
October and November 1948, 2G 48 117. ARSD.
Rapport Politique, Senegal, 1 trimestre 1948, 2G 48 131. ARSD.
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sans apercevoir la difference entre les deux, "964 as union
workers became progressively more involved as an interest group 
in party politics. In a similar vein, Mamadou Dia has 
underscored the importance of the railroad workers to the rise 
to power of the BPS:
Si nous n'avions pas eu des hommes comme Ibrahima 
Sar, Aynina Fall, Abdoulaye Ba, Sidiya Ndiaye etc, & 
cette dpoque 1&, le B.D.S. n'aurait pas tenu. Thi£s 
6tait, en effet, le lieu n<§vralgique et le centre de 
commande de tout le Sdn6gal. C'6taient les cheminots, & 
ce temps-l&, qui dtaient les meilleurs agents de 
recrutement politique, les meilleurs agents des partis.96S
Senghor also addressed himself to ethnic and regional groups 
such as the Sdrdres (13% of the population) especially in Sin6- 
Saloum, Thi&s (where there were 95.000) and Baol (approximately 
51.000). He was particularly influential with the Toucouleurs 
in Podor and Matam who were grouped in the Union G6n6rale des 
Originaires de la Vall6e du Fleuve, and supported the 
Toucouleur candidate Boubou Sail who beat Frangois Salzmann of 
the SFIO in the "Elections-test" to the Conseil Gendral in 
April 19 4 9 . 966 The BPS campaigned as "le parti des badolos" 
("the party of the poor"), a slogan that appealed to many
964. Police sp£ciale du Dakar-Niger, April 1949, 2G 49 141. ARSD.
^  Dia, op. cit.. 1985, p. 56.
966. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1949, 2G 49 27. ARSD. The term 
"elections-test" is from Dia, op. cit.. 1985, p. 57.
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regional groups and which contrasted sharply with the elitist 
jargon of the SFIO. 967 Mamadou Dia remembers the significance of 
those elections:
Nous l'avons [Boubou Sail] emport6 largement dans 
toute la region du Fleuve, sauf & Saint-Louis. C'est 
Saint-Louis qui nous a battus, parce qu'& l'6poque, avec 
la representation des villes qui 6tait plus importante 
que celle de la brousse, Saint-Louis avait plus 
d'eiecteurs que 1'ensemble de la region. C'est ainsi que 
malgre notre succes sur tout le reste de la 
cicronscription eiectorale, ce desequilibre de Saint- 
Louis venait tout bouleverser. Mais, ces elections 
c'etait quelque chose d'extraordinaire: un triomphe. La, 
aussi, c'etait tres exaltant. Cela a donne beaucoup de 
punch au B.D.S., des le depart.968
The Mouvement des Forces Democratigues de la Casamance also 
adhered to the BPS after Senghor's tour of the region in 19 4 9 . 969 
Perhaps the most dangerous opponent for Senghor was the RDA 
which had caused him considerable embarrassment following the 
Bamako Congress of 1946. By 1947, after failing to unite the 
opposition under its banner, the Senegal branch of the RDA was 
in decline. But Senghor maneuvered carefully not to alienate 
the UPS, arguing that the BPS could not
967. Dia, op. cit.. 1985, p. 57.
**. ibid,, p. 57.
969. The MFDC was created in March 1949 and its activity was restricted to 
Ziguinchor. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal, 2G 49 27. ARSD; see also Rapport 
Hebdomadaire, March 14-20, 1949, 13G 5 17. ARSD.
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embrigader tout un peuple dans un parti qui, malgre 
tout, n'avait pas la confiance totale de la masse... Nous 
pr^tendons ne jamais aligner notre ind^pendance par un 
apparentement plus ou moins dfefinitif & des hauts 
m^tropolitains.970
At the same time, he kept the lines of communication open, 
at times leading the RDA to believe that a rapprochement was 
imminent. Twice, the RDA proposed a union with the BPS: The 
first time'Senghor declined outright (in October 1948), while 
the second time— in April 1949— an alliance was forged that 
proved short-lived.
In pursuing an alliance with Senghor, the RPA nurtured 
secret hopes of absorbing the B PS. But the BPS consistently 
rejected a simple fusion and invariably evaded a commitment 
toward the UPS. Indeed, there was a grain of truth in what AOF 
reported on BDS-RDA relations: "Si [Senghor] a fr^quemment 
sollicit6 le RDA c'est comme instrument de lutte contre Lamine 
Gueye."971
Senghor was also able to capitalise on the economic boom and 
high groundnut prices in 1950. According to Abdoulaye Ly, 
Senghor took advantage of "la democratization de 
1'embourgeoisement" in rural Senegal, while Mamadou Dia focused 
the party's efforts on extending the benefits of the crddit
97°. Condition Humaine. no. 20, (December 14, 1948).
OT1. AOF. (October 28, 1948).
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agricole to a greater number of peasants.972
In 1948, the SFIO had 54.000 members. A year later, the BPS 
boasted 27.000 members. 973 Thi£s, Kaolack, Guinguin6o, 
Tambacounda became the strongholds of the new party. 974 The 
colonial administration was baffled by the way in which the 
SFIO disintegrated following the Gueye-Senghor fissure. Yet, 
it underestimated the significance of Senghor's party and 
predicted the BPS would not survive:
D'ou vient alors cette br§che, cette felure qui 
parait aujourd'hui se manifester au sein de la SFIO 
depuis que c'est consomm6e la rupture Lamine Gueye - 
Senghor et d'ou vient que... Senghor, qui connait mieux 
que tout autre la force et le credit dont jouit son 
adversaire dans ce pays, & la pr6somption, courageuse 
peut-§tre, mais & priori insens^e, de s'en aller, comme 
Don Quichotte, attacker les moulins & vent?975
Even as late as 1949, when the party had scored important 
victories, the administration continued to report that the BPS 
was in rapid decline: "il [the BPS] n'enregistre aucun succ&s 
aupr&s de la population africaine qui parait s'en d<§sinteresser 
de plus en plus... bref, parti politique nettement en
sni. Condition Humaine. (April 10, 1951).
973. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1949, 2G 49 27. ARSD.
974. Rapport Mensuel, Police Sp6ciale du Dakar-Niger, April 1949, 2G 49 141. 
ARSD.
975. Bulletin dTnformation, October 1948, 17G 139 17. ARSD.
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regression, £ 1'influence insignifiante .,|976
The reason why the BPS became so popular in such a short 
period of time is partly because it was born at a time of 
labour unrest (the Dakar-Niger strike) which brought into sharp 
focus Lamine Gueye's allegiance to the colonial administration 
rather than to the party's constituents. The BPS offered an 
alternative to the SFIO which was the party of privileged 
originaire civil servants and traders from the Three Communes 
and their representatives in the bush. Lamine Gueye had chosen 
to represent those 'citizens' in the French Parliament, leaving 
Senghor the 'protectorate.' This was deeply resented by the 
'subjects' who accused these 'citizens' of being insensitive to 
their needs and who, above all, wanted a voice of their own. 
Senghor made those former 'subjects' the backbone of his party, 
and from 194 8 onward focused much of his energy to extending 
the vote to the interior. 977 One of the slogans of the BPS was 
that
II n'y a pas deux S6n6gal, un des 'citoyens' et un 
des 'sujets,' mais un seul pays qui doit s'acheminer 
r^solument vers une unite 6conomique, sociale et 
politique indispensable A la modernisation de son 
standing de vie.978
976. Senegal, Police et Surety, Synthese de Involution politique et sociale, August 
1949, 2G 49 123. ARSD.
S77. Hymans, op. cit.. p. 167.
97S. Abdoulaye Sadji, Condition Humaine. (August 8, 1951).
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In other respects, the BPS professed to its disaffected
constituency that it did not differ radically from the SFIO and 
the RDA both of which called for greater autonomy of the 
colonial territories within the framework of the French Union. 
Similarly, it vehemently rejected assimilation and independence 
as a goal
Nos'buts sont les memes que ceux des partis et 
mouvements politiques qui ont pour objet la liberation de 
l'Afrique dans le cadre de 1'Union Frangaise. Ne sont- 
ils pas tous d'accord, en effet, pour r&clamer une 
autonomie rapidement progressive de l'Afrique Noire 
frangaise? et nous disons autonomie, non independence.
Nous sommes franc et net sur ce point capital. Et nous 
disons que 1'assimilation est une illusion dans un monde 
ou les peuples ont pris conscience de leur personnalit6 
et nous affirmons que 1'independence est un r§ve dans un 
monde ou 1'interdependence des peuples s'affirme si 
manif estement.979
Senghor envisaged a "socialist democracy" within the French 
Union "fondle sur la tradition n6gro-africaine renov£e par les 
techniques de 1' Europe . 1, 980 Interdependence and African 
socialism became central to BPS ideology and jargon but even 
greater emphasis was placed on addressing the interests of 
religious, ethnic and interest groups. Condition Humaine 
proclaimed
m . Condition Humaine. no. 1, (February 11, 1948).
Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1949, 2G 49 27. ARSD
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la mise en application d'un socialisme adapts aux 
moeurs du S&n6gal et tenant compte des precepts r61igieux 
en g<§n6ral, de la loi Coranique. Sur le plan social, le 
BDS doit poursuivre le d^veloppement des cooperative 
agricoles, mais en m£me temps, s'efforcer d7 en faire des 
instruments de travail pour le pays et non des 
instruments politiques, soutenir 1'action des syndicats, 
s'appliquer & faire multiplier les etablissements 
d7enseignement. L7 enseignement doit £tre laique.981
The BDS congress of March-April 1949 outlined the major 
themes of the party:
1'organisation des communes en AOF; la r£forme et 
reorganisation de 1'enseignement et le rattachement 
direct de cette branche au minist£re metropolitain; la 
multiplication des dispensaires; I7action syndicale; le 
soutien des cooperative agricoles et le remplacement des 
Societes de Prevoyance par ces cooperatives; 
l7organisation rationnelle de la polyculture; la 
revalorisation du prix de l7 arachide.982
The electoral victories that the BDS won between 1949 and 1952
testified to a party which enjoyed mass support throughout the
country and a formidable leadership. The October 27, 194 8
elections to the Conseil General983 which reappointed Gueye
(against Aby Kane Diallo) as president and Adama Lo and Bonifay
9ei. in Senegal, Police et Suret6, Synthese de Involution politique et sociale, April 
1949, 2G 49 123. ARSD.
982. Rapport H6bdomadaire, April 25-May 1, 1949, 13G 5 17. ARSD.
983. The Conseil G6n6ral had been reinstituted in October 1946. Due to the fact 
that all its members were elected, the Conseil assumed the character of a political 
assembly; the SFIO majority followed the dictates of the president of the assembly, 
Lamine Gueye, the BDS was a minority clustered around Senghor, and there was one 
RDA councillor, Guy Etcheverry.
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as vice presidents were the SFIO's last victory. 964 The
following month, the elections to the Conseil de la R6publique 
signalled a major breakthrough for Mamadou Dia who was elected 
senator with 18 out of 50 votes. 985 Up until then, the socialist 
party had held all three seats in the council. This time, 
however, Senghor had introduced proportional representation 
which worked to the advantage of the BDS.
Next, Senghor and the BDS waged an open war against the 
colonial administration, and particularly Governor Wiltord and 
Governor-General of AOF Bdchard, Gueye's most important allies. 
According to Mamadou Dia,
A cette dpoque-l&, nous dtions en tres mauvais termes 
avec 1'administration coloniale. L'Administration 
soutenait la S.F.I.O., ouvertement et manifestement.
C'dtait le cas du Gouverneur du Sdndgal: Wiltord. II 
etait membre du Parti Socialiste S.F.I.O., ne s'en 
cachait pas; il 6tait, surtout, un ami et meme un protdgd 
de Lamine Gueye. C'est ce dernier qui l'avait fait nommd 
Gouverneur et il faisait naturellement sa politique, avec 
beaucoup d'habilit<5. De meme, les chefs de canton 
recevaient des instructions, & chaque Election, pour 
voter et faire voter S.F.I.O.986
984. Police et Suret6, Senegal, Synthase sur revolution politique et sociale, October 
1948, 2G 48 117. ARSD. There were 12 BDS deputies in the Conseil General.
985. For electoral results see Letter of Police Inspector Trouillet, Affaires Politiques. 
File 2143, Dossier 2, ANSOM.
Mfi. Dia, op. cit.. 1985, p. 58.
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Senghor accused Wiltord of replacing key BDS office holders 
from Fatick, Diourbel, Dagana, and other cercles with SFIO men. 
For instance, Alioune Seek, secretary-general of the BDS in 
Fatick was transferred to Ziguinchor and Abou Sarr Lalla, 
regional secretary of the BDS in Diourbel was transferred to 
Louga under trivial pretexts. 987 Senghor also charged the 
administration with falsifying the results of the complementary 
elections of April 10, 1949 and systematically obstructing BDS 
activities. 988 In October 1950, Senghor, the Syndicat des 
Administrateurs d'Outre-Mer, and commerce succeeded in 
replacing Wiltord with Governor Bailly. 989 Wiltord's departure 
became a contentious issue for the colonial authorities and the 
political parties alike, except for the RDA which was embroiled 
in an internal crisis.
987. Letter of Mamadou Dia to Minister of Overseas France dated February 10, 
1949, 20G 67 17. ARSD.
9e8. Letter of Mamadou Dia to Minister of Overseas France, February 10, 1949, 
20G 67 17. ARSD; see also Senghor’s letter to Minister of Overseas France dated May 
7, 1949, in ibid.
989. Renseignements, Suret6, Senegal, October 19, 20, 1950, 13G 5 17. ARSD. The 
administrators’ union opposed the appointment of governors who took sides such as 
Wiltord and Bdchard who were openly ‘Laministes,’ while commerce opposed the 
agricultural cooperatives that Wiltord supported. As pointed out by O’Brien and 
Crowder, "French West Africa," op. cit.. p. 678-79, while the central colonial 
administration was favourable to the SFIO. the lower echelons were Gaullist or else 
tended to support the MRP.
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BDS-RDA RELATIONS AND THE 'DESAPPARENTEMENT.'
In July 1950, the IOM scored its first major victory as a 
pressure group in the French Parliament when their votes became 
instrumental to the nomination of Rene Pleven as president to 
the Conseil des Ministres with Aujoulat as Under-Secretary of 
State to the Colonies and Frangois Mitterand as Minister of 
Overseas France. A promising meeting between Mitterand and the 
president of the RDA, Houphouet-Boigny was undermined by 
Governor-General B6chard, following which there was en effort 
to revive African unity and return to the spirit of Bamako.990
On August 9, 1950 the RDA and the IOM signed a provisional 
protocol (the signatories included Houphouet-Boigny, Hamani 
Diori, Coulibaly, Mamadou Dia, Senghor) outlining the 
conditions of a comite d'entente between the two groups.
Conscients des perils qui menacent les libertes et 
les droits des Africains frangais, ont decide [le RDA et 
les IOM] de cr6er un Comity d'Entente charge d'etudier 
les modalites d'un accord ... pour la realisation, avant 
la fin de la legislature, d'un programme minimum.
Les eius RDA reprendront leur autonomie pour 
constituer avec les IOM des formations parlementaires 
independantes des partis et des groupes politiques 
metropolitans. . . Toutefois, pour la defense des interets 
Africains au sein de 1'Union Frangaise elles doivent 
faire table rase du passe et unir leurs efforts pour une 
collaboration efficace.991
"°. Roger de Benoist, AOF, op. cit.. p. 123.
"1. Protocole du Comit6 d’entente, August 9, 1950, 17G 572 152. ARSD. The 
committee members included Aujoulat, Lisette, Sailer, Sigue, Tchicaya and M. Toure 
apart from the protocol
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Houphouet-Boigny informed the central committee of the PCF in 
mid-October that the RDA would dissociate itself from the 
parliamentary PCF, having found a more effective way of 
promoting the party programme.992
In Senegal, the UPS was, according to the High Commissioner 
°f AOF, the most badly informed of all the RDA parties in the 
federation regarding the break with the communists. From 
October 4 onward, the comitb directeur of the party (Yaya 
Traorb, Ousmane BS, Joseph Corrba and Abdoulaye Gueye) , held 
daily meetings where the pros and cons of desapparentement were 
discussed. Even though they opposed Houphouet-Boigny's new 
policy, "ils admettaient... que la collusion avec le Parti 
Communiste, voulue par d'Arboussier, 6tait une cause 
essentielle de 1' impopularitb du RDA au S£n6gal.1, 993 At first, 
the party was intent on following the policy line laid down by 
Houphouet-Boigny. However, many UPS militants remained
signatories.
991. According to Houphouet-Boigny’s statement submitted to the press, "Constatant 
que Faction de tous les dlus des T.O.M, sur la base d’un programme prdcis est la 
meilleure formule pour defendre efficacement les interets de l ’Afrique, les 
parlementaires R.D.A. decident de se desapparenter des groupes mdtropolitains." The 
desapparentement. according to Doudou Gueye, was attributed to the "denouement d’un 
malentendu fondamental entre les dirigeants du R.D.A. et ceux du P.C.F. et qui couvait 
depuis le Congres de Bamako: dans les methodes de travail politique, dans le 
comportement iddologique, dans la conception de la Ddmbcratie, de la Libertd." Both 
citations in de Benoist, AOF, op. cit.. 1984, p. 124.
Letter of the Haut-Commissaire AOF to Ministere des Colonies dated December 
2, 1950, 17G 572 152. ARSD.
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fiercely loyal to d'Arboussier.
The administration reported a "crise profonde” within the 
party, particularly after Doudou Gueye was arrested and Guy 
Etcheverry and Cauche went to France. Financial problems also 
plagued the party: the UPS newspaper, R6veil, ceased to appear 
and there was no capital to finance the annual party congress.994 
The party's concerted efforts to mobilise support met with near 
total apathy from its "sympathisants," while further divisions 
emerged between the GEC wing of the party and the UPS proper 
(as was the case in St. Louis.) When Etcheverry returned from 
France, contrary to the UPS' expectations, he defended 
Houphouet-Boigny's position, claiming that African 
parliamentarians wished to remove the colonialist excuse for 
opposing the RPA— its affiliation with the PCF. 995 After 
Etcheverry was tried for defamation in St. Louis (for which he 
was imprisoned for a month and fined several thousands of 
francs), the UPS virtually ceased to exist and d'Arboussier 
assembled his cohorts to form a communist party.996
Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 3 trimestre 1950, 2G 50 143.
ARSD.
"5. Some say Etcheverry had received 500.0000 francs in Paris which would help 
him reduce the deficit of his newspaper Reveil. Etat d’esprit de la population, 
December 1-15, 1950, 21G 13 1. ARSD; see also Rapport sur la situation politique et 
sociale, Senegal, Suret6, October 15-December 15, 1950, 2G 50 145. ARSD.
Etat d’esprit de la population, December 1-15, 1950, 21G 13 1. ARSD.
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Doudou Gueye, who was serving a prison sentence in Dakar, 
wrote he would continue to be loyal to " [!'] Internationalisme 
Proietarien. A t  the general assembly of the UPS in November 
1950, another d'Arboussier disciple, Abdoulaye Gueye, condemned 
the comity d'entente, arguing that the RDA's pact with the IOM 
would amount to little else than collaboration with the 
government.
Accepter cette collaboration... equivaudrait k rester 
definitivement sous le joug de 1'oppresseur; elle 
rendrait vide et sterile la lutte que m&ne le 
Rassemblement depuis sa creation. . .998
The UPS members of St. Louis who were all members of the GEC 
sided with d'Arboussier and remained loyal to the PCF.999 
However, in mid-December, Gabriel d'Arboussier instructed the 
UPS to accept the desapparentement. Senghor publicly welcomed 
the desapparentement:
II est de notre devoir d'aider le R.D.A. k changer de 
politique dans l'interet de la France. Si l'on veut 
eviter la revolte, il faut supprimer les raisons de la 
revolte, mais ce n'est pas par la repression que l'on
997. Letter of Haut Commissaire AOF to Ministere des Colonies dated December 2, 
1950, 17G 572 152. ARSD.
Ibid.
999. Rapport de la situation politique et sociale, Senegal, Suret6, October 15- 
December 15, 1950, 2 0  50 145. ARSD.
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viendra k bout de celle-ci.1000
An Intergroupe was formed in December 1950, comprising 
Senghor, Houphouet-Boigny and Charles Cros as an interim body 
that would oversee the fusion between the RDA and the IOM.' By 
February, however, Senghor had dispelled the hopes of a fusion 
or an alliance between the two parties claiming that "il n'y a 
jamais eu d'alliance ou de regroupement entre ces deux forma­
tions .111001 It is difficult to know whether Senghor had 
seriously intended to forge an alliance with the parliamentary 
RDA and the local UPS or whether he was merely seeking to 
neutralise the Senegalese Rassemblement at least, once and for 
all. The overall effect of his strategy, however, was 
remarkable in that it quietly brought about the demise of the 
UPS without jeopardising in any way his own party.
Confusion lingered over BDS-UPS relations long after Senghor 
dismissed the possibility of an alliance between the two 
parties, and the issue of d£sapparentement remained alive in 
UPS circles for years to come. The party did not participate 
in the ensuing elections and was instructed to abstain from
1000. Afrique Nouvelle, no. 171, (November 11, 1950), cited in de Benoist, AOF, 
op. cit.. 1984, p. 125.
1001. Cited in de Benoist, AOF, op. cit.. 1984, p. 128.
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voting whenever there were no RDA candidates. 1002 The schism 
within the party deepened as the Dakar delegates of the UPS 
became openly hostile to the GEC, insisting that they be 
totally suppressed or else, continue their activities 
underground, under the name Groupe d'Etudes pour la Jeunesse 
and on the condition that they bear no affiliation to the 
PCF.1003
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF JUNE 17, 1951.
As the elections to the Assembl6e Nationale grew nearer, the 
colonial administration reported that the SFIO was "en pleine 
desegregation, " witnessing "defections en masse" to the BDS .1004 
In April 1950, the SFIO held a congress in St. Louis but only 
250 delegates participated (as opposed to 360 in 1949) . 
Financial problems were discussed as was the bitter conflict 
between Maurice Gueye and Ousmane Soce in Rufisque. The 
federal bureau of the party was accused of neglecting the local 
SFIO branches in the protectorate, thereby losing control of 
the Fleuve, Sin§-Saloum, Louga, and Lingu&re. For instance, 
the Louga SFIO section accused Gueye of only being interested
1002. Rapport Hdbdomadaire, March 12-19, April 26-May 5, 1951, 13G 5 17. 
ARSD.
1003. Bulletin Pdriodique d’Informations, no. 15, Synthese, 20-27 November 1951, 
17G 534 144. ARSD. See also Renseignements, December 7, 1951, 17G 539 153. 
ARSD.
1W4. Renseignements, November 12, 1951, 17G 539 144. ARSD.
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in collecting membership fees from the local branches at the 
expense of party doctrine and political participation.1005 
Several SFIO leaders such as Diop Boubacar Obeye were charged 
with gross financial scandals. 1006 Diouf Ibrahim Mapenda, 
municipal councillor and president of a local SFIO committee 
was accused of "un d6sint6ressement complet pour tout ce qui 
touche les questions du parti SFIO. "1007
Lamine Gueye's reaction to this heated congress was to 
underscore the benefits of assimilation, holding himself as the 
supreme example. He called all "democrats" to fight fascism 
which he claimed to be responsible for the country's problems. 
Gueye inopportunely continued to use European issues and 
terminology when addressing his constituency in the interior. 
His short-sightedness partly explains why he did not think it 
necessary to revamp the party and adapt it to the changing 
realities of postwar Senegal. Following the congress which 
revealed his party to be in total disarray, he did little to 
redress the decline of the SFIO except agreeing to increase the 
federal bureau of the party from 25 to 35, the executive 
committee by 20 members and the commission for the resolution
1005. Renseignements, April 17, 1950, 17G 539 144. ARSD.
1006. Renseignements, SFIO congres, St. Louis, April 8-10, 1950, 17G 539 144. 
ARSD.
1007. Renseignements, Senegal, Suretd, May 6, 1950, 17G 539 144. ARSD.
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of conflicts by 10 members— mostly to appease the jeunes of the 
party who were becoming increasingly impatient with their 
marginal role in the party. 1008 The BDS propaganda routinely 
accused the SFIO of not being interested in Senegalese politics 
and issues neither at home nor in Parliament and of paying lip 
service to the socialist sections in the protectorate during 
elections .1009
The SFIO7 s counter-strategy was to organise "les memes 
manifestations populaires, au meme moment [que le BPS]."1010 It 
also promoted the formation of marginal parties such as Afrigue 
de Demain and the Entente S6n6galaise to regain some of Gueye7s 
support which had been won by Senghor; for instance, an Entente 
S&n6galaise was formed in 1951 grouping together individuals 
dissatisfied with the BDS. This new political group was headed 
by a former BDS militant, Papa Amar Diagne. The SFIO also 
revived the UPS affiliate Jeunesse Socialiste, campaigned for 
RDA support,1011 and formed a Comity de Coordination de Dakar, 
comprising L6bous and Toucouleurs to win over support.1012
looe. Ibid.
1009. Mamadou Dia, Condition Humaine. (August 18, 1951).
101°. Renseignements, October 19, 1950, 17G 539 144. ARSD.
l0U. Renseignements, December 20, 1951, 17G 539 144. ARSD.
1012. Renseignements, May 17, 1951, 17G 539 144. ARSD.
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According to the administration, these groups were created with 
the intention of filling the need for socialist representatives 
in the Commission de revisions des listes 616ctorales.1013
The overall outlook of Lamine Gueye and Leopold Senghor 
conveys the impression that the two parties were diametrically 
opposite. Electoral propaganda further accentuated those 
apparent differences. At closer look, however, the party 
platforms were remarkably similar.1014 It is legitimate to 
argue, therefore, that electoral platforms were not as 
important to the parties in question as was the nature of their 
support and the ethnic, professional and religious background 
of the individuals featured on the electoral lists. The BDS 
incorporated more Toucouleurs, Diolas and S6r£res than Wolofs 
and Lbbous in the territorial assembly and more schoolteachers 
than civil servants and traders.1015 Senghor's appointment of 
Abbas Gueye (head of the Senegalese section of the 
Confederation G6n6rale du Travail) at the legislative elections 
of 1951 aimed at winning the support of the trade unionists 
most of whom were either members of the CGT or else of the RDA.
1013. Senegal, Secretary-General, Synthese et rapport politique, 4 trimestre 1951, 2G 
51 144. ARSD.
101\  For an excellent account on the 1951 legislative elections, see Kenneth E. 
Robinson and WJ.M. MacKenzie (eds.), Five Elections in Africa. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1960). See also Crowder, Senegal, op. cit.. 1967, p. 63.
1015. Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit.. p. 152.
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The UPS which had urged its supporters to back the BDS in the 
legislative elections, in a last minute about face demanded its 
members to abstain from voting.1016 Meanwhile, in Bakel, Gueye 
had become engaged in an embarassing dispute with the Governor 
Rey during which he slapped the colonial official in public.
The incident shocked the administration which had hitherto 
bestowed a host of favors on the deputy. According to the 
Governor,
il [Gueye] me traita de 'sale Senghoriste,' de 
colonialiste exploitant sans vergogne le noir pour lequel 
je n'avais que du m6pris, d6clara que bientot tout allait 
changer, et qu'avant peu, je serais chass6 de ce pays 
ainsi que ceux de ma race..."1017
And yet, once again, the senior administration underestimated 
the BDS and predicted that
L'Eventuality d'un succ&s BDS/RDA est tr&s 
improbable, 6tant donn6 le prestige dont jouit Lamine 
Gueye dans milieux s6n6galais et l'appui certain que 
donneront au leader SFIO la plupart des chefs rdligieux 
et coutumiers.1018
1016. Bulletin Quotidien, June 13, 1951, D616gation du S6n6gal, Suret6 Locale, 20G 
109 144. ARSD.
1017. Rapport sur les 616ctions dans la subdivision de Bakel, 1951, Governor Rey, 
20G 109 144. ARSD.
1018. Rapport H6bdomadaire, March 12-19, 1951, 13G 5 17. ARSD.
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The same applied to Paris-Dakar which predicted "une majority 
£crasante [de] la liste SFIO. "1019
During this period, the BDS suffered a minor crisis partly 
due to Senghor's absence but also because intense rivalries had 
developed between the regional leaders of the BDS, particularly 
in Kaolack and Thi6s. Three factions competed for supremacy, 
and each maintained that they alone represented "la pens6e 
Senghoriste. "102° One faction clustered around Ibrahima Seydou 
N'Daw, while a second group was led by his rival, Souleymane 
Dram6, comprising the majority of the municipal councillors and 
a large proportion of young BDS militants who entertained the 
possibility of striking a deal with the SFIO. Dram6 was 
eventually expelled from the BDS and joined the SFIO. Finally, 
a third bloc was formed by party militants who awaited 
Senghor's return to demand the expulsion of Ibrahima Seydou 
N'Daw from the BDS or else they threatened to adhere to the 
RDA. More such crises were reported between Cisse Dia and 
Ibrahima Seydou N'Daw in Kaolack, while in Thi6s, Abdul Karim 
Sow was under attack from all sides.1021 Upon Senghor's return
1019. Paris-Dakar. (June 10, 1051), 20G 109 144. ARSD.
102°. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 3 trimestre 1950, 2G 50 143. 
ARSD.
1021. Rapport sur la situation politique et sociale, Senegal, Police et Surete, October 
15-November 15, 1950, 2G 50 145. ARSD.
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from France, the tensions and rivalries within the BDS abated 
as the party focused its efforts on the legislative elections.
The first results of the June 17, 1951 legislative elections 
were deceptive: up until 7:00 p.m., incoming figures pointed to 
an SFIO victory. By 11:00 p.m., however, the gap between the 
two parties had markedly narrowed, and after that the BDS alone 
scored, leading to a staggering 213.916 votes for Senghor and 
his partner Abbas Gueye against Lamine Gueye and Ousmane Soc6 
who got 95.353 votes. 1022 The BDS had won overwhelming 
majorities in the protectorate as well as in in one commune de 
plein exercice, Rufisque. Even Senghor was reportedly suprised 
by his landslide victory while the dispirited Lamine Gueye 
argued that his defeat showed "de fagon p6r6mptoire qu'on avait 
eu tort d' accorder le droit de vote aux illettr&s. 111023 In fact, 
far more important to the BDS landslide victory in 1951 than 
the decline of the SFIO was the enfranchisement of new groups 
of voters from the protectorate— a pivotal election issue for 
the BDS— which increased the electorate from 280.000 to 670.000 
voters. 1024 Some 44.5% of registered voters reportedly cast
1022. Bulletin quotidien, June 18, 1951, 17G 539 144. ARSD. For election figures 
see Condition Humaine. (August 18, 1951).
1023. Bulletin Quotidien, June 19, 1951, 17G 539 144. ARSD.
1024. Condition Humaine. February 8, 1951. On the 1951 electoral law see Bulletin 
de rAssociation pour l ’Etude des Problemes de l ’Union Franyaise. (January 1951).
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their ballots.1025
Table 13.1026
Comparative Table of Elections 1946-1952. 
(Population: 1.990.885)
Date Registered Actually SFIO BDS
Voters Voting
Other
Assembl6e 1946 257.552
1.822 
Nationale
1951 622.000
95.947
139.483 128.982
314.207 95.947 212.317
(RPF)
Conseil de 1948 
la R^publique
1952
RDA
52
52
48
52
30
8
18
43
Assembl6e
19.105
Territoriale 
5.114
1946 197.423 108.386
1952 660.665 525.028
87.743
95.296 224.122
The SFIO contested the elections and demanded they be 
annulled. Violence erupted in Tivouane, Tambacounda and other 
cercles when the BDS, angered by the accusations, demanded that 
civil servants partial to the SFIO be removed from office. The
1025. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 2 trimestre 1951, 2G 50 143. 
ARSD.
1026. Tableau comparatif des consultations electorates, Senegal 1951, 20G 104 144. 
ARSD.
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issue went to the Assembl£e Nationale which confirmed the 
electoral results (by 216 against 95 votes) . 1027 A few weeks 
later, Senghor explained his victory before the Assembl£e 
Nationale as follows:
D'abord, il [le BDS] a toujours eu comme objet de son
action et de sa propagande les int6r£ts des masses
ouvri&res et paysannes qui repr<§sentent au S6n6gal pr&s
de 95% de la population. D'autre part, nous avons
recrut£ nos cadres chez les ouvriers, parmi les 
syndicalistes et, chez les fonctionnaires, parmi les 
instituteurs, m§decins et v6t6rinaires. C'est dire la 
solidity de ces cadres, naturellement id^alistes... En 
face de nous, la liste socialiste comprenait deux grands 
bourgeois d'origine citadine qui avaient fond6 leur 
politique sur la pression administrative et le prestige 
des honneurs of f iciels .1028
ISLAM AS A POLITICAL FORCE.
Senghor would not have been able to profit from the new 
electoral law to the extent that he did, were it not for the 
powerful support of the marabouts. With the extension of the 
electorate to the protectorate, the marabouts became a key 
element in local politics as cantonal chiefs declined in 
popularity. 1029 In 1951,- the administration singled out the
1027. Condition Humaine. (August 30, 1951).
102S. Senghor, Publication de la Presidence de la Rdpublique, Stance du 15 aout 
1951, quoted in Zuccarelli, op. cit.. p. 47.
1029. Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, The Mourides of Senegal. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1971), p. 266. A Mouvement Islamique seeking to unite all the brotherhoods was 
formed in late 1946 opposing local politicians for allegedly favouring TEmancipation de 
l ’irrdligion." They demanded Arab schools and Arabic to be the official language. See
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increasingly political role of the marabouts as one the most 
important forces in the political arena, arguing that "Les 
grands marabouts du S6ndgal semblent avoir jou6 un r61e
determinant sur 1' opinion des 61dcteurs. "103° It also admitted 
that religion
...echappe le plus £ notre influence et m£me £ notre 
reconnaissance. A 1'approche de la campagne eidctorale, 
les eius se preoccupent des marabouts dont la position 
conditionnne pour ne pas dire commande le vote des 
eidcteurs.1031
Not only did the marabouts assume a crucial role in the 
political arena, but they also reversed a trend that had 
hitherto characterised their relations with politicians; rather 
than financially support their chosen candidate, it was the 
politicians who competed for their favours and subsidized 
them. 1032 Initially, Lamine Gueye enjoyed a strong majority in 
the 1946 territorial assembly and was able to extend 
considerable assistance to the marabouts. By contrast, Senghor 
was unable to compete with Lamine Gueye in the dispensation of
Senegal, Affaires politiques et administratives, Synthese des informations des partis 
politiques, October 1946, 2G 46 125. ARSD.
103°. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 2 trimestre 1951, 2G 50 143. 
ARSD.
1031. Senegal, Secretary-General, Synthese et rapport du ler trimestre 1951, 2G 51 
144. ARSD.
1032. O’Brien, The Mourides of Senegal, op. cit.. p, 266.
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favours, with only minority support in the territorial 
assembly.1033
Senghor had the support of the powerful Seydou Nourou Tall, 
who was particularly influential among the Toucouleur Tijanis 
in the Val6e du Fleuve and in Dakar. A rare opportunity for 
Senghor to win over Mouride and Tijani support presented itself 
as a result of a series of grave errors committed by Lamine 
Gueye towards his former allies: Ababacar Sy, khalifa-general 
of the Tijanis who was considerably powerful in Thi&s and 
Falilou M'Back6, khalifa-general of the Mourides who had an 
important following in Diourbel. 1034 According to Mamadou Dia, 
by untactfully supporting the brother of Ababacar Sy (Abdulaziz
Sy) and Cheick M'Back6, the nephew of Falilou M'Back6. both of
Gueye was responsible for the fact that
whom were antagonistic to the khalifas,A "nous avons 6t6 
automatiguement adopt£s par les deux khalifes.1,1035
The SFIO permanently alienated the khalifa Ababacar Sy who 
had until then supported Lamine Gueye but without becoming 
involved in party intrigues. The dispute began when the SFIO 
reprimanded the administrator of Tivouane, Sankale, for
1033. Ibid., p. 267.
1034. According to Amadou Ali Dieng, Senghor instrumented the schism in the 
Mouride and Tijani camps so as to divide them, set them against Lamine Gueye, and 
then be in an advantageous position to win their support. Interview with Amadou Ali 
Dieng, op. cit.
1035. Dia, op. cit.. 1985, p.57.
393
refusing to register en masse 4.000 voters as the local SFIQ 
chief had demanded. The SFIQ used Ababacar Sy's name to obtain 
the removal of the colonial administrator without first 
consulting with the khalifa. The latter became indignant with 
SFIQ tactics which put him in an awkward position with the 
colonial authorities. His son, Cheick Tidiane, a BPS 
sympathizer, asked the press to rectify the khalifa's integrity 
by printing the original rendition of events. Condition 
Humaine printed a correction but not the socialist newspaper 
A O F .1036
Subsequently, the SFIQ tried to get Ababacar Sy to renounce 
his son's actions but failed. On the eve of the elections, the 
SFIQ's private militia, the berets rouges, stoned the khalifa's 
house. Infuriated, Ababacar Sy informed his voters that rela­
tions with the SFIQ had been severed and that they were to vote 
for the BPS. 1037 However, Aboubacar' s brother, El Hadj Mansour 
Sy, remained faithful to the SFIQ.1038
1036. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 2 trimestre 1951, 2G 5Q 143. 
ARSD.
1037. According to Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit.. p. 148, Ababacar Sy was 
instrumental in the nomination of Abbas Gueye to the Senghor ticket for the Assemblee 
Nationale elections.
103\  Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 2 trimestre 1951, 2G 50 143. 
ARSD.
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The administration was not as surprised with Lamine Gueye's 
loss of Tijani support as with the swing of the Mourides to the 
BPS which was a decisive element in Senghor's victory in the 
1951 legislative elections. 1039 This was a direct result of a 
schism which developed within the brotherhood between the BPS 
supporters, led by the khalifa Falilou M'Back6, and the SFIQ 
supporters led by Bassirou M'Back6 (brother of the khalifa) and 
Cheikh M'Back6 (the khalifa's nephew). In 1949, Lamine Gueye 
had travelled to Mecca with Cheikh M'Back6, thereby shunning 
the khalifa. Senghor recognized Falilou M'Back6 as the only 
leader of the Mourides and was able to override his nephew with 
support from the colonial administration.1040
There were other reasons that prompted Falilou M'Back6 
to support the BPS, most important of which was perhaps the 
fact that Mamadou Dia and Ibrahima Sarr (Pakar-Niger unionist) 
were members of the same brotherhood and the Mourides felt they 
could trust them. In addition, Senghor had promised Falilou 
M'Back§ to assist him financially toward the construction of 
the mosque in Touba.1041
l039. It was reported that "contrary to everyone’s expectations," the Mourides had 
ordered their talib6s to vote for the BPS. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques,. 
Senegal, 2 trimestre 1951, 2G 50 143. ARSD.
umo. O’Brien, The Mourides of Senegal, op. cit.. pp. 267-68.
1£M1. M L, p. 267.
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In 1952, the BPS which had denounced Cheikh M'Back6 as its 
number one enemy during the electoral campaign became the 
champion of a reconciliation between the two factions which was 
resolved to the satisfaction of the khalifa Falilou M'Back6.
But the entente was again, short-lived, as it became 
increasingly evident that politics had ruined the unity of the 
Mourides .1042
On January 8, 1951, El Hadj Mansour Sy, El Hadj Abdoulaziz 
Sy, Cheikh M'Back<§, Bachirou M'Backe and el Hadj Ibrahima 
Niasse formed a xfront commun' to oppose the BPS which they 
held largely responsible for the decree lowering the limit of 
schooling age and for the administration's determination to 
collect debts from agricultural cooperatives. 1043 They projected 
a congress of marabouts to defend Islam and fight against the 
BPS . 1044 To this effect, they began using their influence over 
influential traders like El Hadj Massamba Yacine Ciss6, Bousso 
M'Baye, Abdourahmane M'Boye and Alioune Seek. 1045 After 
unsuccessfully trying to win the support of Falilou M'Backe,
1042. Rapport Politique, Senegal, 2 et 3 trimestre 1952, 2G 52 198. ARSD.
1&43. Synthese et rapport politique, Senegal le  trimestre 1952, 2G 52 198. ARSD.
1044. Senegal, Secretariat General, Rapport et synthese politique, 4 trimestre 1951, 
2G 51 144. ARSD.
1045. Senegal, Secretariat General, Rapport et synthese politique, 4 trimestre 1951, 
2G 51 144. ARSD.
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Ababacar Sy's brother tried to influence Cheikh Tidiane who had 
temporarily sided with the SFIQ. However, at the intervention 
of El Hadj Seydou Nourou Tall, Cheikh Tidiane returned to 
BPS.1046 By 1952, the BPS had succeeded in winning over nearly 
all the influential marabouts who had hitherto supported the 
SFIQ.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS.
After the defeat of the SFIQ in the 1951 elections, Lamine 
Gueye was unable to reverse the decline of his party. Internal 
dissension steadily intensified, and in Rufisque, which was the 
only municipality where the BPS had won in the legislative 
elections, Maurice Gueye and Ousmane Soc£ Piop failed to 
reconcile their differences even after Lamine Gueye's 
intervention.1047 For all intents and purposes, the SFIQ had 
been all but eliminated as a political force in the Senegalese 
political arena.
In the territorial elections of March 1952, the SFIQ 
suffered an even more humiliating and devastating defeat, 
winning only 9 out of 50 seats (almost exclusively in the 
municipalities of Pakar and St. Louis), while losing its last
1W€. Synthese et rapport politique, Senegal, 1 trimestre 1952, 2G 52 198. ARSD.
W1. See Ibrahima Thiam, "La vie politique k Rufisque de 1945 k  1958," Memoire. 
Departement d’Histoire, (University of Dakar, 1983), pp. 40-46.
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strongholds in’the protectorate, Matam and Kddougou.1048 The 
distribution of votes was similar to the 1951 legislative 
elections: 31% for the SFIQ and 69% for the BPS .1049 The 
administration rightly pointed out that these elections were a 
decisive test for the two parties for what was at stake was 
whether the SFIQ which had controlled the country since 1945 
would give way to the BPS, thereby accepting its June 17, 1951 
defeat. At the senatorial elections of May 1952, the BPS list 
was elected in its entirety. Mamadou Pia, Andrd Foussou (a 
former commandant de cercle in Kaolack) and Legros (a 
pharmacist from St. Louis) won with 12, 12 and 11 votes 
respectively. The SFIQ got 8 votes and the UPS one vote.10S0
The BPS now had a majority in the Assembly, which permitted 
it to obtain four members in the Grand Conseil (Senghor, Pia, 
Robert Pelmas, Boissier-Palun), leaving Lamine Gueye alone to 
represent the SFIQ. The following June, Boissier-Palun was 
elected president of the Grand Conseil over Lamine Gueye by 27
ltM8. AOF, Affaires politiques, Synthese des faits politiques et de l ’activit6 
syndicale, January-April 1952, 2G 52 159. ARSD.
1049. Ibid.
105°. AOF, Affaires Politiques, Synthese des faits politiques et de l ’activite 
syndicale, May-June 1952, 2G 52 159. ARSD; see also Marches Coloniaux. (May 24, 
1952).
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to 12 votes.1051 The entrenchment of the BPS in the political 
arena was complete.
CONCLUSIONS
The rise of the BPS as the dominant force in the political 
arena marked the africanisation of black politics in Senegal. 
The legislative elections of June 1951 in particular signalled 
the victory of the bush over the Three Communes, of the prewar 
'subjects' over the privileged originaires and by extension, of 
nigritude over assimilation.
By 1948, the SFIQ was not only embroiled in internal 
dissension but Lamine Gueye was losing the preferential 
treatment which the SFIQ had accorded him. Lamine went to 
great lengths not to break with socialist discipline in the 
French Parliament. However, when the MRP took control of the 
Ministry for Overseas Territories in November 1947, Gueye was 
left in a vacuum, isolated in France and at home. Moreover, 
the constitution of the Fourth Republic had essentially 
incorporated most of the (prewar) agenda of the SFIQ. By 1948, 
the SFIQ had no strategy with which to regain popular support 
other than the achievements already accomplished by Lamine 
Gueye. His message and appeal were to a large extent outdated
10S1. AOF, Affaires Politiques, Synthese des faits politiques et de Faction syndicale, 
1952, 2G 52 159. ARSD.
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and his audience confined primarily to the Three Communes.
Senghor's decision to break with Gueye was motivated by a 
variety of reasons ranging from personal antagonism to 
ideological differences not only in the Senegalese political 
arena but also in the French Parliament, dating back to 1945 
when Senghor first joined the party.
Senghor carefully chose the time to assert himself as the 
postwar leader of the bush. Unlike Gueye, he was not isolated 
in France, for he had already joined the IOM and had powerful 
allies in the MRP which was in control of Ministry of Overseas 
France. At home, the Dakar-Niger strike had shaken the 
legitimacy of Lamine Gueye's deputyship. Labour unrest was 
followed by an economic boom which won the BPS the support of 
many peasants who equated prosperity with the politics of the 
new party.
In addition, Senghor's relations with the RDA, which could 
have caused considerable problems for the deputy particularly 
following his abstention from the Bamako Congress in 1946, 
effectively neutralised the Rassemb1ement in Senegal. Rather 
than permanently alienate the RDA, Senghor kept the party at 
bay, vaguely hinting at a possible alliance while probably 
having no serious intent of ever joining his party to it. The 
subsequent d6sapparentement threw the UPS in further dissarray, 
demoralizing the GEC and the UPS proper.
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The legislative elections of 1951 were a turning point for 
the BPS, demonstrating the massive popular support Senghor 
enjoyed in the protectorate. A significant element in the 
election was that the party platforms were not as important to 
the victory of the BPS as was the grass roots support and the 
electoral lists it presented, comprising candidates who 
represented the major regional, business, religious and ethnic 
groups. The BPS victory in the 1951 and 1952 elections, was 
only the beginning of a series of further electoral triumphs in 
the 1956 legislative elections and the 1957 elections to the 
territorial assemblies which entrenched Senghor's leadership.
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CONCLUSIONS
It has been a persistent paradox in the scholarship of 
African colonial history that despite the fact that the Second 
World War has been widely acknowledged as a powerful symbol of 
the forces inherent in the development of nationalism and 
decolonization, its significance and weight have not been 
analysed or assessed in any depth. Remarkably little effort 
has been put to addressing the divers levels in which the war 
affected French Africa's inhabitants and the dynamics of change 
it set in motion within the colonial structure. 1052 The present 
study has attempted to redress this trend by examining the 
Second World War as a period of African history and a catalyst 
for political, social and economic change, as reflected in the 
postwar history of Senegal from 1945 to 1952.
When I first began working on this project, I confined 
myself to the convenient dates 1939-1945. As I researched 
further into the war, however, 1945 seemed inconclusive as a 
cut-off point while the controversial atmosphere surrounding 
the years immediately preceding it also called for attention.
1052 . The recently published collection of essays in David 
Killingray and Richard Rathbone, Africa and the Second World War, 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), incorporates a chapter on 
French North Africa.
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Initially I widened the scope of the study from 1939-1945 to 
1936-1948, only to extend it further to 1952. In a sense, the 
advent of the Bloc D^mocratique S£n^galais (BDS) and L.S. 
Senghor to power was the culmination of the combined impact of 
structural changes as well as changes in French and African 
mentalit£s) brought about by the war, marking the 
africanisation of politics in Senegal as a prelude to 
independence.
From the point of view of French colonial rule, the Popular 
Front, Vichy and Free France did not in themselves mark clean 
breaks of colonial policy and AOF remained relatively tranquil 
and free of unrest during this period. However, the combined 
effect of the policies of those short-lived but rival 
administrations coupled with the vital and exacting 
contribution of the Africans in the war sent intermittent shock 
waves through the colony.
The importance of the Popular Front in Senegal lies 
primarily in its impact on the development of black politics 
rather than in the regime's policy-making and reforms (with the 
exception of the organisation of the trade union movement), 
which were, in fact, relatively limited in scope or else 
unenforceable. The Popular Front aimed at, and succeeded in 
curtailing some of the most flagrant abuses of the colonial 
system in the protectorate while also inaugurating a novel kind
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of dialogue with the Senegalese elite in the towns. De Coppet 
in particular sought (for his own purposes) to stimulate 
African political activity by encouraging the creation of 
political parties and associations not only in the Three 
Communes but, even more importantly, in the major urban centres 
of the protectorate. He further expanded the possibilities of 
African organisation by legalising the trade union movement and 
by extending labour reforms, however rudimentary, in French 
West Africa.
The majority of urban Africans welcomed the liberal changes 
introduced by the Popular Front, but the same cannot be said of 
Galandou Diouf, Senegal's elected deputy. The politics of the 
Governor-General steadily sapped at Diouf's power, bringing to 
the forefront of the political scene his opponent, Lamine 
Gueye. If Diouf was the Popular Front's greatest casualty, 
Gueye was its prime beneficiary. Lamine adroitly used the 
opportunities that presented themselves under the socialist 
administration to build a mass support base and add an 
ideological platform to his party. He capitalised on French 
organisational know-how and in 1938 merged the Parti Socialiste 
Senegalais (PSS) to the SFIQ, thereby creating Senegal's first 
modern political party and Africa's first branch of a 
metropolitan party, while still retaining full control of the 
Socialist Federation. By identifying his party with the
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Popular Front administration which enjoyed considerable 
popularity among the Senegalese, Gueye was able to extract a 
host of favours from the Minister of Overseas France while also 
manipulating the opposition press to exacerbate the 
antagonistic relationship between Diouf and de Coppet. The 
bloody Dakar-Niger strike of 1938 which Diouf expediently used 
to discredit and ridicule the Governor-General was indeed a 
humiliating finale for the socialist government and a bitter 
pill for the nascent Senegalese trade union movement.
The Second World War precipitated a crisis in the French 
colonial administration with Boisson caught in a delicate 
balancing act in his pursuit of a policy of neutrality at all 
cost vis-a-vis the Allies and the Germans, according to the 
terms of the armistice. Communication with the metropole was 
limited and often unreliable; French national security was 
perceived to be closely linked to colonial neutrality; and last 
but not least, African loyalty was carefully monitored rather 
than taken for granted. For those reasons, Vichy suspended 
elections and most forms of political and trade union activity, 
heavily censored the press and abrogated Popular Front 
legislation. It even attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to 
abolish laws dating as far back as the 1910s relating to the 
status of the originaires, and was particularly anxious to 
retract French citizenship and its corresponding privileges
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from the African elite.
Political life under Vichy, however, did not come to a 
complete standstill for all Africans. For some, in fact, it 
was hardly a stagnant period. A small nucleus of educated 
'subjects' including Mamadou Dia and Ouezzin Coulibaly were, 
perhaps for the first time, able to express its point of view 
in the state-controlled press and elaborate ideas on African 
culture and civilisation. On the other hand, the 'citizens' 
who had lost their privileges under the Vichy regime perceived 
their 'subject' status to be only temporary and often vented 
their discontent by joining the resistance movement. Thus, 
even if on the surface the war seems to have eradicated the 
division between 'citizens' and 'subjects,' the cleavage 
remained and, in some cases, became more clearly defined.
While 'citizens' sought a return to the pre-1940 status quo of 
assimilation, a small segment of educated 'subjects' looked 
into their own culture and political tradition for 
alternatives. Moreover, when African soldiers returned to 
Senegal after the war, they did not merely demand a return to 
the prewar regime of limited assimilation. The sacrifices they 
had endured as prisoners of war and their experience in the 
European battlefield had transcended the narrow boundaries of 
association as defined by the colonial administration in the 
interwar period.
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It is plausible to argue that the Vichy regime was most 
authoritarian in the urban centres and the Three Communes where 
Africans were particularly resentful of their lost privileges, 
rather than in the interior where opposition was less 
pronounced and the nationalist ideology of the Legion had made 
great strides in winning popular support. Moreover, under the 
strain of wartime conditions, Vichy was forced to implement 
economic policies aimed at making the colony self-reliant; 
those policies often met with the positive response of the 
African peasantry.
The Free French eradicated Vichy legislation and proclaimed 
the return of 'republicanism' when in actual fact they imposed 
stringent economic measures and authoritarian policies in order 
to meet the exorbitant demands of the French war effort. The 
disastrous 'battle for groundnuts' launched by Hubert Deschamps 
paralysed the economy but, more importantly, the tragic fate of 
the returning African soldiers in the camp of Thiaroye in 1944 
alienated not only the veterans but the African population at 
large. This was partly reflected in the postwar pattern of 
political activity which was characterised by the polarisation 
of patriotic associations and political parties along racial 
lines.
The time clock of decolonization had begun ticking not only 
amongst 'loyal Africans' inside Senegal but also in the
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international arena, as the Americans and Russians put pressure 
on France to instigate fundamental reform in the empire 
immediately following the termination of hostilities. If to 
those factors we add the military and economic contribution of 
French West Africa in the war, a clearer picture emerges of the 
forces that contributed to African postwar demands for full- 
scale assimilation. Urban Africans in Senegal followed the 
Brazzaville Conference with great interest and fervently 
debated colonial representation to the Assemblee Nationale 
Constituante. Their aspirations were zealously defended by 
Lamine Gueye who emerged as a highly popular statesman after 
the war, thereby easily facilitating his takeover of the 
leadership of the Bloc Africain which became the dominant party 
in the political arena. While before the war Gueye had 
succeeded in using the metropolitan SFIQ to strengthen the PSS 
in Senegal, the reverse occurred after the war as the Bloc 
Africain became absorbed by the Socialist Party.
At first, metropolitan socialist support allowed Gueye to 
maintain a virtual monopoly of power, despite his increasing 
preoccupation and involvement with parliamentary politics in 
France. At home, he was content with the strong hold he 
exercised over the Three Communes and with a favourable 
administration. Indeed, he eventually came to rely almost 
exclusively on his representatives in the bush for support,
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giving a free hand to his protege and former 'subject' Senghor 
who emerged as the leader of the protectorate.
By 1946, the SFIQ had complete control of the colony.
Gueye's assimilation politics at home, however, and his 
commitment to the socialist administration in France, turned 
from an advantage to a liability. After the Lamine Gueye laws 
of 1946 and the adoption of the 1946 constitution, the baron of 
originaire politics in Senegal was left without an agenda, at a 
time when his expanding constituency in the interior was 
pressing for social, political and economic rights. Gueye 
steadily began to lose ground to Senghor on both fronts, as his 
dwindling popularity at home ran parallel to his decline in 
France.
While discontent with the SFIQ mounted inside Senegal, 
opposition parties proliferated, even if on the whole most 
lacked clearly-defined platforms. The most important of the 
opposition groups was the Union Democratigue Sen6galaise, but 
unlike other territorial branches of the RDA, it remained an 
urban party that failed to gain popular support in the 
interior. Opposition parties challenged the political 
supremacy of the Three Communes which in turn became unable to 
maintain a monopoly on political activity: economic and trade 
union centres such as Kaolack, Diourbel and Thiks began to 
assume an increasingly significant role in the political arena,
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and by the end of 1946, aimed at severing the omnipotent 
alliance between Gueye and Senghor.
The culmination of events leading up to Lamine Gueye's 
eclipse from the political scene occured whilst the Dakar-Niger 
strike of 1947-4 8 was in full swing and Gueye had fatally opted 
for a precarious neutrality which shocked and estranged many 
Africans. Senghor broke from Gueye and the SFIQ at home and in 
the French Parliament for ideological as well as pragmatic 
reasons, namely Gueye's obstinate refusal to respond to the 
interests of his rural constituency. On closer examination, 
however, the rift between the two deputies reflected deeper 
divisions within the Socialist Party. The SFIQ was engrossed 
in bitter and often petty factionalism which gradually split 
the party. Yet Lamine Gueye continued to neglect the SFIQ 
while relying increasingly on his socialist metropolitan 
friends as well as on the Three Communes for electoral support. 
Unable to adapt to postwar political realities, Gueye continued 
on the path of assimilation and maintained his prewar political 
habits, only to fall victim to the shifting ground of French 
politics which in 1947 resulted in the victory of the Mouvement 
Republicain Populaire, with which Senghor had cultivated close 
ties and which was also the party that rank-and-file colonial 
administrators supported.
In sharp contrast to Lamine Gueye, as a statesman Senghor
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combined pragmatic judgment and ideological flexibility. He 
strove to obtain the extension of the vote to the interior 
which he considered the single most important factor in tipping 
the political balance to his favour. Uneasy with Gueye's 
loyalty to an outdated and convoluted assimilation dogma which 
excluded the majority of the population from the political 
process, he offered the alternative of negritude politics. 
Moreover, the BPS did not political vision and a heightened 
sensitivity of the needs of prewar 'subjects' whom he deemed as 
a crucial force in Senegalese society and politics, address 
itself to the Three Communes for support but focused on the 
bush, positively responding to the aspirations of religious, 
ethnic and regional interest groups which rose to prominence 
after the war and gradually gaining their confidence. 
Eventually, Senghor attacked the Wiltord administration which 
was pro-SFIQ and succeeded in removing it, thereby obliterating 
Gueye's last chance to have the all-important legislative 
elections of 1951 rigged to his favour.
Indeed, the election of 1951 marked the demise of Lamine 
Gueye and the apparent end of the domination of Senegalese 
political life by the Three Communes as well as the beginning 
of the Senghorian chapter of Senegalese politics which led 
Senegal from colonialism to independence.
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APPENDICES
Appendix l.1 
Principal Prisoner of War Camps in France.
Front-Stalag Name of Camp Number of
x Senegalese'
Camos under the jurisdiction of Vichv
150 Auxerre (Caserne)
Beauregard (Versailles) 182
151 Bourges 3
Fontainebleau 200
Jargeau 16
125 Melvin 104
151 Montargis 1. 200
Moulins 100
153 Orleans (Caserne) 400
152 Pithiviers II 121
Salbris 300
Sully sous Loire 200
Total: 2 .826
Camos under the iurisdiction of Chateauroux
131 Cherbourg 569
Meucon 982
Rennes 373
Total: 1.924
Source: Delegue General Adjoint Burin des Roziers to 
Minister of Colonies, French Red Cross, January 22, 1944; 
Affaires Politiques. File 870, ANSOM.
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Camps under the jurisdiction of Macon
213 Mirecourt 9
211 Toul 1.350
Total: 1.359
Camp under the jurisdiction of Perigueux
2 22 Souge (Bordeaux) 3.000
Total no. of tirailleurs POWs: 7.359
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Appendix 2.
Patriotic Associations in Senegal 1943-45
Association
A. European 
Date of formation Commune President
Association Patriotique 
et Republicaine
Amis de Combat
becomes 
Croix de Lorraine
becomes
*Combat-Empire
Groupe Liberation de 
Diourbel
Groupe Patriotique de 
la France Combattante
Groupe d'Action 
Republicaine
or authorization
January 1944
August 194 3 
September 1943 
May 1943
May 1944 
September 194 3 
May 1943 
May 1944
December 1944 
November 1943
March 1944 
1944
May 1943
Federation de la France 
Combattante AOF 
(fusion of GRA and Croix 
de Lorraine)
St. Louis Camou 
Kaolack
St. Louis Tety, SFIO 
Dakar
Diourbel
Kaolack
Dakar
Casamance
Diourbel
Thies
*Dakar
Dakar
Richard
David
Peyrot
December 1943
Bernard
Th. Monod 
(head of 
IF Am
Rambaud 
(ex-CGT 
leader)
Th. Monod
Groupement Centre Frater-
nitaire Frangais December 1943 Dakar
becomes 
Forces Fraternitaires
Frangaises July 1944 Dakar Th. Monod
becomes
Amis de l'Humanite August 1944 Dakar Th. Monod
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Amis de la Liberte
*France-URSS June 1944 Dakar Sylvandre
(SFIO) 
Thies Fily Dabo
St. Louis Sissoko 
Kaolack v/pres.
Union des Maquisards et
des Frangais Libres 1945 Dakar Milleliri
Les Amis de P'tit Jules 1946
* indicates mixed associations (Europeans and some Africans)
Association
Union Republicaine 
Senegalaise
Association Patrioti­
que Indigene France 
Combattante
B. African
Date of formation Commune 
or authorization
July 1943 St. Louis
May 1944 
March 1944
Thies
Casamance
President
Khayar 
M 7Bengue
F. Gning 
(Dakar-Niger 
union leader) 
A. Gomis
Combat de l7AOF
Amis de Combat
Bloc Africain
1943
1943
1943
June 19 4 3 
1943 
August 194 3
1943
Association Liberation
de la France 1943
formed by the 
Association des Anciens
Combattants de Thies 194 3
Dakar 
St. Louis 
Ziguinchor
St. Louis
Dakar
Kaolack
Kaolack
A. Goux-Mayor
Cherif Hadara
M. Monville
Ibrahim 
Seydou N'Daw
Amadou Nian 
Doumbe
Jeunes Senegalais
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Resistance de l'Afrique 
Frangaise
becomes
IV Republique
becomes
Union des Jeunes
1943
1943
June 1945
St. Louis 
Kaolack
Federation des Anciens
Combattants et Victimes 
de Guerre AOF et Togo
Federation des Victimes 
de Vichy AOF et Togo
Jeunesse Combattante 
Senegal
Amis de la Liberte
Petite Cote Gaulliste
Combat AOF
September 1943
1945
July 1943 
December 194 3 
1944
Souci du Lendemain
becomes 
Amicale et Fraternelle 
Senegal
Comite d 7 Etudes
Franco-Africaines
1944
May 1945 
1945 
1945 
1945 
1945
Association Amicale des 
Anciens Militaires 
Coloniaux de Carriere
St. Louis
Abdel Kader 
Diagne
Louga
Ziguinchor
Dakar
Dakar 
St. Louis 
Thies 
Kaolack 
Ziguinchor
Samuel 
M 7 Baye
Ch. Cros
R.Senghor
M. Sow 
F. Gning
Carvalho
Pierre Diagne 
Sarr, Papa 
Gueye
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